Configuring Foreign Policies for Small States: A Case Study of Sri Lanka

Abstract

Despite a wide array of foreign policy strategies employed by small states, there has been little academic treatment of the subject. This article represents a preliminary attempt to address this lacuna. It traces the rivalry between two Asian giants – India and China – and delineates why navigating the anarchic world in such a climate is challenging for a small state. Summing up concerns and variables that influence Sri Lanka’s foreign policymaking, the paper contextualizes the extant foreign policy under the country’s Unity Government. Following a cumulative linear progression of argument, where different foreign policy options are examined, the paper comes to the conclusion that a balanced approach is the most utilitarian for Sri Lanka in the present milieu.

Keywords: Sri Lanka, Foreign Policy, Small States, Foreign Policy Decision Making, Indo-China rivalry

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Introduction

Asian states – both big and small – are witnessing the genesis of a global geopolitical transformation. An ‘Asian Century’ engineered by the region’s powerhouses – India, Japan and China – have forced small state leaders to recalibrate their foreign policy trajectories. Unsurprisingly, their mutually-exclusive and competing regional visions have led to the rise of realpolitik and power balancing dynamics. In this backdrop, as an island positioned in a critical geo strategic location straddling the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka is caught in the epi-center of a growing Indo-Chinese strategic rivalry.

Indian Ocean Region (IOR) states do not savor a multi-lateral security order. Bi-lateral security relationships are often favored over multi-lateral security arrangements. Added to this dynamic is the fact that most IOR states impute Non-Alignment as their main policy plank. Prevailing policy discourses in the region are also underpinned by the need for economic diplomacy; albeit to what degree this takes the form of a sustained multi-lateral cooperation is a moot point.

Most analysts agree that the highly populated Bay of Bengal region carries significant economic promise. It boasts a combined Gross Domestic Product approximating USD2.7 trillion. South Asia alone is home to over 1.7 billion people and by 2020 the Asian Continent is expected to account for 35 per cent of world trade. Despite the region’s potential for macro-diplomatic cooperation[1], prevailing trust deficits coupled with competing Chinese and Indian regional visions, make the IOR a hotbed for geopolitical rivalry. Beijing and New Delhi’s jockeying for bases or logistical support centers in the region and the Doklam crisis is a notable cases in point.

So then, what must small states do in these testing times? A great deal of ink has been spilt over the foreign policy options open to great powers, but the choices available to small state leaders continue to remain understudied, particularly those in South Asian states. Undeniably, the success of a small state’s foreign policy hinges on its ability to harness geopolitical vicissitudes for its benefit. This success is also contingent on the ability to at least, preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity in times of great power conflict. But what is the approach small states should follow to meet these ends? Is there a universal policy or strategy that should be applied or should states keep their options open?

This is the puzzle undergirding this study. Neo Realism, an often-used theoretical perspective in the domain of small state foreign policy, adopts a binary view of small states foreign policy avenues. For example, they should either balance against a threatening hegemon or bandwagon with it in the hope of gain. The latter option is preferred when a threatening great power is geographically closer to a small state. Not only is this binary perspective inherently reductionist, it also fails to capture the range of options which small states adopt in the face of great power rivalries.[2]

This paper attempts to fill a perceived gap in the existing literature on small state foreign policy in the backdrop of great power competition. Existing investigations on the subject have a tendency to be deficient and often suffer from a fallacy of composition.[3] Attempts at a more comprehensive assessment of small states foreign policy options in the backdrop of great power competition, must be taken with due humility given the myriad factors in play. This paper, therefore, chooses Neo Classical Realism as the most suitable theory to unlock the variables which determine the selection of a particular foreign policy option.

Analogous to other East Asian states, Sri Lanka occupies vital sea lanes for global commerce and communication and is therefore inherently susceptible to geopolitical changes and security challenges. The military buildup in East Asia is also comparable to that in the IOR. However, literature on East Asian small states generally agree that their modus operandi is to hedge between the United States and China. Does Sri Lanka engage in hedging or does it employ a different strategy?

What is the optimal security strategy for small states in the battleground of two great powers? Is it bandwagoning with one, balancing against the more threatening great power or espousing a neutral position? Are there alternative options in a small state’s foreign policy tool box? This study aims to unpack such options, delineate the current strategy pursued by Sri Lanka, and outline the best possible approach for Sri Lanka, after weighing the pros and cons of each option.

In order to tackle these questions, tracing how the island perceives the two powers is also important. Do Sri Lankan statesmen see New Delhi and Beijing as a source of pivotal support, a source of concern, or both? Moreover, what kind of image does the island want to cultivate in the eyes of the regional powerhouses?  Will Sri Lanka be forced to take sides if a conflict erupts? These subsidiary questions are also raised in this paper.

The article unfolds as follows. I begin by discussing the theory of Neo Classical Realism, exposing the varied factors which come into play when a state implements its foreign policy decisions.  Next, I study the prevailing strategic competition between India and China in South Asia, as the latter increases its footprint in the region. The fourth section takes stock of the post-2015 foreign policy of Sri Lanka under the Presidency of Sirisena. The subsequent section looks closely at the varied options Sri Lanka can adopt and the advantages and drawbacks of each choice. A caveat, however, is that the options discussed in this final section are not exhaustive, but instead considers only the most common foreign policy strategies that small states adopt.

Neo Classical Realism

Neo Classical Realists posit that the policy option selected by a country is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Neo Classical realists contend that a state’s foreign policy making is shaped by its power capability because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables. In that sense, the anarchic international system “influences foreign policy, as states must tailor their policies to respond to the threats and opportunities it provides.”[4] Consequently, intervening factors play a significant role in the eventual strategy pursued by the state because policy choices are not conceived as a direct product of systemic stimuli.

According to this school of thought, intervening factors include “leader images, strategic culture, state- society relations, and domestic institutions”.[5] Leader images relate to the beliefs and values of a state’s Foreign Policy Executive (FPE). A FPE generally comprises the President, Prime Minister and key cabinet members. FPE’s personality and character may influence a state’s response to external stimuli and therefore, investigating such factors is critical to analyze how systemic pressures impinge on FPE’s decision.

The strategic culture of a country is the entrenched beliefs and worldviews of the society as a whole. Such beliefs and notions are significant as they have bearing on the FPE’s preference. This is also because the final choice of a FPE has to be one that is acceptable for the public at large. The third factor relates to the degree to which “society defers to state leaders on foreign policy matters”.[6] If for example, a large part of society is suspicious of the FPE’s desires, it will be challenging to carry out a FPE’s decision. This was clearly visible in the case of the proposed Indo-Sri Lanka ETCA agreement driven by the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, which was ultimately stonewalled owing to strong public opposition.

The last intervening variable is domestic institutions. The routines and processes followed by such structures, and the degree of power concentration in the executive’s hand as against the legislature falls under this category. Sri Lankan policy makers for the most part do not have to bargain with the legislature on foreign policy issues and the FPE is therefore; less constrained when taking action on issues pertaining to the foreign policy of the country.[7] Although a Ministry of Foreign/External Affairs (MFA/MEA) could play a role in foreign policymaking in some countries, this is not the case in Sri Lanka. The strongest impression the Sri Lankan MFA makes is that of policy recommendations to the FPE and even then, this has a high tendency to be dismissed if it is contrary to the FPE’s outlook. As a result, the MFA’s role is redundant in this analysis.[8]

Chinese inroads into India’s ‘backyard’

South Asia is a fast-emerging theatre of Sino-Indian rivalry. Despite moments of conciliation, India’s relations with China remain tense, a trend unlikely to reverse anytime soon. Beijing has not eclipsed New Delhi in South Asia yet, but its influence in areas such as trade and investment cannot be understated.

Between 2005 and 2013, Chinese assistance to Sri Lanka amounted to “US$5.664 billion, out of which 98 per cent was in the form of loans”.[9] This prompted Sri Lanka to elevate her ties with China to a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 2013.[10] In Bangladesh, “Chinese firms have invested heavily in power and infrastructure projects such as in the development of Chittagong harbour and in road links to improve connectivity”.[11] In 2015, China and Pakistan launched the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of the largest projects in South Asia, costing close to USD46 billion. This initiative combined with others persuaded Pakistan to characterize her ties with China with phrases such as “iron-brother relationship” and “all-weather friends”. By the end of 2016, symbolizing the crystalized bond between the two countries, close to 30 percent of Pakistan’s imports came from China.

South Asian states are also a significant market for China’s weapons exports. By 2015, Pakistan received 35 per cent of China’s arms exports, while Bangladesh received close to 20 per cent.[12]  Maldives and Pakistan have already signed Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with China, whilst Sri Lanka is currently negotiating a FTA with Beijing. This brief synopsis demonstrates China’s inroads in South Asia. Without doubt, such developments directly impact New Delhi’s foreign policy calculus.

In June of 2017, a tense military standoff took place between Indian and Chinese troops when Indian soldiers entered the Doklam plateau, claimed by both China and Bhutan, to halt the construction of a road project by the Chinese Army in a disputed border area. People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization schemes along with the overseas military base in Djibouti are touted to have direct implications on the maritime security and overall stability of the Indian Ocean. Arguments such as China’s ‘tyranny of distance’ to the Indian Ocean can also be called into question ensuing Beijing’s String of Pearls strategy in South Asia.[13]

Do these developments make China a disruptive force in South Asia? China’s defense budget is estimated to be nearly four times bigger than that of India’s. Indian officials and security experts tend to perceive the expansion of China’s presence in South Asia, in a strategic rivalry lens. Tensions between the two states have also been simmering in recent times. Beijing barred New Delhi from becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, “blocked India’s attempts to list Masood Azhar as a terrorist at the United Nations, and even routed its energy pipelines through disputed territory in Kashmir showcasing scant regard for India’s calls for the pipelines to be re-routed”.[14] Parsing through these events suggest that a degree of rivalry already underpins Sino-Indian relations in the 21^st century.

Sri Lanka’s post 2015 Foreign Policy

2009 ended for President Rajapakse on a high note. Sri Lanka’s Armed Forces routed L.T.T.E separatists in the North-East of the island and despite excessive government spending on defense, a sizeable portion of the public was firmly behind the military offensive. Pressure from the West, however, was mounting. The 2009 ‘crowning success’, though hailed by some, was mired in controversy.

Rajapakse was progressively alienated on the international stage, most notably, in the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo which the Prime Ministers of Canada, India and Mauritius boycotted. Repeated UNHRC resolutions called on the Rajapakse Government to investigate allegations of human rights violations and initiate a credible reconciliation mechanism. The West also cut off aid and assistance to the island, including GSP+ facilities Sri Lanka had hitherto enjoyed from the European Union. Allegations of Human Rights violations continued to be brushed aside by the populist leader as an indication of foreign interference.[15]

Facing a diplomatic onslaught from India and the West, Rajapakse began to seek comfort from Moscow and Beijing. Having visited China seven times during his first nine years in office and received a large amount of Chinese loans, elevating Sri Lanka’s ties with China was axiomatic to Rajapakse.[16]  In an obvious tilt towards Beijing, Rajapakse began constructing a motely of projects using Chinese loans.[17] China’s Export-Import Bank alone is reported to have invested USD1.6 billion in more than 20 projects, mostly involving shipping and transportation.[18] By 2014, Chinese nuclear submarines were also making port calls in Sri Lankan harbours, much to the ire of New Delhi.

Once the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe Unity Government came to power in January 2015, promises were made of a more equidistant approach. In an interview to the Hindustan Times, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe declared, “We will improve relations with India. But that doesn’t mean we will be hostile to China.”[19] A former Sri Lankan economic affairs spokesperson, Dr. Harsha De Silva, also went on record stating that the Government intends to have “a balanced approach between India and China, unlike the [previous] regime, which was antagonizing India almost by its closeness to China.”[20]

The Unity Government consists of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (headed by the President) and the United National Party (led by the Prime Minister) which were until then, the fiercest of rivals. Once the ‘Unity Government’ came into being, the United National Party (UNP) gradually took over the task of managing foreign relations. The extant foreign policy decision making structure remains largely unchanged since 2015, as the UNP party leadership still guide’s foreign policy, but with a greater input from the President since early 2018. The core FPE includes the President, Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and a few selected Ministers, with the ambit of power concentrated around the Prime Minister.

The post-2015 foreign policy, unlike previous administrations, has not been guided by the Government’s ideological posture.[21] This has allowed the regime to forge stronger ties with New Delhi and Beijing devoid of any prejudice or partiality. A month after the Unity Government came to power, the President undertook a state visit to neighboring India. This was followed by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in March. President Sirisena then went on a four day state visit to China at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. By September 2015, Prime Minister (PM) Wickremesinghe followed suit, undertaking an official visit to India at the invitation of Prime Minister Modi and then later visiting China.

The year 2015 also saw constructive engagement with the West. The then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, came to Sri Lanka, followed by Ambassador Samantha Powers in November. The following year, Hugo Swire, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom undertook an official visit to Sri Lanka. These bilateral exchanges signify the effort taken by the new administration to enhance Sri Lanka’s image as a state that seeks to be ‘friends with all’; all the while bearing cognizance of the security interests of the two Asian giants. For example, unlike Rajapakse, deference is now given to India’s security concerns. This was displayed when a Chinese submarine was refused to dock in the Colombo Port in 2017; in contrast to the 2014 decision to allow a Chinese nuclear submarine to dock in the same port.

As an intervening variable, Leader images consider the FPE’s ideology and the impact this may have on foreign policymaking. Despite emerging from opposing political parties, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration is not fixated on a distinct ideological camp.[22] The case of PM Wickremesinghe visiting China despite his party’s traditional alignment with the West is a clear illustration of this.  Thus, leader image comes into play only in terms of the FPE’s (both the President and PM’s) desire to welcome investments and other economic linkages from both India and China.

The government’s conduct on international affairs has traditionally been less central to people’s day to day concerns. Nevertheless, enmeshments with China are being watched today with hesitant eyes. Clashes in Hambantota in 2017 and the debt owed by the island to China are causative factors for the public’s sense of apprehension. Therefore, a balanced approach between India and China resonates more than the previous Pro-China policy of Rajapakse.

Even if equanimity is ubiquitous, this does not imply that the present day FPE has a free hand in deciding matters pertaining to foreign policy. The public’s outcry against the Indo-Sri Lanka ETCA agreement exhibited FPE’s constraints when it came to execute a decision not favored by the public.[23] The China-Sri Lanka FTA currently under discussion has not drawn similar censure from the masses. Optics has therefore, become imperative, not only on the international front, but also to garner domestic support for the regime.

The Unity Government sees India and China more as opportunities that remain to be harnessed, than threats that need to be feared. In an interview to Bloomberg, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Secretary claimed that “Sri Lanka will ‘redouble’ efforts to strike a free trade deal with China and conclude an expanded trade pact with India as part of the island nation’s strategy of becoming an Indian Ocean hub”.[24] The island, whilst welcoming and indulging both, has also sought to remain disentangled from their bilateral disputes. For example, Colombo remained mum over the Dokhlam crisis[25] and has sought to alleviate Indian and Chinese concerns by welcoming their investment projects with open arms.

Although geographically tied to the Indian Subcontinent, Sri Lanka has not sought a security alliance with India, nor has she chosen to linkup with China against India. Instead, the administration jumped on board the Chinese BRI while retaining her traditional ‘friends and neighbours’ like Japan and India. Engaging with New Delhi and Beijing, without availing on either for security guarantees has enabled the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration to chart an independent course in the hope that Sri Lanka can rise alongside her regional economic powerhouses without being tied down by either. This is not a case of balancing, bandwagoning or hedging. Rather, the extant foreign policy denotes an unimpeded and balanced approach to harness the opportunities presented to the island by both powers without being overly acquiescent to either.

Strategizing Foreign policy options for the island

Which foreign policy option for Sri Lanka is the best going forward? Balancing or bandwagoning continue to be unrealistic. “Both options involve choosing one party over the other, something Sri Lanka is not in a position to do. To emphasize this point a simple example suffices: Sri Lanka’s largest portion of FDI in 2017 came from China followed closely by India. Conversely, Chinese tourist arrivals account for 13 per cent of total tourist arrivals to the island. This is second only to India.”[26] The risks of provocation and/or abandonment remain high if Sri Lanka bandwagons with or balances against New Delhi or Beijing. Moreover, the trade and economic benefits Sri Lanka hopes to accrue from both powers would also diminish in size if the island draws closer to one at the expense of the other.

Hedging, as applied to East Asian states, typifies an act of enhancing trade opportunities with China whilst maintaining a vibrant security relationship with the United States against a possible threat from Chinese expansionism. Despite China’s growing imprint in the IOR, Beijing does not pose any imminent security threat to the island. Neither does India, which has sought to display itself (particularly under the Modi administration), as a benevolent regional ‘brother and benefactor’. Hedging, therefore, loses value in such a permissive environment.

Neutrality remains ideal only in the case of a major confrontation between the two powers because this avenue limits more robust forms of engagement in times of peace. David’s theory of Omni-Balancing is another approach that can be used to study foreign policy making of third world states.  His theory assumes that decision makers make foreign policy judgments with an eye on ensuring regime stability. In that sense, foreign policy is shaped by a desire to counter internal and external threats to the regime. His insights help explain why a balanced approach towards India and China could have positive ramifications for the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe regime. However, as David ascribes to the balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy in his theory, it falls short in explaining the present administration’s approach towards India and China and the tangible benefits that this policy accrues.

According to Schweller, under-balancing takes place when a state does not balance or does so inefficiently in response to a dangerous aggressor.[27]  As the island does not see New Delhi or Beijing as revisionist in nature, the island’s contemporary foreign policy is not illustrative of under-balancing. Moreover, Sri Lanka does not wish to remain on the sidelines and/or buck-pass when non-traditional security threats emerge in the IOR. Consequently, under-balancing in the contemporary milieu lacks merit and as a result, is no sensible recourse.

Thus, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is shaped chiefly by the country’s limited power potential, and the regime’s desire to maintain a granular equidistance between India and China. By welcoming both powers to invest and trade with the island, the political administration hopes that Sri Lanka’s economy would grow alongside theirs so that the Government’s vision to make Sri Lanka into an ‘Indian Ocean hub’ and link up with global production networks reaches fruition.

 

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Works Cited

Ayres, A. and A. Anderson. “Economics of Influence: China and India in South Asia.” Council on Foreign Relations, 3 Aug. 2015, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/economics-influence-china-and-india-south-asia.

Cheng-Chwee, Kuik. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore´ Response to a Rising China.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 2, 2008, pp. 159–185., doi:10.1355/cs30-2a.

Cooper, Zack. “Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian

Ocean.” Center for Strategic International Studies, Mar. 2018, csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180403_Cooper_SecurityImplications.pdf7st1090IBycgjjMj3oSIXD8fyzWQ8i3f.

Ellen, Barry. “New President in Sri Lanka Puts China’s Plans in Check.”  The New York Times, 9 Jan. 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/world/asia/new-president-in-sri-lanka-puts-chinas-plans-in-check.html?rref=collection/timestopic/Rajapaksa, Mahinda.

Feng, Bree. “For China, a New Leader in Sri Lanka May Herald a Change in Ties.” The New York Times, 9 Jan. 2015, sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/for-china-a-new-leader-in-sri-lanka-may-herald-a-change-in-ties/?rref=collection/timestopic/Rajapaksa, Mahinda.

Gulbin Sultana. “Sri Lanka after Rajapaksa: Can it Ignore China?” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 40, no. 4, 2016, pp.  245-254, doi: 10.1080/09700161.2016.1184797.

Kleiner, Freddie. “Alaco.” Sri Lankans Sceptical of China’s Investment Rush | Alaco,  17 Jan. 2018, www.alaco.com/our-insight/intelligence/sri-lankans-sceptical-of-chinas-investment-rush.

Marlow, Iain, and Anusha Ondaatjie. “Sri Lanka Will ‘Redouble’ Its Efforts on China, India Free Trade Deals.” Bloomberg, 28 Mar. 2018, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-28/sri-lanka-to-redouble-efforts-on-china-india-free-trade-dealsutm_content=business&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business&utm_medium=social.

Mollman, Steve. “China Is the World’s Fastest-Growing Arms Exporter-Thanks to the Nations Surrounding India.” Quartz, 23 Feb. 2016, qz.com/621884/china-is-the-worldsfastest-growing-arms-exporter-thanks-to-the-nations-surrounding-india/.

Ripsman, Norrin M., et al. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Schweller, Randall L. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, 2004, pp. 159–201, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4137589.

Silva, Shakthi De. “Will Sri Lanka Manage to Perform the Balancing Act between China and India?” South Asia @ LSE, London School of Economics, 19 Feb. 2018, blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/01/19/will-sri-lanka-manage-to-perform-the-balancing-act-between-china-and-india/.

Sun, Yun, and Hannah Haegeland. “China and Crisis Management in South Asia.” Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics and Trajectories, Stimsons, 2018, www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/InvestigatingCrisesChina.pdf.

Sundarji, Padma Rao. “We Can’t Have a President with Unlimited Powers: Wickremesinghe.” Hindustan Times, 9 Jan. 2015, www.hindustantimes.com/world/we-can-t-have-a-president-with-unlimited-powers-wickremesinghe/story-0rIrWq8pSngEV9sUrlhJlM.html.

Usman, Tallal. “Doklam: Prelude to the Clash in South-Asia.” Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, 8 Jan. 2018, utsynergyjournal.org/2018/01/08/doklam-prelude-to-the-clash-in-south-asia/.

Uyangoda, Jayadeva. “Taking Sri Lankan Foreign Policy to the Post Confrontational Phase.” The Wire, 29 June 2016, thewire.in/46921/taking-sri-lankan-foreign-policy-to-the-post-confrontational-phase/.

Wagner, Christian. “The Role of India and China in South Asia”. Strategic Analysis, Vol. 40, no. 4, 2016 pp. 307-320, doi: 10.1080/09700161.2016.1184790

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Endnotes

[1] For an explanation on Macro-Diplomatic Cooperation see Sun and Haegeland 170.

[2] This is best argued by Cheng-Chwee.

[3] A fallacy of composition is to assume that what one actor can do in a given set of circumstances must also be within reach for an indefinite number of actors to do simultaneously.

[4] Ripsman, Norrin M., et al. 2

[5] Ripsman, Norrin M., et al. 9

[6] Ripsman, Norrin M., et al. 71

[7] Ripsman, Norrin M., et al. 76

[8] The MFA plays a minor, if not inconsequential role in foreign policy decision-making, although most routine operations (or standard operating procedures) are handled by it. This deduction is based on a series of confidential interviews carried out with retired and serving Sri Lankan diplomats.

[9] Sultana 246.

[10] For more on the Sino – Sri Lanka relationship see Ayres and Anderson.

[11]Wagner 313.

[12] For detailed insight into China’s weapon exports see Mollman.

[13]  There are two main schools of thought with regard to Chinese activity in the IOR. One idea is that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Others maintain that China is simply following its growing trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. For more information see Cooper.

[14] Silva

[15] At the time, atrocities purported to have been committed during the final phase of the military campaign were not the only charge leveled against Rajapakse by the West. The wave of repression directed at political opponents, the lack of willingness to reach out to the Sri Lankan Tamil minority coupled with an implicit support to extremist nationalist groups operating in the island were other reasons for Western political pressure.

[16] This can be loosely viewed as a case of balancing against the West and India by allying with their political rival – China.

[17] These included among others, the Norochcholai Coal Power Plant, Mattala International Airport, Katunayake Airport Expressway, Moragahakanda Irrigation Development Project, the Southern Expressway, Hambantota Port, the Lotus Pond (Nelum Pokuna) Performing Arts Theatre and the expansion of the Colombo Port.

[18] On Chinese loans to Sri Lanka see Feng.

[19] As quoted in Sundarji.

[20] As quoted in Ellen.

[21] Uyangoda was among the first to purport this view.

[22] A major challenge to the continuance of this balanced approach lies in the political makeup of the regime. The power struggle brewing between the President and Prime Minister, particularly since March 2018, manifests a personal bitterness which may hinder policy implementation in the coming years. Added to this is the possibility of the PM and President indulging in populism to shore up their positions ahead of the next presidential election.  Limited cooperation and consultation, between the two, could make co-habitation within the Unity Government less tenable. If this is the case, it would undoubtedly have major ramifications on the foreign policy of the country notwithstanding the existing consensus for a ‘balanced approach’.

[23] Despite opposition, Sri Lanka’s PM has not given up on finalizing this agreement. For more on this see Kleiner.

[24] See Marlow and Ondaatjie; For more on the Government’s vision to transform the island to a Maritime/ Global Logistics / Financial Hub see: the Government’s 2025 vision accessible from: http://www.treasury.gov.lk/documents/10181/66400/Vision_2025_English.pdf/8d93e8db-2c3a-4e15-9ab2-fc619817e6fd

[25] For a detailed account on the Dokhlam crisis see Usman.

[26] Silva

[27] See Schweller for more on the theory of Under Balancing.

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Shakthi De Silva is a 4th Year undergraduate of the University of Colombo (Sri Lanka) specializing in International Relations with minors in Economics and Sociology.