While states have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic to differing extents, a closer examination of Southeast Asia reveals the increasing entrenchment of patron-client relations between the region and China. With some of the lowest case-numbers on record, Cambodia and Laos have been spared from the worst medical elements of the crisis. However, the economic damage wrought by the pandemic has tightened Beijing’s grip on their political systems. The provision of medical supplies and financial assistance, in tandem with continued investment in vast infrastructural projects, reflects a desire to cement regional patronage networks and secure the political capital necessary for expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Whereas in the West the pandemic has sparked conversations about deficient political structures, in Southeast Asia it has threatened to further endanger the ability of Cambodians and Laotians to retain autonomy over their lives.
The current predicament is largely rooted in Cambodia and Laos’ financial dependency on China. In an attempt to become the “battery of Southeast Asia,” the Laos government has in recent years pursued a number of hydroelectric dam projects. Beijing has served as a primary creditor in these initiatives, and a 2019 study published by the Lowy Institute estimates that Laos’ debt to China stands at 45% of the nation’s GDP.[1] This precarity has been exacerbated by the pandemic, with declines in tourism and the flow of international remittances seeing Laos’ national reserves dwindle to US$864 million – less than debt obligations it holds until 2024.[2] As a result of this dilemma, the Laos government was forced to cede majority control of its national power grid to a Chinese company in September 2020.[3]
Through the financing of development projects, Cambodia has also accumulated a significant amount of Chinese debt. As part of the BRI, China invested US$7.9 billion in Cambodia between 2016 and 2019 with a focus on infrastructural development.[4] This investment is inexorably connected to the larger patronage network that exists between Beijing and Cambodia’s Hun Sen, who “often behaves more like an obedient Chinese regional governor than a prime minister.”[5] Under Hun Sen’s administration, favorable terms have been given to Chinese corporations under the guise of “benefitting ordinary Cambodians.”[6] Though in reality, projects like the deep-water port in Koh Kong have seen 20 percent of Cambodia’s coastline leased to a Chinese development group and the forced eviction of more than 1,000 families.[7] In exchange for green-lighting these projects, Beijing has assisted Hun Sen in systematically undermining Cambodia’s democratic opposition and free press. This has heightened the sense of disenfranchisement among Cambodians whose urban landscapes have become overwhelmingly shaped by Chinese capital.
In March 2020, China was quick to provide both states with medical supplies and oversight in the fight against COVID-19. Teams of Chinese medical experts traveled to Vientiane and Phnom Penh, with China also providing Cambodia with raw materials to support its garment industry following supply chain disruptions.[8] While these actions can be viewed in good faith, they arguably reflect a broader desire to quell anti-Chinese sentiment among populations who grow wary of their inability to contest China’s grander geopolitical strategies. The extent of political influence over Cambodian and Lao elites grows increasingly clear. Not only was Hun Sen the first foreign leader to visit China during the pandemic, but he has continued to help China dodge American tariffs by rerouting exports through Special Economic Zones (SEZs).[9] Moreover, construction on the China-Laos railway was quick to resume in July despite the persistence of pandemic conditions – heralded as working to convert Laos from a “landlocked country to a land-linked hub.”[10]
The history of land-leases in northern Laos, like Golden Boten City, as well as SEZs like the Golden Triangle, can be seen as a kind of dystopian endpoint hinted at by this trajectory. In her paper on rural Laos, Tan suggests that Chinese investment and migration could “render the highlands, ‘legible,’ governable, and profitable,” while “impeding the emergence of a regional bourgeoisie” capable of threatening the power of the current ruling class.[11] By leasing control of certain territory and infrastructure to Chinese corporations, the Lao government and elites in turn become more capable of commodifying rural land and communities – creating greater dependency of rural peoples upon urban centers. As the lines distinguishing Cambodian, Lao and Chinese elite interests become increasingly blurred, the power of local populations is inexorably weakened. In cities like Sihanoukville, locals are being driven out by the soaring cost of living as communities find themselves in the shadows of new Chinese casinos.[12]
Despite avoiding public health crises, the COVID-19 pandemic has undeniably accelerated the subjugation of Cambodia and Laos under a new kind of economic imperialism. As much as China’s provision of medical assistance aids these countries, their economic woes threaten to diminish the agency of their citizens as elite-driven politics festers. The global economy has been battered by COVID-19, but China emerges more capable than ever to shape the lives of peoples across Southeast Asia.
Jonathan Banfield is a cop-editor for the Southeast Asia Section of the Synergy Journal. He is a 3rd-year student at the University of Toronto majoring in Peace, Conflict and Justice and minoring in Contemporary Asian Studies and Political Science. Born and raised in Hong Kong, his primary academic interests include democratization and the politics of Chinese development initiatives in the greater South East Asian region and beyond.
Bibliography
Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. “‘No Cambodia Left’: How Chinese Money Is Changing Sihanoukville.” The Guardian, July 31, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/no-cambodia-left-chinese-money-changing-sihanoukville.
Heng, Kimkong and Len Ang. “Who’s Helping Cambodia Weather COVID-19?” The Diplomat, July 8, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/whos-helping-cambodia-weather-covid-19/.
Nyíri, Pal. “Enclaves of Improvement: Sovereignty and Developmentalism in the Special Zones of the China-Lao Borderlands.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 3 (2012): 533-562.
Rainsy, Sam. “China Has Designs on Democracy in Southeast Asia.” Foreign Affairs, June 10, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-06-10/china-has-designs-democracy-southeast-asia.
Strangio, Sebastian. “Laos Stumbles Under Rising Chinese Debt Burden.” The Diplomat, September 7, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/laos-stumbles-under-rising-chinese-debt-burden/.
Xinhuanet. “Cambodian PM thanks China for sending medical experts, supplies for COVID-19 fight.” April 6, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/06/c_138951934.htm.
Xinhuanet. “Construction of China-Laos railway’s Vientiane station starts.” July 4, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/04/c_139187833.htm.
[1] Sebastian Strangio, “Laos Stumbles Under Rising Chinese Debt Burden,” The Diplomat, September 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/laos-stumbles-under-rising-chinese-debt-burden/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Kimkong Heng and Len Ang, “Who’s Helping Cambodia Weather COVID-19?” The Diplomat, July 8, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/whos-helping-cambodia-weather-covid-19/.
[5] Sam Rainsy, “China Has Designs on Democracy in Southeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs, June 10, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-06-10/china-has-designs-democracy-southeast-asia.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “Cambodian PM thanks China for sending medical experts, supplies for COVID-19 fight,” Xinhuanet, April 6, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/06/c_138951934.htm.
[9] Rainsy, “Democracy in Southeast Asia.”
[10] “Construction of China-Laos railway’s Vientiane station starts,” Xinhuanet, July 4, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/04/c_139187833.htm.
[11] Pal Nyíri, “Enclaves of Improvement: Sovereignty and Developmentalism in the Special Zones of the China-Lao Borderlands,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 3 (2012): 556.
[12] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “No Cambodia left: how Chinese money is changing Sihanoukville,” The Guardian, July 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/no-cambodia-left-chinese-money-changing-sihanoukville.
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