Abstract
The study of international development through foreign aid and development assistance has been of increased debate in recent years. Studying the discourse of emerging and powerful donors displays various other forms of relevant political and economic perspectives. The prevalent schools of thought regarding development discourse have largely centered around a liberalism-realism divergence, with idealism bearing increasing significance. All three are relevant when studying Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donors, Japan and the EU, to Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Problems with aid coordination, implementation, and positing one’s own national interests over the needs of recipient states, have led to the manifestation of a severe disconnection between the EU’s idealist-liberalist normative powers, and the actual realist execution of its discourse. Japan, on the other hand, by targeting both pro-aid and anti-aid arguments, has created an all-encompassing approach that forms a hybridization of idealist, liberalist, and realist notions, which unlike the EU, complements rather than contrasts with one another. Comparing the development discourse of both donors, the main argument set forth is that Japan has not only succeeded where the EU has defaulted, but has also set a compelling example for a preferred path for development discourse at large. This is explored through contrasting how EU assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in aid weariness, ineffectiveness, and severe drawbacks such as further peripheralization through an optically realistic-framework, with the infrastructure set forth by Japan grounded in guiding principles of self-help and sustenance resulting in success. Japan’s hybridization of liberalistic, idealistic, and realistic schema into a compact and complementing framework has given Japan a strategic advantage in their aid allocation that has curved fiscal and institutional bottlenecks, which together may greatly inform future scholarship on Official Development Assistance (ODA.)
Keywords: Official Development Assistance, development, East Asian Miracle, foreign aid
Introduction
The study of international development through foreign aid and development assistance has been of increased debate in recent years. Studying the discourse of emerging and powerful donors displays various other forms of relevant political and economic perspectives. The prevalent schools of thought regarding development discourse have largely centered around a liberalism-realism divergence, with idealism bearing increasing significance. All three are relevant when studying Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donors Japan and the EU, to Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. There is an observable disconnect between the EU’s portrayalof a normative and ideological powerrooted in liberalism and idealism and an actual implementation scheme that portrays sentiments of realism, by serving national interests, and also being impaired by them through lack of effectiveness. On the contrary, Japan’s ODA, by utilizing a hybrid approach rooted in all three schools of thought and targeting the right kind of capital, accumulation, and investment, proves that development aid can be both effective and successful. Both are important case studies when deciphering effective development strategies.
Theories of Aid
The post-Second World War period introduced an international political climate in which dialogue and discourse pertaining to development and growth have been largely championed by discussions of foreign aid and development assistance. Important both for its foundations in reconstructing the international economic world order after the devastations of the war, as well as its important —albeit highly contested—foundation as a source of international recognition of responsibility, foreign aid has become a very significant topic in development discourse. Perhaps even more remarkable is how foreign aid as a promoter of growth and development has garnered widespread support on an international scale.[1] Notwithstanding that there certainly exist critics of this stance, the widely held view that foreign aid has an influential effect on underdeveloped countries has helped shape policy decisions and international cooperation over the last few decades. Important to note, however, is that the rationale and reasons for this adherence to development are not as linear as its acceptance as an important part of international growth. Critically, the reasons behind why states engage in foreign aid are far more contested and opaquer. Thus, to understand the development discourse enacted by both Japan and the EU in terms of their aid flows and allocation, it is beneficial to briefly revisit these theories.
There are three main schools of thought when discussing aid theories; realism, idealism, and liberalism. Realists argue that foreign aid is simply a strategic political tool.[2] Foreign aid, here, is not allocated first and foremost as a means of an international obligation to the promotion of peace, prosperity, and development; but rather, shaped by the political significance of the recipient countries, in terms of trade, national interests and other relative gains. Scholars have amplified this realist stance by citing aid flow from advanced-industrial countries (AICs) to Africa throughout the Cold War as being grounded in the “strategic imperative of the containment of communism”.[3] The quality and quantity of aid flows here is thus established based on a recipient state’s intrinsic strategic value, as opposed to an egalitarian stance on development. An important aspect to note, however, is that realists recognize that although development assistance may be guided primarily by strategic incentives and interests, this does not neglect the values and norms of development aid observed in general.[4] Specifically, although political and economic interests may be the guiding force, this does not mean they are the only force. Nor does it signify a complete refusal of adherence to peace, prosperity, and development inherent in the normative framework of development aid.
The realist stance has provided ample debate in the contemporary political playground. Namely, questions surrounding the motivations behind aid flows in the absence of the Cold War, or a threat to the Western alliance has provided idealists and liberalists with a credible foundation.[5] In complete polarization of the realist stance, idealists stress the altruistic and moral obligation of development, arguing that this obligation is grounded in human nature and a desire to ameliorate human welfare.[6] Idealists focus more on recipient need rather than factors influencing donors. Fundamentally, the idealist school of thought views development as a moralistic obligation aimed at achieving international peace and prosperity.
Departing from the total egalitarian nature of the idealist stance, yet still rejecting the argument posed by the realists, liberalism views development as rooted in humanitarian goals, such as the promotion of peace and democracy; however, it also acknowledges the power of both domestic factors and donor bureaucracies, such as NGOs and political parties, in influencing donor coordination and shaping the aid allocation agenda.[7] Thus, the utopian notions of moral obligations inherent in idealism, and the “strategic imperative” inherent in realism, are both intrinsically intertwined and mediated in the liberalist perspective. Liberalism has gained impressive traction in recent years, with the foreign aid debate oftentimes being reduced to a polarizing split between liberalism and realism.
Important in the discussion of foreign aid is also the pro-aid and anti-aid arguments. Simply put, pro-aid scholars rely on development theory in suggesting that foreign aid is both important and necessary in addressing capital, foreign exchange, and technical knowledge deficits in underdeveloped countries, while anti-aid scholars argue that exogenous efforts are counterproductive, and foreign aid serves as a form of neo-imperialism that perpetuates a vicious cycle of unequal and disparate North-South relations.[9] Pro-aid arguments have idealist and liberalist undertones, while anti-aid scholars essentially take on both dependency theory foundations, as well as the core argument proposed by realists: foreign aid is a strategic tool to serve the wealthy, and keep them wealthy.
These theories of aid are increasingly important when debating and dissecting one state’s success in relation to another state’s failure. Interestingly, in the case of Japan and the EU, both states took on more than one approach. The EU has manufactured a normative power shaped by notions of liberalism and idealism while taking on a realist perspective in the actual execution of their aid flows and allocation. This disconnect is what has served as an impediment to their success. On the other hand, Japan has been very successful in its development assistance discourse because it has been able to create a framework that not only targets and connects the trade-off between liberalism and realism but also addresses the issue of exogenous efforts and unequal relations inherent in anti-aid arguments. Simply put, the EU has succeeded at being an ideological apparatus while failing to implement its agenda, while Japan has been successful in creating a hybrid development discourse that may greatly inform and ameliorate future development aid scholarship.
EU framework
Perhaps one of the most enduring characteristics of the EU is its foundation constructing a normative power that has been recognized on the world stage as a “force for good”[10] which seeks to promote core principles and values such as democracy and human rights. Being one of the largest multilateral donors, the EU has exerted a substantial and observable amount of force in shaping the global agenda on aid. Indeed, with the heavy promotion of poverty alleviation as the affirmed goal of ODA—in addition to core principles such as good governance, sustainable development, environmental protection, and the promotion of education[11]— the EU has successfully coordinated its ideological apparatus to have distinguishable undertones of altruism, in line with notions of idealism and liberalism. The core of the EU framework for development assistance and discourse on the Third World was founded with the Treaty of Lisbon, which promotes fundamental ideals and values such as international peace, security, sustainable development, and human rights, especially the rights of the child.[12] To further emphasize the EU’s idealist framework, there is an explicit mention of “moral obligation”[13] to combat global poverty in Article 1 of the European Consensus on Development. Working in tandem, this kind of development framework helps metastasize the EU’s identity in the arena of foreign policy as one grounded in benevolence and social conscience.
These fundamental values are again reiterated in the framework and development discourse for Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, in the European Strategy for Africa, it states that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this.”[14] However, the EU’s ideological apparatus seems to suffer a severe disconnect with the actual implementation of its aid architecture. Sub-Saharan Africa can tremendously inform the realist-liberal dialogue and debate that has remained largely unanswered for years. On the one hand, doubt over the realist argument is cast when one takes into account donors such as Germany funneling substantial aid into countries like Malawi, with no direct strategic imperative in the Sub-Saharan African region.[15]On the other hand, the lack of a pattern of aid dispersal on the basis of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, or the ones most successful at democratization or institutionalizing a strong human rights approach, serves as a strong basis to conclude that the EU utilizes development aid as a political tool to increase its structural power in the international political arena.[16]
Aid Effectiveness
Despite its successful manufacturing of an altruistic identity, much scholarly insight has been garnered into debunking the motivations behind the EU’s development aid scheme. Carbone[17] argues that there exists a disconnect between the EU’s aid actorness and its aid effectiveness. Here, the definition of aid actorness is based on autonomy and cohesiveness, with the EU facing difficulty with its convergence of preferences. Specifically, there exists a disengagement between the EU’s member states, and the EU’s institutions, one of them being the European Commission. Heightening this disconnect are issues with the implementation and materialization of actual policy on the ground, which Carbone calls “policy evaporation”[18] and “coordination fatigue.”[19] Amongst other things, one of the many conclusions drawn regarding these impediments is that the EU prioritizes their own national interests, which do not necessarily require the effective execution of their coordination. Insofar as it concerns the cultivation of the recipient country’s development, this has served to undermine the EU’s credibility, which in turn has diminished its aid effectiveness. Simply put, the disunity between the various EU Member States and their interests has only impeded the cogency and performance of aid. Though the general consensus seems to suggest that the EU mimics an aid architecture that seeks to strategically benefit from its development assistance, the actual implementation and efficacy of the individual member states’ aid allocation have been highly fragmentary and disjointed. Critically then, the EU has been far more effective internally: as a normative power that shapes the global agenda, rather than one that has truly made meaningful in-country development.
Against this background, by utilizing a dummy variable model regression to look at the EU’s 2000-2010 aid flows to all 48 Sub-Saharan African recipients, Bountagkidis, Konstantinos, and Frangos[20] have found similar results in their study. Notably, they acknowledge the observable normative presence that the EU has successfully constructed since the beginning of the 2000s, however, they also argue that the pattern of aid flows displays donor interest supersedes recipient need and that macroeconomic factors are more heavily weighed than are humanitarian ones. Reasoning along the same lines, scholars have noted that the EU’s trade relationship with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) further exemplifies the peripheralization of developing countries by the EU, notably Sub-Saharan Africa. It has been argued that the neo-liberal nature of ACP policies, which are heavily skewed by EU interest, has resulted in neither a convincing case for poverty alleviation nor environmental and economic sustainability.[21] The 1975 Lomé Convention, as well as the later Cotonou Agreement, have been heavily criticized as mere manifestations of European colonialism. Specifically, both the aid conditionality and the already limited concessions offered in the Lomé Agreement—which have since been progressively removed—are argued to inevitably harm the Third World as a whole, of which, Africa is expected to be impacted the most.[22] Scholars have noted that these historical ties date back to the Yaoundé Convention of the 1960s, during decolonization period, when the European States used these trade development and economic integration links to simply retain access to strategic interests, such as raw materials and natural resources, which they had previously enjoyed as colonial powers[23] Moreover, amplifying this view is the EU’s development ties with the developing world, which have more recently been stressed as national interest in the face of the continued impasse to reach an agreement at the Doha Development Round.[24]
This dimension of EU colonialism is one that is of increased importance when considering EU self-interest. Take, for example, the case of Ethiopia. EU aid conditionality has been successful at targeting reforms but has heavily decomposed the tenets of partnership that supposedly govern EU development discourse.[25] Rather, there has been a heavy reliance on the part of Ethiopia on the EU, fostering a climate that resembles the conditionality complex of “power-over” relations inherent in colonial rule. Historically the EU has been, and continues to be, a political superpower. The evolution towards painting an international identity of moralistic progressiveness falls in line with the universal shift after 1945 to strive for universal peace and prosperity, and reverse the social, political, and economic damages of the war. This has been further heightened by the salience of international institutions such as the UN, and the global consensus towards an integration of the developing world. Seemingly, as a political powerhouse, the EU must follow suit. However, a look at actual aid flows and allocation, as well as trade links with ACP states, uncover a far more self-serving agenda. Problems with aid coordination, implementation, and positing one’s own national interests over the needs of recipient states, has manifested a severe disconnect between the EU’s idealist and liberalist normative powers, and the actual realist execution of its discourse. It has created a deadlock on the matter of integration of aid and actual financing development.[26] It is this disconnect that has put the EU under heavy scrutiny, and inevitably, rendered its development aid as ineffective.
The Case of Japan
In dire contrast to the EU, Japan’s development aid has had a remarkable track record. This can be attributed to its comprehensive and far-reaching approach in terms of targeting both pro-aid and anti-aid sentiments. It has programmed an all-encompassing approach that creates a mix of idealist, liberalist and realist notions, that unlike the EU, complement rather than contrast each other. Japan has procured what scholars call an approach that “apart from reparations and export promotion, [has] also used aid as a form of investment, a confidence-building measure, a solution for bilateral problems, a manifestation of economic power and global leadership, and a tool for buying power and influence in various international organizations.”[27] It is these main tenets that can greatly instruct future discussions and debates on development aid and discourse.
Many factors have influenced the evolution of Japan’s ODA. In the 1950s, foreign aid was a means of reparations after the war. Here is one of the most notable examples of idealist and liberalist discourse. Japan saw development assistance as a humane and moral obligation, paralleled by their adherence to the principle of non-interference. This Japanese aid philosophy according to Takashi Motoki, advanced as a fundamental lesson learned through the plight of war-making, and the subsequent reparation and negotiation processes.[28] In the 1990s, near the end of the Cold War, Japan’s ODA discourse commenced its restructure. No longer being constrained through close alignment to U.S strategic interests, Japan began to improve both the quality and the disposition of its aid. However, it is within this same time frame that domestic and international challenges began to push Japan’s geoeconomic interests and national imperatives, such as export promotion.[29] Thus, here is where Japan succeeded where the EU met its greatest impediment. Rather than shroud its international identity with a moralistic facade and prioritize national interest behind the scenes, Japan manufactured an approach that bridged strategic and impressive integration of its moralistic donor obligation and competitive advantage in terms of its geoeconomic and national interests.[30] This led to a successful development discourse that has been the topic of much scholarly insight in the fields of political science and international relations.
East Asian Miracle
Perhaps the most notable of Japan’s ODA was the aid given to Asia. The aforementioned strategic integration was conducted in a way that prompted the self-sufficiency of the recipient country, complementing partnership, and integrating prevalent and focal theories of development economics, that inevitably led to the paradigmatic case of development assistance success, the East Asian Miracle. The plight of this development assistance arguably began in the late 1960s, when Japan’s economic security was threatened by resource protectionism enacted by a substantial portion of the developing world.[31] In response, Japan began to prioritize its perception on the world stage as a neutral actor. After releasing the “Fukuda Doctrine” in South East Asia, Japan announced its aid expansion and allocation both within and outside Asia.[32] Here, thus, begins the realist infrastructure. Asia was of significant national interest to Japan, hence, the expansion and allocation of aid served not only humanitarian reasons but for strategic ones. By complementing both of these objectives, Japan was able to engineer an approach that was praised as incredibly innovative while also being “straightforward, not miraculous.”[33]
The comprehensiveness of this approach is seen through many lenses. The characteristics attributed to Japan’s development discourse are a “high savings rate and high human capital accumulation in a stable, market-oriented environment.”[34] Japan seemed to depart significantly from the Western “Big Push” tendency, which misinterpreted capital accumulation as the funneling of large amounts of money into recipient economies.[35] The “Big Push” system created a very maladjusted climate, one highly susceptible to corruption and pervasive misuse of money. Japan, instead, focused on the rapid growth of physical and human capital through a myriad of approaches, which included both monetary loans and grants, but also investment in technology, business, human capital, and education. As opposed to the EU, which focused primarily on fiscal and institutional bottlenecks, Japan resisted aid conditionality through filling savings, foreign exchange, and heavy expenditure and investment in technology.[36] Important to note within this analysis is that this approach targets many of the criticisms scholars have posed to defend anti-aid arguments. Namely, critics of aid have argued that the prevalent development discourse, which sees capital as the single most important factor influencing development, does not consider that low levels of technology, poor banking and financial institutions, and ineffective government policies severely impede development.[37] Japan’s innovative approach takes these into consideration and targets them head-on.
The East-Asian Miracle describes the impressive high and sustained growth of eight East Asian economies from 1965-1990. This consists of High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs): Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan; and Newly Industrialized Economies (NIE): South-East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.[38] Japan focused its ODA to these recipient countries to reflect superior accumulation and extensive capacity-building approaches. Some notable characteristics include policy intervention in the form of “targeted and subsidized credits to select industries, protection of domestic imports, subsidies to declining industries, financial support of government banks… and public investment in applied research.”[39] The push towards investment helped emphasize the fundamental principle of self-help. Japan was very hesitant to hinder or involve themselves in domestic affairs of recipient countries, which aided in reducing aid conditionality and weariness but also helped recipient countries become self-sustaining.[40]Additionally, Japan focused heavily on human-capacity building, which included the “Japan Human Resource Development,” promoting cultural interactions, language, and business expertise.[41] Simply put, Japan focused on accumulation, investment, and allocation in a way that guaranteed success for recipients, but that also met Japan’s own national interest and strategic imperatives.
OVOP
The substantive push for self-help is one of the many lessons the East Asian Miracle may offer contemporary development studies. Another common criticism of development aid is on the topic of endogenous development, which essentially views ODA as a stumbling block because it promotes reliance on donors.[42] Japan targeted this through their “One Village One Product” replicability in Asia, an alternative local economic development strategy that was not merely a product specialization, but also an important aspect of social development and human capacity building.[43] This was an initiative that focused on discovering a community product in emerging nations and investing in it in a way that allowed the community to become self-sustaining. This provided an activation of local economies, opportunities for employment, improvement of living standards, and public participation.[44] Not only was this an effective investment in education and technology, but it gave Japan a comparative advantage in terms of market orientation and possible strategic gains. Most importantly, it focused on endogenous development and self-sustenance.
Conclusion
Development discourse is an area of scholarly insight that has been highly contested and critiqued. Under the auspices of idealism, liberalism, and realism, there seems to exist an opaque nature of which theory of aid is most effective. The EU has exemplified that a disconnect between an idealist internal (normative) and realist external actorness will result in handicaps such as policy evaporation and aid weariness. Ultimately, it renders aid ineffective. On the other hand, Japan has exemplified that strategic imperative interests may succeed if implemented in a way that still stresses the humanitarian motive of aid and focuses on self-help through capacity-building and targeted investment. Japan’s ODA discourse essentially proves that complementing rather than contrasting these theories of aid will deliver a competitive and valuable advantage.
Angelika Kuzma is a fourth year student doing a double degree in Political Science and Criminology and Socio-legal Studies at the University of Toronto. She has an interest in international development studies and foreign affairs. She will be pursuing a J.D degree, with her intended focus being on international criminal law and sustainable development.
Bibliography
Amsden, Alice H. “Why isn’t the whole world experimenting with the East Asian model to develop?: Review of the East Asian miracle.” World Development 22, no. 4 (1994): 627-633.
Börzel, Tanja A., and Christine Hackenesch. “Small carrots, few sticks: EU good governance promotion in sub-Saharan Africa.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2013): 536-555.
Bountagkidis, Georgios K., Konstantinos C. Fragkos, and Christos C. Frangos. “EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle.” Social sciences 4, no. 1 (2015): 85-116.
Boyer, Yves. “The ESDP and Its Challenges.” Reports and Analyses 19, no. 03 (2003).
Carbone, Maurizio. The European Union and international development: the politics of foreign aid. Routledge, 2007.
Carbone, Maurizio. “Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Relations 27, no. 3 (2013): 341-355.
Crawford, Gordon. “The European Union and democracy promotion in Africa: the case of Ghana.” The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 4 (2005): 571-600.
Dadabaev, Timur. “Japan’s ODA assistance scheme and Central Asian engagement: Determinants, trends, expectations.” Journal of Eurasian studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 24-38.
Davenport, Michael. “The allocation of foreign aid: A cross section study, with special reference to the Pearson Commission Report.” Bulletin of Economic Research 22, no. 1 (1970): 26-42.
Flint, Adrian. Trade, poverty and the environment: the EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific bloc. Springer, 2008.
Holden, Patrick. In search of structural power: EU aid policy as a global political instrument. Routledge, 2016.
Hurt, Stephen R. “Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest?.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2010): 159-168.
Jerve, Alf Morten. “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance? Summary record of seminar held in Oslo, December 2006.” CMI Report2007, no. 12 (2007).
Michel, Louis. The European consensus on development. Development DE 129, June 2006. 2006.
Natsuda, Kaoru, Kunio Igusa, Aree Wiboonpongse, and John Thoburn. “One Village One Product–rural development strategy in Asia: the case of OTOP in Thailand.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 33, no. 3 (2012): 369-385.
Omoruyi, Leslie O. Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa. Routledge, 2017.
Page, John. “The East Asian miracle: four lessons for development policy.” NBER macroeconomics annual 9 (1994): 219-269.
Pankaj, Ashok Kumar. “Revisiting foreign aid theories.” International Studies 42, no. 2 (2005): 103-121.
Rudner, Martin. “Japanese official development assistance to Southeast Asia.” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (1989): 73-116.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Shahid Yusuf, eds. Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. The World Bank, 2001.
“Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.” Official Journal of the European Union C306 (2007): 1–271.
Trinidad, Dennis D. “Japan’s ODA at the crossroads: disbursement patterns of Japan’s development assistance to southeast Asia.” Asian Perspective (2007): 95-125.
Weston, Ann. “The Uruguay Round–Costs and Compensation for Developing Countries.” Geneva: UNCTAD (1995).
Yamazaki, Jun. “A comparative analysis of one village one product (OVOP) and its replicability in International Development.” Institute of Social Studies (2010).
[1] Pankaj, Ashok Kumar. “Revisiting foreign aid theories.” International Studies 42, no. 2 (2005): 103-121.
[2] Bountagkidis, Georgios K., Konstantinos C. Fragkos, and Christos C. Frangos. “EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle.” Social sciences 4, no. 1 (2015): 85-116.
[3] Omoruyi, Leslie O. Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa. Routledge, 2017, 2.
[4] Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116.
[5] Omoruyi, Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa, 2017; Boyer, Yves. “The ESDP and Its Challenges.” Reports and Analyses 19, no. 03 (2003).
[6] Bountagkidis, Konstantinos, and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116.
[7] Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116; Omoruyi, Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa, 2017.
[8] Omoruyi, Leslie O. Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa. Routledge, 2017.
[9] Pankaj, “Revisiting foreign aid theories.”, 103-121.
[10] Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 88.
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.” Official Journal of the European Union C306 (2007): 1–271.
[13] Michel, Louis. The European consensus on development. Development DE 129, June 2006. 2006, 4.
[14] European Strategy for Africa, 2000 as cited in Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116.
[15] Omoruyi, Contending theories on development aid: Post-Cold War evidence from Africa, 2017
[16] Hurt, Stephen R. “Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest?.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2010): 159-168; Holden, Patrick. In search of structural power: EU aid policy as a global political instrument. Routledge, 2016.
[17] Carbone, Maurizio. “Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Relations 27, no. 3 (2013): 341-355.
[18] Carbone, “Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.”, 344.
[19] Ibid, 350.
[20] Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116.
[21] Hurt, “Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest?”, 159-168; Flint, Adrian. Trade, poverty and the environment: the EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific bloc. Springer, 2008.
[22] Weston, Ann. “The Uruguay Round–Costs and Compensation for Developing Countries.” Geneva: UNCTAD (1995).
[23]Bountagkidis, Konstantinos and Frangos,”EU development aid towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring the normative principle”, 85-116.
[24] Hurt, “Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest?.”, 159-168.
[25] Börzel, Tanja A., and Christine Hackenesch. “Small carrots, few sticks: EU good governance promotion in sub-Saharan Africa.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2013): 536-555.
[26] Carbone, Maurizio. The European Union and international development: the politics of foreign aid. Routledge, 2007.
[27] Trinidad, Dennis D. “Japan’s ODA at the crossroads: disbursement patterns of Japan’s development assistance to southeast Asia.” Asian Perspective (2007): 96.
[28] Jerve, Alf Morten. “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance? Summary record of seminar held in Oslo, December 2006.” CMI Report2007, no. 12 (2007).
[29] Trinidad, “Japan’s ODA at the crossroads: disbursement patterns of Japan’s development assistance to southeast Asia.” , 95-125.
[30] Rudner, Martin. “Japanese official development assistance to Southeast Asia.” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (1989): 73-116.
[31] Trinidad, “Japan’s ODA at the crossroads: disbursement patterns of Japan’s development assistance to southeast Asia.” , 95-125.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Amsden, Alice H. “Why isn’t the whole world experimenting with the East Asian model to develop?: Review of the East Asian miracle.” World Development 22, no. 4 (1994): 627.
[34] Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Shahid Yusuf, eds. Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. The World Bank, 2001, 151.
[35] Rudner, “Japanese official development assistance to Southeast Asia.”, 73-116.
[36] Jerve, “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance? Summary record of seminar held in Oslo, December 2006.”
[37] Pankaj, “Revisiting foreign aid theories.”, 103-121.
[38] Page, John. “The East Asian miracle: four lessons for development policy.” NBER macroeconomics annual 9 (1994): 219-269.
[39] Dadabaev, Timur. “Japan’s ODA assistance scheme and Central Asian engagement: Determinants, trends, expectations.” Journal of Eurasian studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 235.
[40] Jerve, “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance? Summary record of seminar held in Oslo, December 2006.”
[41] Dadabaev, Timur. “Japan’s ODA assistance scheme and Central Asian engagement: Determinants, trends, expectations.” Journal of Eurasian studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 224-238.
[42] Natsuda, Kaoru, Kunio Igusa, Aree Wiboonpongse, and John Thoburn. “One Village One Product–rural development strategy in Asia: the case of OTOP in Thailand.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 33, no. 3 (2012): 369-385.
[43] Yamazaki, Jun. “A comparative analysis of one village one product (OVOP) and its replicability in International Development.” Institute of Social Studies (2010).
[44] Yamazaki, Jun. “A comparative analysis of one village one product (OVOP) and its replicability in International Development.” Institute of Social Studies (2010).
Leave a Reply