Abstract

I investigate Hong Kong’s localist movement, particularly its evolution from a cultural issue to a political movement. The development of Hong Kong’s local identity began alongside rapid economic development in the 1970s with the goal of promoting Chinese culture. However, the Tiananmen massacre and concerns over the transfer of sovereignty led the city’s residents to take pride in the qualities distinguishing themselves from the mainland. After the 1997 handover, campaigns emerged to preserve heritage sites. As modified policies allowed mainlanders to tour and move to the territory, protestors argued mainlanders were taking advantage of Hong Kong, harming its residents. Increasing rejection of the “Chinese” label in favor of “Hongkonger” followed. The 2014 Occupy Central movement’s failure demonstrated to many that traditional methods of protest would never achieve democratic reform. Student activists formed a new political movement aimed at making Hong Kong more autonomous, with some even pushing for independence. Therefore, the intrusion by the Chinese government and mainlanders into Hong Kong’s culture and economic way of life caused increased autonomist and secessionist sentiment. Cultural, economic, and institutional theories explain how Hongkonger identity became a major political force through the unifying nature of ethnicity that causes secession movements to arise.

Introduction

On September 4, 2016, voters in Hong Kong elected to their 70-seat Legislative Council six localist candidates advocating greater autonomy from the central government in Beijing. Although this group comprised a small proportion of the legislature, these new politicians, widely recognized for their roles in the massive, student-led protests two years prior, represented a political movement that broke the duopoly that the pro-democracy and pro- China camps had held in Hong Kong politics for decades. There was now a third major force in the city. They certainly were not pro-China; they opposed greater political and cultural integration with the mainland and advocated genuine democracy. Yet they were also not part of the pro-democracy camp; in contrast with the traditional pro-democrats’ desire to pursue democracy within the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, these politicians argued there was “no way for Hong Kong to maintain its civil liberties under the current arrangement.”¹

Yet, Hong Kong localism was not an entirely new phenomenon. For decades, Hongkongers had been trying to define and defend their local identity. As tensions with the mainlanders and central government grew, localism became an increasingly political topic. Activists-turned-politicians argued that Hong Kong’s culture and way of life were being threatened, and the only viable way to protect Hong Kong was to distance itself from the rest of China.

The political success of these localists – as they are known in Hong Kong – inevitably raised questions. Why was there so much conflict with the mainlanders, and why were people abandoning their Chinese identity in favor of considering themselves Hongkongers? How were the localist politicians different from the pro-democrats? Perhaps most fundamentally, why have increasing numbers of Hongkongers believed greater autonomy or independence as the best paths forward for their city?

I aim to answer these questions in this paper. First, I introduce general theories that explain why nationalist secession movements become popular. I then describe the history of Hong Kong’s development of its local identity and evolution of it from a cultural issue to a political one. I analyze the different stances within the movement itself, how localist politicians set themselves apart from the traditional pro-democracy camp, and the uneasy relationship that emerged. Finally, I suggest answers to the questions posed in the previous paragraph by returning to the theories and connecting them to Hong Kong’s situation. Through this case study, I conclude that the desires for greater autonomy and independence arose from an increased sense of encroachment into Hongkongers’ cultural and economic livelihoods by the Chinese government and mainland Chinese people.

Why Break Away?

The existing literature on nationalist secession movements typically focus on three motivations: cultural identity, economic situations, and political ambition. Some state that calls for secession emerge when an ethnic group does not have the control it claims it deserves over itself and its culture, instead being ruled by another ethnic group that values its own interests over theirs. Others point to the importance of a territory’s economic strength as justification for its independence. Some also believe having unique political institutions gives secessionists an opportunity to raise support for their movement.

Contemporary secession movements are often openly driven by ethnic identity. Minorities have frequently asserted that like humans, nations are natural units; therefore, they are justified in advancing calls for secession because “nations have the same right to self-determination as humans.”² Independence becomes popular when there is a strong desire to be ruled by a government that is more aware of and responsive to local cultural concerns.³ For politicians, appealing to ethnicity is reliable and straightforward; it is a tactic that appeals to people of all socioeconomic classes.⁴ Ethnicity triggers a communal group with a unified set of resources that is more organized than other types of groups. Leaders of such movements claim there is no compatibility nor room for compromise between ethnic groups and their values, alleging that the other community’s preferred values are distant and highly unpreferable from their own. Moderation only works when ethnicity is not a major issue; cooperation between groups falls apart once it does.⁵

Several other hypotheses attempt to identify ethnic patterns among successful secession movements. Minorities that used to have political autonomy are far more likely to pursue secession.⁶ In addition, territories that are physically distant from the rest of the country tend to support secession more as demonstrated by independence parties’ electoral results.⁷ It is interesting to note that while Jenne argues linguistic differences do not significantly influence a minority’s likelihood of pushing for self-determination,⁸ Sorens finds statistically significant evidence that it does.⁹

Therefore, when a people believe their ethnic group’s concerns are not being addressed, politicians rally support by using a united identity to pursue independence. Breaking away from the central government to govern themselves ensures their group’s interests are protected from the malicious intent of other ethnicities.

Another major theory of secession advances that economic interests motivate independence movements. Gourevitch hypothesizes that peripheral nationalist movements tend to be weak if the same region acts as the political and economic center of a state; conversely, if the centers are in different regions, the economic center will develop a stronger sense of nationalism. He notices that Scottish and Welsh nationalism began to rise as England’s economic dominance over the United Kingdom was weakening and their respective regions began contributing more. Notably, Scottish nationalism has been stronger because of its oil production, whereas Wales does not have a comparable economic foundation. Catalonian and Basque nationalism have become also popular because their regions drive much of Spain’s economy, whereas the inland political center contributes less. Elsewhere in Europe, while previously French-speaking Wallonia had a strong economy and led the charge to separate Belgium from the Netherlands, now as Dutch-speaking Flanders has increasingly become the economic center, Flemish nationalism has arisen. Historically, Croatia’s economic development led it to split from Yugoslavia. On the other hand, secession movements in France, such as in Brittany, Occitania, and Corsica, have not been nearly as strong because of their dependence on France’s strong economic core.¹⁰

While Jenne agrees that secession is more likely when the minority is more economically advantaged relative to the majority,¹¹ Sorens believes Gourevitch’s claim is not conclusive, arguing total affluence, not relative affluence, matters more. He reasons that some regions considered poor in the Western world would still be richer than several African and Asian states.

Rather, what is more significant is whether losing the benefits of unification are worth it. In turn, he asserts high-income regions are more likely to support secessionist parties.¹²

Perhaps a minority ethnic group’s wealth can be used as a negotiating point to gain independence. While they may want to retain their economic hegemony over the rest of the state, some nations wishing to separate may find they can use their strong economy as leverage. It is reasonable to assume that areas with more money and resources are expected to be more viable as independent states. As such, they can more credibly claim to the central government that independence would not harm them. Any incentives gained from unification are insignificant and would not be missed if they separated.

Separate political institutions allow activists who promote independence to gain power. Roeder contends secessionists may favor institutions so they can advance their cause from elected offices, and warns secession movements without supporting institutions will fail. He points to East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh) and the split of the former Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs from the Soviet Union as success stories, while secession movements in Dravidistan and Hyderabad in India failed due to a lack of local political institutions giving activists a large public platform to advocate for separation.¹³

Over the course of my investigation of Hong Kong’s localist movement, I have found many of these theories to be highly relevant. Secession was never the dominant ideology in Hong Kong politics. However, the increasing sense among Hongkongers that the city’s culture was being encroached on and the belief that stronger measures were needed to protect it have parallels to independence movements elsewhere. It would be expected that as Hongkonger identity became more widely adopted as a result of these encroachments, autonomy and secession would increase in popularity. Hong Kong’s position as a major global financial hub would give it the economic means to argue it can thrive as an independent state. Finally, the constitutional provisions that allow the territory to have its own self-functioning government might attract localist politicians to run for office so their movement could gain political traction. For a city that was influenced by China but developed so differently from it, Hong Kong is an intriguing case study of how a group realizes they are different and that greater autonomy or even independence are the best paths forward.

Developing Hong Kong Localism

The history of Hong Kong’s localist movement can be divided into four phases. Each phase involves external actors attempting to influence Hong Kong society in a new way culturally or politically. All four demonstrate their effects on the relationship between the city and the mainland as well as a shifting attitude towards how Hongkongers define themselves.

Phase 0: The colonial Hongkonger (pre-1997)

Hong Kong was administered under British sovereignty for over 150 years until July 1, 1997, when it became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. While the city’s localist movement is widely agreed to be a post-handover phenomenon, some argue Hongkongers began developing their identity during the colonial era (hence my labeling of this period as “phase 0”). When border controls were implemented in the 1950s after the Communist Party had taken control of mainland China, the physical separation set the foundation for the establishment of a Hong Kong identity.¹⁴

In 1967, demonstrators and police clashed during a series of leftist, anti-colonial riots. The Chinese Communist Party, through their Hong Kong and Macau Working Committee, supported the rioters, building a network of leftist organizations that included schools, media, labor unions, and youth and commerce groups. This strategy backfired; deadly incidents led the colonial government to depict the rioters as brutal, and an originally sympathetic public ultimately rejected the demonstrators and the Communists’ influence.¹⁵ As a result, unlike neighboring Portuguese Macau, whose residents viewed the Chinese government more favorably after their colonial government conceded to similar protests, Hongkongers were not nearly as sympathetic.

Hong Kong’s local identity truly took shape as it began to be recognized as a vital economic hub. Governor Murray MacLehose’s progressive social and economic reforms in 1971 helped make Hong Kong one of the four Asian Tigers (alongside Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) and bolstered Hongkongers’ sense of local identity.¹⁶ As the city became more important for global trade and finance, Hongkongers took pride in being residents of and laborers behind this success story. The emergence of consumerism and Cantonese pop culture during this time also helped foster Hong Kong’s local identity.¹⁷

While most Hongkongers tended to be politically apathetic, starting from the 1970s, students began supporting the anti-colonialism movement and a sense of Chinese nationalism.¹⁸ This coincides with Communist China’s opening up to the world by replacing the Republic of China as the sole representative of China to the United Nations in 1971 and forming diplomatic ties with Western countries. Many of Hong Kong’s youth backed the Chinese Language Movement to make Chinese an official language of Hong Kong (which was achieved in 1974) and supported the territorial claims of the People’s Republic of China in the three-way dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with the Republic of China and Japan.¹⁹ But most people were apathetic and just wanted political stability. This was the background in the 1980s when Hong Kong’s future was being negotiated between the British and Chinese governments.²⁰

Hongkongers’ attitude shifted significantly following the brutal crackdown of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In its aftermath, Chinese identity among Hong Kong’s youth began to weaken.²¹ Hongkongers began to see major differences in values between Hong Kong’s rule of law and protection of civil liberties, and the mainland regime’s repression. In fact, Wong argues the massacre in Beijing was the pivotal moment that truly started Hong Kong’s localist movement.²² The stark differences between capitalism and socialism, burgeoning democracy and tyrannical autocracy, and rule of law and rule by law proved to Hongkongers that their political culture was very different from that of the mainland. With the 1997 handover gradually creeping closer, questions arose over whether their treasured values would continue to exist under Chinese sovereignty. Hongkongers’ suspicions were heightened by their lack of input during the negotiations on their own future. Would an authoritarian regime really commit to keeping their hands off a moderately democratic territory once they united?

Phase 1: Preserving historical sites (early 2000s)

Immediately after the handover, it appeared as though China was willing to honor its promise of granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy. Still, protests began to erupt in the early 2000s over issues that may have been the early harbingers of political localism. So and Ip consider this phase “civic localism”: opposing urban renewal and preserving places of historical significance, with activists claiming they were aiming to conserve the local lifestyle, culture, and businesses.²³ At this time, Hong Kong’s youth were becoming more expressive and excited to assert their identity, and the heritage protection protests promoted that sentiment. However, these were not well-organized nor integrated with the pro-democracy movement and admittedly had abstract goals. This may have harmed their efforts, as the Hong Kong government ultimately continued ahead with the demolitions, particularly of harbor piers.²⁴

In 2007, the Hong Kong government presented the Express Rail Link project to extend the high-speed rail line from Shenzhen into Hong Kong. One of the main concerns raised by Hongkongers was the destruction of a village and the environment caused by the construction of the underground line. Combined with high construction costs and concerns that local transit demand would exceed capacity if the rail link was completed, protestors pushed against the project but to no avail. ²⁵

Despite their setbacks, these issues offered Hongkongers their first opportunity to protect their city. These historical sites represented their heritage, and any attempt to destroy it was an attempt to erase a part of their storied identity. The smaller protests would set the stage for future, larger demonstrations with more directed and hostile rhetoric.

Phase 2: The “locust” invasion (late 2000s-early 2010s)

As the Chinese government began pursuing closer integration of Hong Kong into the rest of Chinese society, Hongkongers were irked by its consequences. This led to localism’s second phase, which not only saw conflicts over identity and culture, but also increasing concerns over worsening economic circumstances caused by greater unification. While the localism of the mid-2000s that sought to prevent the destruction of heritage sites is generally considered to be left-wing and progressive, by the early 2010s, it had become a right-wing movement that largely targeted mainland tourists and immigrants.²⁶

Due to scandals surrounding tainted baby formula manufactured in the mainland, mainlanders sought Hong Kong’s better-quality powdered milk, leading to shortages that frustrated Hongkongers.²⁷ This was just the start of Hong Kong’s mainland problem. A 2001 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal decision, Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, gave Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong the right of abode in the territory. As a result, by 2010, 40 percent of births in Hong Kong were from mainland mothers.²⁸ These children, often referred to as “anchor babies,” led to too few spaces for Hong Kong students to enroll in primary schools, especially in the mainland-bordering North District.²⁹ In addition, as immigration policies were adjusted to allow more mainlanders to move to the territory, Hongkongers accused the immigrants of taking advantage of social security, public housing, medical facilities, public transport subsidies, and other limited resources, blaming their Chief Executive, Hong Kong’s head of government, for not protecting Hongkongers’ interests.³⁰

Visa policy changes also increased tourism from the mainland. Higher-end businesses set up shop to cater to these tourists, subsequently driving up rent prices. From 2004 to 2013, retail shop rent increased by 69.4 percent, while the number of cosmetics and personal care stores increased by 1500 percent; conversely, the number of non-specialized and stationery shops, both less favored by tourists, dropped by 29.5 and 25.4 percent respectively.³¹ This exacerbated already-divisive issues in the territory. Incidents such as when a security guard told a Hong Kong photographer he could not take photos of a Dolce and Gabbana storefront and that only mainlanders could photograph the store fed the sentiment that mainland tourists were being treated with greater respect than the locals were.³²

Increasing numbers of Hongkongers also began to complain that opportunities for them to develop their futures were coming under threat. More and more mainland students came to Hong Kong to attend university and work after graduating. In turn, a growing rate of Hong Kong university graduates were finding themselves working low-skill or labor-intensive jobs. At the same time, property prices increased as wealthy mainlanders migrated to the territory, further worsening the social and economic inequalities.³³ Greater competition for seemingly everything painted a bleak outlook in the eyes of Hong Kong’s youth. Manufacturing jobs were also being lost to the mainland, and the neoliberal policies of the Hong Kong government fueled income inequality.³⁴ Reactive radicalization followed increasing wealth disparity, a high rate of poverty (around one in five Hongkongers live below the poverty line), and job insecurity, paired with a lack of response from their government.³⁵ It was becoming evident that their government was pursuing policies that caused financial strain for their own citizens.

Thus, many Hongkongers began targeting mainlanders directly. They blamed the influx of mainlanders for causing rising rent costs and overcrowding, and criticized the tourists’ rude behavior.³⁶ Young protesters accused mainland competitors of threatening their career and academic advancement, as well as making affordable property harder to find and worsening their quality of life.³⁷ Tensions escalated to the point where a full-page advertisement in the pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily labeled mainlanders as “locusts” in response to a Peking University professor’s derogatory comments about Hongkongers.³⁸

Eventually, the Hong Kong government made concessions to the protesters. They prohibited mainland mothers married to mainland fathers from giving birth in Hong Kong’s hospitals, banned the export of baby formula, and modified visa policies.³⁹ They admitted that Hongkongers’ livelihood had been affected by the influx of mainland tourists, and the psychological effects of strained transport resources had become unacceptable.⁴⁰ But these changes came too late; many Hongkongers had become fed up with the mainlanders and no longer wished to associate with them.

Identity crisis. Throughout the development of the localist movement, the people living in Hong Kong questioned how they should identify themselves. They were ethnically Han Chinese, practiced Chinese customs, and celebrated Chinese holidays, so it seemed obvious: they were Chinese. Yet they spoke a different language than the mainlanders (explained in a later section), were physically separated from the rest of China due to border controls, and lived in a city that was politically and economically more Western. But they could not pass off as Westerners; after all, they were in Asia. Perhaps they were in a unique situation that saw a blend of both British and Chinese cultures. In turn, more and more people began to reject the “Chinese” label and consider the term “Hongkonger.”

Immediately post-handover until 2022, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute’s (HKPORI) Categorical Ethnic Identity poll asked residents of Hong Kong if they consider themselves a Hongkonger, Chinese, or somewhere in between to track how the city’s identity has evolved. From 1997 to 2003, people tended to consider themselves either as a “Hongkonger” or a “Hongkonger in China” more than those who identified as “Chinese” or a “Chinese in Hong Kong,” with around 50-60 percent of respondents identifying in some way as a “Hongkonger,” while around 35-45 percent selected the “Chinese” options. From 2004 through 2008, the level of Chinese identity began to approach the level of Hongkonger identity: there was a very similar proportion of people on either side (around 45-50 percent for each). But then, from 2009 onwards (a few years before the largest anti-mainland protests), Chinese identity dropped substantially. At its greatest difference in December 2019 (during the biggest protests in Hong Kong’s history), nearly 78 percent of respondents identified fully or partially as a “Hongkonger,” while only 21 percent considered themselves fully or partially “Chinese.” During that same time, the proportion of people who considered themselves only as “Hongkongers” surpassed 55 percent.⁴¹

Semi-annual polling average of identity among Hong Kong residents from August 1997 to June 2022. Blue denotes “Hongkonger” + “Hongkonger in China,” while purple denotes “Chinese” + “Chinese in Hong Kong.” From HKPORI Categorical Ethnic Identity survey.

Chan offers some observations. After the handover, Hong Kong people initially had a new sense of pride in icons representing a Chinese identity, possibly due to China’s ascent as a global power and the movement of people and goods across the border. Yet, the increasingly negative reaction to the political and economic policies of the Chinese government may explain why that trend reversed.⁴² In addition, Chinese identity among Hongkongers likely peaked in 2008 for numerous reasons, such as the Summer Olympics in Beijing (which had its equestrian events held in Hong Kong), double-digit national economic growth, and the success of the Chinese space program, but the issues Hongkongers believed the mainlanders were causing in their hometown led to significant drops in national identification after 2008.⁴³

The difference in identity also comes with differences in attitude toward politics. Hong Kong’s political identity is based on being under threat by Chinese authoritarianism, and the economic and immigration issues facing Hongkongers led to a mutual dislike between them and mainlanders.⁴⁴ They also tend to set themselves apart from the perceived principles that guide Chinese politics: those identifying solely as “Hongkongers” are usually more supportive of democracy.⁴⁵ In sum, Hongkongers’ political beliefs are what Chinese ones are not, and those who consider themselves Hongkongers actively demonstrate that difference in their civic engagement.

The increasing adoption and strength of the “Hongkonger” label meant that people began rejecting any sense of solidarity they had with the Chinese identity. Localists abandoned the goal of democratizing China as a whole; the lack of progress was only fueling hopelessness.⁴⁶ Many youths stopped attending the annual June 4 commemoration, an event that aims to promote ademocratic China and preserve Hong Kong’s ties to Chinese ethnic identity.⁴⁷ At the same time, a declining sense of ethno-cultural solidarity led more younger people to protest China’s human rights abuses while not feeling as though their own society was responsible for them.⁴⁸ There was also a decrease in pride among Hongkongers in China’s national icons, such as its flag, anthem, and military.⁴⁹

In summary, as the guiding principles of localism became more coherent and the movement more popular, people began stripping themselves of their Chinese identity in favor of calling themselves a Hongkonger. As the Chinese government continued to make its presence more conspicuous in the city, Hongkongers took even greater pride in what Chinese politics was not. With their increasing desire to be different, Hongkongers found no reason for sympathizing with anything related to China. Instead, they focused on charting the best path forward for themselves.

This second phase of the movement was when the conversation of how Hongkongers were different from mainlanders originated. An increasing number of Hongkongers believed the two populations were unable to exist in harmony in a unified state. It seemed to many that the mainlanders saw the better lifestyle Hong Kong offered and decided to exploit it for their personal gain without considering how their actions affected the city and its residents. Access to resources and opportunities were becoming scarce for Hongkongers, and their own government did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. Societal and economic divisions were pushing Hongkongers away from a unified identity with the mainland, and with inaction from political leadership, the time was ripe to bring the localist movement to the political stage.

Phase 3: Creating the third way (2010s)

With the growing frustration brought by the mainlanders’ increasing presence in Hong Kong, the transformation of localism from a social movement to a political movement began. To its adherents, it seemed their problems resulted because Hong Kong was politically too close to China. The solution seemed simple: Hong Kong needed to separate from the mainland either through greater autonomy inside China or independence outside it. But how would they make their case to the public?

Scholars frequently point to Chin Wan’s 2011 book 香港城邦論 (On the Hong Kong City-State) as the source of the localist movement’s political ideology.⁵⁰ Himself a scholar, Chin’s arguments are most generally described as prioritizing Hong Kong’s interests over China.⁵¹ Carrico explains Chin’s argument that Chinese democratization is impossible, so Hong Kong must focus on itself. In fact, even if a democratic China became a reality, the special status afforded to Hong Kong might then be revoked, stripping the city of its cultural uniqueness. Chin theorizes Hong Kong is better described not as a colony, but instead as a city-state: an autonomous territory where people, capital, goods, culture, and education from around the world coalesce but is linked to another power that provides it with resources and defense. He argues Hong Kong was not colonized; rather, British control over the territory provided a new cultural and political setting to arise that attracted people. Chin claims the “One Country, Two Systems” principle was proposed to allow China to continue reaping the benefits of Hong Kong’s superior system, but the Communist Party does not want to accept that reality.⁵²

Cheung also describes Chin’s beliefs. Chin explicitly states that he does not promote Hong Kong’s independence but simply autonomy, as Hong Kong still needs to rely on China for military and diplomatic purposes. He also uses the “locust” term from the anti-mainland protests to describe those who get the benefits but do not contribute to Hong Kong society; however, he urges Hongkongers to accept those who are willing to adopt the city’s superior culture and belief in constitutionalism. Chin proposes the Hong Kong Autonomy Flag, which incorporates elements of both traditional Chinese (huaxia) values and British (and broader Western) cultural influences. He also claims that China under Communist rule no longer retains those huaxia values, and it is from Hong Kong where they will be revived throughout China.⁵³ Chan also states that Chin encouraged more militant actions to achieve political autonomy for the territory.⁵⁴

Chin was arguably the first to claim openly that democratic development in the territory necessitated greater autonomy. His book may have also brought about a validation of Hongkongers’ resentment toward mainlanders. Although he describes Hong Kong as a city-state, his book is often seen as one of the first to promote a sort of Hong Kong nationalism and nativism through his promotion of an opposition to immigrants unless they assimilate to the city’s culture.⁵⁵

Chin’s book encouraged others to discuss more openly these radical paths for Hong Kong’s political future. In February 2014, the Hong Kong Undergraduate Student Union’s Undergrad (學苑) journal published a special issue titled “Hong Kong Nationality, Self-Determination of Our Future.” It builds on Chin’s arguments, but introduces the idea of nationality and using identity as the necessary basis for democratization that protects the citizenry. Citing the Court of Final Appeal decision in Kong Yunming v. Director of Social Welfare that reduced the residency requirement to receive welfare benefits from seven years to one, the authors argue it led people to question who really belongs to the community and should receive its support. They cited (notably enough) Joseph Stalin, who defined nationality as a people having a common language (in Hong Kong, Cantonese with the Traditional Chinese script and English), defined territory, economic life (capitalism and common law), and psychological makeup (historical experiences producing a unique culture). As Hong Kong possesses all four of these characteristics, the authors used this against the Chinese Communist Party to argue that Hongkongers are a distinct nationality and thus, under the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, have the support of the United Nations to seek self-determination.⁵⁶

Seven months later, another special issue in Undergrad titled “Hong Kong, Democracy, Independence” brought the idea of Hong Kong independence — not just autonomy — into the mainstream. This new source claimed that secession was the necessary step towards achieving universal suffrage and full democracy. As one author puts it, independence is “the greatest fear of the central state and can thus no longer be a taboo for the democracy movement.”⁵⁷ In other words, secession is what those in power feared the most, and if Hongkongers could show they were serious about pursuing that path, maybe the central government would consider offering democratic concessions to keep the city. Independence was now an option, albeit a highly contentious one. Calls for independence had existed for decades but were isolated occurrences, and any discussion of it immediately post-handover was treated as taboo as it was perceived as a threat to China’s sovereignty over the city, an idea too radical for the public at the time.⁵⁸ However, with the ever-growing discussion surrounding autonomy and self-determination, somebody was bound to take it one step further and propose secession as a viable path for Hong Kong’s future.

With these proposals, Hongkongers now had bold new ideas. It was becoming more normal to admit openly that the whole system needed to change if Hongkongers were to have any hope of real democracy. The justification for localism’s political ideology was set; now, the movement needed people who would lead the way and pursue those goals.

Umbrella-wielding soldiers. From September through December 2014, Hong Kong was embroiled in the Occupy Central movement, which evolved into the Umbrella Revolution. Sparked by proposed changes to electoral rules, it was the largest demonstration the city had ever experienced up to that point. It was also where localism activists began to establish themselves as leaders of a new political movement and form groups to advance it.

Two professors and a pastor originally planned a peaceful occupation of Hong Kong’s central business district starting on October 1, China’s National Day, but the Hong Kong Federation of Students (a coalition of several universities’ student unions) and Scholarism (a group of politically-active secondary school students) began a class boycott a week earlier and protested outside Government Headquarters.⁵⁹ Because many students were arrested after trespassing into government office buildings, many more Hongkongers came to show their support for the protesters, thus starting the Occupy Central movement earlier than planned.⁶⁰ The unexpectedly early start brought about a shift of leadership towards the students, as they began driving the protests while the adults provided help and advice. In fact, the students were the ones who proposed negotiations with the Hong Kong and Chinese governments.⁶¹

These students may have been inspired by the success of the Sunflower Movement, a series of student-led demonstrations in Taiwan earlier that year against a controversial trade agreement with China. The students’ occupation of Taiwan’s legislative building in particular gave Hong Kong students inspiration for their tactics and encouraged them to move away from despair and take action.⁶² However, the Hong Kong movement was not as smooth-sailing. Carrie Lam, the Chief Secretary for Administration and future Chief Executive, cancelled a meeting with the students and claimed that any reform would not happen until after 2017. This led the students to return to the protests and declare that further dialogue would not help. In addition, a contingent of more radical protesters across the harbor in Mong Kok favored violence and confrontation with the police, accusing the pro-democracy and student activists of not doing more. These militant protesters would ultimately form Civic Passion, the Hong Kong Autonomy Movement, and the city’s independence movement, instrumental elements of the faction of the localist movement that advanced radical political reforms with more extreme tactics.⁶³

The Umbrella Revolution was ultimately deemed a failure: none of the reforms passed, and the protests ended in December with no progress towards full democracy. Infighting resulted as the protestors tried to determine what went wrong. Arguments over whether negotiations and peaceful methods should be the future tactic led to four of the eight student unions leaving the Hong Kong Federation of Students.⁶⁴ An increasing number of young activists began to believe nonviolence and negotiation were ineffective.⁶⁵ Nearly all student unions began to adopt the political localist position, creating groups that became well-recognized such as Democracy Groundwork, the Land Justice League, Demosistō, and Youngspiration.⁶⁶

The movement’s failure was undeniably a watershed moment for Hong Kong politics. A new camp began to take shape that clearly was not pro-China but did not comfortably fit into, nor cooperate very well with, the pro-democracy movement either. And these radical militants would not be quieted.

Defining political localism. “Localism” in the general sense usually refers to prioritizing local interests, such as promoting local production and consumption, local government, and local culture. While cultural localism in Hong Kong is based on many of these principles, as a political movement, it has taken on the meaning of distancing from China. However, the extent of that distancing makes the movement more nuanced. Like the pro-China and pro-democracy camps, while the localist camp is unified on several broad key issues, there is a variety of specifics on which parties and politicians disagree. In this particular case, the differences arise from just how much change is needed for Hong Kong to protect itself from China. Lee et al. notes localism can mean anything from autonomy within China to full independence.⁶⁷ Despite these differences, localists agree they need to preserve their separate identity and, in contrast with the pro-democracy camp, distance themselves from China so as to pursue their own democratic development.⁶⁸

Autonomists are the more common variant of localism activists. They want “One Country, Two Systems” defined clearly and implemented in a way such that Hong Kong gets real autonomy, allowing the city to develop independent policies and thus a culture not affected by the Chinese Communist Party.⁶⁹ Youngspiration, one of the most well-known and successful localist parties, argues, “Hong Kong is de facto a nation and Hong Kong people should be given the right of self-determination under international law,” proposing a popular referendum on Hong Kong’s future political status.⁷⁰ They promote civic nationalism, the idea that the Hong Kong nation is anyone invested in the common fate of the city’s future and who is willing to cooperate in the promotion of the city’s treasured civic values.⁷¹ Several other candidates and parties, notably Demosistō, which formed from Scholarism, ran on the autonomy platform in the 2016 legislative election.⁷²

Secessionists take this a step further; as their name suggests, they advocate Hong Kong’s independence from China. Perhaps the most prominent party with this platform is the Hong Kong National Party, which argues independence is the optimal path because “One Country, Two Systems” does not work.⁷³ Its leader, Andy Chan, disagrees with past thinking and approaches, arguing, “We do not feel that we are Chinese. We feel that we are Hong Kong-ers.” He claims that by pushing integration, Chinese interests have been prioritized over those of Hong Kong.⁷⁴ The Hong Kong National Party has been willing to promote independence by any means, including by violence.⁷⁵ Controversially, party members have passed out flyers promoting independence to middle school students while they were leaving school for the day, mirroring the logic Chinese President Xi Jinping has also used that the youth’s mindset best reflects the country.⁷⁶

Hong Kong Indigenous, another political party, advocates independence and uses militant tactics. Established in 2015, they gained notoriety for their confrontational protests, assaulting suspected parallel traders (those importing goods from Hong Kong to the mainland for profit) and harassing tourists. In addition, Studentlocalism, inspired by Scholarism’s ability to politically mobilize the youth, formed to advance the pro-independence movement among secondary school students.⁷⁷

Support for independence among Hongkongers has become remarkably high. In a 2016 poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, one-sixth of respondents and 40 percent of those aged 15 to 24 supported independence.⁷⁸ By 2020, that figure had increased to 20 percent city-wide.⁷⁹ In subsequent protests in 2019, independence banners were sometimes displayed in universities, and people began booing the Chinese anthem (as Hong Kong does not have its own anthem) when performed at soccer matches.⁸⁰

It is clear both autonomists and secessionists are on similar boats when it comes to their claim that the territory’s relationship with China is too close. They both argue that the Chinese government has been exploiting its political control of the city to erase Hongkongers’ culture and identity, and that China’s looming presence is why genuine democracy has yet to take shape. Both embrace the claim that the pacifist, moderate way of thinking has proven fruitless, so it is time to pursue a different path. Nevertheless, while increasing separation is a shared goal, how far that separation needs to go is contentious. While autonomists push for establishing formal policies to grant Hong Kong greater autonomy and a true ability for self-rule, secessionists think that self-rule can only be achieved through making Hong Kong an independent state. Notably, there has also been some infighting between these two tendencies. Because of the autonomists’ closer relationship with the pro-democrats, who do not demand greater autonomy, pro-independence localists tend to deny that autonomists are part of the localist camp. At the same time, autonomists try to distance themselves from what they perceive as the overly extreme rhetoric of the secessionists. Except in elections, these two factions have often opted not to cooperate with each other.⁸¹

As a side note, although it is admittedly a fringe stance with far less public discussion, it is worth mentioning that there is arguably a third position within the localist camp: returning Hong Kong to British rule. Carrico describes this ideology as “returnism,” whose proponents argue Hong Kong has closer cultural ties to the British. Although they may have faced many injustices under colonial rule, people flocked to colonial Hong Kong because of its greater protection of rights and freedoms. They also believe London was increasingly more hands-off in Hong Kong’s affairs than Beijing has been post-handover, demonstrating the British were better at respecting the city’s autonomy. Most importantly, these returnists assert that British rule is the only way to protect Hong Kong from Chinese pressure.⁸²

Entering the political arena. It was hard for Hongkongers to trust the pro-democracy camp to solve these encroachment problems. When they were targeted, they did not have the leadership or unity to confront the pro-China camp, could not provide good alternatives, did not have enough resources, were not a constructive opposition, and suffered from infighting; as a result, there was not significant enough pushback from the pro-democracy camp, effectively allowing the government to continue with its tightening of control.⁸³ Infighting within the pro-democracy camp over coordinating democratization efforts led to vote splitting, which gave the localists an opportunity to gain support from those who had lost interest in the fractured and ineffective group by portraying themselves as people who truly cared about local civic issues.⁸⁴ As a result, dissatisfaction with both the central government’s reluctance to allow democratization and the pro-democracy camp’s inability to get real results led people to shift to the more radical localists.⁸⁵

Activists advancing localist positions started putting themselves up as candidates in elections. In the 2015 District Council (local) elections, localists won 17 seats out of around 50 they contested, while the pro-democracy camp won 105 seats and the pro-China camp 298.⁸⁶ Hong Kong’s flagship pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party, was challenged in six constituencies by localists who argued those politicians were still part of the establishment.⁸⁷ In the end, however, across all of Hong Kong, only about 5 percent of the popular vote went to candidates representing post-Occupy groups, demonstrating the general public still had more negative opinions toward the localists than the two other camps and were hesitant to support radical populism following the Occupy Central movement.⁸⁸ However, their situation quickly became better. In the following year’s Legislative Council elections, out of the 35 directly-elected seats, localists won 6, the pro-democracy camp 13, and the pro-China camp 16; notably, several well-known pro-democracy politicians lost re-election to the localists.⁸⁹ The pro-democracy camp saw a swing of -12 points, while the localists went from non-existence to capturing 19 percent of the popular vote.⁹⁰ Although the localists ultimately made up less than a tenth of the legislature, earning nearly one in five votes was a significant improvement from their performance in the local elections and demonstrated their rapidly growing popularity.

The localist candidates won because they positioned themselves to fill a void in Hong Kong politics. China’s increasing encroachment into Hong Kong’s way of life was threatening the local identity, political autonomy, and economic privileges they had grown so fond of, yet the legacy pro-democracy politicians who were expected to push back on their behalf, in the minds of many, did so too weakly. Thus, the localists argued they would bring new vigor to the political system, represent those who felt they had no true representation, and forcefully fight to preserve the city’s culture. Their message resonated with hundreds of thousands of voters, who saw them as the best hope of achieving the change others promised but could not deliver on.

A testy relationship. This attitude would prove to be a barrier that made cooperation between the new localist and legacy pro-democracy camps difficult. Perhaps the biggest difference between the camps is how close they want Hong Kong to be with China. Traditional pro-democratic parties typically advocate democratic development while under Chinese sovereignty (thus making Hongkongers Chinese nationals), while localists increasingly tend to reject any Chinese identity for Hongkongers.⁹¹ Localists thus saw the pro-democracy camp as competitors, blaming them for the stagnation of the democracy movement. They also accused the pro-democrats of collaborating, sympathizing, and being too weak with the mainland. The June 4 vigil became a target of the localists, as some would claim the event was being used to gain votes for the pro-democracy camp while promoting a pan-Chinese identity.⁹²

During the Occupy Central movement, the pro-democracy and localist camps openly decried each other. The more radical student groups refused to acknowledge leadership from the pro-democracy camp.⁹³ In response, the pro-democracy camp labelled the localists as extreme, using terms such as “rightists,” “racists,” and “fascists” to describe them while also accusing them of stoking hatred and discrimination.⁹⁴

The anti-extradition bill movement in 2019 saw Hong Kong’s largest protests in its history, easily surpassing the magnitude of the Umbrella Revolution. Public support for more radical protest actions in 2019 was a result of the Hong Kong government’s continued failure to listen to the people’s demands.⁹⁵ People were overwhelmingly convinced that the government and police were responsible for the violence; 83 percent of respondents to a poll blamed the government and 73 percent blamed the police, while only 40 percent blamed the protesters.⁹⁶ Ho and Tang add, “‘It was the government who taught us that peaceful protest is useless’ [a 2019 protest slogan most prominently featured during the July 1 storming of the legislative building] partly explains the reason why violence has been escalating during the protests.”⁹⁷ This may have been a reflection of the government’s refusal to negotiate with the protesters back in 2014 and subsequent failure of the peaceful occupation movement.

The 2019 protests also saw more cooperation among the radicals and moderates, as they pursued unified goals such as opposing the city’s administration and its lack of willingness to consider democratization.⁹⁸ Rather than the open conflict seen in 2014, the more peaceful pro-democrats and more militant localists in 2019 sought solidarity, leading to greater unity in their actions and mutual support.⁹⁹ Perhaps the most telling evidence of the unity were the popularization of the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times (光復香港，時代革命),” which originated from a localist activist’s candidacy in 2016, and the adoption of the protest song “Glory to Hong Kong (願榮光歸香港),” which was widely seen as representing the people of Hong Kong and lending credence to the idea that Hongkongers are a distinct nation.¹⁰⁰

Upon reflection of the Umbrella Revolution’s failure, the pro-democracy camp refrained from condemning the radicals, while the radicals stopped speaking of the uselessness of non-violence. In fact, nearly 90 percent of Hongkongers saw combining peaceful and confrontational acts as the most effective strategy to advance their cause, in stark contrast to the sentiment in 2014.¹⁰¹

The collaboration between the pro-democracy and localist camps extended to the polls. In the 2019 local elections, both camps collectively encouraged the public to unite and vote against any candidates who supported police brutality, urging voters to set aside their political differences. In contrast with previous elections, both camps coordinated the candidates they put up for election, leading to all 452 seats being contested by an opposition candidate and only 40 contests with pro-democrats and localists competing. This strategy was a massive success: the combined opposition won 388 seats and gained control of 17 out of the 18 district councils. Turnout was at 71 percent, a record for any Hong Kong election, demonstrating both camps were able to effectively mobilize their bases without targeting each other.¹⁰²

The two opposition camps originally saw each other as fierce rivals, which stifled cooperation. This gave the impression of a fractured opposition that was too weak to forcefully fight back against the establishment. When given a second chance, they chose to work together by targeting not each other, but the common enemy they faced. They sought ways to complement each other and saw past the details on which they disagreed. This led both the pro-democracy and localist camps to see far more victories in 2019. Their evolving relationship from hostility to amiability proved they had learned from their mistakes and were both better off as a result.

Hong Kong’s localist movement was far from an overnight success; over several decades, it experienced many stages of evolution. As a territory with both British and Chinese influences, the city’s residents realized their unique status made them a distinct people, and they began to define what it meant to be a “Hongkonger.” Hongkongers increasingly saw themselves as their own nation, embracing what made them different from the mainland. They fought to defend their history, culture, and lifestyle, which occasionally led to nasty confrontations and name-calling. Radical proposals provoked conversations on whether Hong Kong was on the best path for its future, and the failure of the Umbrella Revolution convinced many that the methods of the past were infeasible. Big changes needed to be made, and prominent people came forth to advance them. While their cause was originally at odds with the pro-democracy camp, both camps resolved to address the common issues of countering their position as a systemic opposition and promoting truly democratic reform.

Analysis

In order to understand why so many Hongkongers believed localist activists’ claims that greater autonomy from China was necessary, we need to investigate what actions the Chinese government had taken that led them to think that way. Fundamentally, these problems arose from a perceived conflict between the Chinese government’s interest in gaining more control over Hong Kong and Hongkongers’ interest in preserving their culture and economic livelihood. The cultural, economic, and institutional theories mentioned earlier, which discuss the many considerations that might lead a nation to pursue independence, help explain the reasons used by the localists to pursue their goals.

The central government’s initiatives fueled the sentiment that Hong Kong’s promised autonomy was being eroded, which backs Jenne’s claim that secession is more likely in places that gradually lost their political power.¹⁰³ Under its sovereignty, the Chinese government increasingly interfered in Hongkongers’ livelihoods by proposing electoral, economic, and educational reforms in an attempt to force Hongkongers to comply with official Chinese doctrines and to assimilate; however, Hongkongers resisted, leading the Chinese government to assert more control over the territory, leading to still more resistance from Hongkongers. For several years, China had practiced self-restraint, but this was abandoned in 2003 after the Hong Kong government attempted to implement Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (which states they need to pass a law on their own to safeguard China’s national security in the territory) without any present threat. Protesters rallied on July 1, the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover, suspecting a national security bill would be used to suppress freedoms by criminalizing any dissent directed at the central government. While the proposal was ultimately scrapped, the forced retreat made clear to the Chinese government that their hands-off approach undermined their efforts to integrate Hong Kong.¹⁰⁴ Thus, in 2004, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) claimed full control over any reforms that would happen in Hong Kong. The Chinese government began providing funding and political support for those Hongkongers who supported Chinese policies, and criticized pro-democracy parties and their leading figures.¹⁰⁵ Then, in 2014, China’s State Council published a white paper titled The Implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in the HKSAR, stating that the central government would henceforth exercise full power over Hong Kong’s governance, marking the start of even further intervention in Hong Kong politics.¹⁰⁶ These actions threatened the principles Hongkongers held dear. Hongkongers have prided themselves on educating students about how civic values, such as democracy, the rule of law, liberty, human rights, and justice, have contributed to Hong Kong’s prosperity. In turn, the Hong Kong government faced backlash when they tried to initiate changes to promote Chinese identity in schools and subsidize study tours to the mainland.¹⁰⁷ In addition, while the promotion of Chinese history in a proposal for national education in 2012 was popularly supported, many Hongkongers saw the government curriculum as indoctrination on loyalty to the Chinese state.¹⁰⁸ Blatant interference by the Chinese government fueled Hongkongers’ negative attitude towards China, especially among the youth. There was an increasing sense that Hong Kong was losing its identity and distinctiveness.¹⁰⁹ After the failure of the Umbrella Revolution, Hong Kong’s youth grew to see “One Country, Two Systems” as a hoax and became frustrated with the pro-democracy camp, which was still ineffectively attempting to promote democracy within the principle.¹¹⁰ It appeared that convincing Hongkongers to integrate was having the opposite effect. The state-building nationalism the Chinese government was pursuing actually helped the growth of peripheral nationalism in the city with the aim of protecting Hong Kong’s identity against mainland encroachment.¹¹¹ Therefore, as the Chinese government claimed authority over Hong Kong’s governance, Hongkongers became protective of their treasured cultural and political values, and ditched any association they had with Chinese identity. As a result, as Jenne theorizes, secessionist sentiment within the city grew.

The invocation of Cantonese supports Sorens’s position over Jenne’s of the importance of linguistic differences in promoting secessionist sentiment.¹¹² Cantonese is a crucial part of Hong Kong’s local identity, in contrast to the mainland’s use of Mandarin. As such, Hongkongers vigorously defended their use of Cantonese (and the Traditional Chinese script over the mainland’s Simplified Chinese) as part of their preservation of local culture. The protection of this unique facet of their prided identity, among many other factors, also supports Sorens’s contention that secession becomes popular when the people desire governance that cares about local cultural concerns. ¹¹³ The Chinese government’s encroachment proved they had no regard for the city’s distinctiveness, causing Hongkongers to advocate more local government that would foster their special cultural identity. Yet his argument on distance is ambiguous at best:¹¹⁴ Hong Kong is connected by land to the mainland but separated by border controls, so physical distance may not be a fully adequate descriptor. Perhaps perceived separation, or how difficult it is to get from the territory to the central country, more accurately describes distance.

The localists’ success in elections supports Rabushka and Shepsle’s argument that politicians use ethnic identity to appeal to voters and promote independence.¹¹⁵ The contrast between the social and political values of the territory with the undesirable ones of the mainland led to the emergence and widespread adoption of the term “Hongkonger.” As the HKPORI Categorical Ethnic Identity poll shows, the proportion of residents identifying more closely as “Hongkonger” rose from 50 percent in 2008 to about 78 percent in 2019.¹¹⁶ The increasing use of this distinct identity was accompanied by anti-mainland sentiment resulting from increasing immigration and tourism, and support for democratic qualities that starkly contrasted from the political values of the mainland. Localist activists thus used the distinction to successfully gain public support for their separation platform. Although they are not necessarily their own ethnicity, defending their local identity and what made it different from a Chinese one united many people under the “Hongkonger” banner. The tensions that arose from their conflicting cultural and political values led to the desire by the Hongkongers to separate. Once this common identity became a salient political issue, as Rabushka and Shepsle correctly predict, moderation and cooperation were no longer effective solutions. In Hong Kong’s case, during the 2019 protests, neither the protesters nor government officials were interested in negotiating as the protesters had made Hongkonger identity a major focal point.

On the economic case, Gourevitch’s argument on separatism being more popular when a country’s political and economic centers are not in the same place can be applied in this situation.¹¹⁷ Hong Kong’s GDP per capita has consistently outpaced that of China; in fact, despite Chinese citizens becoming wealthier, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita was about US$56,030 in April 2025, well ahead of China’s US$13,690 per person.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, Hong Kong’s overall wealth falls short compared to China’s. As the Chinese economy has blossomed and cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and its own capital have become massive economic hubs, Hong Kong’s contribution to China’s economy has declined. From 1997 to 2014, Hong Kong’s GDP decreased from over 18 percent of China’s GDP to only 3 percent, as the mainland has vastly outpaced Hong Kong in manufacturing.¹¹⁹ Therefore, this case study demonstrates that Gourevitch’s economic theory applies better when comparing per capita GDP rather than overall economic capacity. His position on relative affluence explains the economic argument behind the localist sentiment: Hongkongers could argue secession is necessary to protect their city’s superior economy from continued exploitation by the mainlanders because proposed economic policies appeared to be benefiting China more.¹²⁰ People questioned not just China’s growing political influence in their city but their economic influence too, given that in 2013, mainlanders accounted for 70 percent of tourism in Hong Kong and Chinese companies held 20 percent of the value of Hong Kong’s stock market.¹²¹ With the financial strains and disappearing job opportunities caused by the influx of mainland immigrants and tourists, independence would rid the city of an inferior economic power’s exploitation of their wealth and give them control over their local economy again. Sorens’s disagreement with Gourevitch, arguing that total affluence matters more than relative affluence and that wealthier regions are more supportive of secessionist parties, ¹²² can also explain the popularity of Hong Kong’s localist activists. The territory’s position as a wealthy and prominent global financial hub gives Hongkongers a more convincing argument that they can thrive as an independent state.

The final perspective of interest is the institutional argument proposed by Roeder.¹²³ Hong Kong has its own political institutions which several separatist activists successfully became a part of; however, the localist camp would find it very difficult to ever gain unilateral control over both the pro-China and pro-democracy camps to effectively advance their cause. Also, with systemic rules preventing any opposition from ever controlling a majority of the legislature, much less the executive, Hong Kong’s political institutions in their current state would never be able to support an independence movement. Yet the separate institutions served as an opportunity for activists to eliminate the taboo on radical political reform. The localist camp capturing 19 percent of the popular vote and winning six seats in the 2016 legislative election proves that people had confidence in their ideologies, allowing proponents of localism to attract the attention of even more voters as elected officials and gain even more support for their platform, effectively making self-determination mainstream.

Hong Kong’s localists demonstrate many hallmarks of nationalist secession movements worldwide. They rallied people under a common identity to pursue autonomy from a perceived intruding enemy, the basis for ethnonationalist movements. The city’s economic argument is dependent on perspective; while it may not be as powerful within China as it once was, it does not have the issue of overdependence that other secession movements face, and protecting their economy is a major incentive for pursuing greater separation. Separate institutions may not have helped to achieve independence in this particular case, but the power opportunity it provided greatly helped to make localism a major third force in the city’s politics. This raises the question of whether the localists in Hong Kong would have seen even greater successes if they had more time or if the calls for independence had become public earlier. Perhaps if they had not outright succeeded in making the city an independent state, they could at least be strong enough to bargain domestically for more power in the opposition and greater willingness to advance their agenda, and possibly challenge the central government’s tight grip on the territory.

Conclusion

Over decades, Hongkongers sought to define their local identity. As perceived interference in the city’s culture by mainlanders became rampant and people believed that the governments of Hong Kong and China would do nothing to stop it, their local cultural identity became something they fiercely defended. Ultimately, the solution was to distance their city from a central government they believed was intentionally trying to erase their treasured values. Their adoption of a separate identity and desire to pursue their own future instead of remaining under the rule of a repressive power is largely similar to nationalist secession movements elsewhere.

Despite this paper’s extensive discussion of Hong Kong independence, it may not be a realistic scenario. As mentioned earlier, the most recent figure shows 20 percent of Hongkongers supported independence in 2020.¹²⁴ Despite this being noteworthy, it is not enough for the movement to be considered truly serious. In addition, the movement is too scattered, and lacks organization and international backing.¹²⁵ Thus, with insufficient internal and external support, secession is highly unlikely.

With the passage of the National Security Law in 2020 in the midst of the Covid pandemic, any political dissent in Hong Kong has been effectively outlawed. Hong Kong’s government is now opposition-less, and pro-democracy and localist activists alike have either been arrested, fled into exile, or were forced to be silent. Perhaps a discussion on how the rise of the localists gave the Chinese government an excuse to end Hong Kong’s pursuit for democracy is warranted. However, what is certain is that any talk of separation is no longer openly expressed in the city, and any chance of achieving it is highly improbable anytime in the near future.

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