Abstract: This paper argues that since 1970, Canadian relations with the People’s Republic of China has been on a trajectory of increasing political and economic significance, and that this trend is evident in three of the most important watershed moments of this relationship, which include the establishment of formal diplomatic relations by the Trudeau government in 1970, the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, and the increasing focus on human rights and economic trade by the Harper government in the late 2000s. By doing so this paper emphasizes the importance of Canada and China as two large pacific partners who must further cooperate on various issues in the Asia and Pacific region.
Keywords: Foreign policy, Canada, China, Tiananmen, Diplomacy
Many centuries ago, after being cut off by the conquests of the Ottoman empire, Western European explorers set sail across the Atlantic in search of a new route to a land of great wealth and prosperity, known as China. In their attempts to reach the middle kingdom, they instead stumbled upon the riches of the New World. And while the St. Lawrence ultimately did not lead directly to China, it instead became colonised by French settlers who would eventually help create modern-day Canada.[1] And so, in a way, the search for China indirectly gave birth to Canada. China would continue to play an interesting role in the development of Canadian society, as many Quebecois missionaries would travel to China during the 1900s and bring home stories about the vast and exotic land, which captured the imagination of Canadians.[2] Thus, China became deeply entrenched in the Canadian, and specifically French-Canadian, psyche. This paper will explore the relationship between these two pacific nations, and how it has evolved from 1970 to 2015. And while Canadian Chinese relations have many cultural, demographic, religious and political components, it will be predominantly the diplomatic relationship that shall be examined for the purposes of this paper. In doing so, it shall be argued that since 1970, Canadian relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been on a trajectory of increasing political and economic significance, and that this trend is evident in three of the most important moments of this complicated relationship. These watershed moments for Canada-China relations include the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1970, the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, and the increasing focus on human rights by the Harper government in the late 2000s.
This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will give a brief historical context to the events which lead up to 1970. The second section will then focus on the Trudeau government’s policy towards the People’s Republic of China, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, and the early years of the relationship. The third section will then examine the effect of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre on Canada-China relations, particularly how the Canadian government chose to respond, and whether the response impacted relations. The fourth and final section will attempt to examine the complicated diplomacy of human rights, and the burgeoning economic and cultural ties under the Harper government in the late 2000s.
Historical Context
While it is often difficult to pick a starting point when it comes to historical trends, 1949 seems like a particularly apt date to choose for such a subjective task. It was the final year of the Chinese civil war, a war in which socialist Canadians, such as the famous Norman Bethune, lost their lives fighting.[3] The civil war resulted in the mainland defeat of the nationalist Republic of China at the hands of the socialist People’s Republic of China, the former of which was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan. The survival of the nationalist regime on the island of Taiwan would eventually prove to be quite problematic, particularly in the United Nations. Specifically, the question of which government would represent China in the U.N. arose immediately after the war, despite the clear numerical and geographical advantage of the Peking regime’s claim to sovereignty. This issue was further exacerbated due to the Republic of China’s refusal to compromise on any of its U.N privileges, a hardline position it could afford to take due to heavy support from the United States.[4] 1949 was also the year when a young and adventurous 30-year-old French Canadian by the name of Pierre Elliot Trudeau decided to visit the middle kingdom, a trip during which he claims he: “…slipped into the territory still held by the Kuomintang [nationalists]. It was in a state of anarchy. I got myself as far as Shanghai while the Red Army was on the other side of the Yangtze.”[5] This experience would impact the future prime ministers’ views on China, which would later help shape his government’s China policy.
After the victory in the civil war, socialist China was cut-off from the West, thus ending the movement of people between China and Canada.[6] This included Canadian Christian missionaries, who at the time constituted the largest group of Canadians in China; after all, Maoists were not fans of Jesus.[7] Thus, between 1949 and 1970, interaction between Canada and China virtually disappeared, with the exception of large-scale exports of wheat to China which began in 1958.[8] In fact, while Ottawa did not officially recognise the Communist Party in Peking, a deal was made in 1961 to export 422 million dollars’ worth of wheat from Canada to help with China’s famine in the early sixties.[9] For the most part however, bilateral trade with China in the 1950s and 1960s seemed unlikely to increase in the near future.[10] Thus, early relations were mostly non-existent, and because of that, the main issue of political recognition became the primary challenge that was needed to be overcome for better relations to take hold.
Trudeau’s rapprochement with China, ‘The Honeymoon era’
The formal political recognition of China by Canada was the beginning of modern Canada-China relations, and it began with the same French Canadian who first travelled to China in 1949, Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Serving as prime minister from 1968 to 1984 (ignoring Joe Clark’s brief tenure), Trudeau was a womanising and flamboyant francophone academic thrust into the political scene by Prime Minister Pearson to help Canada survive the rise of Quebec separatism in the 1960s.[11] He also had a complex relationship with China, which was shaped by his personal ideology of ‘flirtatious socialism’ and ‘Christian humanism,’[12] as well as his multiple trips to China, the first being the aforementioned 1949 trip, and a second trip in 1960. The 1960 trip was later immortalised in his book Deux Innocents en Chine Rouge, with ‘innocence’ referring to, according to Trudeau, the: “innocence of not knowing any better”; an apt description of Canadian knowledge on China in this era.[13] These trips to China, according to Trudeau’s son Alexander: “left him [Pierre Trudeau] with a profound sense of awe for China, a mix of both fear and respect,” and forced the Quebecois intellectual to: “suspend his judgement, surrender it his dominion and accept China on its own terms.”[14] In other words, it seemed as if Trudeau was enchanted by the scale of Chinese civilisation and the vastness of its history, especially in comparison to that of his minuscule Quebec society. This led him to the realisation that China was too big to ignore, and for Canada to continue to do so was an arrogant act of ignorance towards the history and relevance of both societies’ impact on the story of mankind. Simply put, according to Trudeau: “it seemed to us imperative that the citizens of our democracy should know more about China.”[15]
Thus, with the goal of recognising China ‘on its own terms,’ the negotiations that would lead to recognition began swiftly after Trudeau’s victory in the 1968 election.[16] It became one of the key aspects of the new government’s foreign policy agenda, with Trudeau declaring on the 29th of May 1968 that: “our aim will be to recognise the People’s Republic of China government as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy the seat of China in the U.N.”[17] There were many reasons why the Trudeau government pushed for recognition, even though it was a very controversial political decision at that time.[18] Firstly, it was part of the greater third option, anti-American strategy of a cabinet that wanted to show the world that Canadian foreign policy was independent of the United States, and that Canada was to begin ‘distancing’ itself from the U.S. under Trudeau.[19] Therefore, Canadian policy towards China became a key aspect of this new foreign policy.[20] There was also growing domestic support for relations with China, as many leftist Canadian nationalists (some of which Trudeau knew personally) idolised Mao’s China for its’ independence from Soviet and American hegemony, and thus wished to support what they saw as an alternative for third world development.[21] Furthermore, Canadian enthusiasm for the nationalists in Taiwan waned in the 1960s, as the regime was seen by many as a symbol of the many oppressive right-wing dictatorships propped up by American imperialism.[22] Ottawa also wished to recognise China because there was the growing belief that by ending its isolation, and integrating China into the world order, it would allow China to ‘play a constructive global role.’[23] Trudeau further emphasised this argument by stating that since China had a quarter of the world’s population, their cooperation would eventually be needed in solving future global crises.[24] This belief would become a recurring theme in Canada’s strategy towards China, as it will resurface in the policies of future governments.
There were however, two main problems that came along with recognition: Taiwan and the United States. Because neither Chinese governments wished to compromise, governments around the world were forced to only recognise and maintain relations with one of the two China’s. Therefore, the Trudeau government had to devise a strategy with which to circumvent this reality, with Secretary of State Mitchell Sharp explaining that the negotiations must “bring about a situation in which the existence of a separate government in Taiwan is recognised and that we can, at the same time, recognise that the PRC government is effectively in control of the mainland area.”[25] The other sleeping elephant in the room was the United States. Their president at the time, Richard Nixon, personally hated Trudeau so much so that when his own national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, went to visit the Chinese, he instructed him that “future contacts or channels with the Chinese could take place anywhere except Ottawa.”[26] There was thus a fear that Canada could face repercussions from the U.S. This fear did not last long however, as it seemed that anything as extreme as economic sanctions would be unlikely; after all, the Americans did not retaliate against Canada’s controversial relationship with Cuba.[27]
From the Chinese perspective, while relations with Canada were not a priority (at the time Mao’s government was focused on the Cultural Revolution as well as dealing with increasing Sino-Soviet tensions), it was something that was seen as potentially helping Peking in achieving better relations with the Americans.[28] Therefore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted the offer from the Canadians, and negotiations began in Stockholm.[29] The end result was the creation of a ‘Canadian formula’ for recognition, which meant that Canada would recognise the People’s Republic of China, and simply ‘take note’ of Peking’s claim over Taiwan, without officially recognising any sovereign claim.[30] The Taiwan-based Republic of China would then be de-recognised by Canada.[31] With the Taiwan issue solved, Canada officially recognised the People’s Republic on October 1970, with the immediate effect being Canada’s export of wheat to China nearly doubling within a years’ time.[32] This successful formula was even adopted and used by subsequent Western nations who also began recognising Peking over Taiwan after 1970.[33] This watershed moment thus marked the official beginning of modern Canada-China relations, and was described by third option-enthusiast Mitchell Sharp as: “among the most important developments in Canadian foreign policy of the last two decades.”[34]
The relationship between the two Pacific nations post-1970 saw the rapid growth of cultural and economic ties, and could be described as being in a honeymoon-like state until 1989. Following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Trudeau paid an official visit to China in 1973 (his third time in the country by then), where he became close friends with China’s new leader Zhou Enlai, with whom he: “discussed politics far into the night.”[35] During his stay in China, he praised Zhou for his effort to: “instil equality and greater social justice,” and stated that Canada-China relations: “have achieved such variety, depth and warmth.”[36] Upon returning to Canada, Trudeau established a family reunification program, which allowed over 25,000 Chinese to rejoin their families in Canada, marking the first significant flow of Chinese immigrants into Canada since 1949.[37]
Economic ties also began to rapidly expand during this era, as Canada extended a 2 billion dollar line of credit for the expansion of economic relations in 1979.[38] In addition to this money, as well as the ever-growing sale of wheat to the growing Chinese market, an agreement on development cooperation was signed in 1983 as part of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).[39] This was a huge departure for the Chinese from their previous refusals of Western foreign aid, and came as a result of policy changes within China led by reformist Deng Xiaoping, who wished to orient China away from class struggle and more towards economic reform (a policy known as kaifangle).[40] During this period Canada would continue to hold a trade surplus with China. However, the surplus was mostly thanks to wheat exports, and slowly decreased overtime.[41]
While Trudeau retired from politics in 1984 and a new conservative government under Quebecer Brian Mulroney took power, the song remained the same when it came to Canada-China relations, with one Canadian official stating that: “we hardly missed a step in the transition from Trudeau to Mulroney.”[42] This was likely because Mulroney was preoccupied with domestic constitutional reforms, and therefore he chose a policy of staying on course on the 11th of October 1985, when he explained to the House of Commons that: “I have indicated to the Premier of China and the President of China the fact that the intention of this Government is to pursue the policy set out by my predecessor, Mr. Trudeau, with which I agree. We have honoured that in all circumstances.”[43] In the lead-up to the creation of an official ‘China Strategy’ (which ended up falling apart due to unforeseen circumstances in 1989), Mulroney visited China in March of 1986, where he commented on the success of Deng’s reforms, saying that: “I was struck by the tremendous changes in the last six or seven years, tremendous progress that we can see visibly on the streets.”[44] He also commented on his desire to enhance collaboration between Canadian business and the Chinese government, declaring that his government will make the next century “the age of the Pacific”, with an obvious focus on trade between the two nations.[45] Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Canada-China relations witnessed much political optimism and economic expansion, with trade growing from 161 million dollars in 1970 to over 3.5 billion by 1988, causing China to become Canada’s fourth largest export market.[46] This honeymoon era, however, ended abruptly in the summer of 1989.
Canada’s response to Tiananmen, 1989
The Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4th, 1989, otherwise known in China as the day when nothing happened, was the shockingly violent suppression of a student-led protest in the city of Beijing, in which the Chinese army killed thousands of protesters.[47] The graphic visuals of the massacre were immediately broadcast in news reports around the world, including Canada.[48] Even the windows of the nearby Canadian embassy were fired upon and damaged, as many Canadian exchange students evacuated to the embassy for protection.[49] A sense of disgust, anger and revulsion was felt immediately by Canadians following the massacre, prompting Mulroney to express solidarity with the victims, stating the following:
“I say to those young heroes: Do not despair, victory must eventually be yours because liberty cannot be denied. Canada abhors the great tragedy that has been inflicted on those brave young leaders in Tiananmen Square. Indiscriminate shooting have snuffed out the precious human lives, but they can never snuff out the fundamental urge of human beings for freedom and democracy.”[50]
This was a drastic change in rhetoric towards China, as the idea of ‘human rights’ being an important part in diplomacy with the Chinese regime began to take hold in mainstream Canadian political discourse.
The fallout from Tiananmen on Canada-China relations was immediate, as the Mulroney government no longer viewed China with ‘rose-coloured glasses’[51] and adopted several retaliatory measures against Beijing. Firstly, there was to be a strict political shunning of China, as all high-level visits were suspended for three years following the massacre.[52] Any contact between diplomats and officials was also to be put on hold, and the ban was to remain until “a more appropriate time”, according to Ottawa.[53] An important thing to note about these measures is that they were not unique to the Canadian response, as many others in the West, such as the European Union, enacted similar measures against China.[54]
Additional symbolic measures were made, especially in regards to arms, as the Canadian government would place a ban on the trade of any weapons or military equipment by declaring that they “would not grant export permits for military sales of any sort,”[55] and that defense programs between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Chinese Army were to stop.[56] Even aid programs such as the aforementioned CIDA were halted, with negotiations for additional aid programs, worth 60 million dollars, being suspended as well.[57] It is important to note however, that these measures were mostly symbolic, as the gross domestic products of both Canada and China (each at 565 and 461 billion respectively in 1989) greatly dwarfed any value lost from these measures.[58] Furthermore, the Canadian government chose to respond to the Chinese post-Tiananmen misinformation campaign by creating their first Mandarin language program on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio Canada International broadcast, which was to be broadcast to China and deliver a ‘Western perspective’ on international news.[59] Arguably the most quantifiable retaliation against Chinese actions, however, was the granting of ‘asylum’ and visas to Chinese international students, many of which participated in the student-led protests. By April 1990, over 7,600 applications for permanent resident status from China were accepted by Canada.[60] Along with the other more symbolic measures, the extension of visas for fleeing Chinese nationals was a move which soured relations with the Beijing government, bringing the 20-year relationship to an all-time low.[61] Given all these retaliatory measures, it became clear that China’s blatant violation of human rights would from now on have some impact on diplomatic and economic relations with Canada.
It is also important to note that many of these measures did not last as long as they were intended, especially the political shunning of China, which began to fall apart in the early 1990s. The moratorium on high-level meetings with communist party politicians became dubious rather quickly, as multiple cabinet ministers would quietly travel to meet with Chinese officials in Beijing, within months of the massacre.[62] Trade with China quickly bounced back as well in the ensuing years, despite critical rhetoric from Ottawa.[63] In fact, while ‘securing democracy and respect for human values’ was declared in 1991 as one of the key principles of Canadian foreign policy towards China,[64] by April of 1992 Minister of International Trade Michael Wilson enthusiastically led a delegation of Canadian business leaders to China to facilitate trade expansion, thus ending any illusion of political and economic shunning on the part of Canada.[65] In short, while some damage was done to China-Canada relations, the sanctions were mostly short-lived and symbolic.
Part of the reason why this withdrawal from political and economic shunning took place was the ascension of Quebecois Jean Chretien to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1993, who argued that instead of shunning China, the promotion of economic trade would help foster political democratisation over time.[66] He would then lead multiple trade missions to China, alongside an array of business leaders, provincial premiers, territorial leaders and relevant cabinet ministers known as ‘Team Canada’ in 1996, 1998 and 2001 to help facilitate the expansion of economic links between Canada and China.[67] This new strategy was met with much criticism, especially from human rights and anti-China advocates, against which Chretien would defend himself by stating that: “I’m the Prime Minister of a country of twenty million people. He’s [leader of China] the President of a country with 1.2 billion. I’m not allowed to tell the Premier of Saskatchewan or Quebec what to do. Am I supposed to tell the President of China what to do?”[68] Thus, Chretien illustrated a fundamental problem in Canadian foreign policy towards China; the futility of a middle power dictating rules to a rising superpower, a futility which was further exacerbated by China’s ever-growing market and thirst for Canadian goods. Simply put, as one business consultant would explain, “Canadian firms had done nasty business in the past and would continue to do nasty business in the future because they could not ignore 25 per cent of the world’s population.”[69]
Therefore, the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre was largely symbolic and economically ineffective, as trade relations eventually picked up from where they left off. There was, however, a noticeable change in the rhetoric of Canadian politicians towards China. If in 1986 Mulroney could confidentially say that the issue of human rights was “not a government concern, but a concern to some Canadians,”[70] by 1990 human rights became, at least officially, a government concern, and one that would play an increasingly complicated role in Canada-China relations.
Hence, there was great uncertainty about Canadian policy towards China going into the 21st century. Despite the return to the trend of growing economic ties between the two Pacific partners, there was now an uncomfortable silence on human rights and the political differences between Canada and China, which could no longer be as blatantly ignored as in the past. As Trudeau described the post-Tiananmen mood: “It is hard to know how China needs to move forward, missteps in this immense country lead to death and suffering on a gargantuan scale.”[71]
Harper arrives on the scene
By the turn of the century, Canada-China relations reached a point of maturity, especially as the economic rise of China accelerated in the 2000s. As China’s economy grew, so did its trade with North America, which from 2001 to 2005 rose by 163%.[72] In terms of Canada-China trade, it seemed as though Chretien’s Team Canada missions did their job, as Canadian trade with China grew by 350% between 1998 and 2007, compared to the 33% growth rate of Canadian trade with the rest of the world.[73] Unsurprisingly, this led to China emerging as Canada’s largest trading partner (second only to the United States) in 2006.[74]
There was also a new aspect of Canada-China relations which would become increasingly important in understanding the relationship: demographics. As the 21st century progressed, immigration from China sky-rocketed, with China becoming one of the largest sources of newcomers to Canada.[75] In fact, by 2006, over 1.2 million (out of 31.2 million total) Canadians identified themselves as Chinese (nearly 4% of the total population), meaning Chinese was now the most common non-official language in Canada.[76] It is also important to note that this did not raise much alarm among Canadians, as despite the fact that 40% of Canadians agreed that ‘China will soon dominate the world’, 60% did not see China as a threat to world peace in 2005.[77] And from the Chinese perspective, due to Canada being seen as one of the friendlier Western states, the bilateral relationship in 2005 was declared by Chinese President Hu Jintao to have evolved into a strategic partnership; an important characteristic in Beijing’s foreign policy terminology.[78]
This all changed in February 2006, when Stephen Harper’s conservative government took power, disrupting the previous Liberal’s China policy in the process.[79] The shift in Canadian policy towards China was swift, and harkened back to the summer of 1989. It was part of a greater foreign policy vision of Harper, which he summarised in the following statement from 2006: “I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values; they don’t want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar.”[80] In other words, while trade and economics were important, the issue of human rights was, from now on, to take precedence when dealing with other states, China included. This had an immediate impact on the ‘strategic partnership’ between Canada and China, as China was removed from the list of foreign policy priorities for the new government.[81] Additionally, along with openly criticising the human rights record of China, Harper’s first minister of foreign affairs, Peter Mackay, ignored meeting requests from China’s ambassador to Canada, and didn’t even bother to go over China policy with the Cabinet until October 2006 (nearly eight months into the new government).[82] This neglect of China, and further emphasis on its human rights failings, understandably became frustrating for the Chinese.
The trend of animosity towards Beijing continued in 2007, as the House of Commons gave unanimous support to a motion which would grant honourary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibet; one of the many regions of the People’s Republic vowing for independence.[83] While this move was likely done by the Harper government to further emphasise its focus on human rights abroad, it had an unintended effect on Chinese officials, who interpreted this (along with other actions by Harper and his government) as support for separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet.[84] Thus, due to the optics of supporting separatism abroad, Ottawa muted its rhetoric by the spring of 2008, when there was civil unrest in Tibet. This was also perhaps the first time the Canadian government experienced domestic pressure to take a more pro-China policy from anti-Tibetan immigrants from mainland China, who became a significant voting demographic for the minority government to consider.[85] Important to note, there was also considerable domestic pressure from the Canadian Chinese community in the opposite direction (especially immigrants from Hong Kong or political refugees), with several groups lobbying Harper’s foreign ministers, such as Lawrence Cannon, also in 2008.[86] There was even Harper’s refusal to attend the opening of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, which along with all the other actions, were seen as deeply disrespectful towards China and a violation of a Chinese diplomatic concept known as mianzi, which roughly translates to honour or saving face.[87] Thus, with the re-emphasis of human rights in foreign affairs, Canada-China relations worsened considerably.
A shift in tone came in 2009, as Harper finally had his first trip to China in December of that year.[88] Many factors played into this trip, such as the global recession of 2008, and the recent 2008 election, which left Harper with another minority government.[89] His trip marked a significant departure from previous China policy and was interpreted by the Chinese leadership as a step towards reconciliation.[90] One of the most important achievements of this trip was Canada being given ‘approved destination status’ by Beijing, which increased the number of Chinese tourists in Canada from 40,000 to 50,000 per year, and therefore increased revenue from tourism by around 100 million dollars.[91] This was an important factor in strengthening Canada-China relations, as it not only increased the number of Chinese visitors in Canada, but also greatly improved interactions between Chinese Canadians and their Chinese counterparts from Asia.[92] One of the likely reasons why China reached out to the Harper government despite their human rights rhetoric, was that China was hoping to increase its soft power over Canada, and to leverage Canada as a means to better US relations,[93] hence reflecting their strategy towards Trudeau’s Canada from 1970. Thus, despite the Harper government’s prioritisation of human rights in dictating foreign policy towards China, it seems that the ever-growing trend of greater economic ties between Canada and China was ultimately irresistible and irreversible, as by 2012, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, and Canada-China trade was valued at over 50 billion dollars annually, with questionable improvement in China’s human rights record.[94]
Conclusion
Thus, Stephen Harpers’ failure on human rights advocacy in the 2000s, along with the short-lived Canadian retaliation in the early 1990s and Trudeau’s initial recognition of the People’s Republic are all watershed moments that demonstrate the growing political and economic importance of the Canada-China relationship from 1970 to 2015. It is a special relationship, which has increasingly become the most important foreign policy relationship for the Canadian government outside of the United States. Furthermore, while this paper focused primarily on relations between 1970 and 2015, more recent developments have illustrated the increasing relevance of this topic for Canadian foreign policy. There is an ever-increasing imbalance of power between Canada and China, and this will continue to undoubtably influence relations. As the history shows, it is critical for Canadian national security in the 21st century to have the best possible China policy this country can muster, because with the numerical advantage so clearly not in our favour, Canada cannot afford to continue a lackluster effort. Extradition hearings, arrests abroad and global pandemics are all current developments which support this conclusion. In the words of Dr. Bothwell himself, Canada has “never been this alone. We don’t have any serious allies. And I think that’s another factor in what the Chinese are doing. … Our means of retaliation are very few. China is a hostile power.”[95] And it is with that information in mind that Canada must embrace the upcoming Age of the Pacific.
Boris Kyrychenko is currently a third-year undergraduate at the University of Toronto, majoring in International Relations and minoring in political science and French studies. He is born and raised in Toronto.
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[1] Serge Granger, “French Canada’s Quiet Obsession with China.” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 20, no. 2/3 (2013), 157.
[2] Granger, 168.
[3] Hilary Russell, “Norman Bethune” (The Canadian Encyclopedia, August 8, 2010), https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/norman-bethune.
[4] Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970 (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 73.
[5] Jacques Hébert and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Two Innocents in Red China (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 2007), 46.
[6] Meehan John, and David Webster, “A Deeper Engagement: People, Institutions and Cultural Connections in Canada-China Relations.” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 20, no. 2/3 (2013), 113.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Charles Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context of Canada’s China Policy since 1970,” The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (University of Ottawa Press, 2011), 34.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 44.
[11] John English, Just Watch Me : The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 1968-2000 (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2010), 8.
[12] Hébert and Trudeau, 8.
[13] Ibid., 3.
[14] Ibid., 14.
[15] Meehan and Webster, 109.
[16] Ibid., 110.
[17] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 192.
[18] Burton, 33.
[19] Ibid., 35.
[20] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 190.
[21] Burton, 36.
[22] Ibid., 36.
[23] Paul Gecelovsky and T. A. Keenleyside, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square,” International Journal Vol. 50, no. No. 3, China and Its Neighbours (1995), 587.
[24] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 191.
[25] Ibid., 194.
[26] Ronald C. Keith, “China and Canada’s ‘Pacific 2000 Strategy,’” Pacific Affairs Vol. 65, no. No. 3 (1992), 322.
[27] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 197.
[28] Ibid., 201.
[29] Ibid., 202.
[30] Burton, 34.
[31] Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, 202.
[32] Keith, 323.
[33] Burton, 34.
[34] Keith, 319.
[35] Burton, 38.
[36] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 564.
[37] B. Michael Frolic, “Canada and China: The China Strategy of 1987,” jstor (The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century, 2011), 47.
[38] Burton, 37.
[39] Ibid., 37.
[40] Frolic, 47.
[41] Ibid., 51.
[42] Frolic, 62.
[43] Ibid., 49.
[44] Ibid., 50.
[45] Ibid., 50.
[46] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 565.
[47] “Tiananmen Square: What Happened in the Protests of 1989?” BBC News, June 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934.
[48] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 568.
[49] Burton, 39.
[50] Ibid., 39.
[51] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 566.
[52] Frolic, 62.
[53] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 575.
[54] “EU China Arms Embargo Row,” BBC News, April 18, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4329613.stm.
[55] Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context,” 39.
[56] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 574.
[57] Burton, 39.
[58] Robert Bothwell, “HIS311 Lecture 22: The UN and Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s,” idpz.utorauth.utoronto.ca, March 26, 2020, https://q.utoronto.ca/courses/117981/discussion_topics/597574.
[59] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 569.
[60] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 570.
[61] Ibid., 571.
[62] Burton, 40.
[63] Meehan and Webster, 114.
[64] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 566.
[65] Ibid., 567.
[66] Burton, 40.
[67] Ibid., 40.
[68] Ibid., 41.
[69] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 588.
[70] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, 565.
[71] Hébert and Trudeau, 12.
[72] Wenran Jiang, “Seeking a Strategic Vision for Canada-China Relations,” International Journal 64, no. 4 (2009), 895.
[73] Raaj Tiagi and Lu Zhou, “Canada’s Economic Relations with China,” Fraser Institute Chinese Economic Policy, February 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090306094527/http:/www.fraserinstitute.org/Commerce.Web/product_files/CanadaEconomicRelationsChina.pdf.
[74] Paul Evans, “Canada, Meet Global China.” International Journal 61, no. 2 (2006), 285.
[75] Meehan and Webster, 112.
[76] Burton, 43.
[77] Evans, “Meet Global China,” 286.
[78] Jiang, 892.
[79] Frolic, 63.
[80] Jiang, 900.
[81] Ibid., 892.
[82] Ibid., 898.
[83] Burton, 43.
[84] Jiang, 900.
[85] Ibid., 900.
[86] Sonny Shiu-Ling Lo, “The Politics of Soft Power in Sino-Canadian Relations: Stephen Harper’s Visit to China and the Neglected Hong Kong Factor,” The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (2011), 74.
[87] Ibid., 68.
[88] Burton, 44.
[89] “2008 Canadian Election Results,” www.sfu.ca (SImon Fraser University, 2020), https://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/elections/2008-results.html.
[90] Lo, 67.
[91] Ibid., 69.
[92] Ibid., 70.
[93] Lo, 79.
[94] Meehan and Webster, 114.
[95] Rob Gillies and Paul Wiseman, “Canada Caught between 2 Powers, Feeling Alone in the World,” CTV News (The Associated Press, December 14, 2018), https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-caught-between-2-powers-feeling-alone-in-the-world-1.4217803.
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