Asia’s Fragile Democracies

This article is written by our Editorial Board, consisting of David Daigneault, Grace Choi, Yeji Kim, Peter Ma, Farryzki Noor Thoriq, Tyler Carriaga

Foreword

As 2024, the “year of elections” has ended, our editorial committee decided to reflect on this tumultuous year for democracy in Asia. Among the 60 countries worldwide that held elections last year, 17 were from Asia.^[1] Out of them, the top 4 populous countries were India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, representing 2.09 billion people or one quarter of the world’s population. As our editors will eloquently demonstrate, the trends across Asia continue to demonstrate the entrenchment of democracy and although elections provide the possibility of reform, rulers used their power to maintain control of the government.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, unfair voting practices and cheating were used to retain control of the government.^[2] In Indonesia, the election of Prabowo Subianto who was accused of human rights abuses in the 1990s, was coupled with the outgoing President Widodo putting his son into vice presidency even though it meant altering the constitution for it. In Indonesia, the election of Prabowo Subianto—accused of human rights abuses in the 1990s—was accompanied by outgoing President Joko Widodo’s controversial move to secure the vice presidency for his son, a decision that required altering the country’s constitution.^[3] Countries once considered solid democracies, such as Taiwan and South Korea, have shown troubling signs of democratic backsliding. Parliamentary deadlocks and political gridlock in South Korea culminated in President Yoon’s controversial December 3rd declaration of martial law. Meanwhile, in India—the world’s largest democracy—Prime Minister Narendra Modi secured a third term in office, even as the country’s Freedom House score shows no signs of improvement, reflecting ongoing concerns about democratic erosion.^[4]

It is no surprise that observers in Canada and around the world are closely monitoring the evolving state of democracy in Asia. In response, Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy demonstrates a clear commitment to deeper engagement with the region by strengthening both security and economic ties.^[5] This strategy is reflected in initiatives such as the establishment of the Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia and ongoing trade negotiations with ASEAN member states. In December 2024, Canada further solidified its presence in the region by signing a free trade agreement with Indonesia.^[6] With major trading partners like India, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN, Asia continues to be a key pillar of Canada’s global trade network and strategic priorities. ^[7]

East Asia

Democracies in East Asia have faced significant tests over the past few years, with almost all democracies experiencing some form of destabilization. A significant issue facing all East Asian democracies is institutional strain, where political polarization or underhanded political conduct have eroded the proper functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Still, most East Asian democracies have not experienced significant democratic backsliding, as the institutions of most countries have largely been able to cope with increasing strain to varying degrees.

Over the past two months, South Korea’s democracy confronted and overcame an unprecedented threat to its democracy. On December 3 2024, President Yoon Seok-yeol imposed martial law, citing allegations that his political opponents were engaged in anti-state activities and colluding with North Korea.^[8] This announcement sent shockwaves through the nation, marking the first imposition of martial law since 1979, when South Korea was still under authoritarian rule. In a swift and decisive response, legislators outmaneuvered military forces and unanimously voted to nullify the decree just 30 minutes after its declaration.^[9] Following the “12.3 incident,” tens of thousands of citizens flooded the streets surrounding the National Assembly, demanding Yoon’s impeachment for his attempted insurrection. The unprecedented public outcry led to his impeachment, suspension from presidential duties, and subsequent arrest by the Corruption Investigation Office (CIO).^[10] However, the final decision now rests with the Constitutional Court, which holds the power to formally remove him from office. While South Korean democracy was deeply threatened by the former president’s actions, it ultimately demonstrated its democratic resilience through mass civic mobilization and robust institutional structures that upheld the constitutional order.

Japan’s historically stable democracy is beginning to show signs of strain, largely due to growing concerns over the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) seven-decade dominance in the government. In September 2024, Shigeru Ishiba officially took office as Japan’s new prime minister succeeding Fumio Kishida, who resigned amid record-high disapproval of the ruling LDP.^[11] However, this leadership change is unlikely to bring significant political shifts, as Ishiba remains within the same party as his predecessor. Critics of Japan’s political system argue that the LDP’s prolonged rule, coupled with the weakness of opposition parties, raises serious concerns about the country’s democratic capacity and voter participation.^[12] If this rigid one-party dominance persists, Japan may face unprecedented political stagnation and instability. To safeguard its democracy from further erosion, significant structural reforms may be necessary.

In Taiwan, democratic institutions are coming under increasing strain due to political polarization and legislative obstructionism. Elections in 2024 returned the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the center-left pro-independence party, to the presidency for a record-breaking third consecutive term. However, legislative elections held during the same period resulted in a divided National Assembly. The center-right Kuomintang (KMT) barely became the largest party in the National Assembly with 52 seats, the DPP with 51 seats, and minor third parties with 10 seats. No party gained a majority in the National Assembly, effectively putting the legislature into deadlock. Frustrated with its repeated failure to return to power since 2016, the KMT and its allies in the legislature enacted reforms to strengthen the legislature’s investigative and oversight powers, effectively weakening the presidency. When the reforms were struck down by the Constitutional Court for violating the separation of powers, the KMT accused the Court of being hijacked by pro-DPP judges, initiating a campaign of legislative obstruction. For the past several months, the KMT have pushed for reforms to raise the quorum and supermajorities for the Court to deliberate cases. Furthermore, the KMT has also refused to approve all of President Lai’s nominations to vacant seats to the Constitutional Court until the DPP guarantees the Court will be “ideologically diverse”. KMT obstruction regarding the Constitutional Court has effectively paralyzed the Court’s ability to convene and rule on cases, while proposed reforms to legislative powers threaten to upset the division of power within Taiwan’s five-branch government. Overall, institutional debilitation and political polarization have put Taiwan’s democratic institutions under severe strain.^[13]

Mongolia’s democratic institutions were also tested in recent years. In 2022, Mongolia’s Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the constitution that limited membership in both cabinet and parliament to the Prime Minister and four other ministers, now allowing the Prime Minister and an unlimited number of ministers to serve in parliament. Given the small size of Mongolia’s parliament in 2022, with 76 seats, the court’s decision was criticized as it could enable the executive to appoint a substantial proportion of parliament to the cabinet, potentially eroding the separation of powers. To counteract these decisions, all major Mongolian political parties collaborated to pass a series of constitutional amendments, including re-introducing proportional representation for portions of parliament and expanding the size of parliament.^[14] While many commentators expected the expanded parliament and changes to voting rules to increase the representation for minor parties, potentially hampering the growing dominance of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) in politics and state institutions. However, legislative elections in 2024 saw the MPP and the Democratic Party (DP), Mongolia’s two dominant parties, gain the overwhelming majority of seats. Still, growing MPP dominance has been hampered by the party’s weakening discipline over its own members, and by the fact that it failed to achieve a majority in the 2024 elections, putting Mongolia in an era of coalition politics in the legislature.^[15] The 2024 elections were considered free and fair, although instances of corruption and vote-buying, as well as privileged access to media resources by the MPP,^[16] remain concerned. Still, Mongolia’s democratic institutions have largely held firm during a period of uncertainty.

China and North Korea, the region’s two autocracies, have seen little in the way of liberalization, instead continuing to wallow in repressive rule. Xi Jinping’s “re-election” to an unprecedented third term as Chinese President has seen continued concentration of power in Xi’s hands, further repression and erosion to civil liberties, and widening purges within the Communist Party, government and military.^[17] North Korea has seen cosmetic democratic improvements to its de facto hereditary monarchy, allowing local elections with more than one state-approved candidate on the ballot for the first time in 2023.^[18] The 2023 local election results further shocked the world as the ruling Workers Party (WP) revealed 0.11% of total voters did not vote for the WP, the first time since 1956 the WP did not receive 100% of the votes in local elections. Analysts believe North Korea’s electoral reforms and results show its desire to improve its inglorious image as the most repressive, least democratic country in the world by providing a symbolic facade of present political opposition.^[19]

Despite various challenges and fluctuations in democratic expectations, East Asia’s democracies have remained relatively stable, supported by strong institutions and political resilience. The year 2025 will serve as a critical test for the region’s democratic nations, providing an opportunity to reinforce electoral systems and solidify the strength of their governing institutions.

Southeast Asia

2024 was a relatively quiet electoral calendar for Southeast Asia, with only Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia holding elections. However, this is not to say that democracy is strong throughout the region. For starters, both Vietnam and Laos remain strong one-party socialist republics, while democracy continues to sit at a knife edge in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. Even in countries with democratically elected governments, regression in democratic governance persists, with increased media oppression and abuses of power undermining political freedoms. Collectively, these developments have made 2024 a troubling year for people’s power in Southeast Asia.

Early in the year, Thailand’s Election Commission sought the dissolution of the progressive Move Forward party after the Constitutional Court ruled its attempt to amend an anti-defamation law was unconstitutional.^[20] The move signalled a growing threat to democracy, as the law is often used to suppress dissent.^[21] Despite winning the 2023 election, Move Forward was blocked from power by the military-appointed Senate.^[22] The dissolution of the Party in August echoed the 2020 disbanding of Move Forward’s predecessor, Future Forward, raising fears of further democratic backsliding.^[23] Meanwhile, in Cambodia, the People’s Party solidified its dominance with an unsurprising landslide victory in the Senate election, winning 55 of 58 contested seats.^[24] Former Prime Minister Hun Sen, who ruled for 38 years before handing power to his son, Hun Manet, is set to become Senate President, ensuring his continued influence in government.^[25] This all but ensures the continued entrenchment of the family’s political power in Cambodia.^[26]

Moving to the Archipelagos, both Indonesia and the Philippines exhibited signs of democratic backsliding, primarily through the resurgence of political dynasties and the consolidation of power by leaders with authoritarian tendencies. In Indonesia, the election of President Prabowo Subianto, a former military general with a controversial human rights record, raised concerns about a return to Suharto-era authoritarianism. He began to appoint active-duty military officers to senior government positions and expand the military involvement in civil affairs, especially through the flagship $28 billion free school meal project that has been viewed as undermining democratic reform established after 1998. Additionally, the nomination of Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of the previously incumbent President Jokowi toward the Vice Presidency has been criticized as a move toward the consolidation of his political dynasties, particularly after the corrupt court ruling has marked the further eroding of democratic rulings

While in the Philippines, a series of events has led to an entrenchment of political dynasties and escalating political tensions. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration faced criticism for revising historical narratives of his father’s dictatorship and consolidating power, further weakening democratic institutions. The enduring dominance of the Marcos and Duterte families raised concerns over the erosion of democratic checks and balances. Last year, the situation took a dramatic turn when Vice President Sara Duterte publicly threatened to have Marcos Jr. This unprecedented statement intensified political stability, leading to heightened security measures for the president and further deepening divisions between Marcos and Duterte factions, reflecting broader concerns about the fragility of democracy in the country.

South Asia

South Asia was one of the regions with the most electoral activity in 2024 and the elections in South Asia were fraught, due to the ongoing issues of religious nationalism, decentralization, and post-COVID economic shocks.^[27] Unfortunately, despite the “democratic” procedure of elections, these events did not necessarily bolster democracy and the results hold key implications for the future governance of key countries within South Asia for economic, geopolitical, and military trajectories.

In June 2024, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the Indian general elections under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who secured a third term in power.^[28] One of the biggest criticisms about this election was if the election was truly “fair” and in favour of BJP, critics stating that the Party had leveraged its strong control over media and public institutions, narrowing the space for opposition and dissent from the populace.^[29] A Civic Media Observatory analysis revealed that the Indian government, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had expanded their control over online spaces since 2014, website blocking to control messaging around their political campaign on online platforms and influence voters.^[30] Ultimately, the election reflected India’s shift toward majoritarianism, raising questions about the integrity of the elections and concerns about democratic backsliding in India.

Elections in Bangladesh also had similar issues of technology suppression during their elections. In January 2024, the ruling Awami League party of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won a majority, securing her fourth consecutive term in office.^[31] Similar to India, it was found that the Party imposed strict controls on digital platforms, limited opposition access to media, and allegedly manipulated online narratives to combat misinformation against their Party, during the 2024 elections.^[32] Due to these tactics, the opposition parties faced significant obstacles to contest freely, causing an increased worry about an erosion of democratic norms within electoral processes.^[33]

Pakistan faced the most political instability during its elections in 2024, amongst all the South Asian countries that held elections the same year.^[34] There were legal cases and disqualifications against key opposition figures, such as former Prime Minister Imran Khan, which called into question the fairness of elections before the votes were cast.^[35] The February 8 general elections in Pakistan was regarded as one of the least credible elections in 2024 due to the allegations of vote rigging, the cutting of internet and cellular services on Election Day due to two terrorist attacks that killed civilians in Balochistan, and delays in announcing results post-Election Day.^[36] There was also the military’s influence on political affairs, which further complicated the democratic landscape.^[37] Amidst the chaos, Pakistan ended up with a coalition government made of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).^[38]

The overall trend across South Asia in these elections points to a decline in democratic norms, with governments increasingly undermining institutional checks and opposition participation. While elections provided an avenue for public expression, the broader regression in democratic principles definitely raises concerns about the future of democracy in South Asia.

Bibliography

1. “The 2024 Global Elections Super-Cycle | International IDEA.” n.d. Www.idea.int. https://www.idea.int/initiatives/the-2024-global-elections-supercycle. ↑
2. Kurlantzick, Joshua . 2024. “A Big Year for Asian Elections, but Not Necessarily for Democracy.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/big-year-asian-elections-not-necessarily-democracy. ↑
3. Pepinsky, Thomas. 2024. “Indonesia’s Election Reveals Its Democratic Challenges.” Brookings. January 12, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesias-election-reveals-its-democratic-challenges/. ↑
4. Freedom House. n.d. “India: Country Profile.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/india. ↑
5. Global Affairs Canada. 2022. “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Government of Canada. November 24, 2022. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng. ↑
6. Nadarajah, Hema, Alberto Iskandar, and Alberto Iskandar. 2024. “Canada-Indonesia Trade Agreement Marks New Chapter in Indo-Pacific Relations.” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. November 22, 2024. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/canada-indonesia-trade-agreement-marks-new-chapter. ↑
7. Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” ↑
8. Youngmi Kim, “South Korean Democracy Was Nearly Toppled by Its President. It Was Saved by Its People,” The Guardian, January 21, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/jan/21/south-korea-democracy-president-scandal. ↑
9. Darcie Draudt-Véjares, “How South Korea’s Democracy Saved Itself,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 11, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/south-korea-democracy-yoon-protests?lang=en. ↑
10. Kelly Ng, “Yoon Suk Yeol: Why Has It Been so Hard to Arrest an Impeached President?,” BBC News, January 15, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gp5xe1zwgo. ↑
11. Michelle Lee and Julia Inuma, “A Party’s Seven-Decade Dominance Raises Concerns for Japan’s Democracy,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/30/japan-democracy-ldp-shigeru-ishiba/. ↑
12. Motoko Rich, “A Seismic Election Sends Asia’s Most Stable Democracy into Chaos,” The New York Times, October 28, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/28/world/asia/japan-election.html. ↑
13. You-Hao Lai, “Taiwan’s Constitutional Crisis Threatens Its Democracy,” The Diplomat, January 8 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/taiwans-constitutional-crisis-threatens-its-democracy/. ↑
14. Munkhsaikhan Odonkhuu, “Will Recent Constitutional Amendments Promote Political Pluralism in Mongolia?,” Constitution.net, July 31 2023, https://constitutionnet.org/news/will-recent-constitutional-amendments-promote-political-pluralism-mongolia. ↑
15. Julian Dierkes, “Mongolian government under pressure as its foreign policy options are squeezed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” East Asia Forum, January 25, 2023, https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/01/25/mongolian-government-under-pressure-as-its-foreign-policy-options-are-squeezed-by-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/. ↑
16. “Mongolia 2024 parliamentary elections: ODIHR election observation mission final report,” OSCE, December 16 2024, https://www.osce.org/odihr/583408. ↑
17. “China: No Letup in Xi Jinping’s Repressive Rule,” Human Rights Watch, January 11 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/china-no-letup-xi-jinpings-repressive-rule. ↑
18. “North Korea’s Updated Local ‘Elections’ Seen as Little More than a Democratic Facade,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, November 27 2023, https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/north-koreas-updated-local-elections-little-more-democratic. ↑
19. Kim Soo-yeon, “N. Korea reports opposing votes in elections for 1st time,” Yonhap News Agency, November 28 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231128001500315. ↑
20. The Associated Press, “Thai Election Body to Seek Dissolution of Progressive Party That Won Last Year’s General Election,” AP News, March 12, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/lese-majeste-move-forward-court-thailand-aa50fecb8dd7b7e77d18b9932d287597. ↑
21. Ibid. ↑
22. Ibid. ↑
23. Jintamas Saksornchai, “Thai Court Dissolves Progressive Move Forward Party, Which Won Election but Was Blocked from Power,” AP News, August 8, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/thailand-move-forward-constitutional-court-dissolution-e50be1a85aa69f0e3baf4eb0c1bb2ed2. ↑
24. The Associated Press, “Cambodia’s Ruling Party Wins Senate Election, Paving the Way for Hun Sen to Act as Its President,” AP News, February 26, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/senate-president-election-hun-sen-manet-c8613f0cc226f938f3e09b28e65a565e. ↑
25. Ibid. ↑
26. Ibid. ↑
27. Nishith Agarwal, “South Asia: Election Year 2024,” ISRM, February 5, 2024, https://theisrm.org/en/south-asia-election-year-2024. ↑
28. Global Voices, “A Year of Elections and Digital Repression in South Asia: 2024 in Focus,” January 2, 2025, https://globalvoices.org/2025/01/02/a-year-of-elections-and-digital-repression-in-south-asia-2024-in-focus/. ↑
29. Joshua Kurlantzick, “A Big Year for Asian Elections, but Not Necessarily for Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/big-year-asian-elections-not-necessarily-democracy. ↑
30. Global Voices, “A Year of Elections and Digital Repression in South Asia: 2024 in Focus,” January 2, 2025, https://globalvoices.org/2025/01/02/a-year-of-elections-and-digital-repression-in-south-asia-2024-in-focus/. ↑
31. Ibid. ↑
32. Ibid. ↑
33. Joshua Kurlantzick, “A Big Year for Asian Elections, but Not Necessarily for Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/big-year-asian-elections-not-necessarily-democracy. ↑
34. Ibid. ↑
35. Ibid. ↑
36. Madiha Afzal, “Pakistan’s Surprising and Marred 2024 Election, and What Comes Next,” Brookings Institution, February 29, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-surprising-and-marred-2024-election-and-what-comes-next/. ↑
37. Joshua Kurlantzick, “A Big Year for Asian Elections, but Not Necessarily for Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/big-year-asian-elections-not-necessarily-democracy. ↑
38. Madiha Afzal, “Pakistan’s Surprising and Marred 2024 Election, and What Comes Next,” Brookings Institution, February 29, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-surprising-and-marred-2024-election-and-what-comes-next/. ↑