Abstract: Relations between Canada and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been and remain unique. This essay will argue that Canadian governments maintained relatively consistent approaches to relations with China between 1970 and 2006. The primary determinant of the strength of relations during this period was Chinese domestic stability. This was abruptly altered by Stephen Harper’s implementation of a firmer stance on China. To substantiate this claim, this essay will briefly detail forty-five years of relations, discuss the doctrines and approaches of Canadian and Chinese governments, and note any significant external factors influencing the nature of relations.
Introduction
Relations between Canada and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been and remain unique. This essay will argue that Canadian governments maintained relatively consistent approaches to relations with China between 1970 and 2006, with most prime ministers adhering to Chinese leaders and their policies. This was abruptly ended by Stephen Harper’s implementation of a firmer stance on China. To substantiate this claim, this essay will briefly detail forty-five years of relations between Canada and China, discuss the doctrines and approaches of Canadian and Chinese governments, and note any significant external factors influencing the nature of relations. It will find that from Prime Ministers Trudeau to Chrétien (1970-2003), the primary determinant of the proximity of relations was China’s domestic stability; China’s incremental periods of economic modernization coincided with the closest relations. However, Harper’s government ended this pattern, and he became the first Canadian prime minister to call into question China’s viability as a Canadian ally.
Relations Pre-1970
Early contact in the mid-19th century featured the arrival of Canadian missionaries to the Chinese mainland. Although some were welcomed, Chinese officials resisted the intrusion of Western forces and preached Confucianism.[1] Nevertheless, Catholic missionaries engrained positive perceptions of Canada. A century later, relations became complex. Mao Zedong’s post-WWII ascension instigated uncertainty in Sino-Western relations. He expelled Western missionaries and businesses from China, damaging relations with the West.[2] Notwithstanding, Canada followed the British lead and soon recognized the PRC. A fragile relationship endured until recognition was revoked during the Korean War as Canadian and Chinese military personnel engaged in open battle for the first and only time. China’s decision to support North Korea set Sino-Canadian relations back nearly two decades.[3]
The Trudeau Era
This essay will now detail relations post-1970 via a formulaic approach: a brief history of major events, the doctrines of Canadian leaders, Chinese motivations, and other external factors affecting relations will be noted. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau became one of the first Western leaders to recognize the PRC. This decision shocked North Atlantic leadership. Although other Western nations followed Canada’s lead, providing recognition was not without consequence. Until 1970, the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan were considered the true leaders of China and even occupied its permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council.[4] Trudeau’s decision to officially recognize the PRC without leveraging recognition to improve the Taiwan situation abandoned the Taiwanese people.[5]
The following autumn, China and Canada exchanged ministers for the first time, followed by Trudeau’s first state visit to China in 1973. As an intellectual with a specific interest in China, Trudeau was fascinated at the prospect of meeting Mao. In Beijing, he introduced two Canadian initiatives: a CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) aid program devoted to Chinese development and a family reunification plan for Chinese in Canada.[6] The measures represented both tangible commitments and symbolic respect toward Mao.[7] The first meeting was successful. Mao indicated interest in the Canadian way of life and was enthused with Trudeau’s opinions on international peace and security.[8]
Mao’s death in 1976 could have caused societal collapse in China, however, the ascension of reformer Deng Xiaoping proved otherwise. In 1980, Deng delivered his ground-breaking “Open China” speech through which he advocated for the gradual implementation of pseudo-capitalist reforms. Although Trudeau had developed a respectful relationship with Deng, relations stagnated until Trudeau’s resignation in 1983. This was a consequence of the enduring memory of the Cultural Revolution that forced China to become more inward-looking.[9] In sum, apart from opening the door to China, Trudeau failed to achieve many tangible accomplishments during his tenure.
Trudeau’s foreign policy doctrine was reflective of his personality: curious, intelligent, and sometimes too clever for his own good. He visited the Chinese mainland twice – once in 1949 and once in the 1960s as a Member of Parliament (MP); he was the first Canadian leader ever to visit Asia. His fascination with all things foreign translated into his approach to global affairs; he championed a fundamental belief in embracing and “respecting other cultures.”[10] Additionally, in a speech entitled “Canada and the World,” Trudeau stated that new international challenges required innovative foreign policies better suited to securing Canada’s “interests, objectives, and priorities.”[11] In 1969, Trudeau instructed his civil service to officially review Canada’s foreign affairs priorities. The findings were eventually published as Foreign Policy for Canadians. The policy featured an entire section on relations with Asian powers, indicative of Trudeau’s fascination with the continent.[12] Concerning China, the policy indicated that its market for Canadian wheat was substantial and should be a priority for policymakers.[13] The document represented a broader refocusing of Canadian relations away from the United States (US) and the North Atlantic toward previously uncharted waters and were indicative of Trudeau’s interest in the outside world.
Although Trudeau personally preferred these alternative relations, his redirection of Canadian foreign policy was also a consequence of the “Nixon Shocks.” In response to a stagnating economy, US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of the Treasury John Connally informed America’s allies that the US would disallow the conversion of US$ into gold and impose an import surcharge of 10% on all foreign products.[14] This was in direct violation of the Autopact, a Canada-US automotive sales agreement. Trudeau perceived this policy as a betrayal and rejection of Canadian friendship and directed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, to review Canada’s foreign policy priorities. The resultant approach was deemed The Third Option, which advocated for the diversification of Canadian economic interests away from the United States. This divergence permitted Trudeau to engage more actively with communist nations than before and manifested in stronger relations with the PRC, Cuba, and even the Soviet Union. This notion of economic and political sovereignty was central to Trudeau’s dogma and broader policy doctrine that was evident in his approach to China.
In China, the 1970s saw fluctuations in the stability of society. Events such as the Cultural Revolution and Deng’s Open Door Policy reforms were cataclysmic.[15] By 1970, Mao’s Cultural Revolution had been operating for four years. Mao believed that in order to rid China of capitalism and consolidate his autocracy, “the Great Proletariat Revolution [had to be] carried out.”[16] The policies eliminated political rivals, displaced millions of Chinese, and resulted in the death of one to two million people.[17] In a 1969 address to the First Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Mao stated that politicians “[who] emphasized material incentives and put making profits as the top priority” were enemies of China.[18] This domestic upheaval was at its height during Trudeau’s initial recognition of China in 1970.
Following Mao’s death, it was evident in China that reform was necessary. In his 1980 speech, Deng condemned Mao’s folly in exacerbating the effects of the Cultural Revolution, arguing that advancing communism would only serve to regress Chinese society.[19] The focus of his vision converged on the economy, manifesting in the form of “economic growth and social efficiency.”[20] Despite this positive tone, external relations remained few for years, as China concentrated on domestic reconstruction.
It is prudent to note the influences of the external determinants of Sino-Canadian relations. First, issues of domestic national unity plagued Trudeau’s administration. The October Crisis of 1970 included the kidnapping of Quebec Deputy Premier Pierre LaPorte and British diplomat James Cross by Front de liberation du Québec insurgents.[21] LaPorte was later executed by the group. Following this, Trudeau instituted the War Measures Act, imposed martial law, and provided police with unprecedented authority.[22] This domestic political crisis limited Trudeau’s ability to focus on foreign policy for several years. Second, the ascension of Republican US President Ronald Reagan in 1981 handcuffed Trudeau internationally. Reagan was determined to end the Cold War through increased defence spending, military rollback in Europe, and increased hostility with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov. The revitalization of the East-West conflict in the 1980s made visiting China difficult and forced Trudeau to side with the West and many American policies.
In sum, Trudeau instigated relations with China to the surprise of many. During his tenure, relations were friendly but suffered from internal consternation both in Canada and in China. Additionally, Reagan’s ascent and the end of détente limited Trudeau’s ability to further develop relations.
The Mulroney Era
In 1984, the Conservatives secured their first majority in Parliament since 1963. Following his election, Mulroney welcomed Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to Ottawa, who became the first Chinese leader to address Parliament.[23] Zhao commended former Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau on his efforts at promoting international peace but also indicated that he was eager to work with newly elected PM Mulroney.[24] Mulroney and Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark established the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, a non-profit think-tank focused on “[promoting] mutual awareness and understanding of the cultures, histories, religions, philosophies, languages, lifestyles and aspirations in the Asia-Pacific region.”[25]
The government released a Green Paper in 1985 indicating that Canadian foreign policy would expand toward Asia. While presenting the paper, Clark reiterated that Asia was among the most economically viable markets globally.[26] In 1986, Mulroney made his first state visit to China. Like Trudeau, he arrived with gifts for Zhao. He also proposed increases to concessional financing totalling C$350 million and plans to construct a Canadian-designed bulk-fertilizer plant near Shanghai.[27] In return, Zhao gave Mulroney assurances that Canada would remain China’s primary supplier of wheat and other resources.
At this time, Mulroney’s government began drafting a document to succeed the Green Paper as a culmination of a “generally positive outlook on China’s future [and relations with Canada].”[28] The plan was titled the China Strategy, and it reaffirmed Canadian commitments to relations and trade while giving China special status to communicate with the newly consolidated DFAIT(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade).[29] However, as Michael Frolic argues, the policy’s commitments were superficial and lacked substance.[30]
Relations stalled in 1989. Less than two years after the release of the China Strategy, pro-democracy movements were growing in China. On June 4th, 1989, after months of public protest, Zhao imposed martial law and directed the People’s Liberation Army to occupy Beijing. The day ended with soldiers firing upon unarmed protestors, murdering anywhere from hundreds to several thousands of people.[31] The Canadian reaction was one of horror, and Mulroney called an emergency session of the House to formulate a response. During the session, NDP MP Howard McCurdy expressed his “shocked revulsion” at the senseless brutality on display at Tiananmen Square.[32]
In response, Clark and Mulroney prepared three central policies: the indefinite extension of 8,000 active Chinese student visas already approved in Canada and the denoting of “Special Status” for all family members of students and other protestors under the Immigration Act, the immediate suspension of all bilateral negotiations, and support for victims at the UN.[33] Though this response seemed comprehensive, it was mostly symbolic. Not only were most negotiation suspensions lifted within the year, Canadian imports from China also increased between 1989 and 1992 from C$1 billion to C$2.8 billion.[34] The final years of Mulroney’s government were uneventful, with the lingering memory of Tiananmen still at the forefront of relations. Mulroney’s China doctrine can be distilled into two themes: continuity and adherence. His first year as PM demonstrated a desire to co-opt Trudeau’s general approach to China by welcoming Zhao to Parliament and establishing the Asia Pacific Foundation. Both were tangibly and symbolically significant. Mulroney also arrived in China with financial gifts for his counterparts, demonstrating continuity from Trudeau’s first visit in 1973. Additionally, Mulroney sought to take advantage of the door to China that Trudeau had opened by significantly increasing trade. It can be argued that Mulroney’s first year was Trudeauian. This is reflective of Mulroney’s pragmatism and focus on finance. China presented a booming economy that was relatively uncharted for Western powers; the friendly relations established by Trudeau provided the ideal setting for Mulroney to benefit from China financially.
Second, Mulroney was weak on human rights, indicating acquiescence toward Chinese profitability. Although dissimilar to Trudeau, Mulroney seldom commended China for its improving human rights record; his administration’s response to Tiananmen Square was inadequate. Even during the emergency session of Parliament on June 5th, Clark recognized that Canada would never terminate relations and become “anti-China,”[35] despite the horrors on display. This is indicative of the premium Mulroney placed on trade; no matter the atrocity, he was unwilling to look the other way for the sake of the almighty dollar.
In China, the 1980s were the most economically impressive decade in history, with an average GDP growth rate of over 9%, and growth for 1985 reaching a staggering 16%.[36] It was now clear to most that liberalization ensured the continued growth and viability of the Chinese economy.[37] Further, the booming economy allowed China to transform demographically. Immense urbanization and high birth rates in the 1960s and early 1970s allowed China to put forth a working population of approximately 60% in 1985.[38] Although these advances were positive, they placed stress on national institutions such as the healthcare system. Originally established by Mao in 1949, the system featured rural communes using traditional medicine. By, the 1970s, it had surpassed capacity, and it collapsed in the mid-1980s with just 9.8% coverage in 1984.[39] This, among other institutional challenges, contributed to civil unrest in China.
To make matters worse, the death of pro-reform politician Hu Yaobang in early 1989 unleashed fears among the Chinese population that President Yang Shangkun, General Secretary Zhao, and Premier Li Peng would reimpose Maoist policies. Protests in China lasted nearly three months, during which large numbers of students engaged in a hunger strike. The protests brought widespread support for the movement in mainstream Chinese society, leading the CPC to impose martial law in early June. The foremost consequence of Tiananmen was domestic uncertainty. CPC members feared the spread of public discontent, while citizens became fearful of further social crackdowns.
Externally, the end of the Cold War had minor effects on relations. Within China, the collapse of the Soviet Union made evident that communism was unviable.[40] As both the Soviet Union and PRC had experienced prolonged challenges of ruralism and poverty, the successful Eastern Bloc revolutions demonstrated that autocracy was not infallible and fueled even greater revolutionary fervour in China.[41] Second, the ending of the Cold War terminated five decades of East-West hostility. The US’s ascension to global hegemon allowed Canada to operate more freely in the East. Although Mulroney did not experience these benefits, his successor would.
In sum, Mulroney’s government maintained a similar approach to China as Trudeau. Trade was increased, questions over human rights were secondary, and, by the end, few major achievements occurred.
The Chrétien Era
During Chrétien’s first year in office, he imposed a “Team Canada” approach to relations, leading a delegation of 300 business leaders and political officials to Beijing.[42] To Chrétien, the memories of Tiananmen were secondary. While there, Canada secured C$9.1 billion in orders for Canadian wheat and nuclear facilities to be constructed over six years outside of Shanghai.[43] The success of Chrétien’s early visit to China initiated what would unfold as a decade of robust bilateral relations. Following another successful visit to Beijing in 1996, Chrétien welcomed the soon-to-be-fifth Premier of the PRC, Zhu Rongji, to Ottawa in 1997. Chrétien returned to China in 1997 where relations would reach their zenith: while celebrating the completion of six nuclear reactors, constructed by Canada Energy Ltd. outside of Shanghai,[44] Beijing recognized its relationship with Canada as a trans-century partnership – a recognition of the substantial past and future benefits of Sino-Canadian relations.[45] In 1999, Zhu approached Chrétien with hopes of normalizing China on the international stage. They discussed the prospect for over a week in Ottawa, where it was agreed that admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was mutually beneficial. China’s eventual admittance to the WTO with Canadian support in 2001 was met with jubilation among Canadian and Chinese officials, and another state-visit to Beijing resulted in subsequent financial agreements.[46] Throughout his decade in office, Chrétien substantively improved bilateral relations and was the most successful PM in terms of advancing Chinese and Canadian interests.
Chrétien’s foreign affairs doctrine almost exclusively concerned trade. He was a pragmatist who believed that trade improved relations. By the end of his inaugural year in office, Chrétien had made nine separate trade missions, meeting bilaterally with the leaders of thirty-six different states.[47] Further, he secured free trade agreements (FTAs) with Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica, while lobbying vigorously for a multilateral trade agreement with Latin America. To Chrétien, increasing trade was the foremost facilitator of relations. This was projected onto relations with China as well. Although a bilateral trade agreement was never established, Chrétien made clear that financial commitments were essential to relations during each of his six visits to Beijing. Further, his decision to bring massive delegations of Canadian business leaders indicated a finance-first mentality.
Like Trudeau, Chrétien used symbolic gestures to appease Chinese officials such as the appointment of the first Chinese Canadian, Raymond Chan, to Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific Region. Chrétien announced the measure at a China-Canada Business Council meeting in 1998 where Chrétien also praised China and Premier Zhu for their commitments to “improving the lives of all Chinese peoples” and for their continued commitment to human rights.[48]
From the Chinese perspective, the 1990s introduced stability in contrast to the years after Tiananmen. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping re-emerged in China and advocated for further reform; Deng understood that the survival of the Chinese state was predicated upon economic expansion and international normalization. To achieve this normalcy, Deng urged a new generation of leaders to assume control of the country under the guidance of then-mayor of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin.[49] What was dubbed the ‘Third Generation’ of Chinese leadership reduced tariffs on foreign goods and eased restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. Additionally, in 1998, the reforming CPC disbanded the State Planning Commission in favour of the State Economic and Trade Commission. The transformation indicated that China was willing to expunge collectivist economic structures for pseudo-capitalist ones. According to the International Monetary Fund, the result was a surge in FDI from 16.1% between 1990 and 1994 up to 40.6% between 1995 and 1999, even with the adverse effects of the Asian financial crisis.[50] With Deng’s propagation of political stability, Jiang was able to achieve economic stability.
This domestic stabilization converted to the international stage. As a consequence of China’s robust recovery from the Asian financial crisis, the PRC became an attractive partner for economic cooperation, acceding to the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement with six other regional powers.[51] The period from 1993 to 2003 were among the most robust for China, and thus became the most productive in their relations with Canada.
Externally, Chrétien’s government faced national unity challenges in the form of the October referendum on Quebecois secession that was only defeated by a 49%-51% margin. Further, the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, necessitated a Canadian policy of adherence to and support of the United States. Although Chrétien decided against joining the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003, his tone toward President Bush and the US became more positive post-2001. While his administration still managed to engage with China, these continental issues required immediate attention and prevented Chrétien from focusing more on foreign policy.
Another external factor was the expanding Chinese diaspora in Canada. Chinese immigration to Canada increased gradually over the 20th century; it exploded post-1990. According to Statistics Canada, the population of Canadians identifying as of Chinese origin rose by 19% between 1996 and 2001, while the total population only grew by 4%.[52] This influx of Chinese-born Canadians helped link China to Canada in an unprecedented way. Significantly, two characteristics dominated this demographic: 72% of all Chinese Canadians resided in either Toronto or Vancouver, and the diaspora was relatively younger than the rest of Canada as of 2006.[53] As such, the population had the ability to reinforce policies of reform in China. This is a common theme among diaspora globally as exemplified by Indians abroad who wield considerable influence in domestic politics. Second, the diaspora also provided Chrétien another avenue to appease China. He appointed Raymond Chan to cabinet, symbolically demonstrating to China that they were significant even to his domestic politics.
Concisely, Chrétien’s government was the most successful in terms of relations with China. His focus on business and his willingness to compliment Chinese leaders facilitated the transformation of weak relations in 1993 into a trans-century partnership in 1997. Notwithstanding these positive developments, relations with China would collapse in 2006.
The Harper Era
Until 2006, Canadian policies toward China had remained relatively consistent. Stephen Harper drastically altered the trajectory of relations. From the beginning, Harper practiced animosity toward China; he became the first Prime Minister to present the Dalai Lama with honorary Canadian citizenship in the fall of 2006. Significantly, Harper insisted that the meeting take place in the Office of the Prime Minister, as opposed to in a place of worship as previous PMs had.[54] This indicated that Harper was willing to accept the Dalai Lama as a political guest as opposed to a religious one. This motivated the PRC embassy in Ottawa to release a statement demanding Harper to “stop interfering with China’s internal affairs.”[55]
Relations deteriorated in 2007 as a result of the “Celil Affair,” an extradition dispute concerning a Uyghur – who held Canadian and Chinese citizenships – under investigation in China in connection to the Xinjiang freedom movement. Following Celil’s extradition to China, Harper was informed that his Canadian citizenship would not be recognized.[56] China’s hostile attitude could have been in response to the Dalai Lama incident a year prior. In 2008, China instigated a dispute with Canada at the WTO over issues of Financial Information Services.[57] Harper responded that he was willing to protest China at the same institution for declining to negotiate a tourism agreement with Canada.[58] The measure was the first time that a Canadian leader had threatened China at the WTO.[59] Later, Harper decided not to attend the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, which was of great symbolic disrespect to China.[60] Harper’s decision infuriated Chinese officials, with local news outlets in Beijing calling for a “Canadian boycott.”[61]
Harper’s China policy reversed abruptly with the 2008 global financial crisis. Although no major Canadian banks had defaulted, Canadian economic outlooks remained grim. In early 2009, Harper made his first state visit to Beijing, meeting with Premier Jiabao. Both leaders agreed that it was mutually beneficial to meet more regularly.[62] After his third successful election in 2011, this time securing a majority in Parliament, Harper visited again in 2012, this time needing to return with tangible results. While in Beijing, Canada signed uranium export treaties and the Canada-China Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Agreement.[63]
Harper approached Chinese relations with a straightforward doctrine. Throughout the first years of his administration, he was willing to challenge Beijing on their human rights record, stating to reports that he would not condone Chinese rights abuses and “sell out on important Canadian values” even to the will of “the almighty dollar.”[64] Significantly, this was a deviation from not only Liberal policies, but also from fellow-Conservative Mulroney’s doctrine; Harper demonstrated more hostility toward China in his first year than Mulroney did in ten. During this period, Harper also deviated by openly discussing Tibet and Taiwan, two regions under contested Chinese sovereignty.
However, Harper’s emphasis on human rights was not universally welcomed in Canada. He faced criticism from Leader of the Opposition Michael Ignatieff on the topic, who argued that Harper demonstrated naivete in lecturing a global superpower on rights abuses.[65] Ignatieff then argued that the “most important human-rights advance in the world has been the hundreds of millions of Chinese lifted out of absolute poverty.”[66]
Another explanation for Harper’s willingness to admonish China was his continentalist doctrine. Harper visited President Bush in Washington just two months after his election in 2006. At the White House, Bush described the primacy of the American relationship with Canada and talked of the capabilities of an “ally like Steve.”[67] The two maintained a warmer relationship than previous Canadian leaders had, specifically on the war in Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and Harper’s preference of the US-directed Group of 8 (G8) over the inclusive Group of 20. As a result, Canada-US relations soared. Cross-border trade increased by over 20% between 2005 and 2008.[68]
In China, Harper’s meeting with the Dalai Lama warranted the cancellation of a meeting with President Hu at the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. Although the meeting did take place, little progress was made, and Hu vowed to never tour Canada before Harper visited China.[69] From the Chinese perspective, there was little motivation to engage with a hostile Canada; the Chinese GDP growth rate had reached its highest point since 1992 – Deng’s tour of China – in 2007, while trade was flourishing from China’s admission to the WTO and newly formed FTAs.[70] Given that Harper chose human rights over trade, Hu chose control over any semblance of strong relations. Similarly, the role of “mutual respect” and tradition are principle tenets of Chinese-Confucius culture and cannot be understated.[71] Harper’s decision to forego attendance at the Beijing Olympics was perceived as a direct slight to China.
Despite bitter relations, the 2008 global financial crisis necessitated closer relations. Although both Canada and China managed to evade the disastrous consequences seen in the US, where GDP growth rate plummeted from ~5% in 2005 to ~-8% in December 2008,[72] neither country was immune. At the time of the crash, the United States was the primary trading partner for both Canada and the PRC. According to World Integrated Trade Solutions, Canada’s trade totals with the US in 2008 were valued at US$567,829 million[73] – nearly five times greater than with any other country – while China enjoyed trade shares with the US valued at US$334,430 million.[74] As such, the newfound nonviability of the American economy necessitated the diversification of trade. As both China and Canada recovered quickly, the benefits that would arise from repaired relations became apparent.
As a consequence, Canadian services exported to China “increased by 12.0% between 2009 and 2010” and Chinese investment in Canada tripled between 2007 and 2012.[75] The intermingling of services and corporate ownership further warmed relations in the post-2008 period. In conclusion, Harper’s decade in office included the lowest point in Sino-Canadian relations, as well as many high points. He started by changing Canada’s approach for the first time in thirty-five years but was forced to reengage with China after the American economic collapse.
Themes
- The Pattern of Relations (1970-2006)
Sino-Canadian relations followed a consistent direction of adherence until 2006. Trudeau, Mulroney, and Chrétien were weak on the issue of human rights, Taiwan, and consistently arrived in Beijing with gifts in the form of financial commitments. This was consistent regardless of differences in their doctrines, parties, or external factors such as Canadian national unity. As such, the primary determinant of the intimacy of relations has been the state of China domestically. In the 1970s, extensive domestic reform – first Mao’s Cultural Revolution and later Deng’s Open Door Policy – forced Chinese leaders to look inward. This explains why Trudeau, despite his extensive interest in China and his split with the United States, was unable to achieve substantive successes in relations.
Under Mulroney, relations thrived until 1989. Mulroney released the 1985 Green Paper and the 1987 China Strategy, reminiscent of Trudeau’s Foreign Policy for Canadians, to reaffirm commitments to relations. China’s domestic instability during June 1989 was widespread and resulted in a legitimacy crisis for the CPC.[76] This consternation necessitated inward-looking in China and disqualified international relations between 1989 and 1993. Again, relations were predicated not upon Canadian approaches but rather on China’s ability and willingness to interact with the outside world. Finally, China thrived domestically between 1993 and 2003. Deng’s second wave of reforms under the leadership of the Third Generation increased FDI into China, international trade relationships outside of China, and ownership structures within China.
This facilitated Canada’s closest relationship with China under Chrétien, in which six prime ministerial visits were made to Beijing and the title of trans-century partnership was achieved. Though relations between 1970 and 2006 varied widely in terms of strength, Chinese domestic stability was the preeminent factor in determining the intimacy of relations until Harper. Additionally, the expansion of the Chinese diaspora – that is still connected to the mainland – was representative of increased Chinese strength. The growing size of the diaspora in Canada helped to facilitate relations. Although other factors including relations with the United States and Canadian national unity were significant, their effects were minimal when compared to stability in China.
2. Changing Direction (2006-2008):
This distinct pattern ended in 2006. Harper’s ideology rejected any adherence to Chinese policy, and he became the first PM to meaningfully challenge China on human rights. This resulted in tensions between Canada and China that would last until 2008. China’s economy was thriving with aggregate GDP growth of 14.2% in 2007, fully ending the pattern discussed above. Harper’s deviation from the pattern was successful until 2008 after which international economic uncertainty necessitated diversification of relations away from the United States.
Conclusion
This essay has assessed the development of forty-five years of Canadian relations with China. A policy pattern of adherence could be found under Trudeau, Mulroney, and Chrétien, in which political and economic closeness coincided with China’s periods of economic boom. Stephen Harper attempted to alter this approach through hostility with China but was compelled to diversify relations back toward the East after the 2008 financial crisis. Other factors including the Chinese diaspora, Canadian domestic stability, and the doctrines of each leader affected relations to a lesser degree. The recent resurgence in volatility around the bilateral relationship, due to the detention by Canada of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou and the detention by China of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, makes an investigation of this nature all the more relevant.
Nicholas Lovrics is a fourth year International Relations and Political Science student at the University of Toronto. His interests focus on the intersection of Canadian foreign policy and global and regional security. Nicholas has published in student journals on issues relating to conflict in the Middle East. He has a personal interest in the Pacific Rim and spent two months volunteering in Taipei after his first year of undergraduate study.
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Several limitations have challenged this essay’s research. First, the availability of Chinese primary resources is limited and translated documents can be unreliable. As such, secondary sources will primarily be used concerning the Chinese perspective on relations. Second, as this essay’s timeline is contemporary, a portion of primary resources from more recent administrations will be sourced from news releases and other media as opposed to government documents. Finally, as the length of this research essay is limited, the Clark, Turner, and Martin interludes will not be discussed at length.
[1] John D. Meehan, Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai: Canada’s Early Relations with China, 1858-1952 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 150.
[2] Charles Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context of Canada’s China Policy since 1970,” in The China Challenge Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), 130.
[3] Donaghy, Greg, “Pierre Trudeau and Canada’s Pacific Tilt, 1945-1984,” Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 74, no. 1 (2019): 140.
[4] Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context,” 34.
[5] Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context,” 35.
[6] Michael Frolic, “The China Strategy of 1987,” in The China Challenge Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), 55.
[7] Madokoro, Laura, “Family reunification as international history: Rethinking Sino-Canadian relations after 1970,” International Journal 68, no. 4 (December 2013), 592.
[8] CBC Digital Archives, Pierre Trudeau goes to China, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, originally broadcasted October 19, 1973. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/trudeau-goes-to-china
[9] Donaghy, “Trudeau’s pacific tilt, 145.
[10] Congmin et al, Past and Future in China-Canada Relations, Paper presented at the Institute for Asian Research & the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Shanghai, November 10, 2010.
[11] Pierre Trudeau, ‘‘Canada and the World,’’ 29 May 1969, Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, no. 68/17.
[12] Mitchell Sharp, “Foreign Policy for Canadians,” GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFIARS, 136. http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1603784E/1?r=0&s=1
[13] Ibid.
[14] Office of the Historian, Nixon and the End of the Bretton Woods System, 1971-1973. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock
[15] As a comprehensive analysis and investigation of the doctrines of dozens of Chinese Presidents, Chairmen, and First Secretaries would be beyond the scope of both this essay and its author, major Chinese political figures will be considered to be Mao, Deng, Zhao Xiyang, Zhu Rongji, and Hu Jintao.
[16] “Mao Zedong’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP’s Ninth Central Committee,” April 28,
1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, 35. Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117145
[17] Pye, Lucian W, “Reassessing the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, no. 108 (Dec., 1986): 600. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/653530.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9bdb406612df3c882bd6610842832f15
[18] “Mao’s Speech,” 36.
[19] Deng Xiaoping, “The present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” Columbia University Archive, speech delivered January 16th 1980, 1. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/china/deng_xiaoping_present_situation.pdf
[20] Ibid., 2.
[21] Naidu, M.V, “Democracy Versus Terrorism: FLQ Terrorism in Quebec, A Case Study,” Peace Research 27, no. 4 (1995): 3. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607375
[22] Ibid., 5.
[23] Burton, The Canadian Policy Context, 39.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Asia Pacific, “25th Anniversary of the Asia pacific Foundation of Canada,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. https://www.asiapacific.ca/node/26682
[26] Joe Clark, “Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International relations (green paper) Media Coverage,” GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 82. http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b2622877E/191?r=0&s=1
[27] Frolic, “The China Strategy,” 84.
[28] Frolic, “The China Strategy,” 56.
[29] A Canadian Strategy for China, Document 5-0096-87RD(01)©, April 1 1987. Document released under the Access to Information Act, p. 000007.
[30] Frolic, “The China Strategy,” 81.
[31] Gecelovsky, Paul and T.A. Keenleyside, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square,” International Journal 50, no. 3 (1995), 565. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203022
[32] House of Commons Debates, “Emergency Debates, June 5, 1989,” House of Commons Debates, 34th Parliament, 2nd Session: Vol. 2, 1191. https://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3402_02/1191?r=0&s=1
[33] Gecelovsky, “Canada Human Rights Policy,” 570.
[34] TradingEconomics, “Canada Imports from China,” Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/imports/china
[35] Canadian Parliament, “June 5th Emergency Debate,” 34th Parliament of Canada, 1193.
[36] World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %) – China,” World Bank,org. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN
[37] Jiang, Wenran, “Seeking a Strategic Vision for Canada-China Relations, International Journal 64, no. 4 (2009), 893. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40542164
[38] Lily Kuo, “China’s Birthrate Falls to Lowest Level Despite Push for More Babies.” THE GUARDIAN, published January 17th, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/17/chinas-birthrate-falls-to-lowest-level-despite-push-for-more-babies
[39] Sun, Yuelian, Hans Gregersen, and Wei Yuan, “Chinese Health Care System and Clinical Epidemiology,” Clin Epidemiol 9 (2017): 171. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5360409/
[40] Jiang, “Seeking a strategic vision,” 890.
[41] Gecelovsky, “Canada Human Rights Policy,” 581.
[42] Ibid., 897.
[43] Burton, The Canadian Policy Context, 40.
[44] Jiang, “Seeking a Strategic Vision,” 898.
[45] Ibid., 897.
[46] Heather Scoffield, “Team Canada juggles trade, human rights in mission to China,” THE GLOBE AND MAIL ARCHIVES, originally published January 13, 2000. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/team-canada-juggles-trade-human-rights-in-mission-to-china/article25453126/
[47] John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Toronto: Nelson Publishers, 2006), 230.
[48] Jean Chrétien, “Canada-China Business Council,” Prime Minster Info, speech delivered November, 1998, 6. file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Canada-China_business_council.pdf
[49] Patrick E. Tyler, “As Deng Joins the Immortals, Jiang Vows to Keep the Faith,” NEW YORK TIMES ARCHIVE, originally published February 26, 1997. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/0226china-deng.html
[50] Tseng, Wandas and Harm Zebregs, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some lessons for Other Countries,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper (February, 2002), 3. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2002/pdp03.pdf
[51] “Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA),” United Nations ESCAP. https://www.unescap.org/apta
[52] “The Chinese Community in Canada,” Statistics Canada Report, published 2006. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2006001-eng.htm
[53] Ibid.
[54] Burton, “Canadian Policy Context,” 49.
[55] “Harper hosts the Dalai Lama despite stern warning from China,” CBC NEWS ARCHIVES, October 29, 2007. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-hosts-the-dalai-lama-despite-stern-warning-from-china-1.660791
[56] Jiang, “Seeking a Strategic Vision,” 899.
[57] “China – Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers,” WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Dispute Settled June 2008. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds378_e.htm
[58] Brooke, Dismantling Canada, 266.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context,” 50.
[61] CTV News Staff, “Harper’s Olympic absence noticed in Beijing,” CTV News, published August 11, 2008. https://www.ctvnews.ca/harper-s-olympic-absence-noticed-in-beijing-1.315178
[62] Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context,” 52.
[63] Sonny Shiu-Ling Lo, “The Politics of Soft Power in Sino-Canadian Relations: Stephen Harper’s Visit to China and the Neglected Hong King Factor,” in The China Challenge Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), 69.
[64] Brian Laghi, “Harper promises he won’t sell out on rights,” THE GLOBE AND MAIL ARCHIVES, originally published November 16th, 2006. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/harper-promises-he-wont-sell-out-on-rights/article971520/
[65] “Ignatieff blasts Harper’s ‘megaphone’ diplomacy with China,” CBC ARCHIVES, originally published November 16th, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ignatieff-blasts-harper-s-megaphone-diplomacy-with-china-1.600562
[66] Ibid.
[67] “When George W. Bush welcomed ‘Steve’ Harper in Washington,” CBC ARCHIVES, oringally published July 6, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/when-george-w-bush-welcomed-steve-harper-in-washington-1.4736743
[68] “Trade in Goods with Canada,” UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, updated in 2020. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html
[69] Burton, “Canadian Policy Context,” 52.
[70] “China GDP Growth Rate,” Trading Economics.
[71] Zhang Lihua, “China’s Traditional Cultural Values and National identity,” CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, November 21, 2013. https://carnegietsinghua.org/2013/11/21/china-s-traditional-cultural-values-and-national-identity-pub-53613
[72] “United States GDP Growth Rate,” TRADINGECONOMICS, updated in 2020. https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth
[73] “Canada Trade Summary 2008,” World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), 2008. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CAN/Year/2008/Summarytext
[74] Ibid.
[75] Alexandre Gauthier, “Canadian Trade and Investment Activity: Canada-China,” RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS: LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, 2012. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/TradeAndInvestment/201355E
[76] Zhong, Yang, “Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 26, no. 2 (1996): 205. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472339680000131.
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