Keywords: Singapore; interfaith relations; secularism; Talal Asad; José Casanova; religious governance
Abstract
Interreligious tensions are among the most common sources of contemporary violent conflicts, yet Singapore, despite its remarkable religious diversity, experiences some of the lowest instances of interreligious strife. A 2023 Pew Research Centre study highlights Singapore’s religious diversity as “remarkable on a global scale,”[1] yet the country has remained largely free from significant interfaith conflict, much less violence. While stable economic growth and low general violence levels are obvious contributors, a deeper examination reveals that the relationships between the individual faithful, their representatives, and the state play both critical and interconnected roles. This paper argues that the distinctive interreligious harmony in Singapore is sustained by two key factors: the culturally embedded relationships among religious groups and the consultative approach adopted by the People’s Action Party (PAP) in regulating religious activity. Both foster interfaith engagement and implement de-escalatory measures when necessary. The argument is based on in-depth interviews with leaders from key religious organizations, including the Archdiocesan Interreligious Dialogue and Ecumenism Centre of Singapore (AIRDECS), Singapore’s Buddhist Federation, the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), and the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS). This paper takes a unique approach by integrating the voices of representatives from major faith organizations in Singapore into its analysis of the country’s religious governance – an element largely neglected in earlier research.
Introduction
In 2025, incidents of interreligious violence and sectarian tensions became increasingly prevalent worldwide. A report issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in March warned that “acts of harassment, intimidation, violence and incitement based on religion or belief have risen to ‘alarming levels’ across the world.”[2]
Unlike most of the world, Singapore has established an exemplary track record of fostering peaceful interfaith relations. Recognized as the most religiously diverse country in the world by Pew Research in 2014,[3] Singapore stands out not only for its demographic diversity – but also for its comparatively harmonious interfaith dynamics. Remarkably, two-thirds (68%) of Singaporeans who identify with a religion believe that multiple religions can be true, while only 30% view their own religion as the sole truth.[4] Furthermore, six in ten Singaporeans report a personal connection to at least one religion other than their own, with one-quarter indicating connections to three or more religions – the highest proportion among surveyed nations.[5] These patterns of belief and affiliation reinforce the viability of Singapore’s model of integrating religion into public life through a combination of state policy and community-based engagement.
Beyond such statistics, Singapore has maintained an unparalleled record of interreligious peace since its independence in 1965. Isolated incidents of tension have typically involved minor issues, such as restrictions on public disruptions linked to religious practices (for instance, the Thaipusam Restrictions of 1973) or efforts to moderate aggressive evangelism.
This paper explores the strategies underpinning Singapore’s success, arguing that the country’s distinctive interpretation of religious modernity and secularism, whether intentional or not, is what sustains its achievements in interreligious peace. The Singaporean government and its people reject the notion that modernity necessitates the exclusion of religion from public life. Instead, they collaboratively adopt what legal scholar Li-Ann Thio terms “accommodative secularism,” a model that challenges Western conceptions of secularism as neutral and dispassionate.[6] Through a dual approach – consisting of top-down governance strategies and bottom-up community initiatives – Singapore fosters interreligious harmony while minimizing interreligious conflict. This dual approach strategy includes measures such as Dr. Jaclyn Neo’s “covenantal pluralism”[7] in governance, quota-based HDB housing policies to ensure demographic integration, and grassroots programs such as the Racial and Religious Harmony Circles and shared religious spaces.
This study contributes to the broader literature on religious governance in pluralistic societies, and can serve as a case study on how Singapore’s successful approach can inform other nations that struggle to maintain interreligious harmony. It evaluates whether Singapore’s success is uniquely contingent on its specific historical and political conditions – such as its one-party governance model and the socio-political realities of its independence – or whether elements of its approach can be adapted to diverse global and/or regional contexts.
Theoretical Background to the Singapore Model
International norms suggest that the primary responsibility for mitigating religious violence rests with individual states, particularly those committed to a secular governance model. This is especially true in light of existing political theory. For instance, the principle of state sovereignty, rooted in the Westphalian tradition, affirms that each state has authority over its territory and domestic affairs, free from external interference.[8] While this principle suggests responsibility – namely, who should be responsible for maintaining interreligious peace – Max Weber’s definition of the state in his classic “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) would lead us to believe that the state (in this case, Singapore) is the only entity truly capable of maintaining interreligious peace within its borders. Weber asserts: “The state is seen as the sole grantor of the ‘right’ to physical force. Therefore, ‘politics’ in our case would mean the pursuit for a portion of power or for influencing the division of power whether it is between states, or between groups of people which the state encompasses.”[9]
In short, the current norm is that secular states, especially those entrenched in the Western liberal tradition, are expected to ensure equitable treatment of all religions while fostering interreligious harmony. Theoretically, secular states ought to maintain neutrality toward the religions within their borders, intervening only to prevent violence and uphold pluralism; after all, their very identity is rooted in secularism.
However, this public stance of secular neutrality is critiqued by scholars, perhaps most notably by Talal Asad, who argues that secularism, in reality, functions as a covert exercise of state power rather than a neutral framework. Secularism itself, Asad contends, is not a universal, neutral concept – but a historically constructed power dynamic rooted in Western Enlightenment ideals. The specific worldview it imposes, namely one of “enlightened reason,” shoves religions that resist privatization to the margins.[10] By relegating religion to the private sphere, secular states end up controlling religious expression, defining the kinds of spirituality that are deemed “acceptable,” while those traditions that are opposed to secular norms are suppressed.[11]
The question of how to manage religious diversity has long eluded many governments, as history has shown that many have failed to find a solution that ensures peace. One need only look at events such as the Indian Partition, the Bosnian War, or the Troubles in Northern Ireland to understand why achieving harmony among religiously diverse populations may seem impossible.
Nevertheless, many have attempted to address this challenge. A popular approach has been to advocate for secularism, which argues for a strict separation between religion and the state, ensuring that no religion is privileged. Models like laïcité take this to the extreme, defining separation as a public sphere entirely free from religious influence – an approach Singapore directly rejects through its incorporation of faith leaders’ and religious followers’ voices in state governance and public discourse. Scholars like Asad have criticized the laïcité model, arguing thatit is largely a framework that serves state power by reinforcing the binary distinction between the secular and the religious – a concept rooted primarily in Western Europe.[12]
Not all secular states achieve neutrality among religions through the same model of privatization. While Talal Asad critiques secularism as a Western construct that marginalizes religion by confining it to the private sphere, José Casanova argues for a more flexible interpretation. He argues that privatization is not an inherent feature of the modern state and that secularism can take different forms depending on a country’s cultural and political context.
In Public Religions in the Modern World (1994), Casanova challenges the idea of a singular, monolithic model of secularism. He shows that the principle of separating religious and political institutions is applied differently around the world – sometimes involving close engagement with religion rather than minimizing its public significance. However, most scholarship on secularism has focused heavily on Western liberal democracies, with relatively little attention paid to how secular governance functions in Southeast Asian contexts. Further, studies of secularization in Asia tend to center on India – such as Kothari and Maru’s exploration of Indian secularism and the caste system[13] – or China’s contestation of the thesis, as discussed by Dobbelaere.[14] However, examinations of secularism in Southeast Asia remain relatively rare.
Singapore, in this regard, presents a compelling example of a non-Western secular state that diverges from both the “neutrality model” and the “privatization model.” Casanova’s concept of the “de-privatization of religion” offers a valuable lens for understanding how religious communities in Singapore maintain an active presence in the public sphere. Though these communities often operate within state-defined boundaries and under regulatory oversight through laws like the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) – limiting their full autonomy – they are nonetheless treated as legitimate partners in public discourse and policy development through its presence in organizations like the Inter-Religious Organisation and the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (organizations that are elaborated on in the “Top-Down State Regulations” and “Bottom-Up” sections). This contrasts sharply with Asad’s portrayal of secularism as systematically stripping religion of its political relevance.
Casanova’s idea of “multiple modernities” further supports the legitimacy of Singapore’s approach. By rejecting the assumption that modernization must follow a Western liberal trajectory, this framework opens up space for context-specific models of governance that incorporate religion in different ways. From this perspective, Singapore’s system – marked by deliberate state management of religious harmony and the inclusion of religious voices in national life and state governance – is not a departure from modern secularism. It exemplifies how modernity can accommodate, rather than exclude, religion in the public sphere.
Scholars, most notably Li-Ann Thio, have described Singapore’s model as one of “accommodative secularism.”[15] However, this paper offers a unique perspective by arguing that such state-led accommodation operates through a dual top-down and bottom-up approach: state-drawn legal boundaries for religious expression (top-down) are reinforced by grassroots initiatives such as the Harmony Circles (bottom-up), which together pursue the same goal of prioritizing state security,.
Primary and Secondary Methodologies
To explore how this dual structure functions in practice, this paper incorporates the perspectives of religious leaders themselves. While scholars like Mohammad Alami Musa have offered comprehensive analyses of Singapore’s management of religion,[16] most existing accounts emphasize state policy or conceptual models. Few examine how religious communities experience and participate in this governance structure from the ground up.
There are existing studies based on interviews, particularly regarding Islamic perspectives. For example, Musa and Nursheila Muez’s work features the views of 37 asatizah (Islamic preachers and teachers),[17] while Walid Jumblatt Abdullah’s 2013 article, “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore,” examines the perspectives of two Muslim organizations: MUIS and Persatuan Ulama dan Guru-Guru Agama Islam Singapura (PERGAS).[18] However, no prior study has interviewed representatives from multiple religious groups.
This paper bridges that gap by incorporating the perspectives of leaders from five faiths – Catholicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam – representing organizations such as MUIS, AIRDECS, the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, the Inter-Religious Organization, and the Singapore Buddhist Federation. Their insights into how interreligious peace is maintained in Singapore through a dual top-down and bottom-up approach build upon the Historical Foundations section – based primarily on secondary sources – that explains how key historical events have shaped the state’s current regulatory and institutional mechanisms. This serves as an integral context for the paper’s analysis of the top-down dimension of Singapore’s model of accommodative secularism.
The selection of officials interviewed for this paper was guided in part by the aim of ensuring a diversity of perspectives, including representatives from major faith traditions such as Buddhism and Catholicism, as well as from smaller communities like Taoism. This diversity is important because any survey of interreligious relations in Singapore would be incomplete and potentially misleading if it relied solely on the viewpoint of a single majority group. Capturing voices from faith groups of varying sizes allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how different communities interact with both the state and one another. This is especially important given that the paper seeks to explore Singapore’s interreligious dynamics in their broadest form, rather than focusing only on interactions between major religions like Buddhism and Christianity. That said, it must also be acknowledged that the final pool of interviewees (and the religious groups represented) was shaped by practical considerations, particularly the availability and willingness of individuals to participate.
Participants were reached online through email and social media, with interviews conducted either in person or via Zoom. These semi-structured interviews covered topics ranging from the participants’ roles in interfaith activities to their organizations’ interactions with the government in interreligious affairs.
A note on my own positionality: at the time of interviewing officials representing the organizations mentioned above, I was a high school student. This meant that the power dynamic between myself and those I interviewed was primarily between a student and a teacher. However, because the interviewees occupied the position of authority in this dynamic (as they were essentially doing a favor), I refrained from asking questions that were excessively probing about their political views of the state. It should also be noted that I am a Roman Catholic; however, my faith did not affect the rigor of the questions posed to the official from AIRDECS.
Ethical considerations were carefully addressed. The interviews posed minimal risk to participants, all of whom were informed of the study’s goals and provided verbal consent, and all were given the option to decline participation. Participants were assured anonymity. Data from interviews were securely stored, and participants’ statements reflect their personal experiences in interfaith work rather than the official positions of their organizations.
In addition to interviews, this research also draws on key resources, such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act – a cornerstone of Singapore’s religious management – and reports from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University.
Historical Foundations of the Singaporean Model
The historical context behind Singapore’s model of religious management helps explain why the state exercises such a high degree of control over interreligious relations while simultaneously seeking to cultivate organic interreligious understanding and appreciation. This is not merely to avoid generalizations – such as the notion that Singapore’s occasionally strict religious regulations are simply a reflection of a broader governmental culture of regulatory rigidity, evident in policies on everything from gum-chewing to pigeon-feeding – but to better assess whether Singapore’s model of religious management (which has thus far been successful in preventing interreligious conflict) can be emulated in other national contexts. This question, which the conclusion of this paper will explore, hinges on whether Singapore’s historical circumstances are so unique that replication elsewhere would be ineffective.
The Singaporean government’s hands-on approach to religious governance is the result of several factors: the legacy of the British colonial administration in Singapore and its approach to interreligious matters; the need for national cohesion, which was essential for political survival; Singapore’s history as a port city; and numerous religious and racial riots.
According to Vineeta Sinha, the British colonial administration in Singapore, as early as the mid-19th century, employed official rhetoric that claimed its style of religious management was “not about suppression of religions but their appropriate regulation for the preservation of order in the public domain, and in view of the fore-mentioned riots,[19] appealed to common sense and reason.”[20] “Appropriate regulation,” when applied to the management of religious processions, meant “government surveillance and supervision.”[21] This prioritization of public order would become and remain the paramount principle in the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) approach to managing interreligious relations post-independence and indeed well into the modern era. Such retention of the British colonial administration’s approach to managing religion, one based on a logic of securitization and strict boundaries, shows how the current PAP approach is not a modern pragmatic phenomenon but rather deeply rooted in Singapore’s history.[22]
This can be seen in the vision of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the founding architect of the new republic. In 1990, during a talk at the National University of Singapore, Lee stated that he viewed both Islam and evangelical Christianity in Singapore as groups requiring direct attention. He claimed that “however hard the Christians might try, they are not going to make Singapore a Christian society” and that “soft government, trying to accommodate everybody, will lead to big mischief.”[23]
Lee was not entirely unjustified in this latter statement, as he likely recalled the potential for religious and racial riots to tear the country apart and pose a real threat to its survival as a political entity, particularly during its fragile post-independence years. One such example, predating independence, was the 1950 Maria Hertogh riots, sparked by a court ruling returning a Dutch Catholic girl to her biological parents after being raised by a Malay Muslim family,[24] which exposed the potentially fatal consequences of interreligious tensions.
This made clear how urgently government control over media portrayals of religiously sensitive issues was needed. The fear of a potential recurrence of interreligious conflict, a consequence of the recent memory of the Maria Hertogh riots, and the perceived need for state oversight of inflammatory religious speech culminated in the passage of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1990 – legislation that prohibits religious leaders from making statements or engaging in activities that could incite hostility between communities.
Yet another instance of instability between faith groups was the 1964 race riots in Singapore. Though primarily ethnic in nature, it contained clear religious undertones. The first wave began on July 21 during a Muslim procession for the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, leading to 23 deaths and 454 injuries. A second wave followed on September 3 after the murder of a Malay trishaw rider, resulting in 13 more deaths and over 100 injuries.[25] While rooted in broader Malay-Chinese tensions – exacerbated by issues like urban displacement and political inequality – religious rhetoric and the setting of the first riot revealed the link between ethnic and religious fault lines.
By the time Singapore reached independence in 1965, it became clear that the riots a year earlier would merely be the latest in a series of interreligious strife if the new government failed to create an infrastructure for managing diverse faith groups in a way that prevents religious sectionalism, or if the state failed to cool interreligious tensions before they boiled over into violence. Regardless of whether government control over faith practices limited freedom, it was viewed as necessary not just for peace, but for political survival. In this sense, the 1964 riots contributed directly to the top-down governance style that will be examined in the next section of this paper. After gaining independence, the Singapore Constitution enshrined non-discriminatory policies based on race or religion.[26] Further institutional support came in 1970 with the establishment of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, tasked with ensuring that no law discriminates against any particular racial or religious group.[27] Two decades later, government-imposed religious harmony was again legally reinforced through the aforementioned Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1990.
Top-Down State Regulations
The top-down portion of Singapore’s approach to managing an interreligious population is, largely, about ensuring the state’s survival and treating regulation as a prerequisite for interreligious peace – a point that will be revisited later in this section. This section focuses on state-led or state-imposed tools for managing religion, but it must be emphasized that this represents only one half of a dual framework, with the bottom-up component examined in the following major section of the paper. The top-down structure comprises legal infrastructure, executive governmental bodies, and social engineering mechanisms.
Legal Infrastructure
From a top-down perspective, the government plays a highly active role. This is evident in constitutional regulations such as Article 15(4) of the Singaporean Constitution, which stipulates that an individual’s freedom of religion may be limited by “any general law relating to public order, public health, or morality.”
Among the laws that regulate interreligious affairs, the most directly relevant is the aforementioned Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA). Passed on 9 November 1990 and enforced from 31 March 1992, the MRHA empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to impose restraining orders on individuals of status within religious communities if the Minister “is satisfied that that person has committed or is committing, or is likely to commit, or has attempted or is attempting to commit any of the following acts,” including “causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups,” or using religion to promote political causes, engage in subversive acts, or “excite disaffection against the President or Government.”[28] These restraining orders may also apply to entire religious groups if the Minister suspects that the group has, or may have, “undermined religious tolerance between different religious groups in Singapore” and/or “presented a threat to the public peace and public order in Singapore.”[29]
Institutional Bodies
Another major component of the MRHA is the establishment of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH), which consists of between six and fifteen members, at least two-thirds of whom must represent Singapore’s major religions. This council, whose members are appointed by the President, is tasked with “considering and making recommendations to the President on restraining orders and directions referred to the Council by the Minister.”[30] Some critics may view the intentions of the Act as authoritarian or see its provisions as circumventing the rule of law, given that the Minister may issue orders without prior judicial review and that PCRH proceedings are confidential.[31] These concerns are valid when examined through a Western liberal framework. Indeed, the passage and enforcement of the MRHA and the creation of the PCRH could be seen as enabling authoritarian exercises of power. This resonates with Talal Asad’s critique that secularism is a manifestation of state power. However, unlike in Western secular models where the state relegates religion to the private sphere, Singapore exerts control over religion directly through legal mechanisms in the public realm.
Notably, the very existence of the MRHA complicates Asad’s portrayal of secularism as necessarily stripping religion of its political relevance; if religion were not politically relevant, there would be no need for the MRHA or the PCRH. Still, it must be acknowledged that the MRHA is logically consistent with Singapore’s prevailing philosophy of governance: that the survival of the state must be prioritized above all else. This priority transcends debates over whether specific laws are sufficiently democratic; if a law promotes state survival, it is deemed appropriate. The MRHA and PCRH serve this function by acting as deterrents.[32] Moreover, while the MRHA and PCRH can be interpreted as mechanisms for containing religious groups, containment does not necessarily preclude empowerment. The Act may serve to support the legitimacy of religious communities in public discourse.
Top-down measures go beyond solely reactionary measures. According to an AIRDECS official interviewed, all religion-related bills are reviewed by advisory bodies to prevent discrimination. The Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR), whose composition mirrors the country’s religious diversity, scrutinizes all legislation to ensure it does not disadvantage any racial or religious group and reports its findings to Parliament. This proactive approach shows the government’s commitment to a model of secularism aligned with José Casanova’s vision – one that recognizes religious institutions as legitimate public actors.
In addition to the PCRH, the Ministry of Culture, Community, and Youth (MCCY) plays a central role in promoting interreligious harmony. As the ministry responsible for cultural and community engagement policies, the MCCY oversees the Harmony Circle network, which consists of 93 Harmony Circles – one in each constituency – as detailed in the bottom-up section. These circles serve as localized platforms for interfaith dialogue and conflict mediation, with members trained to work closely with religious and community leaders to defuse potential tensions.[33]
Beyond reactive conflict mediation, the MCCY also provides funding for community projects that it deems conducive to interfaith harmony, another instance of how top-down mechanisms are often intertwined with bottom-up initiatives. The nationwide distribution of Harmony Circles further ensures the standardization of this message, granting all regions the same procedures for maintaining interreligious cohesion.
Social Engineering Mechanisms
A final component of Singapore’s top-down mechanisms for promoting interreligious harmony is its social engineering efforts, which include urban planning and cultural initiatives such as Harmony Day. Notably, there appears to be a highly deliberate effort to foster religious diversity through the design of public spaces. One prominent example is the role of the Housing Development Board (HDB), whose Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) enforces fixed ethnic quotas at both the block and neighborhood levels to reflect Singapore’s broad national demographic composition and prevent ethnic enclaves.[34] Neighborhood quotas, last updated in 2010, limit Chinese residents to 84 percent, Malays to 22 percent, and Indians/Others to 12 percent, while block-level quotas allow slightly higher thresholds (e.g., up to 87 percent Chinese in some cases).[35] In practice, this prevents any single ethnic group from dominating a block or neighborhood entirely, though majorities like Chinese exceeding 80 percent remain possible. While this quota system has attracted controversy,[36] it compels interethnic and, by extension, interreligious interaction in the most intimate of domestic settings – people’s homes. As HDB flats house approximately four-fifths of Singapore’s population,[37] such exposure becomes a near-universal experience, reducing the likelihood of interreligious hostility through normalization and familiarity.
Urban planning directly aimed at amplifying interreligious (and/or interethnic) exposure and cohesion is not limited to HDB flats, however. According to the Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth (MCCY) website, “it is not unusual to find a Hindu temple, a Chinese temple, a mosque and a church located in close proximity to each other and peacefully coexisting” – and this is precisely the case in the district of Yuhua, where all the four exist within 1,400 ft of each other.[38] This is not an organic phenomenon – it is “a reflection of our social policy behind town planning and housing norms,” in other words, deliberate planning that hopes to induce interreligious interactions and mutual understanding of diverse faiths.[39]
Singapore’s strong commitment to interreligious peace is also reflected in its education and national celebrations. Every year on July 21, schools and workplaces come together to observe Racial Harmony Day, helping young Singaporeans appreciate the country’s religious diversity. Through workshops and lively cultural events like the colorful Chingay Parade,[40] students experience and celebrate different traditions. They often wear traditional clothes like the Baju Kurung and take part in reciting a Declaration of Religious Harmony, a state-sanctioned reminder of the importance of interfaith harmony.
However, it must be noted that these top-down mechanisms are effective only to the extent that they are complemented by, and intricately intertwined with, grassroots engagement. The next section examines bottom-up strategies – such as Harmony Circles, shared religious spaces, interfaith initiatives, and a culture of religious pluralism embraced by many faith leaders interviewed – that are inherently community-driven and serve as the other essential component to sustaining interreligious cohesion.
Bottom-Up: Community Initiatives and a Culture of Religious Pluralism
While much of Singapore’s religious governance appears top-down and enforced by a strong-willed state with centralized power, a robust bottom-up culture of interfaith engagement, practiced by civil society and ordinary citizens, undergirds the state’s success in managing interfaith diversity. This section will explore how interfaith institutions and grassroots initiatives both reflect and reinforce a national commitment to religious harmony.
First and foremost, religious openness appears to foster a culture of interfaith respect. A recurring theme among interviewees was the belief that their faith encourages the accommodation of diverse viewpoints and calls on its adherents to respect religious traditions other than their own, even if they do not personally subscribe to those beliefs. The AIRDECS official stated in his interview that the Catholic Church “does not hold a monopoly on the truth,”[41] and he supports this claim with the contents of Nostra aetate,[42] a 1965 declaration by the Second Vatican Council which states the following:
“Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing “ways,” comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men.”[43]
“A ray of truth that enlightens all men” – this welcoming sentiment is not uniquely Catholic, as shown by the responses from other interviews of Singaporean religious leaders. Indeed, the AIRDECS official pointed out in his interview that there exists something intrinsic in each faith that lends itself to interreligious understanding.[44] His views were corroborated by an official from the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, who stated that “Taoism is naturally accommodating to other faiths,” and even embraces religious plurality in its own spaces.[45] In many Taoist temples, for instance, it is common to find statues of figures from other traditions, such as Guan Yin, Buddha, and Confucius, reflecting a naturally Taoist spirit of inclusivity.[46] An official from MUIS mentioned in her interview the idea that “diversity is part of God’s divine will.”[47] She cited the Medina Charter – established during the early years of Islam, when the Prophet and his followers migrated to Medina – as one of the earliest documents to recognize religious diversity. She also pointed to the Abbasid Caliphate, whose culture was characterized by interfaith dialogue, and mentioned Al-Biruni, who lived out this tradition through his Kitab al-Hind, in which he engaged deeply with aspects of Hinduism that most Muslim readers would be unfamiliar with.[48] In his interview, a Buddhist monk in Singapore cited the Kalama Sutta, recounting how, when the Kalama chief asked the Buddha, “Which teaching is the best?” the Buddha refrained from asserting the superiority of his own doctrine. Instead, he encouraged the chief, in discerning the virtue of a teaching, to consider whether it fulfills the criteria of being beneficial to oneself and others, blamelessness, and being conducive to harmony. To the Singaporean monk, this emphasis on individual discernment suggested that Buddhists must adopt a non-competitive, non-evangelizing approach.[49]
Such statements raise the question: Is religious pluralism innate to Singaporean society, or is it cultivated? The answer skews toward the latter – while many faiths have internal resources that support coexistence (the very existence of AIRDECS being one such example), it is the deliberate structuring of shared spaces and civic rituals that has mainstreamed interfaith respect. The acceptance of religious pluralism in Singapore is not merely a natural inheritance from its legacy as a port city – it is continually constructed through lived proximity and national state-led efforts.
This shared national commitment to religious pluralism among adherents of diverse faiths forms the foundation for interreligious collaboration in Singapore. For instance, bottom-up interfaith initiatives are common and encouraged by the government. One particularly prominent form of bottom-up interfaith collaboration through which values of religious pluralism take concrete form is the MCCY’s Harmony Circles program, whereby interfaith projects by the public are funded with a budget of a maximum $100,000 under the Harmony Fund.[50] Both the Buddhist monk and the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan officially viewed them as crucial sites where everyday citizens can practice religious cooperation in public life.
Other examples include interfaith Iftar events, which bring together Muslims and non-Muslims to break fast together during Ramadan, with a recent Iftar being hosted by Singapore’s Jewish community and the IRO.[51] These events promote mutual understanding in a highly personal setting – one defined by food and community.
However, the lived reality of interreligious cohesion is most visible in acts of interfaith service. According to the AIRDECS official, The Novena Church (one of the most prominent Catholic churches in Singapore) collaborated with the Sree Narayana Mission (a Hindu charitable organization) to provide hot meals to elderly beneficiaries.[52] The partnership demonstrates how religious institutions can engage in interfaith collaboration that meets material needs, publicly proving the benefits of interfaith respect beyond the absence of tension.
Dialogue also plays a significant role in this ecosystem. The AIRDECS official shared that his organization had held a Taoist-Christian colloquium alongside interfaith panels, where leaders from numerous faith traditions discussed the theology undergirding their faith practices.[53] These conversations allow communities to discuss not only doctrinal differences but also shared ethical orientations.
Furthermore, state-religion relations themselves take on a consultative tone. The Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan official mentioned how the MCCY does not resort to bans or unilateral regulation during Taoist observances such as the Hungry Ghost Festival, when paper offerings are burned in public. Instead, it engages Taoist leaders in roundtable discussions to seek consensus-based adjustments like limiting burning to specific areas or timeframes.[54] This model of governance through dialogue rather than coercion demonstrates the spirit of respectful accommodation as opposed to total control, as shown in France’s laïcité system, for instance.
In this sense, a bottom-up component may be significantly less influential were it not for a pre-existing top-down model of religious governance. Likewise, the top-down approach would likely fall flat in the absence of a public willing to embody interfaith respect in daily life. Singapore’s success in managing religious diversity is therefore best understood not as the triumph of either state or society, but as a product of their partnership.
Conclusion
In an era marked by rising interreligious tensions worldwide, Singapore stands as a rare case of successful religious management. It does not achieve this success through suppression or enforced homogeneity, but rather through a complex system of “accommodative secularism” – a model in which the state retains robust legal authority over religious communities while simultaneously encouraging religious expression and interfaith collaboration. As this paper has shown, Singapore’s religious governance is neither strictly top-down (state-led) nor purely bottom-up (grassroots), but instead a series of interactions between state oversight and civil society participation. The government’s proactive regulation of internal religious affairs – notably through the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the HDB’s ethnic integration policy, and national education initiatives – serves not to marginalize religion, but to create conditions where peaceful pluralism becomes tenable. Simultaneously, bottom-up interfaith projects – such as Harmony Circles, interfaith Iftars, and interfaith colloquiums – prove the capacity and willingness of Singaporeans to engage in interreligious collaboration even without direct state compulsion (even if there does exist heavy state encouragement in the form of funding).
Singapore’s model challenges the dominant assumption in Western secular thought that religion must be relegated to the private sphere for modernity and interreligious harmony to coexist. Instead, Singapore proves what José Casanova has long argued: that public religion can thrive in modern democratic life, especially when managed in ways that both respect diversity and shared civic values. This paper regards the country as a test case for Casanova’s claim, offering empirical support from voices often missing in the academic literature surrounding the religious aspect of Singapore – namely, religious leaders themselves. By including perspectives from major and minor faith groups alike, this study demonstrates that the Singaporean model is not merely imposed from above but is broadly embraced by religious communities.
However, Singapore’s approach has been shaped by a unique set of historical and political conditions. It is the system of one-party parliamentary dominance that effectively led to the kind of top-down foundation (legal and otherwise) for interreligious peace that cannot be easily replicated in a country without such conditions. While Singapore’s model offers an alternative to Western secularism, its success likely depends on ingredients that may not be present in more pluralistic democracies with more porous borders or less centralized authority.
Even so, the core principles that underpin the Singaporean model – mutual respect between the state and religious communities and a seemingly ubiquitous sense of religious pluralism – hold valuable lessons. Rather than treating secularism as a one-size-fits-all solution, policymakers can take José Casanova’s view to heart, just as Singapore already has: that secularism must be shaped by the context in which it operates.
Singapore cannot offer a one-size-fits-all approach to the global crisis of interreligious conflict. But it does provide a compelling case study in how the goals of modern statehood – pluralism and peace – can be achieved not despite religion, but through its respectful inclusion. The harmony that Singapore enjoys is no accident. It is carefully built and maintained through structures of law and culture, and it is a testament to the efficacy of embracing, rather than fearing, religion.
This study is not exhaustive in the perspectives it includes. Future research could seek to gain insights from government officials from the MCCY, representatives from religious schools, and interfaith workers from religious groups whose members were not interviewed in this study.
Xiu Lim is a first-year student at Columbia University with academic interests in bioethics, political philosophy, religion, economics, and the history of culture as a form of soft power. He has collaborated with Dr. Brian D. Earp of the National University of Singapore (NUS) on a research project examining the ethics of infant organ procurement. He is currently leading a scoping review on the topic in partnership with Dr. Shalom Chalson at NUS, and was a Guest Author for the Fall Cycle for Synergy 2025-2026.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Kristi Petersen-Rhead (Ph.D. candidate in anthropology and history at the University of Michigan) for her invaluable guidance and feedback, especially given the author’s limited prior experience with interviews in a social anthropological context.
Special thanks also go to the individuals and community leaders in Singapore who generously shared their perspectives on interreligious relations. This project would not have been possible without their insights.
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Footnotes
William Miner, “In Singapore, Religious Diversity and Tolerance Go Hand in Hand,” Pew Research Center, October 6, 2023. ↑
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), “UN Experts Warn Islamophobia Rising to ‘Alarming Levels.’” March 15, 2024. ↑
Joseph Liu, “Global Religious Diversity,” Pew Research Center, April 4, 2014. ↑
Miner, “In Singapore, Religious Diversity and Tolerance Go Hand in Hand.” ↑
Ibid.
Li-Ann Thio, “Rule of Law, Religious Liberty, and Harmony: Multiculturalism, Legal Pluralism, and the Singapore Model of Accommodative Secularism,” Journal of Law Religion and State 5, no. 3 (2017): 254–91. https://doi.org/10.1163/22124810-00503004. ↑
Jaclyn L Neo, “Regulating Pluralism: Laws on Religious Harmony and Possibilities for Robust Pluralism in Singapore,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2020): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2020.1795414. ↑
Stephane Beaulac, “The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth,” Australian Journal of Legal History 8, no. 2 (2004). ↑
Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, eds, Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015) 136. ↑
Janez Vodičar, “The Critique of Secularism by Talal Asad as a Chance to Look for New Ways of Proclamation,” Verbum Vitae 42, no. 2 (2024): 345–59. https://doi.org/10.31743/VV.16766. ↑
- Ibid.
Jong, Abbas. “The Post-Secular Cosmopolitanization of Religion,” Religions 16, no. 3 (2025): 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030334. ↑
Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh Maru, “Caste and Secularism in India Case Study of a Caste Federation,” Journal of Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (1965): 33–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2051039.
Karel Dobbelaere, “China Challenges Secularization Theory,” Social Compass 56, no. 3 (2009): 362–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768609338758.
Thio, “Rule of Law, Religious Liberty,” 254–91. ↑
Mohammad Alami Musa, “Singapore’s Secularism and Its Pragmatic Approach to Religion,” Religions 14, no. 2 (2023): 219. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020219. ↑
- Mohammad Alami Musa and Nursheila Muez, “Secularism in Singapore: Asatizah’s Perspectives on Its Reconcilability with Islam,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, April 6, 2020.
- Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of MUIS and Pergas,” Asian Survey 53, no. 6 (2013): 1182–204. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2013.53.6.1182.
According to Sinha, the 1854 riots in Singapore involved “seemingly religious clashes” during religious processions. (Vineeta Sinha, Religion-State Encounters in Hindu Domains (Springer Dordrecht, 2011) 72.) ↑
Sinha, Religion-State Encounters, 72. ↑
Sinha, Religion-State Encounters, 64. ↑
The delineation of strict boundaries regarding what religious groups could or could not do – in essence, a model based on regulatory strictness – is not the sole feature of British colonial religious governance that has endured in contemporary Singapore. An examination of the website of Singapore’s Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO) – today one of the nation’s most prominent interfaith institutions – reveals that its inaugural patron in 1949 was the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald. This reveals the extent to which the colonial administration also sought to institutionalize interreligious understanding and harmony as part of its broader approach to religious management. ↑
Manan Vyas, “Lee Kuan Yew on Religious Tolerance,” Nov 26 2015, video, 07:46. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=1KDjjXUx9bY&t=15s&ab_channel=MananVyas. ↑
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, “The Aftermath of the Maria Hertogh Riots in Colonial Singapore (1950–1953)” (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2008), https://doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00028918. ↑
Singapore’s National Library Board, “Communal Riots of 1964,” September 18, 2014. https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=3cb72867-1eec-4caa-96b2-365e1301cbb1. ↑
Li-Ann Thio, “Irreducible Plurality, Indivisible Unity: Singapore Relational Constitutionalism and Cultivating Harmony Through Constructing a Constitutional Civil Religion,” German Law Journal 20, no. 7 (2019): 1007–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.75. ↑
Adeline Hwee Cheng Low, “The Past in the Present: Memories of the 1964 ‘Racial Riots’ in Singapore,” Asian Journal of Social Science 29, no. 3 (2001): 431–55. ↑
“Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990,” Singapore Statutes Online, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/MRHA1990?WholeDoc=1. ↑
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
Although there have been no known instances of restraining orders issued under the Act, the mere existence of the statute may be sufficient to discourage actions that threaten religious harmony. ↑
Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth. “Racial and Religious Harmony Circle.” May 27, 2025. https://www.mccy.gov.sg/sectors/community/racial-and-religious-harmony-circle. ↑
Housing and Development Board. “Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) and Singapore Permanent Resident (SPR) Quota.” https://www.hdb.gov.sg/residential/buying-a-flat/buying-procedure-for-resale-flats/plan-source-and-contract/planning-considerations/eip-spr-quota. ↑
Ministry of National Development and Housing & Development Board, “Press Release: Adjustments to Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) and SPR Quotas,” March 12, 2010, 3,
https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20100312010/press_release-sc_spr-eip-spr_q.pdf ↑- An official of the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan stated in her interview that tensions may arise in instances such as those where Malays can only sell their HDB flats to other Malays when the quota for non-Malays is full, potentially making it harder for them to find buyers. This may lead some ethnic groups to feel disadvantaged, as they are unable to sell their flats at competitive market prices. ↑
Housing and Development Board. “About Us.” https://www.hdb.gov.sg/about-us. ↑
Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth. “Deepening Religious Understanding.” March 31, 2017. https://www.mccy.gov.sg/about-us/news-and-resources/deepening-religious-understanding/. ↑
- Ibid.
- People’s Association, Government of Singapore. “Racial Harmony Day.” https://www.pa.gov.sg/our-programmes/racial-harmony/racial-harmony-day/. ↑
- An official from the Archdiocesan Interreligious Dialogue and Ecumenism Centre of Singapore (AIRDECS), interview, August 16, 2024. ↑
- Latin for “In Our Time,” also known as the Declaration on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions. ↑
Pope Paul VI. “Nostra Aetate.” The Holy See, October 28, 1965. ↑
An official from AIRDECS, interview, August 16, 2024. ↑
- An official from the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, interview, August 17, 2024. ↑
Ibid. ↑
An official from Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), interview, August 23, 2024. ↑
Ibid. ↑
A Buddhist monk affiliated with the Singapore Buddhist Federation, interview, August 20, 2024. ↑
An official from AIRDECS, interview, August 16, 2024. ↑
Inter-Religious Organisation, Singapore. “Interfaith Iftar Hosted at Singapore’s Jewish Community Centre.” June 3, 2019. https://iro.sg/press-release/interfaith-iftar-hosted-at-singapores-jewish-community-centre/. ↑
An official from AIRDECS, interview, August 16, 2024. ↑
Ibid. ↑
An official from the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, interview, August 17, 2024. ↑
