Abstract
This research does not attempt to give a full account of any one Pacific history (that would take books), nor does it try to explore national defense, great power politics, or hegemony.
Rather, it seeks to offer brief illustrations and specific ethnographic vocations, paired with individual stories of resistance. It looks beyond a merely geopolitical or development-based model of power, instead capturing a way of assessing bodily status through the lens of environmental marginalization. Elevating scholarship that emphasizes local and Indigenous voices rewriting history from the margins, I employ anthropic theories– such as created periphery and bare life, to examine certain island communities.
Key Words: Minamata, Okinawa, sovereignty, militarization
Created Periphery and Minamata
The “sea people” of Minamata are a community in Japan to which the theoretical term “created periphery” can ostensibly be applied.1 The constructed status of these coastal communities can be understood within the context of the Minamata disease, a neurological illness caused by the severe mercury poisoning that ravaged Minamata’s coastal communities and was first discovered in 1956. Minamata disease was the result of methylmercury contamination of the marine environments– namely Minamata bay– that surrounded the Chisso Fertilizer and Plastics Factory of Minamata, Japan. Chisso discharged the organic mercury catalyst it used for its chemical production directly into the marine ecosystem. This contamination went into the gills of the shellfish and fish that populated the bay, and into a particularly vulnerable part of the human global food chain: the human fetus.2 In this way, the flushing of mercuric waste had drastic effects both on human and non-human bodies. However, to begin to understand the sea people’s status as a created periphery, we must first investigate how natural and anthropogenic agencies came together to enact, deny, and ultimately shun the pain experienced by Minamata bodies. In doing so, this section will first investigate how cats and coastal communities knew the origin of the disease years prior to scientific confirmation, government acknowledgment, or corporate change. It will then describe the history of the sea people as a created periphery, and how the public discourse which came to surround the Minamata disease illustrates this positionality.
Cats began to die first, and, in this way, served as a kind of “biological sentinel” for a now toxic and deadly environment.3 Methylmercury in the fish and seabirds cats fed on had begun to eat away at their brains.4 Methyl-mercury destroyed the brains of cats and seabirds much as it would the brains of people and their fetuses.5 But coastal communities knew this long before the scientists arrived. They knew that the discharge from the factory was poisonous and worked its way from fish to people.6 What these fishing communities had come to understand through cats, without the help of scientists, was bioaccumulation.7 The mercury that shellfish in the bay of Minamata bore had “floated” into human subjects with increased potency.8 Through this mechanism, the unborn children of the sea people served as the final destination, and the repository for, the toxins of the Chisso factory.9
Scientists’ initial inability to find a definitive connection between Minamata Disease and the chemical dumping of Chisso can in part be explained by the unrepresentative data that was at their disposal regarding the mercury levels of oysters in Minamata Bay. The only available data was collected between May and July 1959, around the same time Chisso temporarily diverted its waste discharge to the Hachiman sediment pools. This pushed the toxins into the Minamata river, west into the Shiranui Sea. As a result, the mercury measurements of Minamata Bay were low relative to real levels. However, the distorted mercury measurements in the bay were still dangerously high.10
The fishing communities of Minamata could do little against the poisoning of their coastal homes and families. In Japan, fishers had always lived outside the mainstream economic political power wielded by emperors, shoguns, Meiji oligarchs, and industrialists. This subservience is not natural, however, but was created through “deep cultural roots.” The myth of Amaterasu Ōmikamia– story of Jinmu, the legendary first emperor of Japan, represents a different form of “earthly bounty” which symbolizes “competing forms of extraction.” Imperial power in Japan has always been tied to land.11 The sea people of Minamata therefore experienced an inability to stop the poisoning of their communities in part because they have become a created periphery within Japanese society since the imperial era. Their status as a created periphery is further exemplified by the reactions of Japanese society to the occurrence of Minamata disease, as described by Michiko Ishimure.
In the beginning, Ishimure explains that the other residents of Minamata welcomed the rumours of this strange disease as a relief from the everyday monotony of village life. However, newspaper and magazine reporters soon descended on Minamata with the cruelty and tastelessness common to mass media. They reported that the sea people did not often eat rice, inquiring if it was because they did not like the taste.12 In doing so, these reporters were challenging the ‘Japaneseness’ of the Minamata sea people. These reporters and self-styled psychologists shook their heads in surprised empathy, even as they wrote what was to become the dominant narrative depicting the fishing communities of Minamata– as living in poverty and destitution, and, above all, backward. Villages that lacked a regular staple food but rather ate “bowlfuls” of poisoned fish every day.13 In calling the sea people’s way of life backward, the media shifted the blame of the mercury poisoning away from Chisso, and to the lifestyle of the affected communities. It was their way of life that was now contended to make no sense– not Chisso’s willful contamination of marine environments that was culpable. The sea people were likewise blamed by the public, and a good deal of Minamata itself, for their stubbornness in clinging to their way of life, because it was deemed that it was clearly that – not mercury contamination- which was fatal to them.
Ishumure laments the modern world has become “deaf and blind” to the “vibrant soul of all things surrounding us.” That the “measurement of everything in charts and statistics [reduces] human life into a series of mechanical repetitions and the human being [itself] into a mathematical quantity.”14 This aggrieved observation surfaces what this text hopes to explore next. How the enactment of bare life in modern industrial societies renders the human condition nothing more than a biological fact, with complete disregard for how life is lived on the margins.15
Okinawan Periphery
This section begins to explore Okinawa’s status as a created periphery within Japanese society first by borrowing from Inoue’s framework of contemporary Okinawan social consciousness as it exists within two basic historical modalities, or layers.16 The first layer describes Okinawa’s experience of being attacked and then controlled by the US military. This first layer is inherently “grafted onto and interacted” with the second layer– a broader historical perspective which reflects the island’s collective memory of Japanese state violence enacted through the colonial structures that occurred since the late nineteenth century. As this research will later discuss in detail, Okinawans were brutally oppressed during the period of US military control between 1945-1972 and, in thus, made to experience a kind of colonial and military-induced bare life. Their peripheral identity was continuously made and remade into an “appositionally collective consciousness” of minshū– a poor and subjugated ‘people’ united together by the concept of a collective “okinawa-n” identity. The existence of a peripheral Okinawan status vis-à-vis a modern Japanese identity is first dependent on an exploration of Japanese state violence and colonial rule which began in the late nineteenth century. In 1872, the newly formed Meiji government implemented the “Ryukyu Measures,” which would, over the next seven years, expand the old Ryukyu Kingdom– which had long been confined to Qing China and Tokugawa Japan– into the Okinawa prefecture. Okinawa was thus absorbed into imperial Japan– the geopolitical result of the Meiji government’s attempts to more clearly define its borders and transform its empire into a modern nation-state capable of standing up to Western powers. It was this desire that would ultimately lead to the Japanese colonial expansion throughout Asia which would occur in the twentieth century.
From a politico-cultural perspective, this same process would come with the implementation of forceful “assimilation-cum-discrimination” programs throughout Okinawa. 17 Under these programs, Okinawan language, culture, and spirit became, in the imperial gaze, points of backwardness and, as a result, necessary points of intervention. In short, these programs were informed by the conviction that “they are Okinawans” and thereby represented a ‘them’ which was not Japanese enough. These programs therefore aimed to remake Okinawans into more authentic subjects of imperial rule. The Kaiwa Denshūjo (Convention School) trained Okinawan teachers to speak standard Japanese. Copies of the Imperial Rescript of Education and pictures of the emperor were distributed in Okinawan schools to develop loyalty among students and teachers. Implementation of the conscription system quickly followed, with the hopes of creating soldiers to fight for imperial Japan. The Meiji government not only used education and the military to inculcate a sense of loyalty and duty, but also deprived Okinawans of their political rights and benefits typically enjoyed by national subjects.18 The Okinawa prefectural government came to be controlled largely by officials sent from Tokyo, higher educational institutions were not created, financial support to develop industries outside of the sugar plantation system were not provided, and the representation of Okinawan voices in the Diet via elections was long denied. It is important to note that Okinawa responded to the Japanese project of assimilation-cum-discrimination not by rejecting, but by collectively internalizing, the idea that they were “Okinawan,” and therein by not Japanese enough.19 Okinawans thus feared an exclusion from the imagined splendor of the outside empire and indulged in attempts to become more. With this goal in mind, Okinawa began the fūzoku kaizen undō (the culture improvement movement), which attempted to remove the ‘backwardness’ of the Okinawan way of life by taking on a more ‘civilized’ Japanese existence. Initiatives for this attempt at cultural improvement included the abolishment of Okinawan hairstyles, the tattoo styles of women, and Okinawan holidays.
In the 1920s, the international market price for sugar dropped sharply due to the oversupply that followed World War 1.20 The effect was devastating for the Okinawan economy (sugar cane made up 80-percent of its economy export income at this time). By the mid-1920s, the economic situation in Okinawa worsened and a food shortage on the island led to wide scale immigration abroad. Many Okinawans immigrated to mainland Japan– particularly the Osaka area, where they worked as cheap laborers in the textile industry. This emigration led to increased discrimination, both abroad and in Japan. Taking this as evidence that the previous “self-Japanization” efforts had not been sufficient, Okinawan authorities became even more extreme in their project to remake Okinawans into Japanese. The authorities initiated new campaigns to change ‘strange’ Okinawan names into Japanese alternatives and urged individual communities to erect Japanese-style shinto gates and shrines in utaki. The use of Okinawan toilets, aerial burial practices, walking with bare feet, and local shamanism were now discouraged to curb the image of Okinawans as unsanitary and backward from spreading among mainland Japanese.
Okinawan Bare life
In the wake of imperial Japan’s capitulation at the end of World War II, the US Military complex was loath to give up its then newly acquired island of Okinawa, as it represented a key strategic stronghold for future US hegemony in the Asian Pacific. In spite of this ambition, the US State Department was increasingly reluctant to become involved in the governing of Okinawa, in part due to the Atlantic Charter in which President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill agreed to oppose future territorial expansion. Due to the divergent views on Okinawa held within the US government, “no systematic administrative action” was immediately taken.21 The result was Okinawa became a “dumping ground” for “army misfits and rejects” moved away from more desirable assignments. More than 15,000 US troops, whose discipline and morale were likely worse than that of any overseas US military forces, ruled over and policed 600,000 Okinawans who lived in surprisingly inhumane levels of poverty. In the six months prior to September 1949, US solders committed an “appalling number of crimes: 29 murders, 18 rape cases, 16 robberies, and 33 assaults.” 22
As a result of US intergovernmental conflict and inaction on what came to be known as the “Okinawa problem,” the actual everyday task of governing local Okinawan communities fell to the US military forces already stationed in Okinawa. This new administration was named the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). One of USCAR’s first tasks was to expropriate Okinawan land for base construction. Although the former Japanese bases had already been confiscated and used by the US military since 1945, USCAR’s own expropriation project did not begin until 1950, when the creation of Ordinance 109 standardized military land acquisition procedures.23 In the ordinance’s wake, land dispossession became particularly “systematic and atrocious.” 24 Okinawan intellectual and activist Kokuba Kotaro describes his personal experiences in the Isamba area as follows: “The expropriation of the land started after midnight … Around 3 a.m., … I heard ominous noise coming from the military road right across the paddy fields. When the noise approached, I looked hard and found that trucks and bulldozers filled with armed soldiers were slowly coming one after another with their headlights off. By dawn, the 40-hectare area of paddy fields was completely surrounded by the armed soldiers; then, the bulldozers rushed into the community of 32 families … They sat in the houses, now surrounded by barbed wires, to show their last resistance. After turning these farmers out of doors by pointing guns and pistols at them, U.S. soldiers started destroying the houses. First, a giant axe was driven into the roof of a variety store at the entrance of the community. The exposed crossbeam was then tied with a rope, which a bulldozer pulled, and the store fell down. Chopped wood was collected by bulldozers, put on trucks, and dumped on the nearby beach. In this way, all 32 houses were destroyed.” 25
Such forceful dispossession and violence did not prove to be an isolated incident during US military rule. Throughout the 1950s the US military continued to enact structural and criminal violence upon Okinawan bodies. In 1951 a fuel tank fell from a fighter plane, destroying a house occupied by three families and killing six people. In 1956, a woman entering an ammunition depot to collect scrap metal was shot and killed. In 1959, a fighter plane crashed into an elementary school, killing seventeen children and injuring over one hundred. In the same year, a woman was shot by a soldier who mistook her for a wild boar.26 Despite their frequency, remedial measures for crimes and military accidents remained virtually out of reach for Okinawans, as jurisdiction over incidents involving US servicemen remained firmly in the hands of US authorities. As a result, no compensation was given to the survivors of the falling fuel tank,27 nor to the family of the women shot at the ammunition depot (she was judged to have been attempting to steal US property).28 To the families whose children were killed in the elementary school plane crash, $2,525 was paid in total against the $19,906 that each family had requested. Later, USCAR paid an additional $2,000 in total.29
In addition to crimes and base-related accidents, uneven legal implementation occurred often. Special Proclamation 28 prohibited marriage between Americans and Okinawans.
However, only Okinawan violators received punishment. This proclamation was later canceled, but many of the resultant children, (when abandoned by their GI fathers) lost access to either American or Japanese citizenship. USCAR also intervened at educational and political institutions, instructing the University of Ryukyu (created by USCAR) to expel student activists. Notably, the then-Mayor of Naha City, Senaga Kamejirō, was expelled on the basis that he was thought to be a communist. Passports and visas were also controlled by USCAR and were often denied to those with leftist inclinations. Needless to say, censorship was a common practice. In the early 1950s, strikes began against Japanese construction companies that were involved in Okinawa base construction on the basis of wage discrimination and extremely poor working conditions. In 1953, USCAR created Ordinance 116 to suppress such labor movements.30
In this way Okinawa was used, against its will, as a US military base. As such, it was equipped with nuclear weapons, B-52s, and poison gas, for dispatch, logistics, and war training exercises.31 Okinawans came to experience insecurity and militarization in their everyday lives as they were increasingly impacted by base-related crimes and accidents. In 1965, a military trailer fell from a fighter jet and crushed a girl. In 1966, a taxi driver was stabbed to death by a serviceman. In 1967 a hostess was strangled to death by a serviceman, a 4-year-old girl was run over by a military trailer and died, and a high school student was killed by a military vehicle hit-and-run. In 1968, 300 houses were damaged by an explosion of a B-52 at Kadena Air Base. In 1969, a major poison gas leak occurred at a military facility. In 1970, a female high school student was stabbed by a serviceman while she walked home from school. In sum, during the period of US military control from 1945-1972, Okinawans were brutally oppressed and actively re-made into a poor, subjugated people– or Minshū.32
Bare life– as defined by Giorgio Agamben and applied to the fishing communities of Minamata, can be used to explain the violence and insecurity experienced by the neutral bodies of Okinawa as a result of US military construction, rule, and the continued perpetuation of colonial structures. As briefly aforementioned, the life of Okinawans were reduced to a “biological existence,” stripped of meaningful political and social status through structural violence, crime, and technogenic accidents. Lives in Okinawa lived in proximity to US bases came to exist outside of any normative framework, reduced to their most fundamental reality.33 A fundamental reality of alive or dead which became increasingly precarious during US rule.
However, this dynamic did not end with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. From the onset of this reversion, the global aspirations of the United States to remain the “preeminent Pacific power” continued to stand against the Okinawan desire for a daily existence free of military. The tension from this contradiction became even more intense in the 1990s when Japan began to participate even more intimately with the US in its joint policing project to inculcate a US-centred global order.34 In this way, both Japan (once again) and the United States came to extend colonialist violence against the communities of Okinawa. Over the next 23 years following reversion, 4,784 crimes- including 22 murders, 358 robberies, and 110 rapes- would be committed by US Military personnel in Okinawa.35 Just as Agamben used bare life to examine how sovereignty and power operate to utilize biopower to exert state control over citizenship, this paper will next explore how island sovereignty was undermined and made non-existent through Japanese and American collusion and the construction of military bases in Okinawa.
Okinawan Sovereignty
On the surface, there appeared to be “smooth coordination” between the US military and Okinawa in the after math of the 1955 rape incident (in which a 12-year-old Okinawan girl was abducted and raped by three US service man). However, under the surface a complex political process occurred. The OPP attempted to detain the three suspects NCIS had taken into custody, but, while pledging full cooperation with local police, NCIS rejected the request citing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This bilateral agreement sets forth the privileges and rights of the US military in Japanese territory. Article 17 clearly defines criminal jurisdiction, stating US subjects may be transferred only after indictment from Japanese authorities.36 However, to escape punishment, US military suspects often manipulate this provision by hiding on base territory. When a serviceman raped a 19-year-old Okinawan girl in 1993, he managed to escape to the US in this way.37 Other provisions and interpretations favorable to the US military include: Within base territory, the US military is essentially beyond the order of Japanese law (article 3); The United States is not obliged, when it returns its facilities and territories to Japan, to restore them to their original condition (article 4); and financial compensation for damages arising from crimes and accidents by US servicemen are paid at the discretion of the US military (article 18). However, from the point of view of both the US and Japanese governments, the SOFA remains a crucial component of maintaining the current transPacific status quo. That is, Washington and Tokyo fear any substantial change to the SOFA would result in a re-negotiation of US military occupation itself. In a similar way, the military planners in Washington worried that any revision to the SOFA in Japan could lead to negotiations with other countries in which the US currently has similar agreements. A change which could drastically hamper US military operations on a global scale. Thus, in the aftermath of the rape incident, neither government directly addressed the SOFA, but rather reinforced the need for the Security treaty for the sake of ‘peace and prosperity’ in the Asia-Pacific region (of which both governments’ benefite immensely- both in political and economic terms). In stark contrast, Ota, the governor of Okinawa, responded to Tokyo: “You have always said that the Security Treaty is important for Japan, but nobody in Japan has ever been willing to take responsibility by transferring the bases in Okinawa to mainland Japan.”
After the US military “alien rule” of Okinawa ended in 1972, the Japanese government colluded with individual “military landlords” in Okinawa to renew contracts and pay rent, thus assisting the US in maintaining its “vast net” of military bases on the island. In addition, special Japanese forces– reminiscent of the Japanese Imperial Army, were sent to Okinawa to reinforce its function as a “strategic military stronghold.” In this way, contrary to the cries of most Okinawans, reversion did not mean the end to military occupation but rather a new phase in Okinawa’s pivotal role as the foundation of the US-Japan Security Treaty system.38 It was under this unique historical conjuncture that the 1995 rape incident occurred. Although governor Ota refused to sign the land lease back over to the US military, the US subsequently repositioned itself as the only stabilizing power in the Pacific region.39 As a result, Tokyo publicly disclosed the view that “global/American interests,” rather than strictly local/Japanese concerns, would now take policy precedence. Due to the United States’ renewed commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, Tokyo ordered Ota (once again) to sign and renew the land leases to the US military. This reflects the larger post-Cold War strategic framework through which the whole region would soon become incorporated into America’s expanding “political-economic-cultural” frontier.40 The forced re-signing of the leases occurred on the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa and was likewise reminiscent of Tokyo’s heavy-handed demand for the loss of Okinawan life in the name of national policy.
Conclusion
“Our strategy should be not only to confront empire, but to lay siege to it. To deprive it of oxygen. To shame it. To mock it. With our art, our music, our literature, our stubbornness, our joy, our brilliance, our sheer relentlessness— and our ability to tell our own stories. Stories that are different from the ones we’re being brainwashed to believe.” — Arundahti Roy 41
It is important to note that anti-military base movements have been increasingly successful in opposing the continued American militarization of Asian and Pacific home communities. Groups from currently colonial places such as Okinawa are increasingly organizing resistance that questions the core legitimacy of militarism. While the United States views these islands as necessary “sacrifice zones” for imperial national security, these communities oppose “banal colonialism,” campaigning instead for the localization of their sovereignty and the redefinition of security itself. Using strategies of decentralized organization, affinity, direct action, and mutual aid, these “newest” social movements go beyond petitioning the imperial state through the “politics of demand.” They go further, struggling to create secure social and physical home environments that are demilitarized, self-determining, and environmentally decontaminated. In this pursuit, these social movements not only challenge contemporary imperialism, but also the view of the nation-state as the appropriate institution and scale through which to define sovereignty, rights, health, and security.42
Joshua Ecton is a Guest Author, and a senior undergraduate student at the University of Texas at Austin pursuing a degree in International Relations with a regional focus on Asia. Outside of class, he is a senior fellow at the Clements Center for International Policy and Managing Editor of the Texas Undergraduate Law Journal.
Biblilography
Agamben, Giorgio. Means Without an End. University of Minnesota Press, 2000. Arundhati Roy. “War Talk.” South End Press, 2003.
Brett L. Walker. “Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan. Chapter 5 ‘Mercury’s Offpring.’” University of Washington Press, 2010.
Fukuchi Hiroaki. Okinawa Ni Okeru Beigun No Hanzai. Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1995.
Inoue, Fumi. “The Politics of Extraterritoriality in Post-Occupation Japan and U.S.-Occupied Okinawa, 1952-1972.” Boston College Dissertation, n.d.
———. Thomas Taro Higa and World War II: Race, War Collaboration, and Okinawa. The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2022.
Inoue, Masamichi. Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization. Columbia University Press, 2017.
Ishikawa Iwao. “Kakanai Noga Jinkenhōdō Ka.” Ryukyu Shinpo, 1995.
Katsuro Irukayama. “Animal Experiments with Substances Obtained by Various Treatments of the Posionous Fish and Shellfish.” Kumamoto University, 1968.
Kokuba Kōtarō. Okinawa No Ayumi. Vol. Tokyo: Maki Shoten, 1973.
Michiko Ishimure. “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease,” 76. University of Michigan Press, 2003.
———. “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease,” 71,74. University of Michigan Press, 2003.
———. “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease. Chapter 5 ‘Fish out of Water.’” University of Michigan Press, 2003.
Nakano Yoshio. Sengo Shiryō Okiinawa. Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1969.
Nishimura & Okamuto. “Minamatabyō No Kagaku.” In Minamatabyō No Kagaku, 120–21, n.d.
Okinawaken Sōmubu Chiji Kōshutsu Kichu Taisakushitsu, 2003. “Ordinace 109,” 1953.
Sasha Davis. “Repeatign Islands of Resistance: Redefining Security in Militarized Landscapes,” 2012.
Steingtaber. Having Faith, n.d.
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Footnotes
1 Brett L. Walker, “Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan. Chapter 5 ‘Mercury’s Offpring’” (University of Washington Press, 2010).
2 Walker, “Toxic Archipelago.”
3 Walker.
4 Michiko Ishimure, “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease” (University of Michigan Press, 2003), 76.
5 Nishimura C Okamuto, “Minamatabyō No Kagaku,” in Minamatabyō No Kagaku, n.d., 120–21.
6 Michiko Ishimure, “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease” (University of Michigan Press, 2003), 71, 74.
7 Walker, “Toxic Archipelago.”
8 Katsuro Irukayama, “Animal Experiments with Substances Obtained by Various Treatments of the Posionous Fish and Shellfish” (Kumamoto University, 1968).
9 Steingtaber, Having Faith, n.d.
10 Nishimura C Okamuto, “Minamatabyō No Kagaku.”
11 Walker, “Toxic Archipelago.”
12 Michiko Ishimure, “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease. Chapter 5 ‘Fish out of Water’” (University of Michigan Press, 2003).
14 Ishimure, “Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow.”
15 Agamben, Giorgio, Means Without an End.
16 Inoue, Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization
(Columbia University Press, 2017).
13 Ishimure.
17 Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
18 Inoue, Fumi, “The Politics of Extraterritoriality in Post-Occupation Japan and U.S.-Occupied Okinawa, 1952- 1972,” Boston College Dissertation, n.d.
19 Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
20 Inoue, Fumi, Thomas Taro Higa and World War II: Race, War Collaboration, and Okinawa (The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2022).
21 Inoue, Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization.
22 “Forgotten Island,” Time, November 28, 1949, 24–27 edition.
23 “Ordinace 109,” 1953.
24 Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
25 Kokuba Kōtarō, Okinawa No Ayumi, vol. Tokyo: Maki Shoten, 1973.
26 Fukuchi Hiroaki, Okinawa Ni Okeru Beigun No Hanzai (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1995).
27 Fukuchi Hiroaki.
28 Tengan Morio, Okinawa Senryō Beigun Hanzai Jikenbo (Okinawa: Perikansha, 1999).
29 Nakano Yoshio, Sengo Shiryō Okiinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1969).
30 Yoshio.
31 Yoshio.
32 Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
33 Agamben, Giorgio, Means Without an End.
34 Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
35 Okinawaken Sōmubu Chiji Kōshutsu Kichu Taisakushitsu, 2003.
36 Inoue, Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization.
37 Ishikawa Iwao, “Kakanai Noga Jinkenhōdō Ka,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 1995.
38 Inoue, Masamichi, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization.
39 Department of Defense, “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress” (1992).
40 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military.
41 Arundhati Roy, “War Talk,” South End Press, 2003.
42 Sasha Davis, “Repeating Islands of Resistance: Redefining Security in Militarized Landscapes.”
