Abstract: This article surveys China’s strategic governance approach to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s hallmark foreign policy program, in terms of its implications for the liberal international order. China employs a form of quasi-multilateral diplomacy, utilising both bilateral and multilateral governance structures, with respect to the BRI which is indicative of Beijing’s intentions to engage in broader regional and global political-economic affairs. The BRI can, therefore, be viewed as a sign of China’s potential global leadership to come. The details of China’s bi- and multi-lateral relationships under the auspices of the BRI reflect a vast governance network of Sino-centric policies, alliances, and institutions that enlarge China’s influence in the emerging world order. China’s diverse governance approach is telling of the strategic levers of diplomacy authorities will pursue to adjust the international order more commensurate with its present-day strength.
Keywords: China, Belt and Road Initiative, International order, Bilateral, Multilateral
China’s swift economic and technological rise under President Xi Jinping has equipped the world’s second-largest economy with ample industrial resources and regional clout to shift the balance of power in the existing liberal order. Encouraged by a host of government campaigns including the “Made in China 2025 Plan” and the “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” Chinese companies have the roadmap, funding, and support to fashion world-class technologies and carry out extensive industrial upgrading. The whole-of-state strategy aimed at harnessing indigenous innovative capacity is generating favourable returns. Continued success in this area is crucial for Beijing to realise its ambitious leadership goals in strategically important sectors of the economy ranging from telecommunications to manufacturing. Coupled with increasing military strength, the trajectory of China’s development and ability to fulfil national strategies through its authoritarian state-capitalist model gives credence to China’s regional hegemonic position and, more broadly, its great power status. China’s domestic proficiency in reaching state-designated targets complements the resolve of its foreign policy objectives determined to safeguard and advance national interests. The pursuit of these goals echoes Beijing’s rising confidence in implementing its increased power in areas key to China’s economic prosperity.[1] China’s growing influence, however, is raising questions about Beijing’s respect of the international order. Put simply, China is growing in power and might not be sticking to the liberal world order it is presumably inheriting.
The theory of hegemonic stability suggests that great powers (i.e. hegemons) use their preponderance to unilaterally provide and uphold some semblance of international order to create peace and stability.[2] The U.S.-led global order that emerged in the post-World War II moment was carried by the U.S.’s economic and military pre-eminence and therefore saw the United States assume global leadership, largely through multilateral institutions, in the provision of public goods. More recently, however, global political trends like the resurgence of right-wing populism in Western countries and its associated rejection of multilateral overreach are contributing to changing patterns of global leadership.[3] Thus, a firm characterisation of the current international system is mired in the face of a malleable geopolitical landscape but nonetheless appears to be one of increasing bipolarity with the United States as the chief superpower and China closing the gap.[4] This bifurcation marks a noticeable shift from the “Pax Americana” world order. Bipolar systems are understood by structural realists to be more peaceful because great powers can stabilise each other through internal or external balancing like the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in during the Cold War.[5] But as competition over advanced technologies intensifies and the U.S.-China trade war looms, political and economic antagonism between today’s superpowers can still have vast repercussions for the entire world. Therefore, the structure of the emerging bipolar international order is tenuous, highlighting the need for responsible global leadership in a highly globalised world with a growing number of cross-border problems.
The type of leadership China will exhibit within the world order can largely be understood through its governance approach to managing international cooperation. President Xi remarked at the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2016, “the world order should be decided not by one country or a few, but by broad international agreement.” He continued, “it’s for the people of all countries to decide through consultations what international order and global governance systems can benefit the world and people of all nations.”[6] Xi’s comments paint a sanguine image of an equitable international system that embraces the interests of all relevant stakeholders to reach multilateral resolutions to global problems and opportunities. However, behind the hopeful rhetoric that Beijing projects is a multi-pronged arsenal of overlapping bilateral and multilateral relationships that are selectively deployed in the advancement of China’s geo-strategic interests. Put together, China’s amalgamation of bi- and multi-lateral accords reflect an extensive governance network of Sino-centric policies, alliances, and institutions that enlarge China’s influence in the world order. Given its nationalistic attitude, capable government, and flourishing private sector, China’s diverse governance approach is telling of the strategic levers of diplomacy authorities will exhaust to align its international agenda with the “China-first” outlook galvanising domestic growth. If this is any indication of China’s leadership disposition, it suggests at the very least that Xi’s comments can neither be construed as purely altruistic nor entirely transparent.
China’s reputation within the international community has been blemished by criticisms of not acting as a team player for its penchant of free-riding on the actions of other international actors.[7] China’s recent rise has therefore led some scholars to claim the liberal order is in jeopardy, but the extent to which China understands and appreciates the existing order is understated.[8] Amidst ongoing competition with the United States, while President Trump continues to broadcast his disapproval of ostensibly outdated, unfavourable multilateral arrangements, China is maintaining a brand of quasi-multilateral diplomacy in terms of international cooperation. Against the backdrop of American isolationism, China appears to show its appreciation for the existing international order more than is sometimes acknowledged by working through international organisations.[9] This isn’t to gloss over China’s “gaming” of the multilateral institutions it is active in to aid its own growth. For instance, China engages in “convenient compliance” to accelerate economic development by temporarily using non-compliant policy tools during critical stages of development but ultimately bears a compliant status within the World Trade Organization (WTO) by adhering to Dispute Settlement Body rulings, allowing a transitional economy like China to pursue advantageous industrial policies while manoeuvring WTO rule enforcers.[10] Yet, it would be misguided not to point out that although China uses international institutions to strengthen its grip on the global economy, Beijing has neither the desire nor ability to completely usurp an existing order that it, for the most part, already gains from.[11] China enjoys substantial benefits from its participation in liberal order institutions, such as the UN Security Council (where it has veto power) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (where its voting rights have increased).[12] Moreover, China has amplified its efforts to be a dependable leader within the international order in the provision of public goods from contributing handsomely to UN peacekeeping forces to establishing new development institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.[13] The most prominent example of Chinese global leadership in this regard is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project the Chinese government views as an “important international public good.”[14]
President Xi initially conceived the BRI in 2013 to promote economic integration and export Chinese ingenuity (and currency) across Asia, Europe, and Africa. An official national strategy, the BRI is a vital part of China’s trade and investment vision to promulgate Chinese leadership in global economic cooperation and policy coordination.[15] Under the program, Chinese authorities have promised to deliver trillions of dollars in investment to promote economic development by constructing large-scale infrastructure projects in foreign territories.[16] Over the last decade, China has invested nearly 50% of its GDP towards BRI undertakings.[17] Considerable investment is allocated towards roads, rail, airports, ports, pipelines, and communications infrastructure.[18] Chinese financing for infrastructure projects is agreed in principle with the expectation that the partner country will award contracts to one of China’s “national champions” to carry out projects.[19] Internationalising Chinese companies benefits China, and Asia more broadly, by alleviating China’s domestic overcapacity problem and closing Asia’s steep infrastructure gap.[20]
The BRI has been likened to the Marshall Plan, [21] a comparison which, to say the least, carries immense weight. In the post-war moment, the United States assumed responsibility to provide aid to restore the economic infrastructure of a ravaged Europe. These efforts were part of the foundation upon which the liberal international order was built. Similarly, the BRI represents China’s attempt to shape the world order. Through the BRI, China aims to project strong global leadership while shrewdly applying its assorted array of international legal instruments to fuel its development aspirations. Already, China has signed over 120 agreements with countries and international organisations to bring them onto the international infrastructure development project.[22] The BRI positions China’s outward-facing economic statecraft as a means of embedding its leadership into the provision of the global economy by fostering stronger international relationships and stimulating synchronised transnational growth. A project of this magnitude has consequential geopolitical stakes. Therefore, the way China approaches BRI governance may offer insights into the character of Chinese global leadership within the world order.
China’s Bilateral Stratagem
China’s stockpile of BRI governance instruments is partly based on “a series of unrelated but nonetheless interconnected bilateral trade pacts and partnerships.”[23] In particular, China utilises non-binding bilateral agreements called Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) which highlight its intentions to engage with other parties through less rigid organisational structures compared to arduous multilateral frameworks.[24] China’s long list of opaque bilateral arrangements are creating a disperse, open-ended governance network under the umbrella of the BRI which can suit China’s national interests by more easily coordinating economic integration and trade liberalisation, pillars of the existing liberal order, on its own terms. As such, this governance approach offers China the opportunity to pursue a larger geo-economic role throughout the Eurasian continent.
Critics view Chinese bilateralism as a form of debt-trap diplomacy empowering China’s unimpeded regional dominance.[25] Debt-trapping in this case refers to how China lures or “traps” developing or underdeveloped countries to borrow money to be used for much-needed infrastructure projects.[26] In 2013, China and Pakistan inked an MOU agreeing to long-term collaboration on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), BRI’s flagship program.[27] Instead, with a fraction of CPEC projects materialising so far, stymied by dwindling foreign reserves and waist-high in debt to Chinese financiers, Pakistan was forced to go to the IMF for financial assistance.[28] It is increasingly likely that Pakistan’s debt will force it to relinquish shares of the CPEC to China.[29] A debt-for-equity exchange of this kind would substantiate long-brewing scepticism associated with the BRI that gained widespread attention in 2017 when Sri Lanka, unable to repay Chinese loans, was forced to lease the strategic Indian Ocean port of Hambantota to China Merchants Ports Holdings, an arm of the Chinese government, on a 99-year lease.[30] These developments underscore China’s hawkish ulterior motives that can be masked behind the prospects of BRI-inspired growth.
By operating bilaterally, China isn’t restrained by multilateral frameworks to delineate its approach to managing debt-distressed countries. This contrasts the governance style used by many major creditor nations who opt to participate in multilateral mechanisms like the Paris Club.[31] While China is an observer at Paris Club meetings, it doesn’t retain member status so it can pursue alternative approaches to handle sovereign defaults.[32] Therefore, China operates largely on an ad hoc basis to manage debt sustainability which may result in debt-strapped countries abdicating strategic sites. Averse to being pawns in China’s geo-strategic schemes, countries including Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sierra Leone have renegotiated or withdrawn from previous BRI agreements.[33] Expectedly, China’s belligerent behaviour suggests its leadership role in the provision of the international order will exercise self-enhancing “winner” strategies to gain competitive advantages, especially in lucrative commercial spaces, thereby extending its sphere of influence in the world.
China’s bilateral strong-arm approach also has concerning geopolitical implications for regional cooperation as countries continue to weigh foreign investment needs against sovereign interests. The China-Cambodia relationship in particular is afflicting unity in Southeast Asia, signalling danger for regional bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, an increasingly important trading partner, and a benefactor of attractive BRI investment.[34] Cambodia’s conduct as chair of the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting — the gathering that left ASEAN unable to issue a joint communiqué responding to Chinese aggression in the Scarborough Shoal — can be thought of as a canary in the coal mine for what is to come if China continues to uninterruptedly court ASEAN member states with the lure of investment.[35]
At the Second Belt and Road Forum on International Cooperation, China and Cambodia, committed to accelerating the implementation of BRI in Cambodia, signed several MOUs to expand the scope of bilateral cooperation.[36] Fearful of agitating a powerful ally and muscular regional hegemon, reliant on Chinese investment, and potentially debt-trapped into subservience, Cambodia is well-positioned to be a mouthpiece for Beijing’s interests within ASEAN. This has far-reaching consequences for regional cooperation in retaliating against security threats ASEAN must vote to act on. This is an especially relevant geopolitical concern as China continues its militarisation of the South China Sea, a strategically significant location for its trillions of dollars’ worth of oil, natural gas, and fishing rights.[37] Under ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making framework, if China overextends its reach in Southeast Asia, a coordinated regional effort is foiled without a vote from Cambodia. China’s attempts to augment its global political and economic foothold through BRI governance is another instructive signal of the character of Chinese leadership that is eroding state sovereignty and the U.S.-led Western security alliance in East Asia. China’s disquieting operations in Southeast Asia are doing more to reinforce calls for ASEAN reform than assuage Asian-Pacific regional blocs that China is a responsible superpower.
China’s Multilateral Governance Investment Scheme
China’s multilateral approach is rooted in its aspiration for greater influence in the U.S.-led international order. As China gradually gained power as a result of rapid economic growth, Beijing grew increasingly dissatisfied with Western dominance in the post-war financial institutions (like the Bretton Woods Institutions) that still govern the liberal order.[38] Hence, China’s geopolitical governance strategy aims to provide an alternative to U.S.-led financial institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank by promoting regional multilateralism, particularly within Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).[39]
President Xi, with the BRI in mind and a desire to create a parallel international financial architecture to rival the West, first proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2013 as a development bank dedicated to lending for infrastructure projects in Asia. Considered China’s “World Bank” for the Asia-Pacific, the AIIB, which officially launched in December 2015, can be viewed as a manifestation of Beijing’s efforts to adjust the international order more commensurate with its present-day strength. Within the AIIB, China provides the largest share of capital and consequently has the greatest voting power. This leadership responsibility represents a watershed moment in China’s bid to play a more active role in global governance.[40] It also establishes a suitable setting for China to engage in strategic governance to use its leadership position in a resourceful multilateral institution to support a national agenda. China deliberately engages in multilateralism to gain geopolitical and geo-economic advantages by directing vehicles of investment in its favour while taking refuge behind the veil of neutrality and legitimation offered by international organisations. China even shoulders global governance leadership roles within regional International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to achieve these ends. Overt Chinese leadership within the MDBs capitalising the BRI like the AIIB and the New Development Bank (NDB) masks China’s tactical laundering of its geo-strategic agenda with robust global governance leadership.
The AIIB acts as a staunch conduit of BRI investment. As succinctly argued elsewhere, “it doesn’t take an expert in the geopolitics of Eurasia to notice that many of the countries that have so far received funding from the AIIB are located along China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”[41] By managing the Belt and Road in tandem with the AIIB, Beijing concurrently projects comprehensive leadership in the international order and aligns the AIIB’s assets to support the BRI. Whereas national strategies like the BRI are understood to be unilaterally pursued by Beijing to nationalistically promote its interests, the AIIB is perceived with less ambivalence.[42] Developing countries are bullish about the AIIB because they believe it will provide them with more financing to support their economic development, and developed countries feel secure because, as a multilateral institution, the AIIB is governed with built-in oversight guidelines to prevent Chinese unilateralism.[43] Furthermore, it has been hinted that China may soon lose its veto power as the number of AIIB member states rise.[44] To circumvent the hostile reputational consequences of the BRI, China strategically applies language in its MOUs to bring bilateral deals into collaboration with the less contentious MDBs. For instance, the terms of financial cooperation in a BRI MOU can open the door for monetary policy coordination in association with the AIIB.[45]
Like the AIIB, the emergence of BRICS coincides with the relative economic decline of the West which opened an opportunity for non-Western powers like China to have greater input in Western-led global governance structures.[46] The Shanghai-based NDB, formerly the BRICS Development Bank, facilitates investment in private and public projects among BRICS partners (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The NDB, steered by strong Chinese leadership, is a prominent example of intra-BRICS economic and political cooperation skewed to bolster Beijing’s interests. The NDB pours money into emerging economies and green energy, sustainable investments.[47] In this capacity, the NDB funnels money into the “Green Belt and Road,” China’s BRI upgrade launched at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 to address China’s sustainable development shortcomings in the BRI.[48]
Operating within multilateral regional blocs like the AIIB and NDB offers China the opportunity to take advantage of its great power preponderance (and its accompanied generous voting share) as well as a dearth of competing interests (which often produce deadlock in large multilateral institutions) so as to spur BRI longevity and efficacy with support and funding. As more countries attach themselves to the BRI network, it will invariably engender more countries to adopt overlapping strategic interests with China. In doing so, there is room for China to broadly implement its Sino-centric interests beyond the scope of regional multilateralism. In this sense, the BRI, AIIB, and NDB do not function simply as economic projects but also represent a diplomatic and strategic exercise to cast durable networks of governance relationships capable of overpowering U.S. policies attempting to contain China’s ascension.[49]
China’s aptitude in using political mechanisms for calculated BRI-related gains and its intentions of accumulating a greater share of power in the world order is evident through its actions in multilateral fora. In finance, China has bypassed the World Bank by lending unilaterally under the BRI and multilaterally through the AIIB and the NDB, all but surely weakening the prominence of Western-led IFIs in the international economic order.[50] Beijing’s multilateral activity within MDBs reveals the discerning style of Chinese statecraft intended to increase Beijing’s say in international monetary affairs and establish international norms of cooperation that reflect China’s interests. Assuredly, China’s peaceful rise and its strategic manoeuvres to tilt the scales of the international order in its favour are not mutually exclusive.
Conclusion: Chinese Leadership Going Forward
The state of the world order today is contested. The balance of power is changing faster than international institutions are. At this moment, China has emerged as a great power unafraid to flex its diplomatic muscle to abuse critical junctures in international politics for the purpose of advancing its geo-strategic interests. China leverages its resourcefulness to score disproportionate bilateral deals while simultaneously taking advantage of its dominant position within regional multilateral forums for policy victories. Consequently, China’s layered BRI governance approach is getting results for Beijing, but this comes at a steep cost to the balance of the liberal economic order.
The intent of Beijing’s quasi-multilateral strategy suggests China is keen on having its voice function as a directive in global affairs and is comfortable engaging in underhand governance operations to reach these ends. Thus, whether Chinese leadership is responsible leadership does not rest, as some suggest, on “China’s ability (and willingness) to truly transition the BRI from opaque bilateral deals to inclusive, results-driven multilateralism.”[51] Both bi- and multi-lateral arrangements are ripe governance structures eagerly pursued under the auspices of Chinese authorities to progress Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions. This shouldn’t necessarily discredit China’s creation of BRI institutional mechanisms and organisations, but it should bring such initiatives under greater scrutiny.
Alex Kaplan is a rising third-year undergraduate student studying political science at the University of California, Berkeley. Alex researches US-China great power competition as a research assistant at the Berkeley APEC Study Center.
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[1] Kevin G. Cai, “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics.” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 114 (July 7, 2018): 831–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1488101.
[2] Benjamin Frankel, Realism: Restatements and Renewal. Psychology Press, 1996.
[3] Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged.” Foreign Affairs, December 8, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-order-rigged.
[4] Cliff Kupchan, “US-China: The Cool War.” Eurasia Group, September 4, 2019. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/us-china-cool-war.
[5] Frankel, Benjamin. Realism: Restatements and Renewal.
[6] Xinhua, “Xi: China to Contribute Wisdom to Global Governance.” China Daily, 2016. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-07/01/content_25933506.htm.
[7] Amitai Etzioni, “Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?” International Affairs 87, no. 3 (May 2011): 539–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00989.x.
[8] Joseph S. Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Seung-Youn Oh, “China’s Race to the Top: Regional and Global Implications of China’s Industrial Upgrading.” Paper presented at “Great Power Competition in the 21st Century: Linking Economics and Security”, October 2019. Berkeley, CA.
[11] Nye, Joseph S. “Will the Liberal Order Survive?”
[12] Ibid.
[13] Kupchan, Cliff. “US-China: The Cool War.”
[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on President Xi Jinping’s Attendance and Chairing of Related Events of the BRF.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 18, 2017. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1455115.shtml.
[15] Zhexin Zhang, “The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Geopolitical Strategy?” swp-berlin. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2, 2018. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Zhang_BCAS_2018_BRI_China_7.pdf.
[16] Sean Gilbert, Ye Wang, and Lihuan Zhou. “Moving the Green Belt and Road Initiative: From Words to Actions.” World Resources Institute, November 8, 2018. https://www.wri.org/publication/moving-green-belt-and-road-initiative-from-words-to-actions.
[17] Kraneshares, “The One Belt One Road Initiative: A New Paradigm in Global Investing.” Kraneshares, March 31, 2019. https://kraneshares.com/resources/presentation/2019_03_31_obor_presentation.pdf.
[18] Joshua P. Meltzer, “China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United States.” Brookings. Brookings, June 28, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-a-view-from-the-united-states/.
[19] Nicholas Crawford, “Growing public debt isn’t the only problem with Chinese lending to the Balkans.” The International Institute for Strategies Studies, March 18, 2020. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/03/gstrat-bri-in-the-balkans.
[20] Lachlan Carey and Sarah Ladislaw, “Chinese Multilateralism and the Promise of a Green Belt and Road.” CSIS. Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 5, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-multilateralism-and-promise-green-belt-and-road.
[21] WSJ, “China’s ‘Marshall Plan’.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, November 10, 2014. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-marshall-plan-1415750828.
[22] Elaine K. Dezenski, “Below the Belt and Road.” FDD. Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, May 2020 https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fdd-monograph-below-the-belt-and-road.pdf
[23] Wade Shepard, “Why The Ambiguity Of China’s Belt And Road Initiative Is Perhaps Its Biggest Strength.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, October 19, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/19/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-really-all-about/#3a297d0be4de.
[24] Donald J. Lewis and Diana Moise, One Belt One Road (“OBOR”) Roadmaps: The Legal and Policy Frameworks. brill. Brill Nijhoff. September 11, 2018. https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004373792/BP000003.xml; Wang, Heng. “China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative.” SSRN. Journal of International Economic Law, December 9, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283660.
[25] Mark Green, “China’s Debt Diplomacy.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/.
[26] TRTWorld, “How China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy Works and What It Means.” TRT World. TRT World, December 13, 2019. https://www.trtworld.com/africa/how-china-s-debt-trap-diplomacy-works-and-what-it-means-32133.
[27] GB Times, “Li Keqiang: China-Pakistan Ties ‘Unbreakable’, Economic Corridor Planned.” gbtimes.com. GB Times, May 23, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140312032536/http://gbtimes.com/china/li-keqiang-china-pakistan-ties-unbreakable-economic-corridor-planned.
[28] Carey, Lachlan, and Sarah Ladislaw. “Chinese Multilateralism and the Promise of a Green Belt and Road.”
[29] Panos Mourdoukoutas, “IMF Won’t Stop China From Turning Pakistan Into The Next Sri Lanka.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, July 4, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/07/04/imf-wont-stop-china-from-turning-pakistan-into-the-next-sri-lanka/#4e8340334cc7
[30] Ranga Sirilal, “Chinese Firm Pays $584 Million in Sri Lanka Port Debt-to-Equity Deal.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 20, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-ports/chinese-firm-pays-584-million-in-sri-lanka-port-debt-to-equity-deal-idUSKBN1JG2Z6.
[31] John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance. “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” Center For Global Development, March 4, 2018. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Nyshka Chandran, “Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments.” CNBC, January 17, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html
[34] Chheang, Vannarith, and Pheakdey Heng. “Cambodian Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative.” NIDS. NIDS ASEAN Workshop 2019 “China’s BRI and ASEAN,” November 2019. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series17/pdf/chapter01.pdf.
[35] Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN Minus X: Should This Formula Be Extended?” RSIS. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 24, 2017. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/co17199-asean-minus-x-should-this-formula-be-extended/#.Xue_5GpKi-8.
[36] Chheang, Vannarith, and Pheakdey Heng. “Cambodian Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative.”
[37] Uptin Saiidi, “Here’s Why the South China Sea Is Highly Contested.” CNBC. CNBC, February 7, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/heres-why-the-south-china-sea-is-highly-contested.html.
[38] Kevin G. Cai, “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics.” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 114 (July 7, 2018): 831–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1488101.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Wade Shepard, “The AIIB One Year In: Not As Scary As Washington Thought.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, January 16, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/01/16/the-aiib-one-year-in-not-as-scary-as-washington-thought/#40f953e25e83.
[42] Cai, Kevin G. “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics.” 831–47.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Shepard, Wade. “The Real Role Of The AIIB In China’s New Silk Road.”
[45] Sebastian Ibold, “Memorundum of Understanding MoU under the Belt and Road Initiative.” Belt and Road Initiative, April 30, 2019. https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/memorundum-of-understanding-belt-and-road-initiative/.
[46] Daya Thussu, “BRI: Bridging or Breaking BRICS?” Global Media and China 3, no. 2 (2018): 117–22. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2059436418792339.
[47] New Development Bank. 2017. NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. NDB. New Development Bank. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf.
[48] Carey, Lachlan, and Sarah Ladislaw. “Chinese Multilateralism and the Promise of a Green Belt and Road.”
[49] Cai, Kevin G. “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics.” 831–47.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Carey, Lachlan, and Sarah Ladislaw. “Chinese Multilateralism and the Promise of a Green Belt and Road.”
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