The socioeconomic precarity of low-wage migrants hired to do dirty, dangerous, and demeaning work[1] in Singapore is well-established; marginalized migrants are exploited by numerous industries that rely on cheap labour. In response, beleaguered civil society organizations that aim to enhance migrant well-being have provided services such as healthcare while continuing to advocate on behalf of low-wage migrants for additional compensation.[2] However, given the draconian laws imposed on these groups, their organizational capacity remains limited.[3] The majority of low-wage migrants remain in precarious situations, often within enclosed and cramped spaces that house up to 20 people. This amounts to an effective living area of about 4.5 square meters per worker[4]. During the COVID-19 Pandemic, these spaces have become critical infection sites. The first few cases among migrant workers appeared in February before they dramatically spiked in April.[5] From April until September, 90% of all confirmed infections are believed to have originated from migrant worker dormitories. This is a telling lesson for policymakers. COVID-19 has exposed the compounding economic and social disparities surrounding migrant conditions, as the lack of legal protection and fear of deportation, which amplified their risk of infection.[6]
What does this mean for the treatment of low-wage workers post-pandemic? Hopefuls emphasize how COVID-19 foregrounds the economic importance of migrants; Minister Lawrence Wong publicly announced that “We are very mindful of our responsibility to these migrant workers who have contributed so much to Singapore.”[7] Furthermore, the Singaporean government has acknowledged their moral responsibility for care and acted upon this pronouncement – with the government having underwritten all the costs of medical care for migrant workers.[8] The scale of COVID-19 is also unprecedented. This amplifies the importance of the precarity of migrant workers beyond previous outbreaks of varicella-zoster, rubella or the 2019 measles outbreak that were similarly attributed to the cramped living spaces of migrant workers.[9] Considering the above, there is a credible case that the COVID-19 pandemic is a critical juncture for the treatment of low-wage migrants. However, through examining the government response to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic respectively, the political future for the treatment of migrants is bleak.
Drawing parallels between the management of migrants during the SARS outbreak and the present demonstrates how such health crises enable the further marginalization of migrants. With SARS, the differential treatment of migrant workers compared to tourists unveiled the government’s discursive production of migrants as “diseased bodies.”[10] COVID-19 has similarly shifted public discourse and exacerbated the spatial exclusion of migrants. The dominant characterization of migrants in the media likens individuals to pathogens, which obscures the structural inequalities that produce such vulnerability.[11] This discursive separation is reified with state power enforcing migrant dormitory borders and restricting their mobility.[12] Migrant workers have faced extended confinement, isolation and disorientation as Singaporeans emerged from lockdown.[13] Even though the government’s view of migrants as diseased bodies is being challenged by growing media coverage of living conditions, [14] the June 2020 election has exposed the tepid resolve to vote for better migrant treatment.[15] The dominant concern of the electorate of the incumbent People’s Action Party, which was to seek an even stronger mandate, eclipsed all other social issues.[16] Clearly, the COVID-19 pandemic has not supplied enough pressure on the government or the electorate to yield genuine political advancement for the treatment of migrants. This attitude is reflected in the scarcity of data on migrant workers from Singaporean government agencies as well as Singapore abstaining from the vote ratifying non-binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).[17] Furthermore, the advice of NGOs, who have held numerous closed-door sessions with the government to raise alarm about dormitory conditions, have gone unheeded.[18]
Generating enough pressure to tangibly advance migrant conditions is a significant undertaking. For example, in response to 1,500 Bangladeshi construction and shipyard workers fleeing their companies in 2009, the government granted a concession to allow affected workers to find new employers. This gave NGOs the headway to advocate for small-scale reforms. However, the scale and magnitude of migrants deserting their workplace is not analogous to COVID-19, where migrants are further immobilized and securitized. The structural constraints such as the debt low-wage migrants carry, the absence of labour protections for migrants, and the increasing securitization make it harder for migrants of the present day to protest in the same manner.[19] The ideal world to strive for contains equitable and universal healthcare, labour rights, and social safety nets for migrant workers.[20] This necessitates the willingness of the Singaporean government to work alongside international organizations and states to reform labour markets.[21] Unfortunately, there are great leaps to be made before there is enough pressure on the Singaporean government. The COVID-19 Pandemic was not enough, so what will be?
Isabella Li is studying Contemporary Asian Studies, Political Science, and Diaspora and Transnational Studies. She is interested in anything that challenges her preconceptions and helps her understand the lives of people around the world. This looks like a range of key issues such as development, borders, migrations, and more.
Bibliography
Bal, Charanpal Singh. “Production Politics and Migrant Labour Advocacy.” Production Politics and Migrant Labour Regimes, 2016, 171–206. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54859-7_7.
Chua, Beng Huat, and Meisen Wong. “Desiring Political Opposition beyond Covid-19 Pandemic in Singapore.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 21, no. 4 (2020): 495–505. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2020.1832298.
Griffiths, James. “Singapore Had a Model Coronavirus Response, Then Cases Spiked. What Happened?” CNN. Cable News Network, April 19, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/18/asia/singapore-coronavirus-response-intl-hnk/.
Transient Workers Count Too. Home page. Singapore: TWC2; 2020. https://twc2.org.sg. Updated 18 April 2020; Accessed 19 April 2020
Ye, Junjia. “Ordering Diversity: Co‐Producing the Pandemic and the Migrant in Singapore during COVID‐19.” Antipode, 2021, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12740. Ye, Junjia. “Notes from ‘Migrant Encounters’: Visualizing Singapore’s Diversity through South Asian Male Migrants.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 34, no. 3 (2013): 407–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12034.
[1] Amarasinghe Arachchige Saparamadu et al., “Correction to: Low-Wage Migrant Workers during Coronavirus Disease 2019: A Social Determinants Analysis,” Journal of Public Health Policy, January 2021, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41271-021-00305-x, 4.
[2] Junjia Ye, “Notes from ‘Migrant Encounters’: Visualizing Singapore’s Diversity through South Asian Male Migrants,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 34, no. 3 (February 2013): pp. 407, https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12034.
[3] Junjia Ye, “Ordering Diversity: Co‐Producing the Pandemic and the Migrant in Singapore during COVID‐19,” Antipode, 2021, pp. 1914, https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12740.
[4] Transient Workers Count Too. Home page. Singapore: TWC2; 2020. https://twc2.org.sg. Updated 18 April 2020; Accessed 19 April 2020
[5]James Griffiths, “Singapore Had a Model Coronavirus Response, Then Cases Spiked. What Happened?,” CNN (Cable News Network, April 19, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/18/asia/singapore-coronavirus-response-intl-hnk/.
[6] Saparamadu et al. “A Social Determinants Analysis,” 8.
[7] Ye “Ordering Diversity,” 1910.
[8] Beng Huat Chua and Meisen Wong, “Desiring Political Opposition beyond Covid-19 Pandemic in Singapore,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 21, no. 4 (January 2020): pp. 498, https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2020.1832298.
[9] Saparamadu et al. “A Social Determinants Analysis,” 5.
[10] Wong and Yoeh, 74.
[11] Ye “Ordering Diversity,” 1896.
[12] Ye “Ordering Diversity,” 1896–1897.
[13] Chua and Wong “Desiring Political Opposition,” 497.
[14] Chua and Wong “Desiring Political Opposition,” 498.
[15] Chua and Wong “Desiring Political Opposition,” 502.
[16] Chua and Wong “Desiring Political Opposition,” 502.
[17] Saparamadu et al. “A Social Determinants Analysis,” 8.
[18] Ye “Ordering Diversity,” 1914.
[19] Charanpal Singh Bal, “Production Politics and Migrant Labour Advocacy,” Production Politics and Migrant Labour Regimes, 2016, pp. 219 – 220, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54859-7_7.
[20] Saparamadu et al. “A Social Determinants Analysis,” 9.
[21] Saparamadu et al. “A Social Determinants Analysis,” 9.