Abstract

Vietnam faces growing pressure in the South China Sea as China expands its presence through militarized outposts, coercive coast guard patrols, and interference with fishing and energy activities around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. These actions undermine Vietnam’s sovereignty, weaken its economic interests, and fuel domestic demands for a stronger response. This article uses a Realist lens to examine three options for Vietnam to defend its maritime rights without triggering escalation or sacrificing strategic autonomy: maintaining the status quo, aligning more closely with China, or adopting an enhanced non-aligned hedging strategy. The findings show that the status quo leaves Vietnam vulnerable to gradual encroachment, while bandwagoning with China would deepen economic dependence and erode sovereignty. Instead, the most sustainable path is an enhanced non-aligned hedging approach, combining hard balancing (naval and coast guard modernization, asymmetric capabilities, fortified outposts) with soft balancing (legal strategies under UNCLOS, ASEAN diplomacy, and diversified economic partnerships). By reinforcing deterrence while upholding the “Four No’s”^[1] policy, Vietnam can raise the costs of Chinese coercion, preserve autonomy, and contribute to a more rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea.

Keywords: Vietnam, South China Sea, hedging strategy, non alignment, maritime security

Executive Summary

 

Vietnam inhabits an increasingly vulnerable position in the South China Sea as China expands its control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands through militarized outposts, coercive coast guard patrols, harassment of Vietnamese fishermen, and disruption of energy exploration. These actions undermine Vietnam’s sovereignty, weaken its economic interests, and increase domestic pressure for a stronger response. The central question is how Vietnam can defend its maritime sovereignty without triggering escalation, preserving autonomy, and managing both domestic pressures and great-power dynamics. While Vietnam could either maintain the status quo or align more closely with China, both options fall short: the first keeps Vietnam vulnerable, and the second risks losing strategic autonomy.

 

This memo recommends that Vietnam should adopt an enhanced non-aligned hedging strategy, grounded in soft balancing and hard balancing approaches within Realist theory, to secure its sovereignty in the South China Sea while preserving independence and avoiding escalation. In this analysis, hard balancing refers to the development of Vietnam’s own deterrent capabilities, including naval and coast guard modernization, asymmetric defences, fortified outposts, and improved maritime domain awareness, without entering formal military alliances or mutual defence commitments. Soft balancing refers to the use of international law, multilateral institutions, and diplomatic coordination to constrain China’s behaviour, raise reputational and political costs, and mobilize third-party support without collective defence obligations. Hard balancing strengthens deterrence by accelerating naval and coast guard modernization, enhancing asymmetric capabilities, upgrading Spratly outposts, and expanding maritime domain awareness through radar, satellites, and participation in IPMDA. Soft balancing complements this by using institutions, law, and multilateral diplomacy, such as ASEAN, UNCLOS, Code of Conduct negotiations, Mekong mechanisms, and diversified strategic partnerships to constrain China’s behaviour without forming alliances or abandoning the “Four No’s.”^[2] Implementation requires coordinated steps: continuing Notes Verbales and preparing arbitration cases, deepening minilateral cooperation with the U.S., Japan, India, and key ASEAN partners, expanding joint patrols and fisheries cooperation, establishing crisis-communication tools, supporting fishermen operating in contested waters, educating the public to manage nationalist sentiment, and maintaining regular high-level and Track-2 dialogue with China to reduce miscalculation.

 

This approach should be prioritized because it allows Vietnam to defend its maritime rights, remain independent, and avoid being drawn into great-power rivalry. By combining stronger defence with smart diplomacy, Enhanced Non-Aligned Hedging offers the most realistic and sustainable path for protecting Vietnam’s long-term interests in the South China Sea.

Background

The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the most contested and strategically vital maritime areas in the world. Accounting for over 21% of global trade, amounting to $3.37 trillion in 2016, and lies on crucial routes connecting East Asia to the Middle East and Europe. Nearly half of the world’s fishing vessels operate in this area, and the sea is rich in natural resources like oil and gas.^[3] Control over SCS is central to Vietnam’s national defence and economic sustainability.For nearly five decades, China and Vietnam have had a long-standing territorial dispute in the SCS, primarily over sovereignty and resource rights in the Paracel and Spratly (Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa, respectively in Vietnamese) Islands. As early as the 17th century, Vietnamese historical records such as Đỗ Bá’s “Thien Nam Tứ Chí Lộ Đồ Thư” recognized these islands as Vietnamese territory and noted that the Nguyễn Dynasty established the Hoàng Sa Company to manage and exploit them.^[4] These claims were further solidified during the French colonial period, as France continued to administer them on Vietnam’s behalf under the Treaty of Huế, further reinforcing Vietnam’s historical control over the territories.^[5] However, China also bases its claims on historical narratives. China’s official accounts claim that their presence in the SCS dates back over two millennia to the Han Dynasty, during which time the sea served as a major navigation route.^[6]China asserts that long-term navigation, naming, administration, and economic activity established its historic rights to the region.^[7]In 1958, China issued the Declaration on the Territorial Sea, a formal government document asserting a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea measured from straight baselines along the mainland coast and outermost islands. The declaration claimed this territorial sea for all territories China considered its own, including Taiwan, the Paracels, the Spratlys, and other offshore islands. It also classified waters inside the straight baselines as China’s “inland waters,” where foreign military ships and aircraft were prohibited without Chinese permission.^[8] Scholars note that this is one of the earliest attempts by China to codify wide-ranging maritime claims based on sovereignty, historical usage, and national security needs.^[9]

The dispute turned violent in 1974, when China and then-South Vietnam clashed over the Paracel Islands. China seized control after a brief but intense battle, justifying its actions as the rightful resumption of sovereignty. Although South Vietnam acknowledged the military loss, it continued to insist that defeat did not signify a surrender of legitimate sovereignty.^[10] Tensions escalated again in 1979, when China launched a one-month punitive invasion of northern Vietnam in retaliation for Hanoi’s alignment with the Soviet Union and its intervention against the Khmer Rouge. The conflict resulted in tens of thousands of casualties on both sides and left the Vietnamese devastated.^[11] By 1998, the Chinese government reinforced its position through legislation, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Article 14 notes that the law “shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s Republic of China,” indicating that China does not view its historical maritime claims as being constrained by UNCLOS boundaries.^[12] Chinese historical claims gave rise to the infamous “nine-dash line,” first appearing on maps in 1947 and formally asserted in a 2009 Note Verbale to the UN, which declared China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands and adjacent waters.^[13]

 

In recent years, Vietnamese fishing boats operating in traditional grounds around the Paracels have been chased, rammed, and even sunk by Chinese coast guard vessels; crews have been arrested and equipment confiscated.^[14] During China’s 2020 moratorium, a Chinese patrol ship rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracels, causing over $20,000 in damage.^[15] These pressures have pushed Vietnamese fishermen into distant and sometimes illegal waters, leading to more than 1,000 detentions by neighbouring states from 2017 to 2020 and a “yellow card” from the EU for IUU fishing.^[16] China has also targeted Vietnam’s energy interests by pressuring foreign companies to quit projects in Vietnam’s EEZ, including the cancellation of Repsol-backed drilling at Vanguard Bank in 2018, and by deploying the Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey flotilla in 2019 to disrupt ongoing operations.^[17] Recently, three Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted a patrol from October 16–25, 2025, circling several Vietnamese-controlled reefs in the Spratlys where Vietnam has expanded facilities such as a 2.5-kilometer airstrip and new land-reclamation projects.^[18] Overall, China’s actions undermine Vietnam’s sovereignty, threaten its strategic and economic interests through intimidation and penalization , and incite domestic popular pressure for government action to address this.

From a Realist perspective, this option is dangerous because it forces Vietnam into bandwagoning, which is the weakest position a small state can take. While this strategy may lower the risk of military confrontation in the short term and offer temporary regime security by aligning with a stronger power,^[24] However, classical and structural Realists warn that bandwagoning with a threatening power is an unstable choice. Walt argues that weaker states that align with threatening powers end up “at their mercy,” and Vietnam’s recent experience already demonstrates this pattern.^[25] He also notes that when weak states bandwagon, it is usually a last-resort response when they lack credible allies and face a proximate great power.^[26] During the Vietnam War, Hanoi bandwagoned with China because both shared communist goals and faced common enemies in France and the United States. However, after the war concluded and their shared threat disappeared, the partnership collapsed. Tensions spiked over Cambodia, and Vietnam’s 1978 defence treaty with the Soviet Union triggered an even harsher reaction from China. In 1979, China launched a short but brutal border war to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” showing that aligning with a threatening power can backfire and invite coercion rather than protection.^[27]

 

China’s behaviour toward other Southeast Asian states further shows that accommodation does not reduce coercion, rather, it accelerates it. Cambodia’s strategic alignment with China enabled Beijing to secure military access to the Ream Naval Base and to turn Cambodia into a reliable veto player within ASEAN, demonstrating how bandwagoning erodes sovereignty.^[28] The Philippines under Duterte provides a more explicit warning: despite publicly siding with China and shelving the 2016 arbitral ruling, China intensified harassment at Second Thomas Shoal, used water cannons and lasers against Philippine vessels, and refused joint development unless Manila accepted Chinese control.^[29] These cases illustrate the Realist logic that, by bandwagoning with threatening great powers, weaker states become more vulnerable, not safer.

 

Liberalist ideals of international cooperation and the universal benefits of trade do not apply to this option either. While China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, the economic relationship is asymmetric. Vietnam depends on Chinese inputs, machinery, and intermediate goods, and consistently runs a trade deficit.^[30] This is not stabilizing interdependence; it is vulnerability. Under deeper accommodation, China would gain even more leverage to use trade, market access, and supply-chain pressure as tools of economic statecraft. Greater alignment would therefore shrink Vietnam’s bargaining power and make it hesitant to defend UNCLOS norms or challenge illegal maritime activities for fear of retaliation. Instead of reducing risk, this option locks Vietnam into an economic dependence that weakens long-term resilience.

 

In short, Option B is the least viable and most damaging path for Vietnam, offering a short-term reprieve at the cost of long-term autonomy, economic stability, and domestic legitimacy.

 

Option C: Enhanced Non-Aligned Hedging (Recommended)

 

Under this option, Vietnam would continue its current balanced strategy of not aligning with any superpower, while intensifying efforts to build its own defence capacity and pursue multilateral diplomacy. Vietnam would reaffirm their current “Four No’s” foreign policy: no military alliances, no alignment with one country against another, no foreign military bases on its soil, and no use of force or threat of force in international relations.^[31] At the same time, Vietnam would take more proactive steps to strengthen its position, such as accelerating military modernization, particularly of its naval and coast guard forces, and expanding security cooperation with partners like the USA, India, Japan, and Russia.

From a Realist perspective, Option C works because it combines soft balancing and hard balancing in a way that enhances deterrence without triggering escalation. In this option, hard balancing refers to Vietnam strengthening its own deterrent capabilities without entering military alliances, while soft balancing refers to the use of international law and multilateral institutions to constrain China’s behaviour without collective defence commitments. Wivel and Paul argue that in the post–World War II era, growing economic interdependence and the rise of norms favouring self-determination and peaceful conflict resolution have made traditional hard balancing through alliances and massive armament increasingly costly and risky.^[32] As a result, states are “more likely to balance by institutional and diplomatic means than by military alliances and intense armament buildup,” using international institutions to legitimize their own positions and delegitimize aggressive behaviour.^[33] For small states in particular, the authors note that security and survival depend heavily on international recognition of the inviolability of their borders and legitimacy of their statehood, which soft balancing through institutions can help secure.^[34]

 

Vietnam’s behaviour in recent years demonstrates exactly the type of institutional soft balancing described by Wivel and Paul. As ASEAN chair in 2020, Vietnam pushed UNCLOS language into ASEAN statements and openly called out China’s “serious incidents” in the East Sea, making China look like the violator without escalating tensions. ^[35]Vietnam applies a similar strategy on the Mekong, welcoming external partners such as Japan, Australia, and the EU, strengthening the Mekong River Commission, and urging China to join rules-based water governance mechanisms.^[36]These actions demonstrate how Vietnam uses institutions and legal norms to draw China into rules-based frameworks, raise the political and reputational costs of aggressive behaviour, and mobilize diplomatic support from other states without resorting to alliance commitments.

 

Economic diversification through the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)^[37], European Union–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA)^[38], and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework^[39] strengthens Vietnam’s material autonomy by reducing economic dependence on China and limiting Beijing’s ability to apply economic coercion. While these trade arrangements do not constitute soft balancing, they support Vietnam’s broader non-aligned hedging strategy by enabling sustained legal and diplomatic resistance through institutions such as ASEAN and UNCLOS.

 

What makes this option advantageous is that Vietnam’s soft-balancing posture enables it to pursue hard-balancing measures without triggering regional opposition. In practice, this means Vietnam strengthens its military in ways that signal restraint and defensive intent, which do not alarm other countries. Vietnam has conducted the most extensive island-building campaign in the South China Sea apart from China, creating over 3,000 acres of artificial land since 2021 and modernizing runways, harbours, and logistics hubs. However, it has faced virtually no condemnation from China, the United States, the Philippines, or other claimants.^[40] This is an extraordinary strategic outcome. Whereas China’s island-building in the 2010s provoked widespread criticism, Vietnam’s has been interpreted as defensive and stabilizing because of its strict non-alignment policy.^[41] All major powers trust that Vietnam’s expanded facilities will not host foreign troops or be used offensively. ^[42]As a result, Vietnam has been able to modernize its navy, deploy six Kilo-class submarines, acquire patrol vessels from Japan and India, expand naval exercises with the Quad, and upgrade its Spratly outposts without generating threat perceptions.^[43]

 

Potential risks remain, including the possibility that China may reinterpret Vietnam’s modernization as a shift toward hard balancing. However, Vietnam’s credibility as a neutral actor, reinforced by its strict “Four No’s,” lowers this risk. Compared to the dangers of joining an alliance or maintaining the status quo, the risk for Option C is low and manageable.

 

Taken together, Option C allows Vietnam to achieve three goals:

(1) defend and strengthen its maritime sovereignty through hard balancing;

(2) avoid entrapment, escalation, or loss of autonomy by upholding non-alignment; and

(3) increase diplomatic legitimacy and multilateral support through soft balancing.

 

For these reasons, Enhanced Non-Aligned Hedging is the safest, flexible and most sustainable strategy for Vietnam to move forward. It capitalizes on Vietnam’s credibility as a neutral actor to build stronger defence abilities without causing other countries to react negatively.

Implementation

 

First, Vietnam should accelerate the modernization of its navy and coast guard by building or acquiring additional patrol vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, and drones. It should also increase its asymmetric defences, such as coastal-defence missiles, mobile anti-ship systems, submarines, and short-range air defences. Upgrading the outposts in the Spratlys with better harbours, stronger buildings, longer runways, and more radar systems would transform these features into durable, defensible positions that support Vietnam’s EEZ claims. Investing in maritime domain awareness, including radar upgrades, satellite monitoring, and participation in initiatives like the Quad’s IPMDA^[44], will help Vietnam detect intrusions early. Clear rules of engagement for the Navy, Coast Guard, and militia should emphasize restraint and coordinated responses to avoid miscalculation while protecting Vietnam’s right to self-defense.

 

Secondly, Vietnam should lead ASEAN efforts to advance an effective Code of Conduct, coordinate with like-minded claimants, and ensure UNCLOS remains the basis of regional maritime governance. Vietnam should continue filing notes verbales and prepare for potential arbitration cases, thereby reinforcing Vietnam’s legal position and constraining China’s narrative. Expanding multilateral cooperation and regular maritime security dialogues with the U.S., Japan, India, and select ASEAN partners will improve intelligence sharing and capacity building without entering formal alliances. Track-II dialogues with Chinese scholars and institutions can maintain communication channels and reduce misunderstandings during crises.

 

Thirdly, Vietnam must strengthen ASEAN unity by resolving remaining maritime issues with neighbours, negotiating joint fishing arrangements, and supporting coordinated non-combat patrols or exercises. Where ASEAN-wide consensus is slow, Vietnam can pursue bilateral agreements to manage fishermen, share alerts on exercises, and handle accidental intrusions.

 

Fourthly, Vietnam should adopt a clear legal framework for peaceful protest so that public anger can be expressed safely without turning into violence. Public education campaigns should explain Vietnam’s SCS strategy, historical claims, and why restraint is necessary, helping maintain unity and avoid unrealistic expectations. Vietnam should also support its fishermen with better equipment, insurance, and coordinated escorts to keep a strong presence in disputed waters. Investments in domestic defence production and maritime law expertise will further strengthen long-term self-reliance.

 

Finally, Vietnam should maintain regular high-level political and military negotiations so both sides understand each other’s limits, avoid miscalculations, and keep communication open. Economic and cultural engagement, like trade, tourism, and academic exchanges, should continue to stabilize the broader relationship and signal that Vietnam’s assertiveness at sea is compatible with peaceful bilateral ties.

 

Together, these measures allow Vietnam to reinforce its position in the South China Sea while maintaining autonomy, managing tensions, and avoiding entanglement in great-power rivalry.

Conclusion

 

Vietnam’s main challenge in the South China Sea is to protect its islands, waters, and resources from China’s expansive claims while preserving regional stability and its own strategic independence. While no option is without costs, the analysis makes the choice clear: maintaining the status quo enables further China expansion, and aligning with China would undermine Vietnam’s autonomy. In contrast, an enhanced non-aligned hedging strategy offers Vietnam the most flexible and sustainable path forward. By strengthening its maritime capabilities, reinforcing its legal position under UNCLOS, deepening ties with a wide network of partners, and leveraging ASEAN and multilateral institutions, Vietnam can raise the costs of coercion while maintaining its independence.

 

Success will depend on disciplined implementation and clear communication, both to reassure partners abroad and to maintain unity at home. Vietnam must show that it can protect their homeland,uphold international law, and manage tensions responsibly while refusing to be drawn into great-power rivalry. By avoiding both submission and escalation, Vietnam can protect its sovereignty, uphold regional stability, and continue shaping a rules-based order that reflects its long-term interests.

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Footnotes

1. ^{International Trade Administration, “Vietnam – Defense and Security Sector,” Vietnam Country Commercial Guide, U.S. Department of Commerce, January 30, 2024, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/vietnam-defense-and-security-sector} ↑

2. ^{International Trade Administration, “Vietnam – Defense and Security Sector.”} ↑

3. “What is the South China Sea Dispute?”, BBC News, July 3, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349 ↑

4. Trần et al., 2024. “Challenges for Vietnam in Protecting South China Sea Sovereignty and Interests.” Cogent Social Sciences 10 (1). 3 ↑

5. Ibid. 3 ↑

6. Park, Choon-ho. 1978. “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?” Ocean Development & International Law 5 (1). 28 ↑

7. Ibid. 28 ↑

8. Elleman, Bruce. “Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, 4 September 1958.” Chapter. In China’s Naval Operations in the South China Sea: Evaluating Legal, Strategic and Military Factors, 227. ↑

9. Qiang Ye, “Historic Rights in the South China Sea,” Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 7, no. 2 (2019), 213. ↑

10. Park, Choon-ho. 1978. “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?” Ocean Development & International Law 5 (1). 28. ↑

11. Phan Xuan Dung, “‘No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides’: Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power,” Asia Policy 17, no. 4 (2022): 160, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27254598. ↑

12. Article 14, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (Adopted at the third session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, 26 June 1998). The UN Website, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf. ↑

13. Ye, “Historic Rights in the South China Sea”. 213. ↑

14. Trần, Bách Hiếu et al. 2024. “Challenges for Vietnam.” 4. ↑

15. Ibid, 4. ↑

16. Uyên, V. K. B. “Hệ sinh thái biển Việt Nam: Cơ hội phục hồi? [Vietnam’s marine ecosystem: Opportunity for recovery?]”, Tia Sáng Magazine. March 9, 2022, https://tiasang.com.vn/dien-dan/he-sinh-thai-bien-viet-nam-co-hoi-phuc-hoi-29844/ ↑

17. Trần et al., 2024. “Challenges for Vietnam”, 3. ↑

18. “Chinese coastguard patrols disputed reefs controlled by Vietnam in South China Sea”, South China Morning Post, October 21, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3329731/chinese-coastguard-patrols-disputed-reefs-controlled-vietnam-south-china-sea ↑

19. John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power,” in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 34. ↑

20. OE Staff, “Repsol Increases Vietnamese Field Stake,” OE Digital, April 18, 2017, https://www.oedigital.com/news/446757-repsol-increases-vietnamese-field-stake ↑

21. Bill Hayton, “South China Sea: Vietnam ‘Scraps New Oil Project,’” BBC News, March 22, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43507448 ↑

22. Ibid. ↑

23. Ibid. ↑

24. Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 77-82 ↑

25. Stephen M. Walt,“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security 9, no. 4 (1985), 17. ↑

26. Ibid.17-18 ↑

27. Dung, “‘No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides,’” 160. ↑

28. Sebastian Strangio, “4. Cambodia and Laos: Phobos and Deimos” In In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 100-101 ↑

29. Polygraph, “China Misleadingly Projects Blame on Philippines After Maritime Skirmish”, Voice of America, December 13, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-china-misleadingly-projects-blame-on-philippines-after-maritime-skirmish/7396952.html ↑

30. Yoon Ah Oh, “Vietnam’s Economic Dependence on China: Understanding Vulnerability through a Typology of Trade Shocks,” in The Dragon’s Underbelly: Dynamics and Dilemmas in Vietnam’s Economy and Politics, ed. Nhu Truong and Tuong Vu (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2022), 140. ↑

31. ^{International Trade Administration, “Vietnam – Defense and Security Sector.”} ↑

32. Anders Wivel and T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing, Institutions, and Peaceful Change,” Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 4 (2020): 474, https://doi.org/10.1017/S089267942000057X. ↑

33. Ibid., 473.

34. Ibid., 474. ↑

35. Dung, “‘No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides,’” 172.

36. Ibid., 173. ↑

37. CTPP is a free trade agreement between 11 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. It establishes a free trade area by reducing or eliminating tariffs and other barriers, making it easier for member economies to trade and helping businesses of all sizes, especially small and medium enterprises. Government of Canada, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),” Trade Commissioner Service, accessed December 3, 2025, https://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx ↑

38. The EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreemen (EVFTA) is the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, a pact that came into force on August 1, 2020, to eliminate trade barriers and boost economic cooperation between the European Union and Vietnam. European Commision, “EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement”, European Union, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-vietnam-free-trade-agreement. ↑

39. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), launched in May 2022 by the U.S. and 13 partners, is meant to make the region’s economies stronger, more sustainable, and fairer. Together, these countries make up about 40% of the world’s economy. IPEF covers four areas: trade, supply chains, clean energy and infrastructure, and tax and anti-corruption. Countries can choose which parts they want to join. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF),” United States Trade Representative, n.d.,https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity-ipef. ↑

40. Khang Vu, “How Vietnam’s Non-Aligned Foreign Policy Helps Bolster Its Position in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, October 7, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/how-vietnams-non-aligned-foreign-policy-helps-bolster-its-position-in-the-south-china-sea/.

41. Ibid. ↑

42. Ibid.

43. ^Ibid. ↑

44. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), launched by the Quad in 2022, is a regional initiative designed to improve monitoring and transparency across key Indo-Pacific waterways. It provides partner states with near–real-time maritime information using advanced tools such as commercial satellite radio-frequency data. “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness | Quad Leaders’ Summit 2023,” Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-leaders-summit-2023/indo-pacific-partnership-maritime-domain-awareness. ↑