Pakistan’s current blasphemy laws provide certain members of the religious majority the power to demand retribution through human life via mob justice instead of relying on a court of law. The targeting of minorities by this law has been rightfully reported on extensively; the well-known case of Asia Bibi, for example, illustrates the injustices faced by those accused.[1] I will discuss how the vagueness of the blasphemy laws lends itself to the enforcement of the Pakistani nation-state. The stringent anti-blasphemy laws are tools used by the state to consolidate power and scatter opposition—the inflammation of minority tensions is simply a welcome side effect. Mob violence is not, then, a failing of the state, it is produced and expected by it.
The transformation of blasphemy as a political tool has been long in the making. When the British encoded a “Hate Speech Law” into the criminal law amendment in 1927 it prohibited “insults” towards any religious leaders for any reason.[2] When Pakistan was created, it built its own anti-blasphemy laws on top of this pre-existing structure. Since then, these laws have become political tools in their own right, existing as props for various politicians to use and discard to garner public interest. For example, the previous Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan—in his campaign for the position—promised to defend the blasphemy laws from some vague, imagined threat against them.[3] Championing the blasphemy laws is not uncommon in Pakistani right-wing politics; in fact, over time it’s proven to be a surefire way to grab some last-minute votes. Truthfully, the blasphemy laws are erratic—they can boost a politician’s career but also end it, permanently. They are incredibly powerful tools but hard to wield and, more often than not, using them as leverage does more harm than good. Khan’s own use of the laws as political leverage ended with his recent charge of blasphemy by his political rivals.[4] Yet, the law still accounts for one of the largest voting points for Pakistani candidates. The biggest political parties in Pakistan like the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) accrue a significant amount of voter percentage based on promises not to touch or to “protect” blasphemy laws.
Since Pakistan is a state created because of religion, it is paramount for its leaders to be exemplary and publiclyMuslim. The role of blasphemy—the religious concept—in political agendas is something that makes the laws almost impossible to amend. If one politician suggests anything to the effect of changing these laws, another will eagerly jump at the chance to discredit them—declaring their religious degeneracy to the masses and waiting for a mob to act. In Pakistan, religion and politics are synonymous and, in this politicized practice of religion, a new warped version of Islam is born: an entirely fictitious version in which the spilling of innocent blood is justified.
Notably, despite the law’s relative intensity, the state itself has never actually executed anyone over them[5] —although many have been arrested.[6] The reason for this is fairly obvious: the threat of the law is enough. The state doesn’t need to kill anyone, all it has to do is paint a target on people’s backs and, after the mob has acted, it can continue to prosecute its citizens in the name of justice. The truth is that anti-blasphemy laws cause two types of deaths: those that occur from being accused of blasphemy by mobs and those that occur by being involved in the mob itself. In 2021, a Sri Lankan factory manager was accused of blasphemy and set on fire by a mob.[7] In that instance, the state reacted swiftly to this act of “vigilantism,” as then Prime Minister Imran Khan termed it, and six of the men (from the more than 100-person crowd) accused of participating in the violence were sentenced to death.[8] In 2018, a university student named Mahshal Khan was accused of blasphemy following a debate on religion and was killed by a mob composed of his fellow university students and staff members. Two members of that thirty-person mob were convicted by the court and the rest were acquitted.[9] There emerges, after a certain amount of research, a pattern regarding mob violence in Pakistan: one is accused of blasphemy, a mob—emboldened by the idea that the law is on their side—forms to distribute their own brand of justice, an investigation occurs in which it turns out that the accusation was false, a trial occurs where a few members of the mob are prosecuted—even executed, the whole ordeal becomes a distant memory to the public, repeat.
The relative predictability of this cycle of accusation, murder, and conviction points to a certain amount of social engineering. The state positions two communities against each other as natural enemies and furthers their division through this repeated public discourse. By arresting those accused of blasphemy while also prosecuting perpetrators of mob violence, the state performs a sort of repressive reconciliation with both sides. Victims of the blasphemy laws are served a half-hearted justice in which only a select few of the people participating in mob violence are punished[10] while members of the religious majority are convinced that the law “protects” blasphemers.[11] The population is cowed and the state moves on until the next instance in which either side lashes out—ensuring that citizens live in a constant cycle of violence.[12] Most importantly, hatred among the populace rises and communities stay divided.[13]
Pakistan is a country with a complicated, bloody history. It is a state uniquely created because of religion. Thus, a complete separation of religious institutions from the constitution seems unlikely. But the lack of political discussion centred around removing or adjusting the blasphemy laws, contrary to public opinion, is as secular as it gets. Blasphemy and its role in engineering a vicious cycle of violence, suppression, and fear are matched only by its role as a political tool for politicians daring enough to face the very real possibility of having that power turned against them. For those that want to change the system, for those that don’t ascribe to fascist notions of political identity, for those politicians, the blasphemy laws are a sword wielded against them by an all-powerful state keen on maintaining a status quo in which its subjects live in a constant state of unrest.
Ayesham Ali is an undergraduate student at the University of Toronto studying English, History and South Asian Studies. Their research interests include South Asian literary discourse, the disproportionate impact of climate change within the region, and the steady escalation of religious violence in the years following the Partition. Ayesham hopes to use their position as contributor as a vehicle to explore issues of literary censorship and the systematic stifling of activist and minority voices in South Asia.
Bibliography
[1] BBC News. 2020. “Asia Bibi: I Always Believed I Would Be Freed.” BBC News. February 28. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51658141.
[2] Fatima, Eman. 2023. “What Does Pakistan’s Censorship Say About Its Blasphemy Laws? – The Diplomatic Envoy.” The Diplomatic Envoy. February 27. https://blogs.shu.edu/thediplomaticenvoy/2023/02/27/what-does-pakistans-censorship-say-about-its-blasphemy-laws/.
[3] Barker, Memphis. 2018. “Imran Khan Criticised for Defence of Pakistan Blasphemy Laws.” The Guardian, July 9. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/09/imran-kahn-accused-over-defence-of-pakistan-blasphemy-laws.
[4] Sharma, Shweta. 2022. “Imran Khan to Face Blasphemy Charges after New Pakistan PM Called a ‘Traitor’ and ‘Thief’ in Saudi Arabia.” The Independent, May 1. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/imran-khan-blasphemy-case-shehbaz-sharif-b2069341.html.
[5] Kuru, Ahmet T. 2023. “Pakistan’s Real Reason for a Harsh New Blasphemy Law.” Los Angeles Times, February 3. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-02-03/pakistan-blasphemy-law-muslim-countries.
[6] Al Jazeera. 2022. “Pakistan: Six Sentenced to Death for Lynching Sri Lankan National.” Al Jazeera, April 18. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/18/pakistan-six-sentenced-to-death-for-lynching-sri-lankan-national.
[7] AP News Wire. 2021. “Man Lynched in Pakistan Buried in Native Sri Lanka.” The Independent, December 8. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/pakistan-sri-lanka-prophet-muhammad-islam-imran-khan-b1972159.html.
[8]AP News Wire. 2021. “Man Lynched in Pakistan Buried in Native Sri Lanka.” The Independent, December 8. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/pakistan-sri-lanka-prophet-muhammad-islam-imran-khan-b1972159.html.
[9] Al Jazeera. 2019. “Pakistan Convicts Two over Mashal Khan Blasphemy Lynching Case.” Al Jazeera, March 21. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/21/pakistan-convicts-two-over-mashal-khan-blasphemy-lynching-case.
[10] Bukhari, Mubasher. 2023. “Mob Storms Pakistani Police Station, Lynches Man Accused of Blasphemy.” Reuters, February 11. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/mob-storms-pakistani-police-station-lynches-man-accused-blasphemy-2023-02-11/.
[11] Al Jazeera. 2019. “Pakistan Convicts Two over Mashal Khan Blasphemy Lynching Case.” Al Jazeera, March 21. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/21/pakistan-convicts-two-over-mashal-khan-blasphemy-lynching-case.
[12] Naseer, Tahir, and Malik Asad. 2021. “Islamabad ATC Sentences 3 to Death for Sharing Blasphemous Content on Social Media.” DAWN.COM, January 8. https://www.dawn.com/news/1600385.
[13] Al Jazeera. 2021. “Pakistani Police Arrest Four for ‘Blasphemy’ over Mosque Argument.” Al Jazeera, November 25. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/25/pakistan-arrest-blasphemy-mosque-argument-christian.