To what extent are water security issues threatening the Mekong River and how are the riparian states including its associated allies responding to mitigate its impact on the state?

 

Abstract: This paper examines the complex security and cooperation challenges surrounding the Mekong River, a vital lifeline for six riparian nations. The study highlights how unilateral dam construction, primarily by China on the upper Lancang River, raises significant concerns regarding reduced water flow, transparency, and potential hydro-political leverage. The diverse interactions of China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam with the Mekong are analyzed, showcasing how their unique geographies and economic dependencies shape their stakes in the river’s future. The paper discusses the limitations of existing coperative mechanisms like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in addressing these challenges effectively due to a lack of enforcement power. The roles of external actors such as ASEAN, the United States, and the European Union in the region are also considered. Ultimately, the paper emphasizes the urgent need for a stronger multilateral cooperation with enforceable mechanisms to ensure the long-term security and sustainable development of the Mekong River region.

Throughout this report the $ = USD
Disclaimer: This research paper was written before Donald Trump’s suspension of USAID in February 2025.

 

The Valeriepieris Circle is a human geography term for a circle around East, Southeast and South Asia that depicts where over half of the earth’s human population lives. Within this geographic circle are many fragile lifelines of civilization: Rivers. Fresh water is one of the key commodities of human civilization. However, as Asia of today begins its industrialization, nations find themselves competing for the finite resources around them. Rivers are particularly vulnerable to international political conflict since some vital riverways flow through multiple countries. The problem arises with modern technology since nations often have the resources and ability to bend nature to its will. Damming of rivers is particularly an issue facing China and five other continental Southeast Asian Nations. The river is particularly at risk of an international conflict between six different directly impacted nations is the Mekong River. Climate change and the decreasing flow of water exacerbated by the nation’s dam building along the Mekong River may prove to be threatening to some state’s survival and food security. This report will look at how the security of the river is impacted by the political climate in the region. It will examine the steps taken by the political entities with interest in the Mekong to formulate cooperation and prosperity within the region that is so desperate for one. Thus finally offer a solution based on the geopolitical circumstances facing the security concerns of the Mekong riparian states.

The Mekong River is geographically located between the Tibet plateau and the Southern Vietnam basin. With a length of nearly 5,000 kilometres long, the river stretches across six different nations referred to as the Mekong riparian states. These nations include some of the most populous countries in the world, China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar but also smaller states that majorly depend on the Mekong as a source of life such as Laos and Cambodia. The Upper section of the Mekong River which lies within the borders of the People’s Republic of China is known by the Chinese as Lancang.^[1]

Table 1: Share of Mekong River Basin by Country

Countries	China	Myanmar	Laos	Thailand	Cambodia	Vietnam	Total
Area (km2)	165,000	24,000	202,000	184,000	155,000	65,000	795,000
Catchment Area (%)	21	3	25	23	20	8	100

(Data Provided by Mekong River Commission)^[2]

In reference to Table 1, China has around 165,000 km² of the river’s basin which accounts for a 21% share of the total river basin area. The Lower Mekong section starts at Myanmar with the least share of the basin at 24,000 km² or only 3%. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic is one of the least populous riparian states, however, they have the largest shares with roughly 25% of the basin area or around 202,000 km². The second largest control of the basin, at 184,000 km² or 23% of the area, is Thailand which shares its entire Mekong territory with Laos. Cambodia shares 20% or around 155,000 km² of the basin which includes Tonle Sap, one of the largest freshwater lakes in Southeast Asia. Finally, Vietnam shares 65,000 km² or 8% of the Mekong’s total 795,000 km² basin area, with the Mekong Delta entirely within

Vietnam’s borders. The Mekong Commission estimated that around 65 Million people live on the Lower

Mekong River basin with nearly 80% of the population relying on the river for their livelihoods.^[3] Therefore, it is not surprising at all to find that the Mekong River is home to a rich diversity of over 1,100 species of fish, with an estimate that fishery along the Mekong generates around $17 Billion annually.^[4] Comprehension of the geography and the stakeholders in the Mekong River is key to further understanding the reality of the social, political and economic stakes facing the riparian nations if the prosperity the Mekong currently brings to each state ceases to exist in the near future.

To further understand the security issues, one must be accustomed to the major political entities that will be the driving force in the conflict and negotiations that follow. The first interest group is the People’s Republic of China. China under the government of the Chinese Communist Party was founded on 1st October 1949. Having gone through a brutal civil war, the new Chinese state looked to rapidly industrialize under the Communist Party’s supervision.^[5][6] The country heavily invested in mega infrastructure projects as a means to improve the country’s economic growth, such projects include the construction of dams on the Lancang River.⁶ China’s economic growth placed the country as the world’s leading trade partner.^[7] However, one of China’s biggest trade partners is ASEAN, which is the entity representing all of the lower Mekong riparian states and a few other key players in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.^[8] Unlike China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also known as ASEAN, is not one country but a community of Southeast Asian nations that agreed to bring peace and economic harmony to the subcontinent.^[9] The first iteration of ASEAN began at the Bangkok declaration on 8th August 1967, it was originally formed as an anti-communist pact.^[10] However, with the fall of the “Bamboo wall” and the end of the Cold War, ASEAN admitted new members which now span across 10 nations in Southeast Asia with the official ASEAN Charter ratified by all states on 20th November 2007 in Singapore. Five ASEAN member states, Myanmar, Laos Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia are riparian states of the Mekong; on the other hand, the Mekong runs through only three Chinese provinces of Tibet, Qinghai and Yunnan. To illustrate the bargaining power of the collective ASEAN toward the singular nation of China. Take population size for example, China is the most populous nation in the world at 1.4 Billion compared to ASEAN’s combined population of 683.3 Million. Another comparative matrix is GDP by purchasing power parity, ASEAN’s combined GDP (ppp) of $11 Trillion is only a third of China’s GDP (ppp) of $33 Trillion. Thus individual ASEAN nations, especially Mekong riparian ASEAN member states, are hardly comparable to the size of China.

The security issues over the Mekong River concern the supply of fresh water. Geography plays an important role in this conflict as asymmetric environmental pressure is put upon an already asymmetric economic power balance between the Mekong riparian states. The Mekong faces a seasonal cycle of wet and dry seasons coinciding with Southeast Asia’s rainy and dry seasonal climate.^[11] The Mekong River Commission (MRC) reports that from the months of December to May the Upper Mekong disproportionately supplies a greater volume of water than the Lower Mekong as a result of the dry season in Southeast Asia.^[12] While the problem of water management during the dry season puts a toll on those relying on the river’s freshwater supply, it is exacerbated by the unilateral dam construction along the Upper and Lower Mekong. Of the top 5 biggest reservoirs along the Mekong, China’s Xiaowan and Nuozhadu dams hold the top two spots for the largest by volume.^[13] Xiaowan Dam opened in 2010, is designed to hold a 15 Million m³ reservoir costing an estimated $3 Billion.^[14] Meanwhile, the Nuozhadu dam, which opened two years later in 2012, has a much larger capacity at 21 Million m³ costing $6.6 Billion.^[15] These individual statistics of the two Chinese dams on the Mekong present the capability and expense which China took to create these two reservoirs. However, what is more jarring is when one compares the shares of reservoir volume with other dams along the Mekong.

Figure 1. How Much Water is in The Largest Reservoirs? (Graph provided by Mekong Dam Monitor)^[16]

Figure 1. Underscores the proportionality of the two Chinese reservoirs taking up more than two-thirds of the combined volume of usable water in all other 53 monitored reservoirs, dams and basins monitored by the watch group.^[17] Of the 430 dams along the Mekong only 11 dams are situated in China yet the People’s Republic holds the power to turn off the tap on the population of the Lower Mekong.^[18] Even without the threat of man-made environmental disasters, the lack of transparency and information sharing hinders cooperation in the region. With climate change playing an unpredicted role, countries are predictably incentivized to work in their own interest to preserve the necessary natural resources for their people’s survival which can result in a disastrous impact on the downstream population. The construction of dams on the Mekong by all riparian parties does not only have a political impact but also an environmental one. In the case that the diverse species of fish were to go extinct it will lead to a food shortage crisis. Thus China’s geographic location and economic Might threatens to coerce the security and sovereign integrity of vulnerable Southeast Asian countries.

Thus in this section of the report, one will look at how the riparian Nations are addressing concerns regarding dam construction on the Mekong River. First touching on the People’s Republic of China itself, then followed by the actions and political situations of individual ASEAN Mekong riparian states. This report will choose to omit Myanmar from the analysis as it shares the least area of the Mekong while embroiled, for the longest time, in a disorganized state of civil war.

The People’s Republic of China continues to actively invest in the region of the Lancang-Mekong Basin. A multilateral format called the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation is largely spearheaded by China with partners being Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.^[19] The body is tasked with opening up dialogue and cooperation between the riparian states.^[20] Recent activities of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation reports on China’s increasing support towards the lower Mekong nations with security cooperation, and economic bilateral agreements that showcase the great length of Chinese investment in the region.^[21] While the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation helps Lower Mekong countries get access to Chinese support, it seems as if the Cooperation allows China to leverage Lower Mekong countries with aid through this dialogue platform.^[22] China continues to build dams along the Lancang River. It’s official statement addresses that:

“The adverse downstream effects of China’s hydro-power projects are negligible, given that only a small percentage of the Mekong’s total flow originates in China.” ^[23]

Even with opposition and concerns about water security addressed by the Lower Mekong states, the Chinese position claims the opposite effect.^[24] A spokesman for China believes that:

“To the contrary, it is argued, the construction of large dams on the Upper Mekong will benefit downstream users in terms of hydro-electricity generation and flood control, and efforts are being made to protect the river’s ecosystems and fisheries” ^[25]

Thus, it is expected that China will continue its investment in dam building along the river. However, what the spokesman did not account for is the lack of legal liabilities and transparency between China and the lower Mekong region. The Lancang-Mekong acts as a political dialogue platform, nonetheless, the day-to-day updates on the usage of the upper Mekong River dam are not represented by Lower Mekong nations. The transparency regarding the volume and usage can be observed through institutions such as the Mekong Dam Monitor. Still, China will not be held legally accountable if there is ever a case of using hydro-political leverages against the Lower Mekong region. Thus it is still a frightening scenario if the Chinese representative was wrong about the claim that the dams have negligible impact on the Lower Mekong supplies.

Laos
In that spirit, let’s focus on the actors in the lower Mekong that will be affected by the river’s water shortage. Lao People’s Democratic Republic is a communist one-party state that is geographically landlocked. Referring back to Table 1, Laos maintains the largest share by area of the Mekong River, at 25%. Furthermore, the Mekong is the largest source of freshwater in Laos, as prominent cities such as the capital Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Pakse are situated on the bank of the river. In this regard, Laos significantly invested in building hydroelectric power dams. Currently, the country operates 78 dams however, it plans to construct 246 more, helping Laos achieve the goal of becoming the battery of Asia.^[26]

Table 2: Value in US Dollars of electricity export and import in of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Export to:	Value (Millions US Dollars)		Import from:	Value (Millions US Dollars)
Thailand	1,780		Thailand	63.4
Vietnam	67.2		Vietnam	4.61
Cambodia	109		China	0.94
Myanmar	0.159
Malaysia	0.0665
Total	1,970		Total	68.95

(data provided by the Observatory of Economic Complexity)^[27]

Table 2. Compares the exports and imports of electricity into Laos. According to Viraphonh Viravong (2016), the Vice Minister of Lao People’s Democratic Republic Ministry of Energy & Mines, the country’s electricity production is almost entirely 100% dependent on Hydroelectric power.^[28] With a total capacity of generating 10,400 MW of energy, it exports just over half of its maximum capacity to countries in the region. Laos’ electricity exporting industry is a billion-dollar industry, grossing nearly $1.2 Billion in exports alone. Hydroelectricity power generation revenue contributes up to 1.2% of the Laotian economy.^[29] Having shared its border along the Mekong River with Thailand it is not surprising that it exports over a billion US dollars worth of electricity to Thailand. However, one might ask, similar to the situation with Vietnam, why does Laos export electricity from Thailand just to import electricity again from Thailand? That is because hydroelectricity is less efficient during the dry seasons as reservoirs have to be kept half full.^[30] Therefore, Laos needed to import electricity from China, Vietnam, and Thailand which do not mainly rely on hydroelectricity production from the Mekong.

The security of Laos’s economy is hugely tied to the abundance of water in the Mekong. With the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, the one-party ruler of Laos, being heavily reliant on China’s support it is unlikely that China will use hydro-political leverages on Laos. However, climate change will increase the temperature of hot seasons, worsening the level of water flow downstream. Consequently threatening irreversible damage to Laos’s economy and, more importantly, the livelihood of the population.

Vietnam
With a similar form of Government to Laos, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party communist state. However, Vietnam does not share the same level of cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. Still, Vietnam continues to hold a great deal of interest in the Mekong River as it controls the entire delta of the river. The city of Can Tho lies on the delta and Ho Chi Minh City is less than 100km north of it. The river feeds Southern Vietnam with freshwater irrigation for agriculture and farming. Putting Vietnam’s reliance on the delta to scale, 70% of Vietnam’s aquaculture, around 50% of Vietnam’s rice production, and one-third of the country’s GDP rely on the Mekong Delta.^[31] Unlike Laos, the delta does not permit many geographical advantages to build mega hydroelectric dams. Yet, the delta still maintains a highly lucrative area for primary industries in Vietnam. Therefore, at the 4th Mekong River Country Summit held on April 2023 in Vientiane in Laos, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Pham Minh Chinh suggested 5 key points:^[32]

1. Effective implementation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement
2. Maintain fair and rational use of water resources
3. Prevent and limit negative impacts on downstream countries.
4. Protect the legitimate rights and interests of those living in the basin, by putting people at the center.
5. Strive to make the MRC an intelligence hub providing information, data and knowledge about the basin, and consulting services to help other sub-regional cooperation mechanisms.

The 5 key points underline the important interest for Vietnam in the Mekong River which is sustaining the flow of freshwater for the ecology of Vietnam’s delta environment. The first point, calling for the effective implementation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement is a preamble to Vietnam’s growing cooperation in the continental Southeast Asia region. The 1995 agreement recalls the establishment of the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.^[33] The essence of this agreement is to formulate a joint Lower Mekong countries body over the share and management of the river. For example, Article 5 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement calls for Reasonable and Equitable Utilization of the river with a prerogative During the dry season: “Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee.”^[34] With Vietnam’s growing influence, it is in Vietnam’s interest to deal directly with Southeast Asian nations instead of through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism with China. While the effective implementation of the 1995 Agreement would bring most of Vietnam’s concerns to rest, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s other points such as fair and rational use of water resources stress to the upper stream nations that an impact through overuse or over-pollution is a significant impact to Vietnam. Chinh’s final point regarding the sharing of intelligence and consulting services is a direct response to the concern about the region’s poor transparency over the information regarding their section of the river. Vietnam will be greatly affected by any form of natural disaster coming from upriver as the delta region is expected to take in everything that flows down the river.

Conclusively, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s five key points at the Mekong River Country Summit echo Vietnam’s vital reliance on the Mekong River. With around one-third of the country’s economy reliant on the river delta, the country is highly vulnerable to any type of conflict that directly affects the river. Despite Vietnam’s dispute with China over territories in the South China Sea, the conflict must be contained within that limited region. It is, therefore, in Vietnam’s best interest to sustain cooperation and transparency with the riparian countries for their continued prosperity on the Mekong Delta.

Thailand
Another regional power, the Kingdom of Thailand, faces a different set of challenges, as unlike the previous three countries extensively mentioned, Thailand is not a one-party communist state. Therefore the challenges it faces are often based on litigation headed by Non-government organizations trying to preserve the river’s ecosystem. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a history of military rule from time to time. During the rule of a civilian government in 2012, the Thai government pushed for a six nations “Initiative on Sustainable Development of the Lancang-Mekong Subregion.”^[35] This goal was largely achieved with the formation of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. Nonetheless, Thailand’s main concern is between the country’s corporations and the justice system. The Xayaburi dam project which is located in the Xayaburi region of Laos was developed by the Xayaburi Power Company Limited a subsidiary of the Thai Chor. Karnchang Public Company. $2.67 billion was raised by six Thai Banks for the Xayaburi dam project; The Banks involved are:^[36]

• Bangkok Bank
• Kasikorn Bank
• Krung Thai Bank
• Siam Commercial Bank
• TISCO
• Export-Import Bank of Thailand [Government-owned]

The portfolio consists of the four largest banks in the country funding a billion-dollar project in a foreign country should give confidence to the construction of the Dam by the Chor. Karnchang company. However, the project faced international backlash and legal action by NGOs. The WWF claims that the project will bring “Irreversible environmental impacts.” ^[37] NGOs claim that the construction of the Xayaburi dam will lead to the extinction of the Giant Mekong Catfish since the dam will block its migratory path.^[38] A legal suit was launched in 2012 against the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) for buying Electricity from the Xayaburi Dam. The plaintiff argues that the Xayaburi Dam causes irreparable damage to the environment and the livelihood of citizens dependent on the Mekong River.^[39] However, after a decade of litigation and appeal, the case was dismissed by the court.^[40] The Xayaburi Dam is now fully operational and has been open since 2019.

A different story occurred in 2020. Laos is engaged in another hydropower project, called the Sanakam Dam and Thailand is objecting to the construction on grounds of ecological damage.^[41] The consultation documents for the construction of the Sanakam Dam were rejected by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) citing “out of date” information.^[42] However, due to a lack of jurisdiction by the MRC or the government of Thailand, both entities have no real power to stop the construction. Finally, although unofficial from the government of Thailand, a Thai government official broke diplomatic protocol and made criticism of the project in the media. Nonetheless, construction of the $2 Billion project was continued on by The China Datang Corporation.

The lack of action by the Thai government is perhaps due to the political geography of the Thailand. As the country’s political and economic hub is centred around the Gulf of Thailand, Thailand’s reliance on the Mekong River is far fewer than the previously discussed states. However, the environmental impact on the Mekong will surely leave a mark on Thailand’s economy. Many provinces of the agriculture-heavy North Eastern “Isaan” region rely on the water source from the Mekong River. The Isaan Plateau major rivers of Chi and Mun both flow directly into the Mekong River. Therefore, while the government has largely been inactive regarding the issues on the Mekong River, geopolitics and climate change on the Mekong will have a lasting impact on millions of Thais.

Cambodia

Finally, the Kingdom of Cambodia. Having gone through a rough history of colonization, genocides and civil wars, the country is beginning to grow economically. However, Cambodia is arguably the country most dependent on the Mekong River. Consequently, the Cambodian civilization is the most vulnerable to the uncertainties on the Mekong River. Similar to Laos, Cambodia is reliant on hydropower plants. The country has nine operation plants generating a maximum of 979.70 MW of electricity.^[43] Unlike Laos, Cambodian hydropower only accounts for 40% of its energy consumption.^[44] Electricity is not Cambodia’s main concern in regard to the security of the Mekong River. The real concerning issue about Cambodia’s security is their population’s reliance on the river as a food source.

Figure 2. Map of Cambodia’s Fishing Lots in 2001 (Lot areas: red; Flood plains: light blue)

(Map provided by MRC Fisheries Program)^[45]

Figure 2. Shows how interdependent the fishery industry of Cambodia was to the Mekong River in 2001. The red represents fishing lots that cover large areas of the floodplain and almost form an outline of Cambodia’s Mekong River. A finding in 2017 indicates that 60% of Cambodia’s protein consumption comes solely from the fishery industry.^[46] In the case climate change impacts the flow of water, the reduction of the fish population will increase the risk of malnutrition and famine among Cambodian communities. Depending on the severity of the drought caused by the limited flow of water down the Mekong, the Cambodian economy could take a devastating hit. Agriculture in Cambodia makes up 25.3% of the nation’s GDP.^[47] Yoeum Yoeut, a farmer and resident of the Baran district in Battambang province reports that even now: “I’ve seen lower yields on my farm each year since maybe 2017 or 2018 – there just isn’t enough water.”^[48] Cambodia’s main exports, Rice, Bananas and Palm oil, all require water-intensive farming.^[49] The Mekong, therefore, is most important to the security and the livelihood of Cambodia.

No doubt that the statistical realities show that Cambodia will suffer the most from drastic environmental degradation on the Mekong. It is unlikely that Cambodia will face these issues from a confrontation with China as the two governments are very cooperative with each other. However, the threat of Climate Change looms over the security of the country. Therefore, Cambodia must take good measures ahead to ensure that the impact of a natural disaster of this magnitude can be mitigated.

Global Perspectives

In the midst of all this activity between the Mekong riparian states, ASEAN as an entity has largely been inactive. Until 2021, ASEAN has ignored many of the conflicts around the Mekong Region.^[50] While the reason is not clear, one could speculate that ASEAN abides by the non-interference policy which does not allow countries to interfere in the domestic politics of other member states. Thus when an issue, for instance, the case regarding dam building in Laos threatens to affect Thailand, even if there is an open Thai opposition, ASEAN does not have a judicial body to enforce any actionable outcomes on Laos. August 2021 saw ASEAN set a precedent as representatives of ASEAN reached out to the MRC and formalized the association’s support for the commission.^[51] ASEAN’s formal support could be a sign of Southeast Asia’s growing need for security as the rise of China and the People’s Republic’s interest in the region threatens some ASEAN beyond the riparian states such as Malaysia, Philippines and Brunei. Nonetheless, much of ASEAN’s role in the conflict has been insignificant, one can only hope that the full potential of ASEAN can be utilized to help guide the Lower Mekong Countries to peace, prosperity and cooperation in the region.

On the other hand, the United States has been more significant in the Mekong River region than ASEAN.

The US offers valuable financial support to the region such as the $1.8 Million funding to the MRC.^[52] The U.S. Department of State and Agency for International Development offers a list of $3.5 billion in foreign aid to the five lower Mekong countries including:^[53]

• $1.2 billion for health programs
• $734 million for economic growth
• $616 million for peace and security
• $527 million for human rights and governance
• $175 million for education and social services
• $165 million for humanitarian assistance

Furthermore, the US offers two non-financial support in the form of Intelligence gathering and infrastructure building and safety assessment.^[54] The US-Mekong Partnership website offers a list of open-source intelligence regarding the data on the environment, dams and geographic maps. As part of an international team, the United States Army Corp of Engineers assisted the Laos Ministry of Energy and Mines in improving the safety of the Laotian dam.^[55] The U.S. Army engineers specifically provide their expertise in the conduct of safety inspections to their Laotian pupils.

Similarly, the European Union also provides valuable financial support to the development of countries in the lower Mekong riparian states. While less than the US, the EU still provided $6 million worth of funding to the MRC. The EU’s purpose for this fund is to further the efforts of mitigating the impacts of climate change in the region.^[56] Additionally, the EU-Mekong Cooperation Conference saw the European Union allocate $605 million spread across 70 projects following Europe’s Green Deal, the Paris Agreement, and the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.^[57] It is expected that the EU’s support in the region will grow. As the EU is tackling the security challenge that is China, one of the better alternatives for the EU to invest in is Southeast Asia, thus security, and cooperation in the region is elemental to a successful partnership.

Conclusion
The efforts by the riparian countries to engage in collective action for a sustainable water supply in the Mekong River have been slow and prolonged. The challenges of cooperation on the Mekong reflect common setbacks when a natural resource is shared by states with varying bilateral relations. The issue becomes even more concerning when considering the power asymmetry between China upstream and smaller ASEAN members like Laos and Cambodia. The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation platform was established to enhance collaboration, yet it fails to offer binding solutions to looming water security concerns. Chinese mega-infrastructure projects, including numerous large dams, remain operational, granting China significant physical leverage over lower Mekong states, beyond its economic influence through market access. The presence of Chinese mega-dams is akin to two scissor blades around the thin thread keeping Southeast Asian riparian states afloat. With climate change reducing Mekong River water levels, China gains the power to cut vital food sources to downstream nations. In a crisis, there are no formal guarantees that China will not fully exploit its dams at the expense of lower Mekong states. While the likelihood of China cutting off lifelines to allied states like Laos and Cambodia is low, the structural imbalance created by unilateral infrastructure from a regional superpower raises serious concerns about the sovereignty of these smaller nations.

Although Laos has its own series of dams on the Mekong, its water security concerns are less severe for two reasons. First, as China is further upstream if its dams operate at full capacity during a drought, Laos may struggle to collect enough water regardless. Second, unlike China, Laos lacks significant regional influence and remains reliant on neighbouring countries for energy solutions during the Mekong’s dry seasons. This interdependence offers other riparian states negotiating power if Laos were to act unilaterally to conserve water at their expense. Thus, the primary issue with Mekong water security is not the construction of dams per se, but the unilateral construction of dams by a disproportionately powerful state. The most profound impact of Mekong ecosystem degradation will fall on Cambodia, which heavily depends on the river for food. As its economy develops, Cambodia could import more food to offset dwindling Mekong resources, but this would deepen its reliance on neighbouring countries. With limited geographic size and economic development, Cambodia lacks the leverage to assert its interests in a water security crisis.

Efforts by regional and external powers to create a binding resolution for this future crisis remains limited. The water security issue on the Mekong is inherently linked to climate change, a crisis that is severe but not imminent. This reduces the political incentive for democratic entities like Thailand, the US, the EU, and some ASEAN members to divert resources and political capital toward negotiations. Western aid to monitor the Mekong is framed as scientific or economic support, not a political push for a binding water security committee. Vietnam is perhaps best positioned to raise Mekong water security concerns. Its southern region’s food security is a delicate issue in its complex relationship with China, spanning disputes from the South China Sea to the Mekong Delta. While Vietnam has voiced concerns, such efforts often appear more symbolic than proactive. Fear of offending the various stakeholders in the Mekong further stifles cooperative action. As global instability grows, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the water security crisis in the Mekong will be addressed before it reaches a critical point.

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Paul Phanachet is a fourth-year student in the Political Science Specialist program at the University of Toronto. Born in Bangkok, Thailand, he lived through two coup d’etats and numerous protests in the country sparking an interest in topics about Political Development, Institutions and Security in Southeast Asia. He is currently a student Research Assistant at the Munk School and a Contributor in the Southeast Asia Section at Synergy.

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1. Mekong River Commission (MRC), “Geography,” www.mrcmekong.org, n.d., https://www.mrcmekong.org/about/mekong-basin/geography/. ↑
2. Mekong River Commission, “Overview of the Hydrology of the Mekong Basin” (Vientiane: Mekong River Commission, November 2005), http://www.mekonginfo.org/assets/midocs/0001968-inland-waters-overview-of-the-hydrology-of-the-mekong-basin. pdf. ↑
3. Mekong River Commission (MRC), “Mekong Basin,” www.mrcmekong.org, n.d., https://www.mrcmekong.org/about/mekong-basin/. ↑
4. Nicolas Axelrod, “The Role of the Mekong River in the Economy 2016 Brief,” WWF Greater Mekong Programme

   (Ho Chi Minh City: World Wide Fund for Nature, 2016), https://wwfasia.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/key_findings_mekong_river_in_the_economy.pdf. ↑

5. Leslie Holmes, Communism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). ↑
6. Barry van Wyk, “China Is Pouring Huge Investments into Water Conservation and Hydropower,” The China Project, July , 2022, https://thechinaproject.com/2022/07/12/china-is-pouring-huge-investments-into-water-conservation-and-hydropower/. ↑
7. Israel O. Rodarte, “Trade and Development Chart: The Rise of China,” blogs.worldbank.org, April 12, 2023, https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/trade-and-development-chart-rise-china. ↑
8. ASEAN, “ASEAN-China Economic Relation,” asean.org, 2020,

   https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-community/integration-with-global-economy/asean-china-economic-relation/. ↑

9. ASEAN Secretariat, “Economic Community ,” asean.org, 2020, https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-community/. ↑
10. Lau Teik Soon, “ASEAN, North Vietnam and the Communist Challenge,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 1976, 72–79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27908269. ↑
11. Mekong River Commission, “The Flow of the Mekong,” ed. Tim Burnhill (Vientiane: Mekong River Commission, November 2009). ↑
12. Ibid. ↑
13. Mekong Dam Monitor, “Mekong Mainstream Dam Monitor,” monitor.mekongwater.org, November 26, 2023, https://monitor.mekongwater.org/home/?v=_376766c8a9498a0e8a0c_1a499bd. ↑
14. Liang, Chen. “Xiaowan Dam, a Reservoir for Progress.” www.mwr.gov.cn. Ministry of Water Resources, the People’s Republic of China, September 16, 2002.

    http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/news/200209/t20020916_100694.html. ↑

15. Reduper, “Nuozhadu Dam,” Super Engineering Website, September 13, 2022, https://www.reduper.com/industry/energy/power-station/hydro/nuozhadu-dam/. ↑
16. Mekong Dam Monitor, “Mekong Mainstream Dam Monitor,” monitor.mekongwater.org, November 26, 2023, https://monitor.mekongwater.org/home/?v=_376766c8a9498a0e8a0c_1a499bd. ↑
17. Ibid. ↑
18. Buasawan Simmala and Christy Lee, “China’s Mekong River Dams Expected to Worsen Southeast Asian

    Economies during Drought,” Voice of America, August 4, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-mekong-river-dams-expected-to-worsen-southeast-asian-economies-during-dro ught-/7211918.html. ↑

19. Pou Sovachana and Bradley J. Murg, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism: Confronting New Realities in Cambodia and the Greater Mekong Subregion,” ed. Ron Huisken et al., CSCAP REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK + ARF – The next 25 Years 2019 (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22260.16. ↑
20. Ibid. ↑
21. Hoang Thi Ha, “China’s Hydro-Politics through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation,” Www.iseas.edu.sg 2022, no. (November 22, 2022),

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22. Ibid. ↑
23. Climate Diplomacy, “Dam Projects and Disputes in the Mekong River Basin,” climate-diplomacy.org, n.d., https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/dam-projects-and-disputes-mekong-river-basin. ↑
24. Parameswaran Ponnudurai, “Water Wars Feared over Mekong,” Radio Free Asia, September 30, 2012, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/mekong-09302012160353.html. ↑
25. Climate Diplomacy, “Dam Projects and Disputes in the Mekong River Basin,” climate-diplomacy.org, n.d., https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/dam-projects-and-disputes-mekong-river-basin. ↑
26. Tom Fawthrop, “In Laos, a ‘Very Dangerous Dam’ Threatens an Ancient World Heritage Site,” Mongabay

    Environmental News, December 10, 2021, https://news.mongabay.com/2021/12/in-laos-a-very-dangerous-dam-threatens-an-ancient-world-heritage-site/. ↑

27. OEC, “Electricity in Laos,” OEC – the Observatory of Economic Complexity, September 2023, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/electricity/reporter/lao. ↑
28. Viraphonh Viravong, “Laos: A Unique Perspective on Hydropower and Carbon Credits” (Initiative for the Future of Great Rivers, October 2016). ↑
29. Asian Development Bank, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic Energy Sector Assessment, Strategy, and Road Map”:, December 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.22617/tcs190567. ↑
30. Taejun Kang, “Laos to Experience Electricity Shortage during Hot Season – Laotian Times,” Laotian Times,

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31. S. D. Pradhan, “The Role of Vietnam in Promoting Cooperation in the Mekong Region,” The Times of India,

    April 14, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/the-role-of-vietnam-in-promoting-cooperation-in-the-mek ong-region/. ↑

32. Ibid. ↑
33. Ing Kieth et al., “Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin,” April 5, 1995. ↑
34. Ibid. ↑
35. Pou Sovachana and Bradley J. Murg, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism: Confronting New Realities in Cambodia and the Greater Mekong Subregion,” ed. Ron Huisken et al., CSCAP REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK + ARF – The next 25 Years 2019 (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22260.16. ↑
36. Julnarong Wannakowit, “Challenges of Dam Financing for Thai Banks: the Case of Xayaburi and XPXN Projects” (Fair Finance Thailand, November 2019). ↑
37. WWF, “NGOs Set One-Year Deadline to Stop Xayaburi Dam,” www.wwf.or.th (World Wide Fund for Nature, May 30, 2014), https://www.wwf.or.th/en/?218410/NGOs-set-one-year-deadline-to-stop-Xayaburi-dam. ³⁸ ↑
38. WWF, “Dams Could Signal Death Knell for Mekong Giant Catfish,” www.wwfca.org, June 20, 2013, https://www.wwfca.org/en/?208993/Dams-could-signal-death-knell-for-Mekong-giant-catfish. ↑
39. RFA Lao, “Thai Court Dismisses Mekong River Activists’ Case against Xayaburi Dam in Laos,” Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2022, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/thailand-sayaburi-08172022184604.html. ↑
40. Ibid. ↑
41. Ryn Jirenuwat and Tyler Roney, “Thailand under Pressure to Act against the Sanakham Dam Project,” China

    Dialogue, September 25, 2020, https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/thailand-under-pressure-over-sanakham-dam/. ↑

42. Ibid. ↑
43. EuroCham Cambodia, “Energy in Cambodia” (Bangkok: Netherlands Embassy, October 2018). ↑
44. Ibid. ↑
45. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, “Data Requirements for Fisheries Management in the Tonle Sap,” www.fao.org, November 2, 2002, https://www.fao.org/3/ad070e/ad070e0a.htm. ↑
46. Kevin Enochs, “Pollution, Overfishing Threaten Important Cambodian Lake,” Voice of America, December 2, 2017, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/cambodia-fishing-worries/4140365.html. ↑
47. Chea Vanyuth, “Agricultural Product Exports Revenue at $2.4 Billion – Khmer Times,” Khmer Times, July 13, 2023, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501323748/agricultural-product-exports-revenue-at-2-4-billion/. ↑
48. Gerald Flynn and Phoung Vantha, “Cambodian Farmers Can No Longer Rely on the Tonle Sap Lake,” The Third

    Pole, May 10, 2021, https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/livelihoods/cambodian-farmers-can-no-longer-rely-on-tonle-sap-lake/. ↑

49. Chea Vanyuth, “Agricultural Product Exports Revenue at $2.4 Billion – Khmer Times,” Khmer Times, July 13, 2023, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501323748/agricultural-product-exports-revenue-at-2-4-billion/. ↑
50. Josh Martelli, “The Case for Greater ASEAN Action in the Mekong,” ASEAN-Australia Strategic Youth

    Partnership, December 31, 2020, https://aasyp.org/2020/12/31/the-case-for-greater-asean-action-in-the-mekong/. ↑

51. Maria Siow, “Asean Formalises Involvement in Mekong Issues with Water Security Dialogue,” South China

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52. USAID, “Mekong-U.S. Partnership,” www.usaid.gov (United States Agency for International Development, November 29, 2021), https://www.usaid.gov/asia-regional/lower-mekong-initiative-lmi. ↑
53. Ibid. ↑
54. Ibid. ↑
55. Ana Allen, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Partners to Battle Malnutrition in Laos,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,

    November 22, 2019, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2024644/us-army-corps-of-engineers-partners-to-b attle-malnutrition-in-laos/. ↑

56. Mekong River Commission (MRC), “The European Union Provides over 6 Million USD to Tackle Climate

    Change in the Mekong,” Mekong River Commission, January 16, 2013, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/the-european-union-provides-over-6-million-usd-to-tackle-clim ate-change-in-the-mekong/. ↑

57. Viet Nam News, “EU Committed to Sustainable Development of Mekong River Nations,” Asia News Network, March 18, 2022, https://asianews.network/eu-committed-to-sustainable-development-of-mekong-river-nations. ↑