In contrast to the historically accepted assumption, the population issue in Southeast Asia is not having too many people but having too few.^[1] In retrospect, overpopulation theory has been one of the most dangerous ideas to come out of the social sciences, and its general acceptance has actively hindered the prosperity of our species. Across Southeast Asia, past efforts to limit family size have radically altered the demography of the region to introduce serious social and economic consequences. In the later part of the 20^th century, Southeast Asia experienced tremendous economic growth which would have been impossible without an abundant workforce. Today, the same participation cannot exist, where many of the issues SEA contends with stem from a diminishing supply of labor and the implications of changing social dynamics.^[2]

The overpopulation idea was initiated by an economist, Thomas Malthus, who believed that if left unchecked our species would collapse under the strain of unsatisfiable demand, where resource scarcity would be our ruin.^[3] This stream of thought has inspired centuries of excessive caution and a general faithlessness in the human ability to solve problems. To appreciate the flaws in the Malthusian argument, consider food scarcity, the primary concern of Malthus and his modern supporters, where technological advancement has exponentially improved crop yield per unit of land through innovations like genetic engineering, robotics and efficient automation. It is evident that the overpopulation proponents are characterized by a deep cynicism, and that their worries have historically been dismissed by the resourcefulness of our species.^[4]

Clearly, the human ability to adapt and innovate should not be underestimated, and yet the overpopulation idea has managed to grow to a level of mass acceptance. Only recently, through the failures of birth-limiting practices, have nations realized the dramatic consequences of restricting population growth. Such consequences have been especially obvious in Southeast Asia. Ranging from the 1960s until the 2010s, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines all campaigned to restrict family size for the sake of limiting population growth, reflecting a trend which was common during this era across Asia.^[5]

These campaigns were seemingly successful. In 1970, the average Southeast Asian woman gave birth to 5.6 children. In 2022, this value dropped to around 2.^[6] The implications of such a dramatic shift are extensive. In response, a trend of pro-natalism has emerged in Southeast Asia, where countries which previously encouraged smaller families are now incentivizing citizens to have as many children as possible to undo prior damage.^[7] It should be noted however that lowered fertility rates are not simply a result of state campaigns but generally reflect a broader consequence of shifting societal ideals and economic realities.

To understand the issue, however, we must first consider why a trend towards smaller families is dangerous. If the average woman has 2.1 children, then a country’s population can be expected to remain constant over time. A clear trend has emerged which suggests that as a nation develops, its fertility rate declines past this marker of 2.1, which implies that without immigration the population will decline over time^[8] The economic consequences of this are clear and vast. Many of the world’s most developed economies, including some of those in Southeast Asia, are experiencing a tremendous worker shortage. The dependent retired population is growing in relative size, the working population is declining while these nations strive to grow, and the younger generations are being replenished at decreasing rates.^[9]

Indisputably, global progress is driven by collective human effort, and a reduction in the size of our population will hinder development while actively causing problems. This is already becoming a problem in Southeast Asia. The trend is common throughout the region, however, consider the case of Thailand which had a fertility rate of 1.32 in 2022, almost matching Japan’s notoriously low value of 1.26. With a rate this low, Vietnam can be expected to have its population half in just 60 years. This means a dramatically smaller workforce. It suggests that an unoptimized abundance of residential resources and underused infrastructure will emerge, and it generally implies widespread economic inefficiency where the limiting factor becomes human input which will result in an overall slowing in the progress of the country’s development.^[10]

The economic challenges to a country with a falling population are clear. What is perhaps more nuanced are the societal consequences. Family size and structure in Southeast Asia is culturally of great significance. Generally, the traditional family structure in Southeast Asia consists of a broad network of extended relatives. Multiple generations frequently live within the same residence, and a large family size has characterized the norm in this region for centuries. Dropping fertility rates will completely change the traditional social dynamic. Where previously large families would work to collectively raise the new generation and take care of the older generations, the new reality will inevitably shift towards a more Western nuclear family type where large families increase in rarity.^[11] For example, the average family size in Singapore decreased by 20% in 20 years from 1980-2000 and continues to decrease steadily.^[12]

Through careful criticism of the overpopulation theory, many of its fundamental arguments dissipate as unreasonably cautious and poorly informed. The problems of accepting this idea have already materialized, so we are now tasked with considering solutions to pre-existing problems. Recently, the trend of pro-natalism has been characterized largely by a system of incentivization.^[13] For example, Thailand and Vietnam both offer financial incentives to each additional child born to encourage mothers to raise the birth rate. Such policies have had moderate success; however, they often fail to address the core deterrents which compel couples to restrict the number of children they have.^[14]

Education and urbanization are some of the greatest influences on restricted birth rates. These are also basic markers of human development and globalization and are clearly desirable. Countries must therefore contend with the realities of their social landscape and shape solutions based on the recognition that these problems can only be solved by a shift in what is deemed as socially acceptable, economically realistic, and personally desirable.^[15] Solutions should be unique to a country’s culture and economic situation and must fundamentally develop a social environment where it is possible and attractive to have larger families.

It is also of note that one of the most consequential contributing factors to lowering fertility rates has been female empowerment. Women have pursued social change to achieve greater equality, which has uncovered new opportunities and the greater flexibility to act independently from often oppressive traditional expectations.^[16] When approaching the fertility crisis therefore, great care must be taken by policy makers to ensure that in the pursuit of demographic transformation there is no impediment to the human right for true self-determination, which has often not been historically respected.

Acceptance of the overpopulation myth has led to the dissolution of culturally important family structures, the emergence of a critical worker shortage issue, and has limited the future economic and social prospects of nations throughout Southeast Asia and beyond. We must fully recognize the absurdity of the overpopulation idea, such that it can be forgotten, and we can turn to solutions. The issues in Southeast Asia have been explored here, however the implications of a fertility crisis have global implications which must be taken seriously, where the sustained development of our species is under threat.

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Paul is a second-year student studying international relations and mathematics. He is interested in studying the historical context of modern issues to understand modern geopolitics and to forecast possible future outcomes. Through sharing his opinions and perspectives, he hopes to first inform readers, then to encourage them to think critically about the issues at hand and what the optimal path forward may be.

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1. “Declining Fertility Rates in ASEAN.” The ASEAN Post, March 29, 2020. https://theaseanpost.com/article/declining-fertility-rates-asean?utm. ↑
2. Jones, Gavin W. “Ultra-Low Fertility in East Asia: Policy Responses and Challenges.” Asian Population Studies 15, no. 2 (March 27, 2019): 131–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441730.2019.1594656. ↑
3. Shermer, Michael. “Why Malthus Is Still Wrong.” Scientific American, February 20, 2024. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-malthus-is-still-wrong/. ↑
4. “Farm Practices & Management.” Farm Practices & Management | Economic Research Service. Accessed February 27, 2025. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management. ↑
5. Rizkianti, Anissa, Sari Kistiana, Desy Nuri Fajarningtiyas, Evalina Franciska Hutasoit, Andhika Ajie Baskoro, Herti Maryani, Anastasia Septya Titisari, et al. “Understanding the Association between Family Planning and Fertility Reduction in Southeast Asia: A Scoping Review.” BMJ Open 14, no. 6 (June 2024). https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2023-083241. ↑
6. Solving Southeast Asia’s looming fertility crisis: IVF as a path toward hope | kearney. Accessed February 28, 2025. https://www.kearney.com/industry/health/article/solving-southeast-asia-s-looming-fertility-crisis-ivf-as-a-path-toward-hope ↑
7. Boydell, Victoria, Rintaro Mori, Sadequa Shahrook, and Stuart Gietel-Basten. “Low Fertility and Fertility Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region.” Global Health & Medicine 5, no. 5 (October 31, 2023): 271–77. https://doi.org/10.35772/ghm.2023.01058. ↑
8. Provencher, Claudine, and Nora Galbraith. Fertility in Canada, 1921 to 2022, January 31, 2024. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/91f0015m/91f0015m2024001-eng.htm. ↑
9. “Declining Fertility Rates in ASEAN.” The ASEAN Post, March 29, 2020. https://theaseanpost.com/article/declining-fertility-rates-asean?utm. ↑
10. “Thailand’s Birth Rate Hits 75-Year Low, Raising Concerns over Future Workforce.” Thai Times. Accessed February 27, 2025. https://thaitimes.com/thailand-s-birth-rate-hits-75-year-low-raising-concerns-over-future-workforce?utm. ↑
11. Yeung, Wei-Jun Jean, and Sonalde Desai. “Families in Southeast and South Asia.” Annual Review of Sociology 44 (2018): 469–95. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073117041124. ↑
12. Yeung, Wei-Jun Jean. “Household Structures.” Demographic and Family Transition in Southeast Asia, 2022, 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85679-3_5. ↑
13. Götmark, Frank, and Malte Andersson. “Human Fertility in Relation to Education, Economy, Religion, Contraception, and Family Planning Programs.” BMC Public Health 20, no. 1 (February 22, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-8331-7 ↑
14. Gietel-Basten, Stuart, Anna Rotkirch, and Tomáš Sobotka. “Changing the Perspective on Low Birth Rates: Why Simplistic Solutions Won’t Work.” BMJ, November 15, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj-2022-072670. ↑
15. Götmark, Frank, and Malte Andersson. “Human Fertility in Relation to Education, Economy, Religion, Contraception, and Family Planning Programs.” BMC Public Health 20, no. 1 (February 22, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-8331-7. ↑
16. Caudell, Mark A. “The Interplay of Mortality, Economics, and Female Empowerment in Fertility Transformations.” Cross-Cultural Research 49, no. 4 (June 19, 2015): 358–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397115591152 ↑