On February 1, 2020, the military junta in Myanmar (also known as the Tatmadaw) staged a coup and took up the reins from the rightfully voted members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Claiming voter fraud in the 2020 elections, the Tatmadaw detained and charged President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and other NLD bureaucrats with various offences, ranging from the illegal importation of telecommunication devices to inciting civil unrest1. The regime change could not happen in a more crucial period—happening a day before the oathtaking of elected officials of the assembly of the Union. With the legislative assembly dissolved and a year-long state of emergency declared, supporters of the NLD have staged rallies and attacks2 against the military junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. Furthermore, the grave human and civil rights situation3 in the country, notwithstanding the scourge of the pandemic, has prompted international concerns. Particularly, the pressure to act lies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in engaging in humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in the region.
Two months after the Myanmar coup, ASEAN, led by the rotating chairpersonship of Brunei
Darussalam, called for an ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting. ASEAN Member-States discussed pandemic response and reached a “Five-Point Consensus”4 for Myanmar. First was a call for “utmost restraint” in all parties concerned for the “immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar.”The second and third pertained to establishing constructive dialogue among parties mediated by an ASEAN Special Envoy to “seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.” The fourth stipulated the providing of humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). Lastly, it reiterated the role of the special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with the concerned parties. But the junta had remained obstinate about ASEAN’s demands. In fact, it barred envoy chief Dato Erywan Yusof5 in meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, the detained, democratically elected opposition leader.6 At this instance, mediation is virtually impossible. Dozens of killings and attacks perpetrated by the military junta have also ensued. With ASEAN’s patience running thin, it made no choice but to consequently exempt Min Aung Hlaing in the annual summit, which commenced three weeks after barring the envoy’s entry. The Myanmar junta leader was left out of the loop and ASEAN instead invited a “non-political representative”7 from Myanmar. Unsurprisingly, this angered the military government and protested the move as a blatant violation of the founding principles in the ASEAN Charter. But through a diplomatic snub, ASEAN has shown that it is taking matters seriously in Myanmar. But is this move an instance of carrying out the “ASEAN Way” of engagement?
ASEAN has a distinctive style of handling the pressing affairs of its Member States. Dubbed the “ASEAN Way8”, it is, in a nutshell, an exercise of due restraint in diplomacy. Specifically, scholars generally agree to its four defining characteristics: the non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, quiet diplomacy, absence of force and arms, and consensus in decision-making. These attributes further take its roots from Chapter I, Article 2, Section 2(e) of the ASEAN Charter9, the regional bloc’s bedrock principles.In the current context of Myanmar, the notion of an ASEAN Way of engagement is being redefined again and challenged with the regional bloc’s role in dealing with the junta. Observers argue that the mere implementation of the Five-Point Consensus violates the non-interference principle12. Such is also the retort of the Myanmar junta. But ASEAN’s “constructive engagement to critical disengagement13,” in the word of Jones (2008), is a re-emerging development. The most common flaw of the ASEAN Way that is being pointed out by experts is that it possesses a weak pragmatic potency in implementing decisions. That is, for example, when ASEAN reached a consensus for Myanmar, the regional bloc could only do so much14 since it sticks to its non-interventionist policies. Hence, pronouncements by the group may only fall on deaf ears: in this case, the junta.
This is why a rethinking of the ASEAN Way comes into discussion. To what extent has ASEAN remained faithful to non-interference? Well, ASEAN did cold-shoulder the military junta in the 2021 summit, but that is as far as ASEAN could be forceful— there is no such thing as absolute non-interference. At the same time, inviting another attendee shows that ASEAN still recognizes Myanmar as a Member State. If not for ASEAN’s bold move to snub the junta in the summit, it might have even legitimized the rule of the junta through its inaction. Still, the ASEAN Way is far from perfect, but it is vital to solving one of the greatest challenges in regional solidarity.
Challenges remain on the rocky path to peace and order in Myanmar. Hopes are still uncertain about a greater level of engagement with the junta and the opposition. ASEAN, under this year’s chairpersonship of Cambodia, has already appointed Prak Sokhonn as the new ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar15. Last January 7-8, Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen became the first state leader to set foot in Myanmar and held talks with Min Aung Hlaing16. The state visit has drawn mixed sentiments17 in ASEAN and neighbouring countries. Opposition leaders in Myanmar have objected the visit as they fear it would legitimize18 the junta’s rule. The Malaysian Foreign Minister, meanwhile, commented that Cambodia could have consulted19 with ASEAN first before making such visit. Japan, on the other hand, praised20 Cambodia’s visit for its efforts to resolve the situation in dialogue in Myanmar.
Indeed, the stakes are high with Cambodia’s leadership this year21. We are seeing a reversal in stance coming from Hun Sen who argues that the junta should be allowed to join the regional bloc’s summits and meetings22. Does this undermine the ASEAN Way of snubbing the junta last year? It will if the Tatmadaw remains recalcitrant on calls for ceasefires and mediation23. But then again, we have yet to see improved outcomes in the crisis. For now, the fate of ASEAN in dealing with Myanmar will rely on Cambodia’s intimate yet unconventional approach.
Niño Jan Pol V. Dosdos hails from Pagadian City, Philippines. He is a first-year student at Trinity College in the University of Toronto.
1 BBC News. 2021. “Myanmar Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Faces New Charge amid Protests,” February 16, 2021, sec.Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56074429.
2 “Anti-Coup Protests Ring out in Myanmar’s Main City | Reuters.” n.d. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics/anti-coup-protests-ring-out-in-myanmars-main-cityidUSKBN2A139S.
3 Agence France-Presse. 2021. “Human Rights Disaster Looms in Myanmar – UN | The Manila Times.” October 14, 2021. https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/10/24/news/world/human-rights-disaster-looms-in-myanmar-un/1819506.
4 ASEAN. 2021. “Chairman’s Statement on ALM Five-Point Consensus.” April 24, 2021. https://ASEAN.org/wpcontent/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf.
5 “Myanmar Won’t Allow ASEAN Envoy to Meet Aung San Suu Kyi.” 2021. Al Jazeera. October 14, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/14/myanmar-wont-allow-ASEAN-envoy-to-meet-aung-san-suu-kyi
6 BBC News. 2020. “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s Party Wins Majority in Election,” November 13, 2020, sec. Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54899170.
7 Tan, Hui Yee. 2021. “Myanmar Blasts ASEAN’s Summit Snub of Junta Chief | The Straits Times.” October 25, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ASEAN-convenes-summit-after-unprecedented-decision-to-barmyanmar-junta-chief.
8 Katsumata, Hiro. 2003. “Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way.’” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25 (1): 104–21.
9 “The ASEAN Charter.” 2020. https://ASEAN.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/November-2020-The-ASEANCharter-28th-Reprint.pdf.
10Fisher, Charles A. 1962. “Southeast Asia : The Balkans of The Orient? A Study in Continuity and Change.” Geography 47 (4): 347–67.
11 “The ‘ASEAN Way’?” 1999. The Adelphi Papers 39 (325): 39–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329908449570.
12 Yadanar-Aungmin, Hsu. 2021. “ASEAN: Conditional Prodder to Myanmar in Its Quest for Credibility?” Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies, no. 13: 95–112. https://doi.org/info:doi/10.15068/0002000157.
13 Jones, Lee. 2008. “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement.” Asian Security 4 (3): 271–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850802306484.
14 Dunst, Charles. 2021. “The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN Inflection Point.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, no. Special Issue (August): 37-45.
15 “DPM Prak Sokhonn to Be Nominated New ASEAN Envoy to Myanmar – Khmer Times.” 2021. December 15, 2021. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50989007/dpm-prak-sokhonn-to-be-nominated-new-ASEAN-envoy-tomyanmar/.
16 “Cambodia Prime Minister Visits Myanmar for Talks with Junta, Sparking Protests – National | Globalnews.Ca.” 2022. January 7, 2022. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://globalnews.ca/news/8494871/cambodia-myanmar-juntatalks/.
17 Strangio, Sebastian. 2022. “‘No Progress’ on ASEAN Peace Plan for Myanmar: Singaporean PM.” Accessed January 26, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/no-progress-on-ASEAN-peace-plan-for-myanmar-singaporeanpm/.
18 “Voices of Concern at ASEAN over Hun Sen’s Myanmar Visit | ASEAN News | Al Jazeera.” 2022. January 14, 2022. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/concern-in-ASEAN-over-cambodiapms-myanmar-visit-malaysia-minister-says.
19 Cambodia’s Hun Sen Hits Back at Malaysian FM for Criticizing Myanmar Strategy.” 2022. Radio Free Asia. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/myanmar-malaysia-01212022165317.html.
20 Reynolds, Isabel. 2022. “Japan Praises Cambodian Leader Hun Sen’s Visit to Myanmar as Bringing ‘Progress.’” The Japan Times. January 12, 2022. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/01/12/national/japan-praisescambodia-leader-myanmar/.
21 Watanabe, Riko. 2022. “Prospects for Cambodia’s Chairing of ASEAN in 2022.” East Asia Forum. January 18,
2022. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/01/18/prospects-for-cambodias-chairing-of-ASEAN-in-2022/.
22 “Cambodia PM Says Myanmar Junta Welcome at ASEAN If Progress Made | Reuters.” 2022. January 5, 2022.
Accessed January 26, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodia-pm-says-myanmar-juntawelcome-ASEAN-if-progress-made-2022-01-25/.
24 Naw, Theresa. 2022. “Is Mediation Even Possible in Myanmar?” Accessed January 26, 2022.
https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/is-mediation-even-possible-in-myanmar/.