India’s Strategic Autonomy: A Balance of Political Friendships

Photo Credit: United Nations University

On October 5, India further reinforced its relationship with Russia by signing a 5-billion-dollar contract for five Russian S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft weapons.[i] What is being referred to as a game-changer in military technology, the S-400 can support four different interceptor missiles within a range of 400 kilometres using its advanced radar systems, much superior to its predecessor and arguably other comparable missile systems currently on the market.[ii] Some justify this purchase of arms as a means “to fill in critical gaps in [India’s] defence capabilities,” due to existing geopolitical tensions within the region.[iii] This acquisition of arms, however, is relevant not only for its implications on India’s neighbours, but also relevant to the international community in its implications for India’s foreign policy.

            As an emerging superpower, India has wisely made friends with key players on the international stage. Such pragmatism is not surprising. Rather, it is India’s ability to make friends with states at conflict—both parties to the conflict—that makes this a peculiar case. Up until now, amidst disagreements between the U.S. and Russia regarding foreign intervention, India has surprisingly managed to avoid the crossfire that has caught other states. Given the possibility of an Indian exception to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and in light of India’s recent arms deal with Russia, there is an unsettling possibility that India’s potential role of international leadership is greater than anticipated. This observation can be understood by examining the bilateral relations between the aforementioned countries in relation to India’s current foreign policy agenda.

Inherited from its relations with the former USSR, India’s ties with Russia are the result of continued historic support in significant wars and military hardware transactions. This bond was explicitly acknowledged at the BRICS summit in 2014, where Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: “even a child in India, if asked to say who is India’s best friend, will reply it is Russia because Russia has been with India in times of crisis.”[iv] Establishing clear ties along the fault lines of political sensitivity in South Asia, India’s relationship with Russia shows a bilateral connection that goes beyond business dealings. These historical interactions between the two states are fundamentally about sowing seeds of influence in a region left untapped. Now that India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, there is an expectation that bilateral diplomatic investments will soon yield returns. Therefore, more than just an upgrade in defence capabilities, this recent purchase of Russian missiles must be understood as an act of reassurance to an old friend that Russia is still an integral part of India’s future.

The significance of this shared history between the two nations rests on efforts towards more bilateral cooperation. In 2000, an action plan to deepen political and economic ties was signed in the form of a formal declaration of strategic partnership.[v] This “special and privileged strategic partnership” entailed the recognition of India and Russia’s mutual interests in security, technology, economic growth—among others—that can be uniquely harnessed by this partnership in virtue of India and Russia’s shared past and envisioned future.[vi] Today, Indo-Russian relations can be observed in the fact that nearly 60% of India’s defence equipment is sourced from Russia. This presence will continue to be felt as Russia further invests in Indian energy infrastructure.[vii] From security to energy, Russia is undoubtedly a key figure in India’s development.

Despite Russian influence, India has also been faring well with other states. Namely, the United States of America. As it stands, the U.S. and India are major bilateral trade partners. India is America’s ninth largest trading partner, and America is India’s second largest trading partner.[viii] In fact, in the 40% of India’s military equipment not supplied by Russia, roughly 12% of India’s defence equipment comes from the US.[ix] This reflects India’s interest in pursuing economic opportunities without being strictly bound to political relations.

A key area of convergence between India and the U.S. is their shared concern about China’s rise. During an official visit to Washington D.C. in 2017, Prime Minister Modi met with U.S. President Donald J. Trump to address the need to stabilize the Indo-Pacific region and further establish their bilateral strategic partnership.[x] While the rising prominence of China is not unexpected, China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region and abroad has nurtured distaste among affected states. Some see the rise of China as disruptive to the international order, and those who subscribe to the worldview of a zero-sum game are either anticipating change to the status quo or preparing for counteraction. In the case of the U.S., which currently sits at the top as the world’s hegemon, the latter scenario is more appropriate. Thus, India’s geographic location makes it pivotal to America’s own quest to balance power in the East.

Last August, President Trump signed CAATSA, which has since affected China, Iran, and North Korea. This legislation implements automatic sanctions on states involved with Russian defence and intelligence.[xi] While the purpose of CAATSA is to punish Russia for its inappropriate acts of foreign intervention, CAATSA also conveniently targets what may be considered “problematic states” from the perspective of the United States. In September 2018, following China’s purchase of a S-400 Triumf missile system from Russia, the American government imposed sanctions on China’s Equipment Development Department.[xii] This sanction on China raises concerns about India’s future relations with the U.S., seeing that India has just committed the same act of military purchase as the Chinese.

There are two possible American responses, each possessing very different implications. Either the U.S. will impose sanctions on India under CAATSA, or it will make an exception for India’s case. Ordinarily, the U.S. should follow three CAATSA precedents and rightfully implement sanctions on India due to its significant purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia. To act otherwise is to put into question the legitimacy, credibility and consistency of American foreign policy. However, as a matter of the fact, India’s case is not an ordinary circumstance. The White House has yet to make a statement addressing India’s most recent transaction with Russia, despite the fact that CAATSA clearly states that sanctions against countries will be applied automatically upon dealings with Russian arms. This delay or hesitation in declaring a verdict suggests that bilateral relations with India are critical to the US as well. By imposing sanctions on a pivotal actor in the U.S.’ containment scheme and geopolitical pursuits in Asia, America risks losing a friend that has historically been a great trading partner with potential for incredible growth. Soured relations with India will result in a disconnect between the U.S. and South Asia.

The international quagmire that India finds itself in is the result of being caught between conflicting allies due to its unique position in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Despite looming threats of American sanctions, India ultimately sided with its brother in arms – Russia. As rational decision-maker, states are seen by realist theories as prioritizing the pursuit of national interests within reasonable limits. When considering trade-offs associated with the purchase of S-400 missiles, India must have been cognizant of some advantage over America. Even without the U.S., India made plans to contain its neighbours by acquiring controversial military technology. Placed near many important actors, India has had a long history of managing fragility and strategic instability in South Asia and beyond. With support from Russia and elsewhere, it is not necessary that India depend on the U.S. when determining its own strategic autonomy. Knowing that America wants a piece of the pie in geo-political influence in Asia, India is thus able to make the gamble and ignore threats from the U.S. in pursuing its own course of action.

India’s leverage over the U.S. is dependent on its current foreign political agenda. Once again assuming a realpolitik perspective, contemporary changes in the international order are concerning to powerful countries such as the U.S., which has had undisturbed, unipolar power for several decades now. Considering China’s plans and efforts to realize its international ambitions and leadership in global governance, the perceived threat in China’s rise is warranted. However, India’s interest in becoming an international leader has seemingly slipped through the attention of China’s superpower aspirations. It is in India’s interest for global attention to be diverted away from its own rise, channeled towards China and other current international affairs. As such, India can continue to hold this leverage as a pivotal actor in Indo-Pacific politics.

Without a formal response from the U.S. with regards to India’s military transactions with Russia, very little can be said about the future of India’s foreign relations. Although India has yet to reach superpower status, it has already reached the point at which it is a crucial actor in international relations. India’s balancing act between two opposing large powers has demonstrated a pragmatic outlook towards pursuing its political goals as an independent actor. This case of implicit defiance towards American pressure and unconventional political alignment is just one example of India’s exercise of strategic autonomy. Thus, with clear political objectives, India may one day become a completely new character in the international community—one that may ultimately choose to side with neither of its major allies.

 


Yun Wen Siow is a third-year Political Science student with minors in Philosophy and Ethics, Law, and Society at the University of Toronto. She is currently serving as a Contributor for Synergy.

[i] Nirmala Ganapathy, “India, Russia seal $6.9b missile system deal,” The Straits Times, October 6, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/india-russia-seal-69b-missile-system-deal

 

[ii] Stephen Bryen, “Russia’s S-400 Is Way More Dangerous Than You Think,” National Interest, January 18. 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-s-400-way-more-dangerous-you-think-24116

 

[iii]  “US, China look on as Putin seeks India arms deals,” The Times of India, October 4, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-china-look-on-as-putin-seeks-india-arms-deals/articleshow/66062801.cms

 

[iv] PTI, “Modi invites Putin to visit Kudankulam power plant,” The Hindu, April 22, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-invites-putin-to-visit-kudankulam-power-plant/article6215743.ece

 

[v] Ashok Sajjanhar, “India and Russia – special and privileged strategic partnership,” Observer Research Foundation, August 26, 2016, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-russia-special-and-privileged-strategic-partnership/

 

[vi] Pranab Dhal Samanta, “S-400 deal gives US a unique chance to spell out special relations with India,” The Economic Times, October 8, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/s-400-deal-gives-us-a-unique-chance-to-spell-out-special-relations-with-india/articleshow/66111287.cms

 

[vii] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Russia may wrap up strategy to expand nuclear ties,” The Economic Times, September 26, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-may-wrap-up-strategy-to-expand-nuclear-ties/articleshow/65958104.cms

 

[viii] PTI, “Any US-India bilateral trade deals negotiations will encounter challenges: Scholar,” The Economic Times, October 17, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/any-us-india-bilateral-trade-deals-negotiations-will-encounter-challenges-scholar/articleshow/66260401.cms

 

[ix] Samanta, “S-400 deal.”

 

[x] “Joint Statement – United States and India: Prosperity Through Partnership,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, last modified June 27, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint+Statement++United+States+and+India+Prosperity+Through+Partnership

 

[xi] Sanjeev Miglani and Lesley Wroughton, “India risks U.S. sanctions with $5-billion purchase of Russian missiles,” Reuters, October 3, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-russia/india-risks-us-sanctions-with-5-billion-purchase-of-russian-missiles-idUSKCN1MD18K

 

[xii] Nicole Gaouette and Marshall Cohen, “US sanctions Chinese military for buying Russian weapons,” CNN, September 21, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/20/politics/russia-china-sanctions-caatsa-state-dept/index.html

 

 

Bibliography

 

“Any US-India Bilateral Trade Deals Negotiations Will Encounter Challenges: Scholar.” The Economic Times. October 17, 2018. Accessed October 19, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/any-us-india-bilateral-trade-deals-negotiations-will-encounter-challenges-scholar/articleshow/66260401.cms.

 

Bryen, Stephen. “Russia’s S-400 Is Way More Dangerous Than You Think.” January 18, 2018. Accessed October 19, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-s-400-way-more-dangerous-you-think-24116.

 

Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “India, Russia May Wrap up Strategy to Expand Nuclear Ties.” September 26, 2018. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-may-wrap-up-strategy-to-expand-nuclear-ties/articleshow/65958104.cms.

 

Ganapathy, Nirmala. “India, Russia Seal $6.9b Missile System Deal.” October 06, 2018. Accessed October 08, 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/india-russia-seal-69b-missile-system-deal.

 

Gaouette, Nicole, and Marshall Cohen. “US Sanctions Chinese Military for Buying Russian Weapons.” September 21, 2018. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/20/politics/russia-china-sanctions-caatsa-state-dept/index.html.

 

India. Ministry of External Affairs. Media Center. January 27, 2017. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint Statement United States and India Prosperity Through Partnership.

 

Miglani, Sanjeev, and Lesley Wroughton. “India Risks U.S. Sanctions with $5-billion Purchase of Russian…” October 03, 2018. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-russia/india-risks-us-sanctions-with-5-billion-purchase-of-russian-missiles-idUSKCN1MD18K.

 

PTI. “Modi Invites Putin to Visit Kudankulam Power Plant.” April 21, 2016. Accessed October 08, 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-invites-putin-to-visit-kudankulam-power-plant/article6215743.ece.

 

 

Sajjanhar, Ashok. “Raisina Debates | India and Russia – Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” August 26, 2016. Accessed October 07, 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-russia-special-and-privileged-strategic-partnership/.

 

Samanta, Pranab Dhal. “S-400 Deal Gives US a Unique Chance to Spell out Special Relations with India.” October 08, 2018. Accessed October 09, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/s-400-deal-gives-us-a-unique-chance-to-spell-out-special-relations-with-india/articleshow/66111287.cms.

 

 

“US, China Look on as Putin Seeks India Arms Deals – Times of India.” The Times of India. October 04, 2018. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-china-look-on-as-putin-seeks-india-arms-deals/articleshow/66062801.cms.

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.


*