As countries aim to meet climate goals ahead of international summits, the United States and Canada, alongside other European powers, are claiming exemplary status as their domestic greenhouse gas emissions have reduced significantly in the past years.[1] However, while wealthy countries’ domestic emissions have decreased, their carbon emissions look drastically different when adjusted for trade. By outsourcing carbon-heavy industries to Asia and favoring the purchase of low-cost products over “buying clean” domestically, wealthy nations have created a public facade to mask their increasing rate of carbon consumption.[2] In reality, wealthy nations have effectively outsourced carbon emissions to countries such as China, Cambodia, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan. Britain, for example, which often boasts of having decreased carbon emissions by one-third since 1990, has increased its carbon footprint considerably if one takes into account imported products such as steel.[3] The effects of this practice have been particularly visible in countries like India and Pakistan, which are now among eleven countries of high risk and concern according to an intel report on climate and will likely face severe disruptions in their economies, diplomatic relations, and future standard of living.[4]
Perhaps the biggest issue area for both India and Pakistan concerning climate is the precarity of the countries’ water-sharing status and the geopolitical elements that are central to future diplomatic discussions. The Indus River, which passes through India and Pakistan, has proven to be a prominent feature of both countries’ economies and sustainability. Pakistan relies on the river for nearly all its exports as almost 70% of the country’s GDP depends on water from the Indus.[5] Similarly, India’s population relies on water for sustenance and economic growth, both of which are in danger with the river’s groundwater depletion. In 1960, the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was formed with the help of the World Bank to allocate the water of the river equally throughout India and Pakistan.[6] Westward flowing tributaries (e.g. Jhelum and Chenab) were apportioned to Pakistan while India controlled eastern rivers (e.g. Ravi, Heas, and Sutlej) through the use of dams and canals.[7] Amid previous political and social tensions, this moment of collaboration was seen as an exemplary practice in diplomacy. Nearly 60 years later, however, the treaty has yet to be re-evaluated through a scientific lens and only grows more unsteady as the effects of climate change—much of which can be traced back to outsourced projects— disrupt resource allocation, power dynamics, and sustainability throughout India and Pakistan.
The Himalayan Glaciers, which sustain the Indus Basin, have been melting at exceptionally fast rates in recent years.[8] As this trend progresses, water in the area faces a unique challenge: an unprecedented increase in water flow, followed by depletion of groundwater recharge. During times of rapid melting and subsequent accelerated water flow, the dams of both countries may not be able to control how water movements affect agriculture and sustenance in the surrounding areas. This change will inevitably prompt increased flooding, pressures on hydroelectric systems, and lower economic yields in both Pakistan and India.[9] This has become increasingly worrying, as the IWT has failed to promote collaboration between the two countries, has little information on proper water storing methods, and neglected details on proper treaty maintenance—particularly, omitting the potential of climate change. The prospect of irregular monsoons and rains, new climate change-induced complexities, and historical diplomatic tensions only further strain potential cooperation between the neighboring states.
Today, India’s location as the regulator of upstream dams has caused fear within Pakistan; the state suggests India will have too much control of water flow via the Indus.[10] The Kishanganga water dispute best exemplified these fears as Pakistan alleged that the dam’s construction over western rivers violated the IWT. Through this project, India hoped to build on its hydroelectric power by diverting water to an underground powerhouse and transferring water from the Gurez Valley into Kashmir, impeding its flow into Pakistan.[11] To worsen the issue, both states have a history of mistrust and inherent suspicion that does not bode well for potential conflict resolution.
As the effects of climate change become more prominent, India and Pakistan’s diplomatic tensions are simultaneously worsening and fueling divisive political narratives in both states. In India, the Hindu nationalist administration under Narendra Modi has consistently peddled Islamophobic content and rhetoric,[12] using the acts of Pakistani-affiliated Islamic terror cells to justify their refusal to participate in diplomacy.[13] Likewise, Pakistan has chosen to blame India for its floods and water mismanagement, as often seen in the local press and nationalist media outlets.[14] Both parties are to blame for the growing distrust and lack of cooperation between countries; the politicization of an issue that will primarily impact those in the working class and local communities before its consequences amplify is contemptible.
To better mediate water-sharing between India and Pakistan, both states must take action to quell rhetoric which exacerbates diplomatic tensions, reassess their roles in global carbon outputs, and work collaboratively to amend the IWT. First, the rival states must focus on ceasing internal rhetoric that prevents meaningful dialogue on climate action. While the IWT withstood the conflict in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the climate change-induced threats to the treaty are categorically unique and can only be solved through collaborative action sans domestic pushback. Secondly, the states should re-evaluate which powers they should lean on for support when amending the treaty and considering third-party guarantors. While the World Bank may have taken considerable steps to help the parties in the 1960s, it largely left behind the opinion of local communities and focused solely on a state, macro-based solution—this approach has outlived its usefulness. Not only has this guarantor failed to protect at-risk communities, but some of its more powerful member countries are also responsible for the rapid increase in India and Pakistan’s emissions via carbon offshoring. Rather than looking to other global hegemonic powers for assistance, as Pakistan aimed to do through the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),[15] India and Pakistan have a unique opportunity to set the tone for climate action across Asia and globally. As countries whose livelihoods will soon be threatened by the effects of climate change and offshored emissions, collaborative action to revise the Indus Water Treaty is the first necessary step India and Pakistan can take to pave the way for a more climate-conscious future in Asia.
Keah Sharma (she/her) is a second-year student at Victoria College in the University of Toronto studying political science, contemporary Asian studies, and literature and critical theory. Her research interests include diaspora and migration, data governance, and post-colonial studies in South Asia. She is excited to be joining Synergy this year and looks forward to further exploring these topics along with many others.
Bibliography
“Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank.” World Bank Group, September 17, 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank.
“India Again Threatens to Restrict Flow of River Water to Pakistan as Tension Builds.” The Guardian, February 22, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/22/india-again-threatens-to-restrict-flow-of-river-water-to-pakistan-as-tension-builds.
“India Reiterates Plan to Stop Sharing Water with Pakistan.” Al Jazeera, February 21, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/21/india-reiterates-plan-to-stop-sharing-water-with-pakistan.
“Kishanganga Dam Issue: World Bank Asks Pakistan to Accept India’s Demand of ‘Neutral Expert’: India News – Times of India.” The Times of India, June 5, 2018. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kishanganga-dam-world-bank-asks-pakistan-to-accept-indias-demand-of-neutral-expert/articleshow/64466122.cms.
Newburger, Emma. “Himalayan Glaciers Are Melting at an Extraordinary Rate, Research Finds.” CNBC, December 20, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/20/himalayan-glaciers-melting-at-extraordinary-rate-research-finds-.html
Parvaiz, Athar. “India, Pakistan Cross-Border Water Treaty Needs Climate Change Revision.” Nature News, September 16, 2021. https://www.nature.com/articles/d44151-021-00036-8.
Plumer, Brad. “You’ve Heard of Outsourced Jobs, but Outsourced Pollution? It’s Real, and Tough to Tally Up.” The New York Times, September 4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/climate/outsourcing-carbon-emissions.html.
Rajghatta, Chidanand. “First Ever US Intel Report on Climate Puts India, Pakistan among 11 Countries of High Risk and Concern – Times of India.” The Times of India, October 21, 2021. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/first-ever-us-intel-report-on-climate-puts-india-pakistan-among-11-countries-of-high-risk-and-concern/articleshow/87212037.cms.
Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. “CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Our World in Data, May 11, 2020. https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
“Water Conflict and Cooperation between India and Pakistan.” Climate Diplomacy. Accessed January 13, 2022. https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan.
Zhou, Steven. “From India, Islamophobia Goes Global.” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/india-islamophobia-global-bjp-hindu-nationalism-canada/.
[1] Hannah Ritchie, and Max Roser, “CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Our World in Data, May 11, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
[2] Brad Plumer, “You’ve Heard of Outsourced Jobs, but Outsourced Pollution? It’s Real, and Tough to Tally Up,” The New York Times, September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/climate/outsourcing-carbon-emissions.html.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Chidanand Rajghatta, “First Ever US Intel Report on Climate Puts India, Pakistan among 11 Countries of High Risk and Concern – Times of India,” The Times of India, October 21, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/first-ever-us-intel-report-on-climate-puts-india-pakistan-among-11-countries-of-high-risk-and-concern/articleshow/87212037.cms.
[5] Athar Parvaiz, “India, Pakistan Cross-Border Water Treaty Needs Climate Change Revision.” Nature News, September 16, 2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/d44151-021-00036-8.
[6] “Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank,” World Bank Group, September 17, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Emma Newburger. “Himalayan Glaciers Are Melting at an Extraordinary Rate, Research Finds,” CNBC, December 20, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/20/himalayan-glaciers-melting-at-extraordinary-rate-research-finds-.html.
[9] “Water Conflict and Cooperation between India and Pakistan,” Climate Diplomacy, Accessed January 17, 2022, https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan.
[10] “India Again Threatens to Restrict Flow of River Water to Pakistan as Tension Builds,” The Guardian, February 22, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/22/india-again-threatens-to-restrict-flow-of-river-water-to-pakistan-as-tension-builds.
[11] “Kishanganga Dam Issue: World Bank Asks Pakistan to Accept India’s Demand of ‘Neutral Expert’: India News – Times of India,” The Times of India, June 5, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kishanganga-dam-world-bank-asks-pakistan-to-accept-indias-demand-of-neutral-expert/articleshow/64466122.cms.
[12] Steven Zhou, “From India, Islamophobia Goes Global.” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/india-islamophobia-global-bjp-hindu-nationalism-canada/.
[13] “India Reiterates Plan to Stop Sharing Water with Pakistan.” Al Jazeera, February 21, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/21/india-reiterates-plan-to-stop-sharing-water-with-pakistan.
[14] “Water Conflict and Cooperation between India and Pakistan,” Climate Diplomacy, Accessed January 13, 2022, https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan.
[15] “Water Conflict and Cooperation between India and Pakistan,” Climate Diplomacy, Accessed January 13, 2022, https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan.