The serene countryside province of Udon Thani, Thailand, was recently rocked by a fierce battle between two leading characters; in The Orange Corner, a recent household name in Thai politics, critics called his electoral rise a major disruptor in Thai politics, representing the newly organized People’s party: Pita Limjaroenrat. In the red corner, the Boogieman of Thai politics returns after 15 years in self-exile, the former Prime Minister, Leader of the Red Shirts movement, and puppet master behind the incumbent Pheu Thai: Thaksin Shinawatra.
The stage is set, and the prize for this fight is the election for the Chief Executive of the Provincial Administrative Organization (CEPAO), an elected official that heads the devolved governing body of each province, dealing with aspects such as provincial budgeting.[1] The elections for the CEPAO are happening from November 23rd 2024 until Febuary 1st 2025 in 47 provinces.[2] However, it seems to have been hijacked by the two major political parties, turning this rather local office position into a matter of National struggle between the establishment and anti-establishment parties.[3]
With Udon Thani citizens going to the Polls on November 24th, the province naturally became the first battleground as former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, after 15 years in self-exile, made a surprise appearance at the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) rally on November 13th. Thus prompting Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader of the anti-establishment orange movement, to hastily return from his work at Harvard University to Udon to attend a People’s Party rally later on November 15th.[4] The People Party’s reaction to Thaksin’s appearance alone is a testament to how influential the former Prime Minister still is in Thai politics today.
But not so long ago, Thaksin was “Public Enemy Number One” to the ever-powerful establishment class. Yet, around mid-2023, the unexpected plurality in the House of Representatives by Pita’s Move Forward party (MFP) not only paved the way for Thaksin’s return to Thailand but also, behind the scenes deal-making with the establishment parties established the PTP now under the leadership of his daughter Paetongtarn as the incumbent government.[5] It appears that Thaksin has completed the impossible. Thailand’s establishment staged two coup d’etats (in 2006 and 2014), numerous city-wide protests, and a handful of Constitutional changes, all in the name of removing what they call the “Thaksin regime” just to end up with a Shinawatra back in the Prime Minister’s seat and Thaksin back in Thailand.[6]
However, this time it is different. 2023 is not like 2006 before Thaksin was ousted from office. Thaksin today faces different opponents and has different allies. It is unclear what agreements were made between Thaksin and the establishment.[7] However, one can theorize from the successive events following his return that it has to do with keeping the People’s Party at bay from taking on the establishment.
Thaksin as an agent against the Orange Movement
Thaksin’s return had two uncharacteristic events played out. The first sight saw him lower himself to the ground in the traditional “Kraab” gesture in front of a portrait of King Rama X. It was odd to see this gesture of respect for the institution Thaksin had attempted to undermine through his protests and covert political actions.[8] However, it signaled to the PTP supporters that a new alliance had formed. It became even more apparent when, on the 13th of July 2023, the PTP successfully formed a government with the backing of the two military-backed parties without including their previous opposition-ally the MFP—some even coined it a backstab.
The result was the realignment of Thai politics with the unprecedented government coalition consisting of the military-backed parties and the PTP. More importantly, it excluded the MFP. The underlying context of this realignment is an ideological one. The pro-establishment parties suffered massive defeats due to the split between party elites and the electorate’s general dissatisfaction with the 9-year-long incumbency. The MFP, which campaigned on deconstructing the establishment, won a plurality in the 2023 General election, thus sending shockwaves among the pro-establishment leadership.[9] Moreover, the MFP refused to renounce their campaign promises to controversially reform the Lese Majeste Law, which, to some influential conservative figures, is a red line they wish never to cross.
Judging Thaksin’s performance in undermining the anti-establishment Orange movement is difficult. Besides the coalition that kept the MFP out of Government, it appears that the pro-establishment lawyers had made more progress in disassembling the party politics of the Orange movement by banning Pita Limjaroenrat from institutional politics and the dissolution of the MFP by the constitutional court.[10] Concurrently, Thaksin was dealing with his own lavished prison time for cases dating back to his prime ministership.[11] Thus, it became quite an important moment to see Thaksin no longer making decisions in the backroom and appearing at the Udon CEPAO election campaign this past November.
Thaskin returning to the place in the Sun
Contrarily, more evidence suggests that Thaksin operates under his own agency. Speculatively, the establishment may have accepted Thaksin’s return with no strings attached as they fear opening a political “war on two fronts” — with the red and the orange movements. One such tell-tale sign is Thaksin’s encroachment on the independence of the Bank of Thailand (BOT). After leading the formation of the government coalition, the PTP looks to deliver on one of their campaign promises of distributing 10,000 baht (416.41CAD) digital wallet to all Thai citizens above 16 years old.[12] However, in September 2023, the main opposition to the “handout” came from the BOT Governor, Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, which illustrates the delicate equal standing in the shared responsibility that the BOT and the Government have in the management of the economy.[13] Napon Jatusripitak, a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, best describes this relationship as “The BOT is primarily concerned with monetary policy and fostering long-term financial stability, while the government handles fiscal policy and broader economic strategies, tackling more immediate challenges as demanded by its democratic mandate.”[14] In short, the Government requires around 500 billion baht (20.82 Billion CAD) to fund its “handout” policy.[15] However, Sethaput, along with ninety-nine academics and economists, openly raised concerns over the viability of this initiative.[16] As this story continues, the Ministry of Finance has opened up a new front, calling for the BOT to ditch its slow interest rate cuts and embrace Prime Minister Paethongtarn Shinawatra’s more drastic cuts to the cost of borrowing money.[17] However, as of October 2024, the BOT was able to retain its inflation targets at 1-3% for the next year, despite criticisms from the Government.
Nonetheless, the PTP has shifted its strategy to influence the BOT. Instead of facing the bank head-on, on November 11, reports suggested that a Pro-Thaksin former minister of Finance, Kittiratt Na-Ranong, was in contention to become the next Chairman of BOT.[18] Indeed, the role of the BOT chairman does not influence the Bank’s policymaking; however, it is still very influential in deciding who will join the BOT’s Monetary Policy. As of the time of writing, Kittiratt has yet to be named Chairman of BOT. However, if Kittiratt becomes chairman, it will undoubtedly question the integrity of the BOT’s independence—perhaps a microcosm of Thaksin’s growing influence in Thailand’s public institutions since his return.
The return of the “Thaksin regime” will divide Thailand’s politics even further than it is today. Thais will have to reassess the current realignment of their national politics and come to terms with the tragedy of the last two decades in Thai democracy. The sunk cost fallacy will inevitably be in the thoughts of many Thai citizens as the 21st-century political turmoil seems to be for nothing. However, we can take examples from the resistance against the influence of Thaksin from both the right and the left isles of the political ideology. The BOT governor’s resistance to pressure in the pursuit of what he believes is best for the public good reflects the same conviction shared by the leaders of the People’s Party and its Orange movement. These virtue-based postures curb the corrupting nature of personal interest-based politics and overt populism. Whether from the left or right of the political spectrum, I encourage Thais to value, support, and celebrate those who stood and fought for the public interest, root out the self-interested actors, and further the cause of Thai democratic governance.
Disclaimer: On 23rd of December at 22:56 EST, it was reported that the candidacy of the former minister of Finance, Kittiratt Na-Ranong, for the position of Chairman of the Bank of Thailand has been rejected by the Office of the Council of State. This news came after the writing of this Op-ed; however, it further shows how Thai political institutions continue to play a role in balancing the power of interest groups.
Thai PBS. “‘กิตติรัตน์’ ไม่ผ่านคุณสมบัตินั่งประธานบอร์ดแบงก์ชาติ [‘Kittirat’ Does Not Meet the Qualifications to Be the Chairman of the Bank of Thailand Board].” Thai PBS, December 24, 2024. https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/347531.
Paul Phanachet is a fourth-year student in the Political Science Specialist program at the University of Toronto. Born in Bangkok, Thailand, he lived through two coup d’etats and numerous protests in the country sparking an interest in topics about Political Development, Institutions and Security in Southeast Asia. He is currently a student Research Assistant at the Munk School and a Contributor in the Southeast Asia Section at Synergy.
Footnotes
Abu Zeid Mohd Arif et al., “Enhancing Governance in Thailand Economics Department Working Papers No. 1472,” OECD, May 25, 2018, https://one.oecd.org/document/ECO/WKP(2018)20/en/pdf. (P. 20)
Thai PBS, “ประชาชนเตรียมใช้สิทธิ์! เลือกตั้ง อบจ. 47 จังหวัด 1 ก.พ.2568 [People Prepare to Exercise Their Rights! Election of Provincial Administrative Organizations in 47 Provinces on February 1, 2025],” Thai PBS, November 22, 2024, https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/346525.
Napon Jatusripitak, “How a Provincial Election in Udon Thani Became a National Battleground,” FULCRUM, December 3, 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/how-a-provincial-election-in-udon-thani-became-a-national-battleground/.
Ibid.
Napon Jatusripitak, “THAILAND in 2023: Political Realignments and the Quest for Resilience and Stability,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2024, ed. Hoang Thi Ha and Daljit Singh (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024), 307–24, 314-15.
Eugénie Mérieau, “Defensive Populism in Tutelary Democracies: The Case of Thaksin Shinawatra vs the Deep State in Thailand,” in The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, ed. Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Elise Massicard (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2022), 271–88, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84079-2_15, 284.
Napon Jatusripitak, “THAILAND in 2023: Political Realignments and the Quest for Resilience and Stability,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2024, ed. Hoang Thi Ha and Daljit Singh (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024), 307–24, 315.
Khorapin Phuaphansawat, “Anti-Royalism in Thailand since 2006: Ideological Shifts and Resistance,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 48, no. 3 (February 7, 2018): 363–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1427021, 367.
Allen Hicken and Napon Jatusripitak, “Introduction: Making Sense of Thailand’s Seismic Elections,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2023): 335–413, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs45-3a.
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “Power, Courts, and Dynasties: Is Thailand Navigating in or out of a Political Crisis?” (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2024), JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep63417.
Aekarach Sattaburuth, “Thaksin to Be Quizzed on ‘Privileged’ Hospital Stay,” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2901603/thaksin-to-be-quizzed-on-privileged-hospital-stay.
Julia Bergin and Hannah Jose, “Thailand’s Controversial $21 Billion Digital Cash Handout Scheme Finally Gets Moving,” Abc.net.au (ABC News, August 2024), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-01/thailand-digital-cash-handout-scheme-begins-registrations/104169206.
Napon Jatusripitak, “Pheu Thai versus Bank of Thailand: More than a Question of Digital Wallets and Interest Rates,” FULCRUM, March 19, 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/pheu-thai-versus-bank-of-thailand-more-than-a-question-of-digital-wallets-and-interest-rates/.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Suttinee Yuvejwattana, “Thailand to Name Critic as Central Bank Chair, Reports Say,” BNN Bloomberg, November 11, 2024, https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2024/11/11/thailand-to-name-critic-as-central-bank-chair-reports-say/.
Ibid.
Bibliography
Arif, Abu Zeid Mohd, Lara Fleischer, Adam Bogiatzis, Hidekatsu Asada, Andrea Colombo, and Koffi Zougbédé . “Enhancing Governance in Thailand Economics Department Working Papers No. 1472.” OECD, May 25, 2018. https://one.oecd.org/document/ECO/WKP(2018)20/en/pdf.
Bergin, Julia, and Hannah Jose. “Thailand’s Controversial $21 Billion Digital Cash Handout Scheme Finally Gets Moving.” Abc.net.au. ABC News, August 2024. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-01/thailand-digital-cash-handout-scheme-begins-registrations/104169206.
Hicken, Allen, and Napon Jatusripitak. “Introduction: Making Sense of Thailand’s Seismic Elections.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2023): 335–413. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs45-3a.
Jatusripitak, Napon. “How a Provincial Election in Udon Thani Became a National Battleground.” FULCRUM, December 3, 2024. https://fulcrum.sg/how-a-provincial-election-in-udon-thani-became-a-national-battleground/.
———. “Pheu Thai versus Bank of Thailand: More than a Question of Digital Wallets and Interest Rates.” FULCRUM, March 19, 2024. https://fulcrum.sg/pheu-thai-versus-bank-of-thailand-more-than-a-question-of-digital-wallets-and-interest-rates/.
———. “THAILAND in 2023: Political Realignments and the Quest for Resilience and Stability.” In Southeast Asian Affairs 2024, edited by Hoang Thi Ha and Daljit Singh, 307–24. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024.
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. “Power, Courts, and Dynasties: Is Thailand Navigating in or out of a Political Crisis?” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2024. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep63417.
Mérieau, Eugénie. “Defensive Populism in Tutelary Democracies: The Case of Thaksin Shinawatra vs the Deep State in Thailand.” In The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, edited by Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Elise Massicard, 271–88. Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84079-2_15.
Phuaphansawat, Khorapin. “Anti-Royalism in Thailand since 2006: Ideological Shifts and Resistance.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 48, no. 3 (February 7, 2018): 363–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1427021.
Sattaburuth, Aekarach. “Thaksin to Be Quizzed on ‘Privileged’ Hospital Stay.” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2024. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2901603/thaksin-to-be-quizzed-on-privileged-hospital-stay.
Thai PBS. “ประชาชนเตรียมใช้สิทธิ์! เลือกตั้ง อบจ. 47 จังหวัด 1 ก.พ.2568 [People Prepare to Exercise Their Rights! Election of Provincial Administrative Organizations in 47 Provinces on February 1, 2025].” Thai PBS, November 22, 2024. https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/346525.
Yuvejwattana, Suttinee. “Thailand to Name Critic as Central Bank Chair, Reports Say.” BNN Bloomberg, November 11, 2024. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2024/11/11/thailand-to-name-critic-as-central-bank-chair-reports-say/.