Abstract

This paper examines how state-led development policies in Laos perpetuate ethnic exclusion and structural inequalities, positioning economic expansion as a mechanism for dispossession rather than inclusion. While large-scale infrastructure projects, foreign investment, and market integration have driven aggregate economic growth, their benefits remain disproportionately concentrated among lowland Lao elites, reinforcing historical patterns of exclusion. Tracing these disparities to French colonial rule, the paper argues that colonial-era racialized economic hierarchies continue to shape contemporary development practices. Land dispossession, financial marginalization, and political underrepresentation systematically disadvantage ethnic minorities, including the Hmong, Khmu, and Akha, ensuring their continued exclusion from economic and political participation. Through policies such as forced resettlement, restricted access to financial resources, and governance structures that favor Lao elites, the state sustains a model of development that prioritizes market expansion over ethnic autonomy. This exclusion is not incidental but a calculated strategy to regulate labor, control resources, and maintain elite economic dominance. By framing modernization as an ostensibly neutral process, the Lao state justifies ongoing dispossession, transforming development into an instrument of control. This paper challenges dominant narratives of economic progress, highlighting how state power and neoliberal policies entrench ethnic inequalities rather than dismantling them.

Introduction

Laos has undergone rapid economic changes in recent decades, with state-led development policies emphasizing market integration, foreign investment, and large-scale infrastructure projects as pathways to national growth. These policies, often framed as mechanisms for poverty alleviation and ‘modernization’, are embedded within a broader neoliberal development agenda that prioritizes economic expansion. Yet, development is not experienced uniformly across all populations. While these initiatives have contributed to aggregate economic growth—such as increased infrastructure, expanded markets, and higher GDP—they have not translated into widespread economic well-being. Instead, their benefits have been unevenly distributed, reinforcing long-standing structural inequalities rather than reducing them.

This paper argues that development in Laos relies on the land-based, financial, political, and structural exclusion of ethnic minorities, while highlighting that development is not merely a neutral process of ‘modernization’, but one that is deeply political and historically rooted in structural inequalities including systemic barriers such as ethnic exclusion, restricted land rights, and limited political representation. French colonization entrenched power structures and narratives that framed ‘development’ as a justification for deepening inequality, positioning ethnic minorities as obstacles to progress while legitimizing their dispossession. Postcolonial development policies have sustained these hierarchies, prioritizing state-led market expansion that systematically excludes marginalized communities. Rather than dismantling colonial-era inequalities, the Lao state has repurposed them to fuel and subsidize the economic growth of the ruling class, ensuring that ‘modernization’ remains a tool of exclusion rather than inclusion.

Colonial Foundations

French colonial rule in Laos did not merely impose administrative control; it actively produced a hierarchical social and economic order that continues to shape patterns of exclusion today. By categorizing the lowland Lao, referred to as Lao Loum or Lao Thai, as “civilized” and suited for governance and commerce, while labeling upland ethnic minorities—including the Khmu, Hmong, Akha, and Chinese-Tibetan groups—as “primitive,” the colonial administration institutionalized a racialized division of labor.^[1] This was not simply a matter of perception; it determined access to land, resources, and economic participation. The colonial state structured economic life in ways that reinforced this hierarchy: Lao Loum populations were integrated into administrative and commercial roles, while upland minorities were systematically excluded, confined to subsistence farming, or forced into exploitative labor regimes, reflecting how colonial rule stratified ethnic identities to serve its extractive economic model.^{[2] [3]}

This racialized economic order was not incidental—it was foundational to the colonial economy. Land expropriation for cash-crop plantations and taxation policies compelled ethnic minorities into precarious livelihoods, ensuring a supply of cheap labor while maintaining their marginalization.^[4] Infrastructure projects, designed to link resource-rich areas with colonial markets rather than serve local needs, further deepened these disparities. The colonial emphasis on market integration and labor control did not simply exclude ethnic minorities; it actively shaped their socio-economic conditions, trapping them in cycles of dispossession and dependency.^[5]

The social and economic hierarchies produced under colonial rule have not only endured but have been reproduced through modern state policies. The post-independence government, dominated by the lowland Lao elite, inherited and maintained many of these colonial structures. Large-scale land acquisitions for industrial plantations continue to displace ethnic minority peasants, echoing colonial-era land grabs and reinforcing patterns of exclusion.^[6] Infrastructure projects, much like their colonial predecessors, prioritize economic integration over local well-being, often at the expense of ethnic communities. These patterns of exclusion are reflected in contemporary poverty data. In fact, a multi-dimensional poverty index reveals that, “for the Lao-Thai there was a 66% decline in multi-dimensional poverty between 2003 and 2013, while for the Chinese-Tibetan it was just 27%”.^[7] This disparity is not incidental—it is the product of an economic order that, from its inception under colonial rule, positioned ethnic minorities at the periphery of development.

The enduring legacies of colonial economic policies ensure that these communities remain disproportionately excluded from the benefits of economic growth, reinforcing historical inequalities in land ownership, labor conditions, and political representation (Rigg, 2018, p.164).^[8] Crucially, this exclusion is not merely about economic marginalization but about how different forms of labor are valued—or devalued—within this system. Underpaid or unrecognized labor functions as a hidden subsidy for economic growth, reducing the costs of development by extracting labor without fair compensation. In colonial Laos, ethnic minority labor—whether in subsistence farming, plantation work, or informal economies—was systematically undervalued, treated as peripheral to the ‘modern’ economic sector dominated by lowland Lao elites.^[9] This dynamic persists today, as ethnic minority labor remains concentrated in low-wage, insecure sectors, effectively subsidizing national economic growth while deepening structural inequalities.

Land Exclusion

As communal lands are replaced by industrial plantations and state-controlled projects, minority ethnic groups face mounting pressure to integrate into wage labor economies, further diminishing their ability to sustain their livelihoods. Rather than fostering economic inclusion, these relocations reinforced structural inequalities, prioritizing ‘modernization’ over ethnic autonomy.^[10] This shift is not an organic process but a direct outcome of state policies and economic structures designed to extract labor while consolidating state control over ethnic minorities. State-led resettlement programs have systematically displaced ethnic minorities under the pretext of promoting development, environmental conservation, and national security.^[11] By concentrating ethnic minorities into designated areas, the state aimed to facilitate governance and service delivery. However, in practice, these policies resulted in widespread land dispossession, food insecurity, and deepened poverty.^[12] Many resettled communities struggled to adapt to lowland agricultural practices and market-based livelihoods, as they were often given less fertile land and lacked access to essential infrastructure, making subsistence farming unsustainable and pushing them into wage labor.^[13]

This restructuring of livelihoods echoes colonial-era labor control strategies. Under French rule, the administration imposed forced labor and corvée systems on upland communities, compelling them to work on plantations and infrastructure projects. The colonial government’s focus on resource extraction and labor discipline laid the groundwork for contemporary state practices, which continue to regulate mobility and economic participation along ethnic lines.^[14] The post-colonial Lao state has effectively reproduced these patterns, using development rhetoric to justify the restriction of ethnic minorities to undervalued forms of labor, ensuring a steady workforce for market-oriented production. These enduring inequalities are reflected in policies that disproportionately benefit lowland Lao-Thai populations, who enjoy greater access to infrastructure, education, and economic opportunities, while marginalized groups such as the Hmong and Akha remain structurally disadvantaged.^[15]

Financial Exclusion

Financial exclusion further entrenches economic disparities among ethnic minorities in Laos, revealing how state policies and financial institutions actively curate knowledge deprivation as a means of control. While microfinance initiatives, such as village loan funds, were introduced to promote economic participation, these programs disproportionately benefit wealthier, lowland Lao.^[16] Ethnic minority groups are significantly less likely to access these financial resources due not only to a lack of collateral but also because of state neglect in fostering financial literacy.^[17] The deliberate failure to provide these communities with banking knowledge or mechanisms for navigating formal credit systems ensures that they remain economically vulnerable.

This lack of access is not merely an oversight—it is a structured deprivation that serves the state’s interests. Structural barriers, such as language differences and exclusion from financial decision-making processes, further restrict ethnic minorities’ participation in formal credit systems, effectively trapping them outside economic mobility while maintaining their dependency on wage labor. The government exploits these limitations, crafting financial programs that demand a level of banking literacy that ethnic minorities were never given the tools to develop. By doing so, the state ensures that even when financial resources exist on paper, they remain inaccessible in practice, reinforcing economic hierarchies under the guise of development. The state’s approach to financial inclusion demonstrates how exclusion is not merely an economic consequence but a calculated strategy to regulate labor and reinforce structural inequality. The Village Development Funds, introduced as compensation for the loss of natural resources, serve less as genuine support mechanisms and more as instruments of control.^[18] Rather than offering direct financial restitution, these funds restrict borrowing to narrowly defined “productive activities,” such as rice cultivation and livestock raising, while enforcing rigid repayment structures with interest rates of around six percent per year.^[19] However, these activities presuppose access to land—land that ethnic minority communities have lost to state-backed plantation projects.

By designing financial assistance around economic activities that require land and financial literacy, the state ensures that displaced minorities remain excluded from meaningful participation in the economy while being pushed into low-wage labor markets as their only viable survival strategy.

Political Exclusion

Furthermore, upland ethnic communities remain severely underrepresented in governance structures, further marginalizing them from decision-making processes. Most affected villages, including those inhabited by the Brou, have disproportionately low political representation, as local governments in these regions are often dominated by lowland Lao officials.^[20] The political structures in Laos reinforce these disparities, as administrative appointments tend to favor ethnic Lao elites, who are more likely to align with national economic policies that emphasize foreign investment and industrial expansion. Consequently, ethnic minority leaders struggle to gain political influence, and their concerns are often overlooked or dismissed in policy discussions.^[21] This political marginalization is not just an unfortunate consequence but a deliberate reinforcement of economic exclusion, creating a cycle of disenfranchisement. Without financial resources or institutional support, ethnic minorities lack the means to advocate for policy changes that could address their systemic disadvantages.^[22] Their exclusion from economic participation feeds into their political invisibility, which in turn prevents them from challenging the very structures that sustain their economic marginalization. This cycle ensures that ethnic minorities remain subordinate to state development goals, with their exclusion serving both economic and political interests.

Moreover, many ethnic minority communities lack the bureaucratic literacy required to navigate land tenure laws, leaving them vulnerable to dispossession with little legal recourse. Government policies that require formal land titles for legal recognition of ownership disproportionately disadvantage upland communities, as traditional land tenure systems—based on communal ownership and customary use—are rarely acknowledged in state legislation.^[23]

Structural Exclusion

Hydropower dams, such as the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) Hydropower Project, plantation agriculture, and mining operations are framed as national progress, yet they displace entire communities without adequate compensation or relocation support. Roads and industrial zones are developed not to integrate ethnic minorities into the economy but to facilitate resource extraction and the movement of labor to serve state and corporate interests. This model of development treats land not as a foundation for livelihoods but as a commodity to be exploited, reinforcing economic hierarchies that privilege state-aligned industries over the well-being of marginalized populations.The intersection of these exclusions creates a cycle of disenfranchisement that disproportionately affects ethnic minorities, reinforcing existing hierarchies of economic and social power. Rather than fostering inclusive growth, these projects entrench disparities by concentrating resources and economic benefits in the hands of state-affiliated elites and foreign investors while leaving affected communities with diminished agency and heightened precarity.

Nam Theun 2

NT2, supported by the World Bank, was framed as a poverty alleviation initiative but, in practice, functioned as a mechanism of economic and political exclusion, disproportionately harming ethnic minorities like the Brou. Despite extensive research demonstrating that large-scale hydro projects disproportionately impact women, Indigenous Peoples, and other ethnic minorities—who constitute the majority of those displaced by such projects—the NT2 project proceeded with minimal regard for these vulnerabilities.^[24] Crucially, the World Bank “decided to not define the Brou there as Indigenous, even though the Bank did recognize the similar Mon-Khmer language-speaking peoples in the reservoir area as being Indigenous”.^[25] This deliberate categorization allowed project stakeholders to sidestep policies requiring special compensation and participatory planning, illustrating how development institutions exploit bureaucratic definitions to evade accountability.

By denying Indigenous recognition to the Brou, the World Bank and the Lao government not only stripped them of legal protections but also reinforced structural patterns of disenfranchisement. Approximately 6,300 people, predominantly from ethnic minority groups, were forcibly resettled, under promises of improved livelihoods.^[26] However, resettlement efforts were fundamentally flawed. The land allocated to displaced families was infertile and unsuitable for agricultural practices, demonstrating a failure—or refusal—to provide viable economic alternatives. Simultaneously, the dam’s environmental consequences, including declining fish stocks and water contamination, disproportionately affected women, who had previously depended on fishing for sustenance and income. As Manorom et al. note, interviews with affected women revealed that fish were “abundant” before the dam’s construction, but the subsequent decline in water quality led to severe reductions in fish populations.^[27] This loss of subsistence resources not only heightened food insecurity but also forced women into precarious wage labor, exacerbating economic instability and gendered inequalities.

The NT2 project exemplifies how large-scale infrastructure projects serve as tools of economic restructuring that entrench existing hierarchies. Rather than fostering development, such projects displace marginalized communities while funneling resources and economic benefits to state-backed industries and urban centers. The World Bank’s selective recognition of indigeneity in this case underscores how states and international financial institutions manipulate legal and administrative frameworks to render consultation inaccessible, thereby reinforcing patterns of exclusion and dispossession under the guise of development.

Industrial Plantations

The Lao state deliberately engineers land dispossession by structuring policies that prioritize Vietnamese and Chinese corporate interests, granting long-term land concessions that systematically strip ethnic minorities of their customary land. Over 10,000 hectares have been transformed into rubber and pulpwood plantations, displacing groups such as the Brou, Khmu, and Tai Dam from their agricultural lands, forests, and water sources.^[28] This is not an incidental byproduct of development but a calculated strategy that allows the state to consolidate power while maintaining plausible deniability. By framing land concessions as necessary for economic modernization, the government masks its role in perpetuating ethnic marginalization, ensuring that wealth and influence remain concentrated among state-affiliated elites and foreign investors.^[29]

The state’s neglect of ethnic land rights is not a failure of governance but an intentional political maneuver. By refusing to establish safeguards for ethnic minority communities, the Lao government ensures their systematic exclusion from economic benefits. This neglect functions as a strategic tool: by withholding legal protections and avenues for recourse, the state passively facilitates corporate land grabs while maintaining a façade of neutrality. The coerced transition of displaced communities from self-sufficient farming to precarious, exploitative plantation labor is not an unfortunate side effect but an expected outcome of policies designed to entrench economic dependency. Workers on these plantations endure hazardous conditions, exposure to chemical pesticides, and unregulated wages, all while the state refrains from enforcing labor protections to maximize investor profits.^[30] Beyond economic disenfranchisement, the government’s indifference toward environmental degradation further underscores its role in crafting these inequalities. Deforestation, soil depletion, and the contamination of water sources directly undermine the long-term sustainability of traditional livelihoods, making displacement effectively irreversible.^[31] The state’s inaction in addressing these consequences is itself a form of governance—one that prioritizes the entrenchment of elite power over the well-being of marginalized populations. The inequalities produced by these policies are not incidental; they are the intended result of a system that thrives on dispossession and exclusion.

Conclusion

This paper does not suggest that economic development in Laos is an entirely unchallenged force that renders ethnic minorities passive victims of state and market forces. To ignore the forms of local resistance, adaptation, and negotiation that ethnic minority communities engage in—whether through advocacy, informal land tenure practices, or alternative economic networks—would be to overlook their agency. However, the ways in which the Lao state and international development actors continue to reinforce colonial-era economic hierarchies cannot be dismissed as incidental or inevitable. The privilege of lowland Lao communities in land ownership, finance policy, and governance has been structurally entrenched through legal structures and large-scale infrastructure projects that disproportionately displace upland ethnic minorities. This is not merely a case of economic mismanagement or policy oversight but a structural reproduction of exclusionary development.

While economic growth has contributed to poverty reduction among the dominant Lao Loum population, it has failed to meaningfully address the disparities that leave ethnic minorities trapped in cycles of dispossession and marginalization. To focus solely on legal reforms or improved land governance without addressing the underlying power imbalances would be to reinforce the very system that sustains inequality. Recognizing the colonial roots of contemporary economic structures is essential—not as an academic exercise, but as a necessary step toward dismantling a framework that continues to naturalize exclusion.

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Tisya Raina is a fourth year student studying Peace, Conflict & Justice, Contemporary Asian Studies, and Canadian Studies. With an interest in the legal landscape surrounding information disorder regulation in Canada and globally, Tisya has conducted extensive research on the legal challenges posed by the proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, aiming to inform policy development. Tisya has also served as the Co-Chair of Executive Summit Studies at the G20 Research Group, the world’s leading independent source of analysis on the G20 Summits. She has attended the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit in India and the 2024 G7 Apulia Summit in Italy, where she presented research highlighting the urgent need for action against the information disorder to global leaders and media.

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Bibliography

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Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850.

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1. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
2. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
3. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
4. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
5. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
6. Kenney-Lazar, Miles. “Governing Dispossession: Relational Land Grabbing in Laos.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 679–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2017.1373627. ↑
7. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
8. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
9. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
10. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
11. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
12. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
13. Brown, James Alan. “Laos’s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia,” October 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01702005. ↑
14. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
15. Rigg, Jonathan. “Rethinking Asian Poverty in a Time of Asian Prosperity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (2018): 159–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12189. ↑
16. Baird, Ian G., Bruce P. Shoemaker, and Kanokwan Manorom. “The People and Their River, the World Bank and Its Dam: Revisiting the Xe Bang Fai River in Laos.” Development and Change 46, no. 5 (2015): 1080–1105. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12186. ↑
17. Baird, Ian G., Bruce P. Shoemaker, and Kanokwan Manorom. “The People and Their River, the World Bank and Its Dam: Revisiting the Xe Bang Fai River in Laos.” Development and Change 46, no. 5 (2015): 1080–1105. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12186. ↑
18. Baird, Ian G., Bruce P. Shoemaker, and Kanokwan Manorom. “The People and Their River, the World Bank and Its Dam: Revisiting the Xe Bang Fai River in Laos.” Development and Change 46, no. 5 (2015): 1080–1105. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12186. ↑
19. Baird, Ian G., Bruce P. Shoemaker, and Kanokwan Manorom. “The People and Their River, the World Bank and Its Dam: Revisiting the Xe Bang Fai River in Laos.” Development and Change 46, no. 5 (2015): 1080–1105. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12186. ↑
20. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
21. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
22. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
23. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
24. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
25. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
26. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
27. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑
28. Kenney-Lazar, Miles. “Governing Dispossession: Relational Land Grabbing in Laos.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 679–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2017.1373627. ↑
29. Kenney-Lazar, Miles. “Governing Dispossession: Relational Land Grabbing in Laos.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 679–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2017.1373627. ↑
30. Kenney-Lazar, Miles. “Governing Dispossession: Relational Land Grabbing in Laos.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 679–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2017.1373627. ↑
31. Manorom, Kanokwan, Baird ,Ian G., and Bruce and Shoemaker. “The World Bank, Hydropower-Based Poverty Alleviation and Indigenous Peoples: On-the-Ground Realities in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin of Laos.” Forum for Development Studies 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 275–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2016.1273850. ↑