On February 23, the Asian Institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs hosted an event titled “The Ripple Effect: China’s Complex Presence in Southeast Asia”. The speaker of the event was Enze Han, who is an Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. The talk was structured around Professor Han’s new forthcoming book The Ripple Effect. Professor Rachel Silvey, who serves as the director of the Asian Institute, opened the event with a land acknowledgement.
Prof. Han’s new book is essentially his response to some of the general scholarly interests in understanding China’s global reach. Many people have talked about the phenomenon of global China, showing multiple dimensional influences across various sectors in politics, economy, and culture. They are interested in the case of China being a rising power and how its power is translated into influence. Influence is conceptualized as the act of modifying or having an impact upon another actor, and preferences of behavior in favor of one’s aims. This conceptualization involves a certain sense of intentionality and concentrates on the state as the primary actor. China’s foreign influence is thus often researched with a particular focus on the state and its intention. However, in his book, Prof. Han not only explores actors other than the state and incorporates a variety of non-state actors in China but also pays attention to the unintended consequences of the actions of different actors.
Southeast Asia is a distinct case to understand China’s overseas presence for four reasons: 1) China and Southeast Asia have geographical proximity and share long land and maritime borders. 2) The two regions have a complicated history of intertwinement. Political changes happening within China have implications for Southeast Asian societies. 3) Southeast Asia stands out from other parts of the world as a result of the long history of Chinese migration. The Chinese people’s encounter with societies in Southeast Asia in general created very intimate relations between these two regions. 4) Southeast Asia is a center for geopolitical competition. Therefore, China’s presence in Southeast Asia has some unique elements and the relevant studies will hopefully have more wide implications for understanding China’s presence in other parts of the world.
In his book, Prof. Han argues that “to understand Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, we not only need to examine the Chinese state and its policies but also the substantial impact of Chinese non-state actors on state-society relations in Southeast Asia.” Also, “we need to differentiate between the intended versus unintended consequences of China’s presence in Southeast Asia, particularly when we want to understand what kind of ‘influence’ China wields in the region.” Prof. Han’s book focuses on actions carried out by a variety of actors in three key areas: China’s economic presence, China’s authoritarianism, and Chinese consumption.
First and foremost, the economic engagement between China and Southeast Asia is substantial. China became ASEAN’s largest trading partner in 2009 and ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner in 2020. On the one hand, the substantive amount of economic growth within China increased the demand for products from Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the bilateral trade relationship is also a reflection of the ongoing trade war between China and the US, particularly the tariffs implemented on China since the Trump administration. This led to a substantive amount of relocation of the Chinese manufacturing sectors to Southeast Asia, as well as transshipment of “Made in China” goods to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia. These substantial amounts of made-in-China goods are still destined for the European and American markets but are just transshipped through Southeast Asia.
Another important economic topic is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For Southeast Asia specifically, China’s investment in infrastructure development has been substantial. One of the most noticeable projects is the construction of the high-speed railway, which has already connected Kunming and Vientiane and is carrying both cargo and passengers and would ideally reach Singapore in the future. As the commuting duration between Kunming and Luang Prabang decreases to only 2 hours, the understanding of geography and time in Southeast Asia has thus changed. For countries such as Laos, the railway will also benefit the tourism sector. Moreover, there has been a significant increase in outbound Chinese private capital in recent years. Singapore, in particular, has emerged as a pivotal “springboard” for Chinese investment into Southeast Asia, positioning it as a hub for numerous business operations across the region. Many Chinese big companies have now utilized Singapore as their headquarters for overseas operations and business expansion, such as TikTok, from ByteDance. Another case is China’s EV sector. They have utilized Southeast Asian countries, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, as a gateway for expanding its regional presence. Considering the economic relations, the causality here is relatively straightforward. The Chinese state has directed a very strong focus on its relations in Southeast Asia to bypass the political pressure from the US, which has led to a proliferation of economic engagement with the region.
The second case presented by Prof. Han is authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. Numerous scholars have conducted research on the impact of China’s rise as an authoritarian government. For example, Jessica Weiss argues that “China has done some things, first, to demonstrate that autocracy can work… It’s also made cheap financing available to governments that wouldn’t otherwise have access to it. It has exported some technologies that governments can use to surveil their populations.” In Southeast Asia, there are many authoritarian governments, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, as well as flawed democracies. Is there a particular linkage between China’s presence and authoritarianism in Southeast Asia? Prof. Han identified three modes of Chinese influence, both direct and indirect, on the resilience of authoritarian governments in the region.
1) In the case of Myanmar, there is direct Chinese support for the Myanmar military government. China played an explicit role in recognizing the legitimacy of the military government and to some extent empowered the government through sales and economic engagement. There were also various levels of either indirect diplomatic engagement with or direct recognition of Juntas as well. Moreover, there were very explicit linkages between the Chinese sheltering of the military government at international organizations, particularly the United Nations, and the coup in 2021. 2) In the case of Cambodia, China provides economic assistance to bolster the performance legitimacy of the Cambodian government and domestic-originated authoritarianism. As the main benefactor of the Cambodian government and its economy, China possesses a significant economic presence in the country, accounting for a quarter of Cambodian foreign direct investment (FDI). Another instance is China’s contribution of 90% of Cambodian Covid-19 vaccines, resulting in Cambodia being the Southeast Asian country with the second-highest vaccination rate after Singapore. 3) In the peculiar case of Thailand, there are no direct linkages between China’s presence and authoritarian resilience. From an economic standpoint, China’s importance to Thailand is not as significant as Japan’s, as Japan remains the largest investor in Thailand. However, there is a domestic polarization in Thailand, between conservative forces and pro-democracy opponents. Those domestic authoritarian forces in Thailand are strategically making use of the “China factor” or the China model to empower themselves.
The third case presented by Prof. Han is the connection between Chinese consumption, maize cultivation, and deforestation in Northern Myanmar. The Chinese consumption accelerated the pace of deforestation in northern Myanmar. According to the Global Forest Change dataset, 9.5% of the forest has been lost (a total of 415 million ha) in Myanmar between 2000 and 2019, an average annual rate of 0.5%. In northern Shan State, 18.3% of forest has lost between 2000-2019, more than Shan East (11.4%) and Shan South (9.3%). Two major causes of deforestation are timber trade and agricultural transformation. As China has 1.4 billion people, the demand for meat and tropical goods is tremendous. Rising Chinese consumption of meat expanded the animal feed market. As the Chinese domestic price for corn is higher than the international price, Myanmar became the supplier to the Chinese market owing to their geographical proximity.
All in all, with China becoming increasingly outbound, the encounters between the Chinese people and local societies have intensified. Prof. Han’s new book The Ripple Effect serves to conceptualize China’s overseas presence. It explores the multifaceted implications of China’s pervasive presence in Southeast Asia, including both the state and non-state actors. Their presence brings both intended influence and unintended consequences to the region.
Yipin Wang is a first-year Munk School student pursuing a Master of Global Affairs with a collaborative specialization in Contemporary East and Southeast Asian Studies. He has an extensive background in history, international relations, and comparative politics. His research interests lie in the interdisciplinary studies of modern and contemporary China, as well as China’s political relations with its surrounding countries.
