In 2023, China’s population shrank by 2.08 million.[1] The reason was unambiguous: its total fertility rate is approaching 1 child per woman,[2] whereas 2.1 children per woman are needed to maintain a stable population.[3] For the third consecutive year, China’s fertility rate dropped below that of Japan, a country known for its low fertility and aging population.[2] Additionally, China’s fertility has been declining since 2017, one year after the Chinese government moved to the two-child policy.[4] Ironically, Chinese families are having fewer children than ever—including the period of strict enforcement of the one-child policy.
Is China too poor or rich to bear children?
What factors are more consequential than the iron wrist of birth-planning officials in suppressing childbirths? One instinctual answer is financial insufficiency. For example, in one survey, college students in China cited housing pressure as the greatest obstacle to childbearing.[5] However, such a perspective implies that childbearing entails a fixed and absolute price and thus the wealthy will be more capable and willing to bear children. But the same survey showed that students with higher educational attainment, more financial support from their families, and origins from wealthier regions actually desire and are willing to have fewer children than those who are more financially disadvantaged.[5] Statistics also confirmed that richer families and regions in China generally have far fewer children.[5][6] Considering the Maoist China that supplied scarce houses and commodities, couples still bore many children even if they did not have their own apartments.[7] The financial insufficiency argument is at fault because it overemphasizes the income effect of wealth on childbearing, assuming that people always derive happiness from having more children insofar as their budget allows.[8]
On the other extreme, some scholars of demographic transition theories argue that Chinese couples naturally desire fewer kids as China urbanizes and industrializes, as other industrial countries have experienced.[9] Citizens, especially women now have and value individual freedom, career development, and self-actualization more than before, so the opportunity costs of raising children become higher, meaning that a higher sacrifice needs to be made if they give birth to more children.[10] Examining the fertility pattern of China since its founding, such an explanation stands up against scrutiny because it adequately considers the substitution effect of childbearing. Compared to time spent on financing and exercising childcare, spending time on working and purchasing leisure for oneself may generate more utility. However, China’s ultra-low fertility in the past decade is unmatched by its economic progress. Again, taking Japan for comparison, in 2023, Japan’s GDP per capita is 271% of China’s,[11] but Japan’s total fertility rate is still higher than China’s by more than 20%. Therefore, it is necessary to further investigate the substitution effect of childbearing under the unique socio-economic realities of China.
I argue that the opportunity costs of raising children with a socially accepted standard in urban China are indeed extremely high, for primarily two structural factors: (1) high work-family conflict due to high labour force participation with a lack of access to affordable substitute childcare; and (2) tendency for trading quantity for quality due to intergenerational mobility expectation under the background of high social stratification.
Work-family conflict with a historical and international lens
China has been noted for its relatively high female labour force participation rate and small gender pay gap.[12][13] Scholars have categorized China’s family system as an example of “flexible traditionalism,” signalling the liberal expectation of working women in a country with conservative gender ideology.[14] Such a subtle arrangement was also the result of market reform and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. The transition utilized the socialist legacy of universal employment and high female labour force participation while shedding off the state’s responsibility and provision for childcare. It was argued that Deng consciously combined anti-welfare neoliberalism and traditional Chinese family values to create the demographic dividend of cheap labour under low social expenditures.[15] The work-family conflict thus exaggerated as the market reform deepened. Women bore the first impact of mass layoff from state-owned enterprises due to their dual roles as mothers/caregivers and employees[15] and the female participation rate kept dropping for decades, especially for urban, low-educated, married, or poor women who live with their children.[16][17]
Currently, Chinese women enjoy high educational attainment—52% of university and college students were female in 2020.[18] Naturally, educational attainment leads to women’s increasing career potentials and an internationally still high labour force participation, but what does this mean for the opportunity costs of childbearing and childrearing? Interestingly, OECD experiences showed that there is a U-curve relationship between female labour force participation and total fertility rate.[19] The justification was that since economic independence has become a necessity in modern economies, more so than childrearing does, women across developed countries tend to prioritize careers. For countries with traditional family values and insufficient childcare substitutes (defamilialization policies), women sacrifice childbearing for work, resulting in a pattern of lowering fertility. However, once countries move towards comprehensive public childcare provision or subsidy and gender egalitarianism, the substitution effect and work-family conflict is alleviated so that women are not necessarily forced to give up childbearing for careers. Hence, the social democratic countries with affordable and high-quality public childcare policies enjoy both high female labour force participation and high fertility rates.[20]
Some scholars take it for granted that high female labour force participation in China is pro-fertility because it means “higher family income, female economic independence, and childbearing ability” under “the employment reality and social expectation of Chinese women”.[6] But this is a wrong application of OECD trends on China and it again overemphasizes the income effect. China does exhibit a high female labour force participation rate close to the Nordic countries, but it significantly lacks childcare substitutes that reconcile work-family conflicts. For example, the enrollment rate in early childhood education and care for Chinese toddlers below 3 years old was only 5.5%,[21] compared to the roughly 50-70% rate for Nordic countries.[22] Even for the minorities that do take advantage of nurseries in China, they are all privately funded and expensive and fail to substantially lower the general childcare costs.[23] Therefore, taking female labour force participation as one of the positive predictors for fertility conditions, these researchers only established a negative correlation between fertility conditions and fertility rates across Chinese provinces.[6]
Discrepancies in public childcare provision and gendered division of labour in the household resulted in a high motherhood penalty in China. After having children, Chinese women’s employment and leisure time reduced by 2.811 and 2.106 hours per day.[24] Whereas no significant alteration in time allocation and wage occurs for the husbands and fathers. Although as Children reach 4 years old, Chinese mothers’ working time largely reverts to the pre-childbearing level, career interruptions still result in long-term human capital, productivity, and wage losses.[25] Controlling for education, age, and sectors of employment, having one child results in an immediate 7% wage drop for the mother, which increased to 16.8% for mothers with two children.[26] Class differences are also noteworthy. Childbearing has no significant effects on women with primary or secondary education, but having one child leads to a 38.7% wage drop for women with a college level of education. It also results in a 24.1% wage drop for women in technical or managerial sectors, with no significant effect for women in agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial sectors.[26] In the next section, I will adopt a class-sensitive and future-oriented lens and examine the childcare opportunity costs for the Chinese middle class.
Inequality, downward mobility, and the precarious middle class
In the above paragraphs, the issue of class has already been relevant through a work-family conflict framework. However, the high opportunity costs of children were not only due to the onerous physical activities of childcare that crowd out existing working and leisure time, but also due to the expanded perceived financial demand for children’s development that necessitates additional wage-earning time. The middle class especially perceives the indispensable responsibility of investing as much as possible in children’s upbringing and building them for upward intergenerational mobility.[27] One reason to conceptualize educational expenses under a substitution effect framework rather than an income effect framework is that its level also corresponds to a family’s current income level and will rise until the family reaches a very high income class.[28]
Many Chinese people experienced upward social mobilities in the past decades,[29] but China is still characterized by high income and wealth inequalities.[30] In addition to inequalities, China has a very weak social safety net and a newly emerged but fragile middle class. One scholar contends that, since the market reform, China’s income structure changed from an inversed-T shaped to a new 土-shaped society, with the dash in the middle representing the new Chinese middle class.[31] Anthropologist Xiang Biao (2021) uses the term “suspension” to describe the “prevalent condition of being” of Chinese people. He compares Chinese people to hummingbirds that “frantically vibrating its wings, striving to sustain itself in the air,” “struggl[ing] hard but … incapable of landing” (p. 236). Although such an analogy was used to capture the hypermobility in Chinese society, recent trends towards decreasing mobility have been found (Xie, et al, 2022).
However, fewer venues of upward mobility combined with a real risk of downward mobility due to unpredictable accidents such as layoffs or diseases only means higher competition pressure. Therefore, concentrating enough resources on one child (and postponing or forgiving childbearing for financially unconfident parents) became an optimal strategy to maximize their children’s chances of success in fierce competition.[27][32] Another interesting study has shown that families who overestimate their current income class location and have higher expectations of upward mobility exhibit lower fertility, while downward or identical estimation and expectation have the opposite effect.[33] The justification is that those identifying with or pursuing higher class status invest more in cultivating their careers and their only child. Scholars have documented that there is a U-shaped relation between income and fertility in China, with the middle class having fewer children than the lower or upper class.[33][29][34] This is in agreement with the U-shaped relationship in countries with larger income differentials (UK and Austria), compared to the positive linear relationship in countries with more equal income distribution (France and Norway) that also exhibit overall higher fertility.[35]
Is there a way out?
If we view ultra-low fertility as an undesirable phenomenon, what can be done to enable or encourage childbearing? I suggest that we should focus on alleviating the opportunity costs and concerns of potential parents. One primary policy suggestion is universal public childcare provision through kindergartens (for children between 3-6) and nurseries (for children below 3). For example, in 2011, Beijing’s local Three-year Action Plan for Preschool Education (2011–2013) already targeted a 90% kindergarten enrollment rate.[14] Attention should be given to both the left-behind children in rural areas and to the middle class families who require high quality and affordability. Accessibility, high quality, and affordability are all consequential in promoting middle class’ usages of public childcare facilities and lowering their financial, time, and mobility concerns.
The ultra-low fertility in China reflects a modern problem requiring modern solutions. Moral condemnation and lamentation of the “selfish” or “indulgent” young generation will do little to recognize their particular concerns and promote voluntary childbearing activities. At this critical juncture, I believe that abundant and proactive policies that lower both the perceived time and financial investment are necessary for making healthy and robust children and families.
Atlas Wu is a graduate student from the political science department with a collaborative specialization in Contemporary East and Southeast Asian Studies. His academic backgrounds range from ethics, political philosophy, to comparative politics and welfare states. His research interests include Chinese ideologies and social policies, with a focus on childcare arrangement. As a contributor to Synergy, he hopes to critically uncover and assess the challenges faced by Chinese youth in a time of turbulence and opportunities.
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[1] Qi, L. (2024). China’s Population Decline Accelerates as Women Resist Pressure to Have Babies. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-population-decline-accelerated-last-year-a5096672
[2] Minzner, C. (2024). China’s Population Decline Continues. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-population-decline-continues
[3] OECD (2024), Fertility rates (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8272fb01-en
[4] Roser, M. (2017). “Fertility Rate.” OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate
[5] Li, T., Zheng, Y., & Yan, Y. (2022). Have Marriage and Fertility been De-Institutionalized in China? ———Findings from a Survey on Marriage and Fertility Intentions among College Students. Journal of Chinese Women’s Studies, (3).
[6] Song, J., Hu, B., Jiang, C., & Chen, W. (2023). China’s Low Fertility and Provincial Differences: Fertility Index-based Observation. Population Research, 47(5).
[7] Dong, H. (2016). “Having become personal matter gradually” on Chinese marriage during the reform and opening-up from 1978 to 2000. Social Sciences Academic Press (China).
[8] Black, D. A., Kolesnikova, N., Sanders, S. G., & Taylor, L. J. (2013). Are Children “Normal”?. The review of economics and statistics, 95(1), 21–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00257
[9] Tsuya, N. O., Choe, M. K., & Wang, F. (2019). Convergence to Very Low Fertility in East Asia: Processes, Causes, and Implications. Springer Japan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55781-4
[10] Van de Kaa, D. (1987). Europe’s Second Demographic Transition. Washington, D.C: Population Reference Bureau.
[11] GDP per capita, current prices. (2023). International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/CHN/JPN
[12] Dasgupta, S., Matsumoto, M., & Xia, C. (2015). Women in the labour market in China. International Labour Organization. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—asia/—ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_371375.pdf
[13] Iwasaki, I., & Ma, X. (2020). Gender wage gap in China: a large meta-analysis. J Labour Market Res, 54(17). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1186/s12651-020-00279-5
[14] Chen, W. (2023). China’s Low Fertility and the Impacts of the Two-Child Policy (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003429661
[15] Song, S. (2012). Ziben Zhuyi, Shehui Zhuyi, he Funv [Capitalism, Socialism, and Women]. Open Times.
[16] Peng, Q., Li, H., Shi, X., & Wu, B. (2017). Trend of Chinese Urban Female Labour Participation in Transition. Journal of Financial Research, 6.
[17] Du, F., & Dong, X. (2013). Women’s Employment and Child Care Choices in Urban China during the Economic Transition. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 62(1), 131–155. https://doi.org/10.1086/671714
[18] Lu, Y., & Du, W. (2023). Women’s Education in China: Past and Present. SHS Web of Conferences, 152, 02001. https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202315202001
[19] Oshio, T. (2019). Is a positive association between female employment and fertility still spurious in developed countries? Demographic Research, 41, 1277–1288. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2019.41.45
[20] Esping-Andersen, G. (2003). Social foundations of postindustrial economies (Reprint of the ed. Oxford 1999). Oxford Univ. Press.
[21] Liang, J., Huang, W., & He, Y. (2024). Zhongguo Shengyu Chengben Baogao 2024 Ban [Report on Chinese Childbearing Costs 2024 Edition]. YuWa Population Research. Retrieved from https://file.c-ctrip.com/files/6/yuwa/0R72u12000d9cuimnBF37.pdf
[22] OECD. (2023). PF3.2: Enrolment in childcare and pre-school. OECD Family Database. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF3_2_Enrolment_childcare_preschool.pdf
[23] Shi, Y., & Han, R. (2023). Will Subsidized Childcare Increase Women’s Fertility Intentions? Evidence from the Seventh National Survey on Births and Fertility. Zhejiang Social Sciences, (11).
[24] Xu, Q. (2018). Where does the Time Go? Gender Differences in Time Use over the Life Course in China. Collection of Women’s Studies, (04).
[25] Yang, F., & He, Y. (2022). Motherhood Penalty on Chinese Women in Labor Market. Population Research, 46(5).
[26] Yu, J., & Xie, Y. (2013). The Effect of Fertility on Women’s Wages in China. Population Research, 38(1).
[27] Li, H., Zhang, J., & Zhu, Y. (2008). The quantity-Quality trade-Off of children In a developing country: Identification using chinese twins. Demography, 45(1), 223–243. https://doi.org/10.1353/dem.2008.0006
[28] Chi, W., & Qian, X. (2016). Human capital investment in children: An empirical study of household child education expenditure in China, 2007 and 2011. China Economic Review, 37, 52–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2015.11.008
[29] Gan, Y., & Wang, P. (2023). Social class, intergenerational mobility, and desired number of children in China. Social Science Research, 114, 102912. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2023.102912
[30] Piketty, T., Yang, L., & Zucman, G. (2019). Capital Accumulation, Private Property, and Rising Inequality in China, 1978–2015. American Economic Review, 107(7).
[31] Li, Q. (2016). Zhongguo Li Ganlanxing Shehui Haiyou Duoyuan [How Far is China Still Away from the Olive-shaped Society]. Exploration and Free Views, (8). Retrieved from http://www.tsyzm.com/CN/Y2016/V1/I8
[32] Wang, F., & Zhou, X. (2012). Zhongguo Haizi Zhiliang yu Shuliang de Tidai Guanxi Xianzhuang Fenxi [Analysis of Trade-off Relation between the Quality and Quantity of Chinese Children]. Northwest Population, 33(3).
[33] Chen, W., & Li, X. (2021). Jieceng Rentong he Shehui Liudong Yuqi dui Shengyu Yiyuan de Yingxiang [Impact of Class Identification and Social Mobility Expectation on Childbearing Willingness]. Nankai Journal (Philosophy, Literature and Social Science Edition), (2).
[34] Liu, G. G., Yamada, T., & Yamada, T. (1996). An economic analysis of Chinese fertility behavior. Social Science & Medicine, 42(7), 1027–1037. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(95)00214-6
[35] Baizan, P. (2021). Welfare regime patterns in the social class-fertility relationship: Second births in Austria, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 73, 100611. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2021.100611
