On February 14, 2024, Prabowo Subianto was elected the 8th President of Indonesia following his role as Defence Minister in 2019. He is assuming the leadership of the largest economy in Southeast Asia at a pivotal time, as tensions between the US and China are facing greater difficulties and the conflict in Gaza and Ukraine looms. Indonesia has long adopted a neutral stance, deciding to act as a ‘bridge’ between developing and developed nations.[1] Prabowo is likely to continue his predecessor ‘Jokowi’ policies and has shown eagerness to increase Indonesia’s role on the global stage. As the geopolitical climate becomes increasingly challenging, Prabowo has vowed to focus on economic development, which likely means continued alignment with China for economic ties.[2] However, Indonesia has increased its ties with the West through recent purchases of weapons from France and the United States.[3] Furthermore, Indonesia has clashing territorial claims with China in the South China Sea and has recently embarked on an ambitious military modernization program.[2] Prabowo’s nationalist-populist leanings may bring an end to this delicate balance. This article delves into Prabowo’s past and policies to extract valuable insights that could shed light on Indonesia’s future role on the international stage under his Presidency.
Unlike his populist rhetoric, Prabowo is the son of one of Indonesia’s most powerful families and the son-in-law of former dictator Suharto. He was educated overseas and returned to serve in Indonesia’s military and special forces, Kopassus. During the 2014 and 2019 elections, Prabowo pushed divisive rhetoric, and even spread rumors of Jokowi being a secret ‘Chinese Christian’.[4] Furthermore, he was associated with and even fueled hardline conservative Islamist groups such as Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). His manichean rhetoric is strongly associated with populism and threatens democratic institutions and norms of Indonesia’s young democracy.[5] When he lost the 2019 elections, he refused to acknowledge the results and claimed to represent the true people. However, his loss in both presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 led to a change in messaging and a more inclusive campaign for his third election bid. Acknowledging Jokowi’s popularity, with polls showing 70% support for the outgoing president, Prabowo positioned himself as a ‘student’ of Jokowi’s leadership, and a patriot for his people (termed pengbadi).[6] In 2019, Prabowo was appointed the Minister of Defence, and was ‘co-opted’ into Jokowi’s government and patronage networks. This network of elite control in politics has been a common feature of politics in Indonesia, commonly known as KKN in Indonesia (Corruption, collusion, and nepotism). To this end, outgoing President Jokowi made changes to the constitution to ensure his son Gibran could be eligible to be Prabowo’s running mate. Indonesia’s democracy may suffer a great challenge with Prabowo at its helm. Although his messaging has changed, he warned of democracy being ‘very, very tiring’ and ‘very, very costly’.[7] Prabowo is also accused of various human rights violations under Suharto’s dictatorship.[8] Particularly during the invasion of Timor-Leste, when Indonesia occupied the region from 1975-1976. Moreover, Prabowo was discharged from the military once found guilty of participating in torture against Suharto’s political enemies.[8] Since then, Prabowo has been sanctioned by Australia and the US, which were only removed in 2020 when Prabowo became Minister of Defence.
What can we make of Prabowo’s populist past and authoritarian leanings, compared to his recent change of attitude? We can see that Prabowo’s new messaging is in part due to his new reliance on the Indonesia elite, making anti-elitist populist rhetoric awkward.[4] Although it is unclear what Prabowo will do, he has clearly stated he will continue to follow in Jokowi’s footsteps.[9] Jokowi was incredibly popular for leading growth in Indonesia and maintaining a delicate balance between Chinese and US rivalry.[10] Coupled with this, Prabowo has declared an ambitious target of 8% GDP growth in the following years, something that is unlikely to happen without huge investment from China.[11] However, it is important to note that the Indonesian foreign policy establishment views China as a potential threat with its rising economic coercion, which may impact Prabowo’s actions.[12] Prabowo is also responsible for modernizing Indonesia’s military, which he believes is pivotal for national autonomy.[2] He was responsible for deepening security linkages with the West, through his huge purchase of Western equipment and the expansion of military training under Super Garuda Shield.[2] He has also expanded security agreements with Australia and South Korea.[13] Although Indonesia has supported its long-standing neutral policy of Dasasila Bandung, increasing Chinese encroachment into territorial waters and a potential confrontation with Taiwan may make it difficult for Indonesia to remain neutral and reap the benefits from both Chinese and Western camps. Furthermore, a decline in populism and authoritarianism may lead to reduced qualities of democracy and may put Prabowo at odds with the West.[5] However, Indonesia remains pivotal, with its control of the Straits of Malacca and its position as the largest nickel producer.[14] Although we can expect a clear continuation of Jokowi’s policy, international politics is constantly transforming and Prabowo’s domestic position may force him into more autocratic leanings. He has shown a lack of experience when mediating the conflict in Ukraine, which may run him into trouble with his ambition to seek greater regional dominance and international standing.[15] To manage this delicate situation, Prabowo should uphold the tradition of a technocratic cabinet, as followed by his cherished predecessor. However, there have been indications that Prabowo will not choose to go down this route, and instead, enforce a greater military cabinet.[16] Described as ‘unpredictable’, Prabowo may change Indonesia’s posture and attitudes in line with his nationalist rhetoric.[17]
David Daigneault is a third-year student at the University of Toronto, majoring in Peace, Conflict, Justice and International Relations, with a minor in Economics. David’s areas of interests include climate policies, economic inequality and international security.
Bibliography
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Chivvis, Christopher S., Elina Noor, and Beatrix Geaghan‑Breiner. “Indonesia in the Emerging World Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/09/indonesia-in-emerging-world-order-pub-9096 6.
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[1] The Economist. “What Will Prabowo Subianto’s Foreign Policy Look Like?” The Economist, February 29, 2024. https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/02/29/what-will-prabowo-subiantos-foreign-policy -look-like.
[2] Rachman, Joseph. “What Prabowo’s Victory Means for Indonesian Foreign Policy.” The Diplomat, March 7, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/what-prabowos-victory-means-for-indonesian-foreign-policy/.
[3] Apdr. “Indonesia Defense Expenditure to Reach $9.7 Billion by 2028 – APDR.” APDR, October 13, 2023. https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/indonesia-defense-expenditure-to-reach-9-7-billio n-by-2028/.
[4] “From Populist Pariah to ‘Jokowi’s Man’: Analyzing Prabowo Subianto’s Transformation in the Lead-up to the 2024 Indonesian Elections | CSIS,” n.d. https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/populist-pariah-jokowis-man-analyzing -prabowo-subiantos-transformation.
[5] Huber, Robert, and Christian H. Schimpf. “On The Distinct Effects of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism on Democratic Quality.” Politics and Governance (Lisboa) 5, no. 4 (December 29, 2017): 146–65. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.919.
[6] Grunebaum, Dave. “Indonesia’s Popular President Accused of Undermining Democracy.” Voice of America, February 10, 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-s-popular-president-accused-of-undermining-dem ocracy-/7482068.html.
[7] Suroyo, Gayatri, and Stefanno Sulaiman. “Indonesia’s presumed president Prabowo vows smooth transition, pushes privatisation,” March 2024. Accessed April 10, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/presumed-president-prabowo-says-indonesia democracy-messy-should-be-proud-2024-03-05/.
[8] Staff, Al Jazeera. “Who Is Prabowo Subianto, the Man Likely to Be Indonesia’s Next President?” Al Jazeera, February 16, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-man-likely-to be-indonesias-next.
[9] Dinarto, Dedi. “Snap Insight: Prabowo Looks Set to Be Jokowi 3.0 After Huge Lead in Indonesia Presidential Election.” CNA, February 15, 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-2024-election-president-win-vi ctory-prabowo-joko-widodo-snap-insight-4122871.
[10] Wardhani, Baiq, and Vinsensio Dugis. “Indonesian Foreign Policy Under the Jokowi Administration: Variations on Traditional Ideas.” Issues & Studies/Issues and Studies – Institute of International Relations 59, no. 03 (August 17, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1142/s1013251123500054.
[11] Financial Times. “Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto Vows to Boost Economic Growth to 8% Within Five Years,” n.d. https://www.ft.com/content/4e09f403-0e17-47e6-96ec-00fe0cb6a5c1.
[12] Yeremia, Ardhitya Eduard. “Indonesian Diplomats’ and Foreign Policy Scholars’ Perceptions and Their Implications on Indonesian Foreign Ministry Bureaucratic Responses to a Rising China.” the Pacific Review/Pacific Review 35, no. 3 (November 30, 2020): 529–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.1851293.
[13] Da-Gyum, Ji. “Leaders of S. Korea, Indonesia Agree to Deepen Economic, Defense Cooperation – the Korea Herald.” The Korea Herald, September 8, 2023. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230908000553.
[14] Chivvis, Christopher S., Elina Noor, and Beatrix Geaghan‑Breiner. “Indonesia in the Emerging World Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/09/indonesia-in-emerging-world-order-pub-9096 6.
[15] Dianti, Tria. “Indonesian Defense Minister’s Ukraine Peace Plan Draws Fire.” Benar News, June 6, 2023. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-ukraine-peace-plan-0605 2023045330.html#:~:text=Speaking%20at%20the%20Shangri%2DLa,peacekeeping%20force.
[16] Arifianto, Alexander R. “Prabowo’s New Cabinet: No Room for Technocrats?” Indonesia at Melbourne, March 6, 2024. https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/prabowos-new-cabinet-no-room-for-technocrats/.
[17] United States Institute of Peace. “How Might Prabowo Navigate Conflict, Competition as Indonesia’s President?,” n.d. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/how-might-prabowo-navigate-conflict-compet ition-indonesias-president.
