Keywords: India, China, Border, Galwan, Truth
Conflicting understandings of truth, or at least claims of such, are not without consequence in international affairs. Almost two years have now passed since the events of 15 June 2020 in the Galwan River Valley, which saw a skirmish leave twenty Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese dead.[1] For the first time in 45 years,[2] lives were lost along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) – the 3488 Km stretch of contested territory designated in the uneasy truce ending the 1962 Sino-Indian war.[3] The LAC is divided into three sectors: the Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet), the Middle (Uttarakhand/Himachal Pradesh-Tibet) and the Western (Ladakh-Tibet/Xinjiang) – with the Eastern and Western being the most hotly contested. The underlying causes of this violence remain unresolved – as demonstrated by the 14th round of talks on 12th of January, which again failed to reach any meaningful agreement.
While several factors are at play – geostrategic competition not being the least of which – observers should not overlook the impact of subjective notions of truth inherent within the opposing territorial claims. These claims run deeper than strategic ambitions, striking to the very legitimacy of the nationalist leadership within each state. This article seeks to highlight these opposing truth claims and their sources of authority. It will outline Beijing’s position first, then contrast it with New Delhi’s, and subsequently, discuss the nature of the divergence to illuminate the conflict’s intractably.
Before delving into the central discussion, however, it is worth considering what a truth claim entails in the context of this article. Sovereignty is a claim to territorial truth. It exists due to respective understandings and expectations between states; in other words, there is no sovereignty over a given area without the recognition of another state.[4] When sovereignty is contested – as was the case along the LAC – violence can ensue, but ultimately, mutual recognition is required to substantiate the territorial claims.[5] Therefore, Sino-Indian claims to sovereignty (or truth) can be viewed as overlapping appeals for recognition – not only from each other and their domestic populations, but also from the wider international community. This recognition – particularly at the level of global consensus – is a significant element of a state’s legitimacy in that it corresponds with norms of the international system.[6] Such considerations shed light on the foundational nature of respective Sino-Indian truth claims.
Beijing’s territorial claims across the LAC are grounded in the sovereignty it extends over Tibet and Xinjiang. After the PLA ‘liberated’ Tibet in 1959, Mao Zedong claimed Chinese territory extended everywhere Tibetans lived.[7] The most ambitious implication of this assertion was the status of Arunachal Pradesh – which, according to Chinese maps, was designated as Southern Tibet. This truth claim – or subjective worldview – rests upon arguments that the region belonged to Tibet historically, as suggested by the Tawang Monastery having tributary relations with the Dalai Lama.[8] Such sentiment persists in the 21st Century, sometimes manifesting in bizarre ways – reflecting a unique relationship to reality. A prominent example emerged in 2007 when China denied a visa to an Indian public servant from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that he did not require one because he was a Chinese citizen.[9] Regarding the Western Sector, Zhou Enlai argued that a border never existed and only the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 – which ceded much of Aksai Chin – held any significance as it was the sole arrangement ever presented to Qing officials.[10] Although the Chinese did not reject this line, they did not formally accept it either; instead, they failed to respond.[11] Therefore, only since the proposal became convenient to the CCP did it became worthy of recognition.
On New Delhi’s side of the territorial debate, the colonial residue is evident. In contrast to Mao, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised the line established by Sir Henry McMahon at the 1914 Shimla Conference, which demarcated a vague India-Tibet boundary, attempting to formalise de facto Tibetan independence.[12] The McMahon line – as it became known – delineates the border in the Eastern Sector of the LAC, lying adjacent to Arunachal Pradesh. In the Western Sector, the Ardagh–Johnson Line proposed in 1897 to the British Raj – which placed Aksai Chin within Indian borders – formed the basis of independent India’s claims after 1947. The justification for this line laid “chiefly [in its] long usage and custom”[13]. However, Indian claims to Aksai Chin went beyond colonial cartography, asserting deeper historical ties – as demonstrated by Nehru’s position that the region was “part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries.”[14] Similarly to Beijing, Indian officials opted to recognise the version of truth most aligned with their interests, which in this case, were mostly carefully selected remnants of British rule.
Both Chinese and Indian claims seek to draw authority from the past, but each focuses on selectively chosen representations aligning with their preferred narrative. Officials in Beijing and New Delhi can be seen as constructing alternative historical realities – each drawing from competing understandings of truth – to garner recognition of their sovereignty. The Chinese construction elevates the significance of historical linkages with its current territories. While the Indian construction essentially does the same – albeit stressing different linkages – its most fundamental difference of emphasis is that of the legitimacy of British cartography.
Inherent within such efforts lies a peculiar relationship to truth. Here, it appears that the value of truth stems not from its intrinsic worth as a representation of reality but rather from its pragmatic political utility. In such contexts, parties rarely seek to find a truth that all will agree on, but rather attempt to preserve their own version of the truth upon which they have settled domestically – ultimately upholding their international and internal reputation.[15] Such factors make conflicts of opinion incredibly difficult to resolve as it is in neither side’s interest to do so, especially when paired with nationalist incentives. On the Chinese side, there is little room for compromise on issues of national importance, as the brand of nationalism which ensures domestic unity, is tied to such matters.[16] At a deeper level, the integrity of Beijing’s truth claims correspond with the broader legitimacy of the CCP garnered through wide-reaching nationalist narratives.[17] Likewise, India’s populist Bharatiya Janata Party draws heavily from nationalist Hindutva narratives to legitimise its mission of Hindu rejuvenation.[18] Such emphasis hinders prospects of compromise – furthering the disagreement’s intractability.
In conclusion, Sino-Indian claims along the LAC are grounded in conflicting readings of history and are exacerbated by legitimacy concerns. While the nature of truth within these assertions partly corresponds with reality, this is not their primary intention; instead, it is to reflect each states’ self-interest. So long as each state lacks the will to understand objective reality, let alone empathise with the other, violence akin to that seen at Galwan will likely reoccur – especially when such incentives are intensified through competing nationalisms.
Ben Barron completed his undergraduate studies at the Australian National University and is now pursuing a MSc in Modern South Asian Studies at St Antony’s College, Oxford.
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[1] Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations (June 18, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-india-border-dispute-what-know.
[2] Tanvi Madan, “China Is Losing India,” Foreign Affairs (June 22, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-22/china-losing-india.
[3] Marc Santora, “For China and India, a Border Dispute That Never Ended,” The New York Times (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/world/asia/india-china-border.html.
[4] Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 412.
[5] Wendt, “Anarchy,” 412-413.
[6] Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 206-226.
[7] Alexander E. Davis et al., “International relations and the Himalaya: connecting ecologies, cultures and geopolitics,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2020): 9.
[8] Namrata Goswami, “China’s ‘Aggressive’ Territorial Claim on India’s Arunachal Pradesh: A Response to Changing Power Dynamics in Asia,” Strategic Analysis 35, no. 5 (2011): 782.
[9] Goswami, “China’s ‘Aggressive’ Territorial Claim,” 781.
[10] Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 3.
[11] Amit Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes: An Overview,” Asian Affairs 47, no. 1 (2016): 105.
[12] Karunakar Gupta, “The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy,” The China Quarterly 47 (1971): 521.
[13] Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 235.
[14] Maxwell, India’s China War, 3.
[15] Akos Kopper, “Managing conflicting ‘Truth Claims’ – ambiguity in the diplomat’s toolkit in East-Asian Island conflict,” The Pacific Review 29, no. 4 (2016): 608.
[16] Ja Ian Chong, “Popular narratives versus Chinese history: Implications for understanding an emergent China,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4 (2014): 944.
[17] Chong, “Popular narratives versus Chinese history,” 956.
[18] Thorsten Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism, and Foreign Policy in India: The Politics of Representing “the People”,” International Studies Review (2019): 9.