Authoritarianism, Buddhism, and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: A Critical Inquiry

Abstract: This paper investigates whether Myanmar’s consecutive authoritarian governments and Buddhist monastic community maintain an unacknowledged alliance against the Rohingya. Scrutinising an unacknowledged alliance between the authoritarian state authority and Buddhist monks is vital because it is widely known that they have records of hostile history with each other. The study utilises qualitative research methods such that its data collecting techniques were accomplished with literature studies. It concludes that due to their mutual interests exerting influences on political, religious, and economic landscapes of Myanmar, consecutive authoritarian governments and Buddhist monks of the country strategically maintain an unacknowledged nexus with each other against the Rohingya.

Keywords: Rohingya, Authoritarian Government, Buddhism, Monks, Myanmar.

Introduction 

Myanmar (formerly Burma) is an ethnically diverse country that became a sovereign state in 1948. The country experienced some form of democracy until 1962 when a military coup dismantled its democratic practice replacing it with an authoritarian regime. It has yet to escape that authoritarian black hole. With more than 100 languages and dialects, the ethnic configuration of Myanmar is one of the most complicated mixes in the world.¹ Buddhist people constitute the majority of the population – roughly 90%.² The Rohingya Muslims of the Rakhine state (previously Arakan) of Myanmar is an ethno-religious minority group who have lived in the state for generations.³ However, consecutive authoritarian governments of the country have maintained that the ethno-religious minority is illegal Bengali immigrants having the Chittagong accent of Bangladesh. The Buddhist population of Myanmar also maintains the same view and subscribes to this narrative. Apart from the illegal immigrant tag in Myanmar, there is no denying that the Rohingya have also been repeatedly experiencing systematic and serial violations of their fundamental freedoms in the decades following the establishment of authoritarian rule. The 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar has denied their citizenship rights and made them the largest stateless community in the world. It was expected that Myanmar would walk along democratic lines after its 2010 National Election, and the Rohingya would enjoy their basic rights. Conversely, the reality is that its democracy has been sandwiched between military personnel and extreme Buddhist monks, suggesting that the country has not been an ideal place for the Rohingyas. Put simply, the recent estimate is that, since 25 August 2017, more than 700000 Rohingya refugees have entered Bangladesh to escape the military crackdown of the Myanmar government.⁴

Over the last few years, considerable research articles have emerged to shed light on the reasons for the discrimination and persecution against the Rohingya in Myanmar. Hein⁵ and Alam⁶ demonstrate that British colonialism left legacies of ethnic conflict and set the foundations for politics along ethnic lines in Myanmar — which is unwelcoming to the Rohingya minority. Knuters examines Political Buddhism and argues that it promotes a mono-religious identity in Myanmar and is responsible for the exclusion of the Rohingya from the country.⁷ Ibrahim argues that Myanmar is on the verge of genocide and that without a resolute stance from the international community, the Rohingya crisis may develop into a fully-fledged genocide.⁸ He has blamed not only the direct role of military rulers but also the violent intention of extremist Buddhist monks and the silence of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy for the indescribable plight of the Rohingya.⁹ Ullah reveals the multiple dimensions of injustice faced by the Rohingya because of their religious identity and suggests that both co-ordination and an active role is needed from the international community for a long term solution to the crisis.¹⁰ However, the extant literature has given lukewarm academic attention on what the actual standpoints are between consecutive authoritarian governments and the Buddhist monastic community over the Rohingya issue. Thus, the study aims to investigate whether Myanmar’s consecutive authoritarian governments and the Burmese monastic community, despite their previous records of hostile history with each other, maintain an unacknowledged alliance against the Rohingya. To accomplish the objective of this study, it takes into account the Buddhist monastic community’s role in Burmese politico-religious landscapes since colonisation, the authoritarian political system since 1962 and the background for the rise of authoritarian political culture of the country.

Before starting the discussion of authoritarianism, Buddhism, and the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, religion and politics as well as their relationship with one another need to be clarified. Religion and politics have greatly directed the historical trajectories of human civilisation from its beginning. Religion is, in general, a moral guide of its adherents with a focus on supernatural power whereas politics is the art of how to govern a state. According to Rieffer, “religion as a creed, a cult, a code of conduct and a confessional community often creates individuals who act on its behalf.”¹¹ To define politics, Lasswell states that it is “who gets what, when, how”, thus accentuating competition for scant resources¹² Hanson argues, though, contemporary political scientists, include a different question: “who gets to participate?” This is because many types of individuals, such as peasants, persons of colour, women, lower castes, and ethnic minorities have been deprived of political participation during certain periods of time.¹³ Although the formal separation between state and religion was accomplished by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the landmark treaty could not diminish the role of religion in politics. In fact, having a bearing on the study of government or the theory and practice of statecraft, politics has remained intertwined with religion.¹⁴ Certainly, it is seen that within an integrated political-religious system, people can maintain their respective satisfactory personal identities in a changing worldview and they can also keep the distribution of political and economic power.¹⁵ Besides, dominant religions like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism have the history to provide a “sacred canopy” – legitimising state power from traditional religious empires to modern states e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran etc.¹⁶ Practical issues of religion (i.e. spirituality, symbolism, myths, ritual, scripture and prophecy, cultural worldview, doctrine, organisation, and morality and law) often intend to both endure and influence the politics of a country—whether it be democratic or non-democratic.¹⁷ Particularly, when a country’s political culture falls under a non-democratic orientation rather than a democratic one, the above religious perspectives, if used by a dominant religious group with that state’s authority, can be very threatening to religious and ethnic minorities (such as Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims). Koesel argues that not only do authoritarian political elites fear religious groups’ capabilities of inciting unsteadiness, rebellion, and inviting foreign influence but also that religious communities are afraid of authoritarian states’ coercion and containment.¹⁸ That is why it is observed that an alliance between an authoritarian state regime and religious clerics can be mutually beneficial for both of them. Thus, an authoritarian regime can secure its strategic goals such as regime survival, and rule legitimisation, while religious clerics can boost their religious spirituality and ensure their religious liberty.¹⁹

To accomplish its crucial goals, the paper proceeds as follows. First, it discusses authoritarianism, Buddhism and political Buddhism, and constructivism as the base of our conceptual radar. Second, it investigates the relationship between Buddhism and politics in Myanmar to elaborately understand the Rohingya crisis. Finally, it recapitulates the arguments made in this article.

Some Conceptual Clarifications

Before examining the nuanced causes of the Rohingya crisis, it is pertinent to establish the conceptual radar. Accordingly, authoritarian politics, Buddhism and political Buddhism, and constructivism have been concisely discussed below to guide readers in the entire analysis.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism as a political system is a type of government where power is retained by either one leader or a small group of elites. It may conduct elections and have contact with citizens but the voices of citizens are marginalized.²⁰ This means that authoritarian regimes are run by the arbitrary wills of rulers. This political system poses barriers to the freedom of speech, press, and religion, and it does not follow majority rule nor does it safeguard minority rights (e.g. the rights of the Rohingya Muslims). Casper emphasised the requirement of military support for an authoritarian regime to maintain its basis of legitimacy, which can include law and order or counterinsurgency.²¹ Linz, a proponent of the theory of authoritarian politics, provided a detailed picture by arguing that this type of government has four characteristics: a restriction on the freedom of political institutions, a basis for the legitimacy of regime with easily identifiable social problems, constraints on the freedom and rights of most people, and ill-defined executive power.²² The political culture of independent Myanmar has long been attached to the authoritarian political system responsible for the plight of the Rohingya. It was speculated that the country would become democratic following the 2011 political reformation. The 2008 military-drafted constitution of the country has, nevertheless, blocked the political transition by giving vast authority to the military and has kept three key ministerial sectors ─Defense, Home Affairs, and Border─for them.²³ In fact, the Burmese military institution ignores democratic norms and values and what is apparently observed in democratic terms in Myanmar is nominal.

Buddhism and Political Buddhism

Buddhism is a religion that encompasses spiritual practices and ethical perspectives of the Buddha. The unique features of this belief are: it is not based on a supernatural God and it mainly focuses on the mundane world. The basic instructions of Buddhism are non-violence, non-killing, and the peaceful co-existence of its followers. There are three traditions of this religion: Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana.Jayasuriya has discussed these in an ingenious journal paper.²⁴ Theravada, the oldest school of Buddhism, emphasises self-transformation, and the practice of meditation in obtaining salvation or emancipation through one’s own attempts. In comparison, the Mahayana tradition is very communal in that it leans towards social transformation and social activism. The Vajrayana school shares much in common with these two.²⁵ It can be assumed from the above three Buddhist traditions that Theravada Buddhism is the most peaceful religion practiced by the Buddhist population of Myanmar. The traditional Western perspective of secularism connoting the separation between politics and religion should be set aside in discussing Buddhism because this religion, like Islam, has a political dimension.²⁶ Buddhism has retained its influential leverage on politics from traditional Buddhist empires to modern states such as Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. Buddhism impacts every aspect of Myanmar’s social and political life.²⁷ Political Buddhism is a political ideology and is a strategic tool for political and religious actors of the country. Knuters has elaborately discussed it in his landmark Master’s thesis. He argues that Political Buddhism is the politicization of Buddhism for the advantages of Buddhists and it can be used by both state and non-state actors.²⁸ He has used religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism as its building blocks. Both are based on religious and cultural sameness and so they are exclusionary to the other ethno-religious groups. Politically promoting the religion has been problematic in Myanmar for those who believe and follow different other religions such as Islam and Christianity.²⁹ For the Rohingya, political Buddhism acts efficiently to segregate them from the mainstream Burmese society by making them politically, economically, and socially vulnerable.³⁰

Knuters’ graphic portrait has clarified about the political ideology in the Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Political Buddhism.³¹

As depicted in the figure, the green shows that the foundation of political Buddhism as an ideology was cemented by Myanmar’s authoritarian history, and Buddhism as the national religion. The blue represents Burmese nationals including the rulers of Myanmar as actors and their goal is to make the country ethnically homogenous, whereas red depicts the procedures of political Buddhism as a weapon against the ethnic groups. First, it excludes non-ethnic Burmese. Second, it segregates ethnic minorities from society; then finally, physical violence is used to get rid of opponents of the ideology.

Constructivism

Constructivism is a social theory, which “makes claims about the nature of social life and social change”.³² In other words, constructivists claim what we know about the world is socially constructed. This denotes the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge that is also called ontology and epistemology in academic terms.³³ Green and Sheer argue “constructivists see ethnic identities and ethnic conflicts as the product of concrete historical process”.³⁴ Maintaining some similarities with the above argument, Kaufman moots that for the advocates of constructivism, language, history, symbol, and cultural orientation play vital roles to incite and sustain ethnic conflict.³⁵ Smith offers a deep argument regarding it. For Smith, even though ethnic identities are constructed, like primordial identities they can generate emotional glue and profound sense for that group by being internalised and institutionalised with their commonalities.³⁶ Distinct religious, social and linguistic identities of Burmese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims and their different colonial experiences have generated antagonism between them, reflecting in their several ethnic conflicts.

Buddhism and Politics in Myanmar ─Engaging with the Rohingya Conundrum

As stated earlier, the Peace of Westphalia could not entirely diminish the role of religion in politics despite it being considered the marker of the formal separation between state and religion in the history of modern states. Instead, the appearance of religion has increased in the political affairs of states not merely for the benefits of state leaders but also religion clerics themselves. Religion often plays vital roles to incite violence in different political contexts. One aspect of this is that non-democratic states, particularly authoritarian ones, tend to repress and discriminate against ethnic minorities as they are highly favourable towards one religious group.³⁷ In this context, Myanmar is not exceptional from the beginning of the pro-Buddhist authoritarian rule of the country.

British Colonialism and Buddhism

The prestigious position of Theravada Buddhism as a spiritual guide in Burmese state affairs was first institutionalised in 1057.³⁸ This was prevalent until the British occupation of Burma in 1886. Since Britain incorporates secular politics, which ignores the role of religion in the political domain of the state, monks opposed its rule in Burma. As part of their resistance, they actively participated in two Anglo-Burmese wars in 1825 and 1852 against the colonial power that then led to several rebellions against the British in 1886. During British rule, the Burmese king was disposed of, Buddhism was sidelined from Burma, and Buddhists were deprived of economic, political, and social aspects of the country.

On the other hand, British colonialism favoured the Muslim and Christian minorities of Burma. The British had this record to favour particular minority groups in order to strengthen their colonial grip in some of their colonies where majority groups showed disobedience to them: for instance, they preferred minority Tamils in Sri Lanka to the defiant Sinhalese majority. In Burma, the number of churches and mosques increased while Pagodas decreased during the colonial period.³⁹ Compared with the majority Burmese, the Muslims, especially the Rohingya, were economically advantageous position. The Village Amendment Act of 1924 by Britain, furthermore, provided Muslim communities religious and cultural autonomy.⁴⁰

To be sure, biased treatment by the British between the ethnic minorities and the majority Burmese created hostile ethnic polarisation in Burma. Riots in 1930 and 1938 were unleashed in some parts of Burma against the immigration of Indian workers and Muslims by jobless Burmese supported by monks who then insistently reiterated that “to be Burmans is to be Buddhist”.⁴¹ Moreover, at that time, monks also repeatedly said that Muslims to be the ‘enemy number one’ ─“exploiting our economy and seizing our women, we are in danger of racial extinction”.⁴² More than 400 Indian workers and Rohingya Muslims were killed, over 3000 were wounded, and several mosques were destroyed in those riots.⁴³

The unfriendly British policies towards Burmese Buddhists not only generated ethnic hatred in Burma but also made monks agitated to first incite Buddhist nationalist reaction against the British. In 1906, when political activity was curtailed by Britain, the Young Men’s Buddhist Association was established against the colonial power. It was a religious organization attached to Buddhism for promoting political aims and interests to develop and spread nationalist sentiment across the country.⁴⁴ In a nutshell, British colonialism generated ethnic hatred, downgraded the role of Buddhism in social and political fields, and created extremely violent mindsets among monks to defend Buddhism in Burma.

The Premature Death of Democracy with the Rise of Authoritarianism

The role of a nationalist group of secular-minded people in Burma surfaced from the 1930s with the formation of the Thakins led by General Aung San against British colonialism.⁴⁵ Opposing the monastic intervention in secular affairs, San described his organisation as “the only non-racial, non-religious, and impersonal movement that ever existed in Burma”.⁴⁶ He emphasised, through his statement, the planned engagement of all ethnic groups of Burma to liberate it from Britain.

In contrast, San’s appeal could not initially make charms for the pro-British minority groups such as the Rohingya to go against colonial Britain with whom they had good-hearted relations going against the interests of ethnic Burmese. World War II justifies this clam. When the invading Japanese occupied Burma, Rohingya Muslims of Burma cooperated with the British while ethnic Burmese sided with the Japanese. Their strategic position with the British generated suspicions among Burmese Buddhists about their loyalty towards Burma. Consequently, Burmese Buddhists in connivance with the Burma Independence Army (BIA) took revenge by killing 100000 Rohingya and driving out 50000 across the border of Bangladesh.⁴⁷

Aung San, the architect of independent Burma, was a charismatic leader who was finally able to take all ethnic groups of Burma under an umbrella before its formation. Under San’s leadership, the 1947 Panglong Agreement assured the demands of autonomy and federalism of minority groups would be met.⁴⁸ He stated that the state would be inclusive and all who lived within its borders were now to be deemed as Burmese citizens.⁴⁹ His political philosophy was a cornerstone in the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma to have its secular and democratic characteristics. Sadly, San’s assassination before the declaration of the independence of Burma on 4 January 1948 left a volatile political atmosphere in the nascent country. In that situation, U Nu became the first Prime Minster of independent Burma in 1948. During his tenure, several insurgent groups emerged and they virtually hijacked the state mechanism of Burma. They made two different political demands: the communist groups fought for the replacement of democracy with communism while ethnic minorities struggled for the unimplemented promise of federalism and autonomy.⁵⁰ All these cornered the civilian government and eventually led to a successful military coup in 1962 by Ne Win.

It is arguable whether U Nu had keen interests in furthering Buddhism in Burma. In a ground-breaking report of the Human Rights Watch it was, found that Nu mainly promoted Buddhism in Myanmar to undercut the power of communists.⁵¹ Whatever ways Buddhism was applied for political purposes during the parliamentary system of the country it was not used as a strategic weapon to target the Rohingya. The Rohingya were also not deprived of basics rights at that time. They actively participated in all elections. They were even officially recognised by the parliamentary government as one of the indigenous ethic groups of Burma.⁵² The authoritarian government of Burma has gradually curtailed all these rights.

The Trap of Authoritarianism since the 1962 Military Coup

A particular manifestation of the authoritarian political system derives from military regimes.⁵³ The year 1962 when General Ne Win took power from the civilian government was a political watershed moment for Burma. From that time, the state has been regulated by either direct or indirect military rule. Win’s Revolutionary Council, known as the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), controlled the country for more than two decades. Amid a pro-democracy movement in 1988, General Saw Maung staged a military coup that again established a military tutelage with the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to rule Myanmar which ended the Win era. Interestingly, the military of Myanmar unleashed democratic practice in 2010 because of domestic and international pressures and has seemingly withdrawn itself from the apex of power in 2011.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Myanmar still remains under the control of a quasi-civilian regime that is a military regime with a cosmetic civilian visage. This indicates that the militarily generated democracy in Myanmar does not indicate an escape from its long authoritarian political history. Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution largely substantiates this claim. One-fourth of parliamentary seats are reserved for military members of Myanmar.⁵⁵ This gives them political leverage to intervene in the decision-making process of the country for their favour. Moreover, as stated earlier, the present Constitution keeps three key ministerial sectors─Defense, Home Affairs, and Border─for active military officials.⁵⁶ Consequently, civilian leaders have become sidelined from the security environment of Myanmar. Apart from these, the military has now been maintaining a repressive stance towards oppositional political parties and ethnic minorities—particularly the Rohingya. All these points echo that Myanmar is again trapped in the authoritarian political system.

The Relational Picture between Consecutive Authoritarian Governments and Buddhist Monks against the Rohingya ─An Unacknowledged Alliance

The relationship between the Sangha and Myanmar’s authoritarian government is complex and has determined the unfortunate plight of the Rohingya in a considerable way. Monks are generally prohibited to participate in political activities unless the public opinion expects them to, with regard to the Vinaya (the monks’ code of discipline). In the history of Myanmar, monks guided kings in ethical perspectives. It is further seen in the cultural tradition of Myanmar that there are three types of people worthy of being worshipped: monks are the first before parents and teachers.⁵⁷ This provides monks adequate public legitimacy which they can utilise as they see fit. Now, before exploring whether there is an unacknowledged alliance between monks and authoritarian governments and monks over the Rohingya of Myanmar, I will focus first on their hostile history to help us clearly conceptualise the trajectory of their relationship. There were several episodes that indicated monks having shown resentment and resistance through demonstrations against the BSPP. Monks, for example, participated in occasional labour and student uproars from 1962 to early 1970s and the U Thant Funeral Crisis in 1974 to mobilise anti-government demonstration. Like many protesters, monks faced a military crackdown and certain numbers of them were also arrested.⁵⁸

Perceiving that not any political parties or insurgent group other than Sangha would directly threaten his military regime, Win was resolute in his desire to control it. In 1980, the Supreme Sangha Council (SSC) was established to augment the control of the state over the Sangha (Burmese monastic community) so that monks could not threaten the authoritarian regime of Win. It did not mean that he was against Buddhism. Like all authoritarian rulers of Myanmar, Win has used Buddhism to serve his regime interests. He even started propagating Buddhism in the traditional royal style of Burmese monarchs.⁵⁹ He politically utilised Buddhism for three reasons: to establish Buddhist Nationalism and a unitary state system, as well as to obtain legitimacy from monks.⁶⁰ He endeavoured to do these to strengthen his government power and legitimacy. So, Buddhism had initially been politicized. However, the SSC failed to regulate the engagement of monks in political platforms during the rule of the BSPP government and the period following it. For instance, monks mobilised the pro-democracy uprising with students and many people of various professions in 1988 and the Saffron Revolution in 2007 against authoritarian regimes for economic and political issues. In addition to the latter point, monks also sacrificed their lives in both cases to military crackdown where thousands of them were imprisoned.⁶¹

Notwithstanding their divergences, both the Sangha and the military have convergences. It is without doubt that they struggled to make Burma an independent state and that they committed the Rohingya massacre in 1942. Besides this, another salient point of their confluence is that they want the exclusion of the Rohingya Muslims from independent Myanmar. Now, the rest of this subsection will discuss their role of continuing convergence in repressing the Rohingya and expelling them from the country.                       

Assuming power, President Win dissolved social and political organisations of the Rohingya, closed Muslim religious schools, and stopped the establishments of new mosques. His government forcefully took the Rohingya’s government-issued identity cards that were given to the Rohingya during the previous parliamentary government system to confirm their citizenship status in Burma.⁶² Following this, the extreme nationalist leaning of many Buddhist monks was exposed during the 1973 population census of Myanmar. By the permission of the government to the Muslim minority of the Western Rakhine state to identify themselves as the Rohingya, nationalist monks warned to boycott the census. The government, then, announced that the Rohingya had an opportunity to register if they identify themselves ‘Bengali’, a term which is used against the minority to justify that they are illegal immigrants who have come to Myanmar from present-day Bangladesh. This governmental strategy made the ethnic minority uncounted.⁶³ The military government, subsequently, enacted the Emergency Immigration Act in 1974, which made it necessary for all citizens to carry identity cards (National Registration Certificates). The Rohingya, though, were only offered Foreign Registration Cards.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Win government took two evil steps against the Rohingya. The first was “Operation Nagamin” conducted in 1978 to screen out foreigners. It, in fact, targeted the Rohingya Muslims. The military action of this campaign forcefully moved 200000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. Under mounting international pressure, Burma signed the 1978 Repatriation Agreement with Bangladesh and ensured the return of the Rohingya refugees based in Burma.⁶⁵

Second, the 1982 Citizenship Law spearheaded by the BSPP government has made the Rohingya stateless. Besides them, the law has also crossed out Panthay (Chinese Muslims), Bashu (Malay Muslims), and six other ethnic groups.⁶⁶ The previous parliamentary government acknowledged 144 ethnic groups while the Law includes 135 of them. A crucial point regarding the Law is that it was made not long after the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. Another point was that it was based on indigenous/racial criteria to intentionally exclude the Rohingya from the country. In both cases, the 1978 military operation and the 1982 Citizenship Law directed mainly against the Rohingya, the Buddhist monastic community remained silent. It certainly generates skepticism with the normative position of Buddhist monks towards the welfare of particular non-Buddhist citizens of the country. Overall, the Win era brought a tectonic shift of the statuses of the Rohingya ─from ethnic minority and a common enemy of Burmese Buddhists to the largest stateless community around the world. Win had used several strategies from 1962 to make the Rohingya stateless that peaked in 1982. The trap of statelessness has perpetuated the plight of the Rohingya by depriving them of basic amenities from their motherland and further by being targets of persecution by authoritarian governments and monks of Myanmar.           

The subsequent authoritarian governments of Myanmar have virtually followed what Ne Win did against the Rohingya and they have been able to earn support and non-resistance from Buddhist monks over repressive Rohingya policies. Coming into power in 1988, The State Law and Order Restoration Council integrated Buddhism into its slogans, one of which is “one race, one language and one religion”.⁶⁷ This slogan of the military regime reiterates ethnic Burmese nationalism, which was first ignited by nationalist Buddhist monks against Britain and several ethnic groups including the Rohingya during the colonial period of Myanmar. The SLORC started resettling ethnic Burmese in the Muslim areas of Rakhine in late 1989.⁶⁸ The resettlement program was initiated to strike an ethnic balance with the Rohingya so that they could not maintain their demographic and political dominance in Rakhine. In addition, the armed force of Myanmar under the dictation of the SLORC carried out Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation against the Rohingya from 1991 to 1992 on the pretext of countering the Rohingya insurgency. Nearly 300000 Rohingya had to again take shelter in Bangladesh for this military operation. With the help of the United Nations, Bangladesh reached a Joint Statement with Myanmar for the repatriation of the Rohingya and Myanmar ultimately agreed to take them back in April 1992.⁶⁹ In this case, the standing of Buddhist monks as a moral pillar of Burmese politics was also oblivious.  

Despite all these, optimism spread in 2010 over the fact that the country was going to be ruled by a civilian government with political reforms that could guarantee the basic freedoms of the Rohingya. However, the country could not yet escape its authoritarian political nature. Expelling the Rohingya from Myanmar helps the Myanmar government be favourable towards the majority of Buddhists not only in a religious but also from an economic perspective. In 2015, a UK government agency published a report that said Myanmar is replete with huge natural resources mostly in its Rakhine State and is ranked fifth in the world in terms of its evidential treasure with 3.2 billion barrels of oil and 18 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.⁷⁰ To tap these natural resources, the Myanmar government has adopted million-dollar projects with China, India, and Russia. Hence, depopulating the region means easy access to its land and water for resource extraction. The Rohingya have, thus, become the most preferred target of Rakhine by the authoritarian government of Myanmar and the process is working.⁷¹ The government has recently turned its attention to 3100000 acres of Rohingya-populated areas.⁷² This indicates the intention of Myanmar’s authoritarian government to exclude the Rohingya for economic interests. In this regard, the economic policy of the government does not contradict with the economic anxiety of ethnic Burmese against the Rohingya. In fact, Buddhist monks have been calling for a boycott of the Muslim business shops of Myanmar since the pre-colonial era of Myanmar. Jones calls the nationalist-incited mass boycotting of Muslim shops by Buddhists as “xenophobic economic nationalism”. This type of nationalism is certainly a part of ethnic Burmese nationalism.⁷³

In the 21^st century, the worst experience of the Rohingya in Myanmar began following the 2012 communal clash between the Rohingya and Buddhists. Since then, the Myanmar government has been opportunistically using military forces against the Rohingya to oust them from the country. The humanitarian crisis of this ethnic minority has been terrible since then. Though the situation remains unchanged, a renewed spate of violence erupted in 2017 when Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Rohingya insurgent group, attacked several police posts and left 12 members of security forces dead. In retaliation, the Myanmar army conducted the “Clearance Operation” and committed massive human rights violations including extra-judicial killing, arson, and gang rape.⁷⁴ It is estimated that between 2012 and 2019, over one million Rohingya have fled Bangladesh to escape the military crackdown in Myanmar.⁷⁵ There is no denying that the present aggravation of the Rohingya crisis is the extension of the communal violence of 2011 between the Rohingya and Buddhists led by monks in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. In other words, the ongoing Rohingya crisis was led and started by Buddhist monks but prolonged and expanded by the authoritarian government of the country.

The hostility of the Burmese monastic community shows that Rohingya Muslims are the top enemy of the former’s assumption of the latter being the biggest threat to Buddhism. Buddhist monks assume that threats from Islam come in several ways against their religion. First, Buddhism was once in a glorified position in Myanmar’s three nearby Muslim countries; Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but now this faith is almost extinct in these countries. Second, according to the Pew Research Center, Muslim population growth is predicted from around 1.6 billion in 2010 to roughly 2.8 billion by 2050 whereas the number of Buddhists is projected from about 488 million in 2010 to nearly 486 million by 2050.⁷⁶ The data signals that Islam will be more dominant in the future but Buddhism will be less dominant in a demographic sense. Indeed, the demographic profile of the Rohingya Muslims has been continuously growing in Rakhine of Myanmar. Third, there are many instances that female Buddhists have converted into Muslims after marrying Muslim men. All these have generated Islamophobia among Buddhists in Myanmar. Based on the Vinaya, Buddhist monks have the responsibility to protect Buddhism from any threats.⁷⁷ In Myanmar, the ultra-nationalist Buddhist organization MaBa Tha, which was born in 2014 out of the 969 Movement emerging in the 1988 political upheaval of the country, incites anti-Islamic propaganda and aims to defend Theravada Buddhism and Buddhist nationalism. The political leverage of the Ma Ba Tha has further exacerbated the plight of the Rohingya. The government of Thein Sein formally enacted the Population Control Law, the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, the Religious Conversion Law, and the Monogamy Law proposed by the ultra-nationalist group in 2015 although these were globally criticised as being directed against the Muslims, including the Rohingya. This was not only the victory of the nationalist Buddhists but also further recognition of an unacknowledged alliance between the authoritarian government and Buddhist monks. It is argued the Ma Ba Tha was established by the military as a strategic power base.⁷⁸ In the middle of 2019, the spokesperson of the Myanmar military has also publicly clarified the military’s recent position on the Ma Ba Tha as he articulated that it deserves assistance for the promotion Buddhism.⁷⁹

It is crystal clear from the above that the Rohingya crisis in independent Myanmar has mainly been triggered by authoritarian governments and their unacknowledged alliance with the Burmese monastic community. The unacknowledged alliance was desired and is still meticulously maintained by consecutive authoritarian governments for the regime’s survival. However, it does not mean that the Burmese monastic community has less enthusiasm and interests. It has intentionally aligned itself with authoritarian rulers for nurturing the spirituality of Buddhism and protecting it from their notional threats posed by Islam. The state authority should be blamed first for such alliance because the state government is the most influential entity of a state and so it can impose or construct anything it wants from its position. Nevertheless, its agenda cannot often be successful until it makes an alliance with a majoritarian religious group. Strategic alliances can take place in both democratic and authoritarian governments with particular religious clerics followed by mobs for several reasons. However, to exclude ethnic groups with such an alliance is more witnessed in authoritarian states.⁸⁰ As the majority of people in Myanmar practice Buddhism and as Buddhists drive its illegitimate government, every authoritarian regime has been exploiting the established Buddhist-Rohingya animosity in a religious sense to divert the attention of the majority from the unlawful state authority to the assumed common enemy of Buddhists. Another vital point is that the economic interests of the authoritarian government in Rakhine and Buddhist peoples’ economic anxiety against the Rohingya have been helpful for the economic vision of the present government.Further, both the state authority and non-state actors have shaped the political and religious landscapes of Myanmar to serve their interests at the costs of several ethno-religious groups, namely the Rohingya. This is because the country’s project of politicized mono-religious identity has been a robust nationalist umbrella for ethnic Burmese with a decidedly exclusionary stance against the rest. Thus, though monks have often shown anti-government sentiments against authoritarian rulers on normative grounds, for the name of Buddhism they either have remained silent or showed their supports of harsh measures consecutive authoritarian governments have taken against the Rohingya. Likewise, the government accepted what discriminatory measures and repressive actions were levelled by the Buddhist monks against the Rohingya. This has created an unacknowledged alliance between consecutive authoritarian governments and Burmese Buddhist monks. The unacknowledged alliance between authoritarian governments and the monastic community has almost achieved sustainability as it has been running before the state-sponsored inception of the Rohingya crisis in post-colonial Myanmar. This strategic alliance is also observed when other ethnic minorities are targeted for violence and discrimination in Myanmar. It was, nevertheless, not present during the parliamentary government system of Myanmar (1948-1962) when the government largely focused on the interests of the mass.

Conclusion

The Rohingya crisis is a cogent example of a politicized use of Buddhism and economic exploitation in Rakhine by authoritarian governments with the collaboration of Burmese monastic community of Myanmar. In this article, it has been shown that there is an unacknowledged alliance between authoritarian governments and Buddhist clerics to oust the Rohingya from and to persecute them in Myanmar. Such a nexus between them has been shaped by politico-religious and economic reasons. Through their unacknowledged alliance over the Rohingya, both authoritarian state authority and Buddhist monastic community have been receiving mutual gains. With such a nexus, authoritarian governments have been benefiting as they secure their regime’s survival, and implement their contemporary economic policy to exploit the natural resources of Rakhine. At the same time, the Buddhists monks, who have been able to protect their religion from their assumed threat posed by Islam, have strengthened the spirituality of Buddhism to promote their mono-religious identity, and have expelled their economic rival, the Rohingya, from the country. The consecutive authoritarian governments are, however, the key mover of the unacknowledged alliance and have been maintaining it with Burmese monks as long as it serves their regime interests. Buddhist monks are accordingly given political voices if they do not clash with government interests. Thus, their divergence has not been absent when monks have, for instance, previously joined and mobilised anti-authoritarian protests and authoritarian regimes have taken punitive actions against them. Their divergence has, in this context, shrunken following the unsuccessful democratic transition of Myanmar in 2011.

In exploring the unacknowledged alliance, it has also been demonstrated that Myanmar’s authoritarian governments have widened the British-induced ethnic polarisation between Buddhists and the Rohingya and have been continuing to do so since 1962. It is important to state that the military institution of Myanmar maintains its power and has hijacked civilian institutions even after its nominal democratic opening in 2011.

 

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Shuva Das is studying International Relations at Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Science and Technology University, Gopalganj, Dhaka, Bangladesh

 

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1. Nehginpao Kipgen, “Political Change in Burma: Transition from Democracy to Military Dictatorship (1948-62).” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 20 (2011): 48. https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/20/special-articles/political-change-burma-transition-democracy-military-dictatorship
2. San Yamin Aung, “Govt Publishes Data on Populations of Religious Groups”, The Irrawaddy, July 21, 2016, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-publishes-data-on-populations-of-religious-groups.html.
3. Delware Hossain, “Tracing the Plight of the Rohingyas.” In The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas: Responses of the State, Society & the International Community, ed., Imtiaz Ahmed (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2010), 16.
4. International Organization for Migration (IOM), IOM Bangladesh Appeal Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Response.Geneva: International Organization for Migration, February 15, 2019, https://www.iom.int/appeal/rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-iom-appeal-january-december- 2019.
5. Patrick Hein, “The Re-ethnicisation of Politics in Myanmar and the Making of the Rohingya Ethnicity Paradox.” India Quarterly 74, no. 4 (2018): 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0974928418802072.
6. Jobair Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 39, no. 1 (2019): 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1575560.
7. Simon Knuters, “PoliticalBuddhism and the exclusion of Rohingya in Myanmar: Exploring targeted religious nationalism using Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority as a case study.”Master’s thesis, Uppsala University, 2018,https://uu.diva- portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1210875/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
8. Azeem Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide. London: Hurst and Company, 2016.
9. Ibid.
10. A.K.M Ullah, Ahsan. “Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for the “Stateless”.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 32,no.3(2016): 285-301. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1043986216660811.
11. Barbara-Ann J Rieffer, “Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship”, Ethnicities 3. No. 2 (2003): 217. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1468796803003002003.
12. Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (Massachusetts: Peter Smith Pub Inc, 1990), quoted in Eric O. Hanson, Religion and Politics in the International System Today(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 69.
13. Eric O. Hanson, Religion and Politics in the International System Today(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 69.
14. Dharmasoka L. Jayasuriya, “Buddhism, Politics, and Statecraft,” International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture 11, (2008): 42.
15. Hanson, Religion and Politics, 47-48.
16. lbid, 50.
17. May et al., “The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalisation, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred,” Politics, Religion &Ideology 15. No. 3 (2014): 339. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2014.948526.
18.  Karrie J. Koesel, Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 15.
19. lbid, 17.
20. Ibid.
21. Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pennsylvania, USA: University of Pittsburgh press, 1995), 137.
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24. Jayasuriya, “Buddhism, Politics, and Statecraft,” 43-44.
25. Ibid.
26. Peter Friedlander, “Buddhism and Politics”. In Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, ed. Jeffreys Haynes (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 11.
27. Fred Von Der Mehden,  “Buddhism and Politics in Burma.”The Antioch Review 21. No. 2 (1961): 166-175. 10.2307/4610325.
28. Knuters, “Political Buddhism and Rohingya”.
29. Dr. Kalana Senaratne, “Mobs, Monks and the Problems of Political-Buddhism,” Groundviews, May 5, 2012, https://groundviews.org/2012/05/05/mobs-monks-and-the-problems-of-political-buddhism/.
30. Knuters, “Political Buddhism and Rohingya”.
31. lbid, figure 1..
32. M.Finnemore and K. Sikkink. “Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics,” Annual Review of Political Science4(2001): 393, quoted in Hoyoon Jung. “The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present,” SAGE Open,(2019): 2. 10.1177/2158244019832703.
33. Sarina Theys. “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations, February 23, 2018,https://www.eir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/.
34. Donald P. Green and Rachel L. Seher. “What Roles does Prejudice Play in Ethnic Conflict?.” Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003): 509-531. 10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085642.
35. Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War Ithaca(New York:  Cornell University Press, 2001), quoted in Dodeye Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories of Ethnic Conflict?”, Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 4, no. 1 (2015), 149. 10.5901/mjss.2015.v4n1p147.
36. Anthony D. Smith, “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed., Michael Brown (New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993), 28-39, quoted in Dodeye Williams, “Main Theories of Ethnic Conflict”, 149.
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42. Daw Khin Yi, The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–38), Southeast Asian Program (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 96, quoted in Mikael Gravers, “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism in Burma and Sri Lanka: Religious Violence and Globalized Imaginaries of Endangered Identities,” Contemporary Buddhism 16 no 1, (2015), 8. https://doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2015.1008090.
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44. Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis”, 5.
45. Mehden, “Buddhism and Politics in Burma”, 169.
46. Ibid.
47. Hossain, “Tracing the Rohingya Plight”, 15.
48. Kipgen, “Political Change in Burma”, 49.
49. lbid, 50.
50. Ibid.
51. Bertil Lintner, The Resistance of the Monks: Buddhism and Activism in Burma.New York: Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/09/22/resistance-monks/buddhism-and-activism-\burma.
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53. Marco Bünte, “Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”: Abdication or Institutionaliz-ation of Military Rule?”, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, August 2011, https://www.gigahamburg.de/en/system files/publications/wp177 _buente.pdf.
54. Ibid.
55. Burma Peace Foundation.“Const. of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008),” Online Burma Library,n.d., § 109, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf.
56. James, “UN Calls for Genocide”.
57. Sylwia Gil, “The Role of Monkhood in Contemporary Myanmar Society”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2008, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05699.pdf.
58. Lintner, The Resistance of the Monks.
59. FGravers, “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism”, 12.
60. Ibid, 57.
61. Lintner, The Resistance of the Monks.
62. Syeda Naushin Parnini, “The Crisis of Rohingya as a Muslim Minority in Myanmar and Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh”,  Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33, no. 2, (2013), quoted in Mohajan, “History of Rakhine State”, 24.
63. Ibid,  3.
64. Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis”, 9.
65. Hein, “The Rohingya Ethnicity Paradox”, 13.
66. Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis”, 9.
67. Gravers, “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism”, 11.
68. Hein, “The Rohingya Ethnicity   Paradox”,14.
69. Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis”, 9-10.
70. Lee Jones, “A better Political Economy of the Rohingya Crisis”. New Mandala, September 26, 2017, https://www.newmandala.org/better-political-economy-rohingya-crisis/.
71. Saskia Sassen, “Is Rohingya persecution caused by business interests rather than religion?” The Guardian, January 4, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopmentprofessionalsnetwork/2017/jan/04/is-rohingya-persecution-caused-by-business-interests-rather-than-religion
72. Ibid.
73. Jones, “Political Economy and Rohingya Crisis”.
74. Alam, “The Current Rohingya Crisis”, 11.
75. Ibid.
76. Pew Research Center. The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. Washington: Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/ uploads/sites/11/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf.
77. Biver, “Religious Nationalism: in Anti-Muslim”.
78. Ibrahim, Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide, 87.
79. H. Naing Zaw, “Ma Ba Tha is a Necessity: Military,”The Irrawaddy, June 19, 2019, https://www.irrawaddy. com/news/burma/ma-ba-tha- necessity-military.html.
80. Fox and Sandler, “Discrimination against Ethnoreligious Minorities”, 485.