After being imprisoned and tortured for eleven months,[1] human rights lawyer Chang Weiping was only granted ten minutes to briefly speak to his parents in a police station. “I plead to you and mother to live well,” he screeched desperately as his father walked out of his cell.[2] Chang’s plight was no outlier. Many activists and legal professionals focused on the defence of human rights suffered similar fates during the 709 Crackdown in 2015 and the crackdown of a gathering in Xiamen in 2020.[3] Human rights lawyers (维权律师) are an important component of Chinese civil society as they initiate and facilitate legal reforms. Movements centred around the defence of human rights are unintended consequences of the market and legal reforms in China, since the government has pursued stability and growth without human rights in mind. Recently growing repression has uncertain effects on the future of the defence of human rights, since it damages human rights lawyers’ advocacy network and does not resolve the socioeconomic grievances that cultivated the movements.
Human rights lawyers originate from the socio-political tension of post-reform China. Economic reform in the 1980s allowed free market competition but started with unequal access to resources and opportunistic speculations, which created entrenched urban-rural, ethnic, gender, and housing inequalities.[4] An authoritarian political system, which lacks supervision from society or internal mechanisms, enabled the new elites to redesign rules to maintain their interests. Thus, free market competition and authoritarian politics exacerbated inequality and social stratification, creating marginalized populations who are excluded from official channels and cannot defend their rights. The combination of authoritarian politics and economic inequality limits the social mobility of marginalized populations while excluding them from resources needed to defend their rights or policymaking.[5] Marginalized groups, without jurisprudence and access to intralegal channels, often resort to extralegal avenues, such as petitions, protests, and riots. For example, land grabbing, in which developers collude with local officials to illegally evict apartment owners and farmers, causes 75,000 cases of disturbance every year.[6] Under such circumstances, human rights lawyers, leveraging their professionalism and social influence, bridge the inside and outside of the legal system through advocacy, providing legal aid and promoting legal education. However, representing controversial and excluded clients, in turn, marginalizes the lawyers.[7]
Legal reforms, which aimed at facilitating marketization, unintentionally empowered lawyers and citizens to take an interest in defending human rights. Discussions regarding laws (such as those pertaining to the protection of citizens’ rights or the government’s illegal conduct) became crucial in China’s public sphere, which “generate[s] issues and agenda[s] not set by the state.”[8] Legal-centric public discourse and popular human rights movements are by-products of legal reforms and education motivated by the transition to an open market economy. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, laws have always been subservient to the political consideration of the Chinese Communist Party, such as class struggle. The legal system was thoroughly decimated during the Cultural Revolution, as extrajudicial violence committed by the government and civilians went unchecked. During the reform era, the government modernized and westernized the legal system to stabilize the country and attract investments. For example, the Administrative Litigation Act, which empowered many rights defenders to sue the government, was designed to reassure foreign investors. Similarly, the government promoted legal education with a focus on economic laws (such as consumer protection) and solving conflicts within the legal framework.[9] However, the government’s actions did not prevent the public, lawyers, and media from taking a step further into human rights issues.
Thus, the history of human rights lawyers can be traced back to the 1990s, when China started to professionalize and modernize its legal system. Since then, human rights lawyers have worked on sensitive cases (such as those involving freedom of speech and Falun Gong practitioners), provided legal aid to marginalized groups, and promoted procedural justice and fundamental rights. They became prominent voices in legal reform and civic debates in the 2000s. Although there were only around 400 human rights lawyers among 300,000 lawyers in China,[10] they directed attention to individual cases to push for legal reforms, such as abolishing custody and repatriation (收容遣送) and re-education through labour (劳动改造).[11] Besides substantial legal reform, human rights lawyers are also active in legal education, especially rights awareness. For example, Li Boguang taught house church Christians about legal rights, because many did not understand that laws are supposed “to protect citizens’ rights – and not just to maintain political stability.”[12] However, the work of human rights lawyers often faces multiple obstructions, especially from an increasingly suspecting and restricting government. For example, a case of death from police brutality attracted seven lawyers and their staff to visit Qing’an in 2015. Instead of being granted access to information and to their client, they were arrested, held incommunicado, and denied legal assistance.[13] In response to their plight, 600 lawyers petitioned for an explanation, and thousands of people expressed their concerns online. Although most of the lawyers were eventually released, there was no progress on the police brutality case.[14] The most severe blow to human rights lawyers was the 709 Crackdown that took place in the same year. Approximately 200 legal professionals and their families were arrested under the charge of inciting subversion of the state (煽动颠覆国家政权罪) or picking a quarrel and provoking trouble (寻衅滋事罪), among whom fifteen were convicted.[15] After the 709 Crackdown and the Xiamen gathering incident, the activism of human rights lawyers faces a trough.
Human rights movements went beyond the courtrooms and relied on an advocacy network constructed by the lawyers. Critical and radical lawyers appealed to public opinion and resorted to some political advocacy. Unlike the moderates, who wielded restrained rhetoric and focused on individual cases, radical lawyers preferred to organize mass movements and confrontations with the state.[16] The lawyers’ network, including the press, the legal community, and even members of the National People’s Congress, mobilized to appeal to the public and create pressure for progress. Commercial newspapers, especially in Beijing and Guangdong (where censorship was relatively weak), sought advice from lawyers for producing in-depth reports on social issues and assessing legal risks. In the 2000s, the professional network enabled human rights lawyers and journalists to advance common goals, namely the protection of citizens’ rights, the exposure of systemic issues, and further sociopolitical liberalization. This collaboration did not last long as the government soon overhauled these publications.[17] Many human rights lawyers relied on support from formal (now increasingly informal) connections with colleagues, as demonstrated in the Qing’an police brutality case and the abolition of re-education through labour. Positive interactions and networking with judges were also helpful in advancing the rule of law in the long term. For example, Zhiqiang Pu sent books about free speech and social justice to judges. However, the dense network of human rights lawyers has disintegrated rapidly in recent years due to various instances of repression.[18]
Human rights lawyers and their allies have been under intensive attack during the Xi Jinping administration. It is debatable whether the defence of human rights is fundamentally at odds with the party-state. Some consider the concept of inalienable rights as foreign to the non-liberal system and political culture of China,[19] while other legal scholars view the defence of human rights as a safety valve by preventing disadvantaged groups from seeking extralegal outlets.[20] Although the Xi administration has continued the rhetoric of rule by law (different from rule of law) and to uphold the constitution, abiding to the constitution means upholding the party’s leadership (including its control over the judiciary) instead of a liberal interpretation of constitutional governance.[21] The government’s conservative turn has led to the discrediting and weakening of human rights lawyers and their allies. For example, depicting rights defenders as criminals and emphasizing “political education” among lawyers aims to diminish support inside the industry.[22] Some human rights lawyers feel alienation, if not disdain, from their colleagues because of the controversies they cause.[23] Southern Weekly, a critical newspaper and partner of prominent legal professionals, has gradually taken a more cooperative stance with the government, drifting away from serious investigative journalism under pressure.[24] As the situation has worsened in recent years,[25] rights defenders and activists are compelled to reorient themselves. Some lawyers still work on controversial cases with professionalism, such as Siwei Lu and Quanniu Ren who worked on the “Save 12 Hong Kong youths” case.[26] Although many young lawyers choose to defend marginalized clients, they are less willing to appeal to the public or organize political activities. Participating in legal education and rights awareness training is a less provocative way to continue their work. Despite restrictions on foreign non-governmental organizations, some still value connections with various international organizations.[27]
The future of Chinese human rights lawyers remains unclear. Despite the government’s draconian repression, human rights lawyers are unlikely to be eradicated, because socioeconomic inequalities and exclusions persist and create demand for legal aid. It is debatable whether depoliticization will be a trend. Disintegration of the domestic advocacy network shrinks the space for human rights lawyers’ political advocacy and engagement in policymaking. However, contact with foreign media and their more provocative counterparts may generate more international pressure and escalate confrontation with the state.
Zihan Alison Pang is an undergraduate student studying international relations at the University of Toronto. Her research interests include democratization/democracy consolidation, internet governance, and East Asian politics. She has extensive research experience on China’s social credit system and Latin America democracy erosion. Currently, she is the president of Internet Governance Forum at U of T, a researcher at Engineers Without Borders U of T Chapter, and an event organizer at Canada-China Initiatives Fund.
Bibliography
Bibliography
“以政治建设为统领 全面加强新时代律师行业党建: 全国律师行业党的建设工作座谈会发言摘登.” CPC News. Last modified July 25, 2018. Accessed January 26, 2021. http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0725/c117092-30169381.html.
“揭开“维权”事件的黑幕.” Xinhua News Agency. Last modified July 11, 2015. Accessed January 26, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-07/11/c_128010249.htm.
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. “Five Years After 709 Crackdown, Lawyers Continue to Face Repression and Punishment.” Last modified July 9, 2020. Accessed January 26, 2021. https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/five-years-after-709-crackdown-lawyers-continue-to-face-repression.
Creemers, Rogier. “China’s Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications.” The China Journal 74 (2015): 91–109. doi:10.1086/681661.
“Free Chang Weiping-常玮平.” Accessed January 26, 2021. https://www.facebook.com/Free-Chang-Weiping-%E5%B8%B8%E7%8E%AE%E5%B9%B3-107416584492421.
Gao, Feng and Wen Cheng. “协助港人律师遭清算, 卢思位、任全牛：无怨无悔.” Last modified January 8, 2021. Accessed January 26, 2021. https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/lu-01082021050123.html.
Hai, Yan. “庆安当局维稳升级拘捕多位律师及公民.” Voice of America. Last modified June 1, 2015. Accessed January 26, 2020. https://www.voachinese.com/a/qing-an-security-lawyers-arrest/2802865.html.
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. The Fight for China’s Future: Civil Society vs. the Chinese Communist Party. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020.
Lei, Ya-Wen. The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China. Princeton Studies in Contemporary China. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Pils, Eva. China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance. Routledge Research in Human Rights Law. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.
Wei, Rujiu. “中国维权律师忧思录.” Last modified January 18, 2015. Accessed January 26, 2021. https://www.gongfa.com/html/gongfazhuanti/minquanyuweiquan/20150118/2759.html.
Wu, Xiaogang. “Inequality and Social Stratification in Postsocialist China.” Annual Review of Sociology 45, no. 1 (2019): 363–382. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073018-022516.
Xu, Wenzhao. “A Study on Resource Mobilization Strategies of Human Rights Lawyers in Public Events.” Master’s diss., East China Normal University, 2015.
Xu, Zhiyong. “孙志刚之死——公民建议.” Last modified April 20, 2017. Accessed January 26, 2021. https://cmcn.org/archives/29567.
[1] “China: Shock at Continued Crackdown on Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers – UN Expert,” United Nations Human Right Office of the High Commissioner, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26612&LangID=E.
[2] “Free Chang Weiping-常玮平,” accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/Free-Chang-Weiping-%E5%B8%B8%E7%8E%AE%E5%B9%B3-107416584492421.
[3] Shamil Shams, “China Arrests Pro-Democracy Activists in Year-End Crackdown,” Deutsche Welle, last modified February 1, 2020, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/china-arrests-pro-democracy-activists-in-year-end-crackdown/a-51859750.
[4] Xiaogang Wu, “Inequality and Social Stratification in Postsocialist China,” Annual Review of Sociology 45, no. 1 (2019), doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073018-022516, 371-375.
[5] Wenzhao Xu, “A Study on Resource Mobilization Strategies of Human Rights Lawyers in Public Events” (Master’s diss., East China Normal University, 2015), 16-22.
[6] Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Fight for China’s Future: Civil Society vs. the Chinese Communist Party (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 107.
[7] Eva Pils, China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance, Routledge Research in Human Rights Law (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 15.
[8] Ya-Wen Lei, The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China, Princeton Studies in Contemporary China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 69-70.
[9] Lei, The Contentious Public Sphere, 69-70.
[10] Rujiu Wei, “中国维权律师忧思录,” last modified January 18, 2015, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.gongfa.com/html/gongfazhuanti/minquanyuweiquan/20150118/2759.html.
[11] In March 2003, a young man named Zhigang Sun was beaten to death in a custody and repatriation station. Alarmed by the incident, lawyer Zhiyong Xu started to research and help victims sue the police, which was not successful. He and his colleague Biao Teng wrote to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to suggest abolition or reform of the custody and repatriation system and to launch a constitutional challenge. Meanwhile, they garnered media attention for the systemic injustice behind the case. In June 2003, the custody and repatriation system was abolished. Zhiyong Xu, “孙志刚之死——公民建议,” China Citizens Movement, last modified April 20, 2017, accessed January 26, 2021, https://cmcn.org/archives/29567.
[12] Lam, The Fight for China’s Future, 120.
[13] Yan Hai, “庆安当局维稳升级拘捕多位律师及公民,” Voice of America, last modified June 1, 2019, accessed January 26, 2020, https://www.voachinese.com/a/qing-an-security-lawyers-arrest/2802865.html.
[14] Lam, The Fight for China’s Future, 109-110.
[15] Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown,” New York Times, last modified July 22, 2015, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html.
[16] Pils, China’s Human Rights Lawyers, 7.
[17] Examples of such newspapers include Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekly. Lei, The Contentious Public Sphere, 71-84.
[18] Xu, “A Study,” 30-38.
[19] Pils, China’s Human Rights Lawyers, 3-4.
[20] Lei, The Contentious Public Sphere, 91.
[21] Rogier Creemers, “China’s Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications,” The China Journal 74 (2015), doi:10.1086/681661.
[22] “揭开“维权”事件的黑幕,” Xinhua News Agency, last modified July 11, 2015, accessed January 26, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-07/11/c_128010249.htm;“以政治建设为统领 全面加强新时代律师行业党建: 全国律师行业党的建设工作座谈会发言摘登,” CPC News, last modified July 25, 2018, accessed January 26, 2021, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0725/c117092-30169381.html.
[23] Lam, The Fight for China’s Future, 117-119.
[24] Maria Repnikovam and Kecheng Fang, “Behind the Fall of China’s Greatest Newspaper,” Foreign Policy, last modified January 25, 2015, accessed January 26, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/29/southern-weekly-china-media-censorship/.
[25] This is a detailed list on the current condition of those who were detained or convicted during the 709 Crackdown. “Five Years After 709 Crackdown, Lawyers Continue to Face Repression and Punishment,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, last modified July 9, 2020, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/five-years-after-709-crackdown-lawyers-continue-to-face-repression.
[26] Feng Gao and Wen Cheng, “协助港人律师遭清算, 卢思位、任全牛：无怨无悔,” Radio Free Asia, last modified January 8, 2021, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/lu-01082021050123.html.
[27] Lam, The Fight for China’s Future, 117-119.
Leave a Reply