Abstract
This essay focuses on the challenges South Korea faces as a middle power amid the rising tensions with China, Japan, and North Korea. The episode demonstrates policy implications for the South Korean government to utilize its soft power, hallyu, as a tool for public diplomacy and to strengthen its ground as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific.
Keywords
South Korea, middle power, soft power, hallyu, public diplomacy
South Korea, with a population of fifty million and total area equivalent to a quarter of Japan, unfortunately does not have the capacity to be one of the great powers in the world.1 As a consolation, South Korean policy-makers have historically adopted middle power diplomacy to overcome the obstacle of size and to strengthen its position in international affairs. This middle power statecraft strategy comes to a turning point with the recent rise of China, North Korea’s intensifying nuclear security threat, and Japan’s growing nationalism and military normalization.2 The lack of trust and respect from Beijing, as well as the recent trade war with Japan, have made it impossible for South Korea to assert its “middle powermanship” in the Asia-Pacific region.3 In response, South Korea has adopted a strategy of “soft power.” Soft power, a concept prompted by Joseph Nye, points middle power states to an alternative to military coercion and economic sanctions. These states instead act through co-optation rather than coercion.4 Given the current geopolitical situation, I argue that it would be more beneficial for South Korea to focus on escalating its soft power rather than its hard power. In doing so, the government should not force its hand in the country’s already influential popular cultural outflows, coined as hallyu (the Korean wave), but rather indirectly support its expansion. This would work to avoid adverse perceptions from the foreign public and its governments. The structure of my argument is as follows. First, I describe middle power diplomacy and South Korea’s unique utilization. Then, I distinguish my recommendation for the continuation of soft power from public diplomacy, where the latter should be avoided since it involves more government intervention. Lastly, I suggest three policy recommendations that the South Korean government should adopt to provide indirect support to hallyu: 1) decentralizing state control, 2) supporting small companies, and 3) initiating research projects.
Theoretical Approach to Middle Power Diplomacy
The notion of middle powers in international politics first appeared as early as the 16th century. The concept was born in Italy, by the writer of Della ragion di Stato (The Reason of State), Giovanni Botero, a Jesuit-trained Piedmontese teacher of philosophy and rhetoric who became the archbishop of Milan.5 Botero graded international powers and separated them into different roles of small, medium, and large states.6 He advocated for middle-sized states to be the most lasting of the group since “they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their wealth and power being moderate.”7 He added that instead of conflicts, middle powers placed their ambitions towards being mediators in international affairs. In 2011, former Australian Prime Minister, Gareth Evans, contributed to the middle power conceptualization: he defined middle power leadership as “good international citizenship, within the utility, and necessity, of acting cooperatively with others in solving international problems, particularly those problems with by their nature cannot be solved by any country acting alone, however big and powerful.”8 Thus, contemporary thinkers have promulgated Evans’s idea that the size-based division of middle powers inherently allows them to take on peace-promoting roles in the international system.
Andrew Cooper, in his book Niche diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, conceptualized four different ways to view middle power states. First, he described a “positional approach” where the country is observed to be the middle point in a range from small to big countries in terms of population, economy, and military. Next, he described that middle powers also exist geographically, when a country is physically located in the middle of great powers. Third, Cooper described a “normative approach” that would measure middle powers as “middle” relative to other states in regard to wisdom, virtuosity, and trustworthiness. Lastly, he advocated a “behavioural approach” for imagining middle powers, where a state is willing to actively involve itself as the “middleman,” in diplomacy for multilateral relations or international disputes.9 South Korea, as a middle power, can and will be analyzed through three of Cooper’s definitions: as a positional, geographical, and behavioural middle power. The one definition it does not fulfill is one of being a normative middle power, where it lags behind the traditional normative middle powers in western democracies: Australia, Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden.10 South Korea, however, is making progress on this front as a rising normative middle power, alongside other states such as Indonesia and Vietnam.11
South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy
South Korea has recently been recognized as a substantial and rising middle power in the Asia-Pacific region, albeit a latecomer to middle power diplomacy. The term “middle power” has been mentioned alongside South Korea for the past two decades, but the government only recently inaugurated middle power statecraft in 2008 under Myung-bak Lee’s administration.12 The mentioning of junggyunguk (middle country) by policy-makers began with President Lee’s slogan of “Global Korea”.13 Lee tried to develop South Korea’s position as a middle power by engaging in multilateral forums, such as, the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit, the 2011 fourth High-Level Forum for Development Effectiveness, and the 2012 Nuclear security Summit.14 The former United Nations Secretary-General Ki-moon Ban supported this view, arguing that “South Korea has been active in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency because of its unique middle power status that gives it the legitimacy of a small power and the capabilities of a great power.”15 Both Lee and Ban inserted South Korea into the middle power contention, setting and steering the South Korea’s newly explicit middle power goal.
Power shifts and economic globalization have made the international system more complex relative to Korea’s middle power goal. For example, in July of 2019, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s announcement of trade restrictions on South Korea triggered a trade war.16 This resurfaced historical animosity between the two countries, and the public started to get involved by boycotting each other’s products.17 Bilateral relations with Japan are only one example of the strenuous road South Korea faces in pursuing its goal as middle power in the Asia- Pacific region. This is especially important in East Asia because power appears to be a zero-sum game: geopolitics is strategically competitive where the countries want to increase their own power while decreasing that of others.18
Another current political consideration affecting South Korea’s middle power status is the great power struggle between the United States and China. The struggle has made Asian middle powers more significant in foreign affairs, but further poses problems in South Korea’s middle power considerations. For one, Seoul’s unstable relationship with Beijing restricts South Korea’s attempt to act as a mediator between its old ally, the United States, and the new rising power, China. Although South Korea would like to mediate the conflict as a middle power, the complexity of having the United States as an ally is that their escalating tensions with China indirectly forces South Korea to have to choose one side over the other.19 This conundrum puts South Korea in a bind regarding its goal of being a middle power. A response to China is often demanded of South Korea, instead of being allowed to act as a middle ground, a privilege other middle powers such as Australia and Canada can enjoy.20
In order for South Korea to solidify its position as a middle power in this period of regional turmoil, I argue that the focus of diplomacy should not be developing its hard power. Like other South Korean political analysts who argue that soft power and public diplomacy are useful tools in assisting South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, I corroborate the view that soft power is the most useful tool for South Korea to facilitate its middle power in the international system.21 This is because a forceful public diplomacy would likely backfire; a government initiated push for middle power would instead draw ire from the international community.
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
Joseph Nye has defined soft power as “get[ting] other countries to want what it wants … in contrast … of ordering others to do what it wants.”22 The persuasive nature of soft power is exemplified by cultural influence. The “power” comes from a persuasive desire created in a different state to emulate the country with soft power. Nye emphasized the importance of soft power, often ranking it as more important than “economic and military assets.”23
In contrast, public diplomacy, traditionally defined as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments,” is much more direct and confrontational.24 Scholars like Eytan Gilboa have stressed the importance of public diplomacy, observing how “foreign policy [has] changed to aim [at] more of a favorable image…[where] attraction and persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials.”25
To meet this goal of a “favourable image,” many governments around the world use both public diplomacy and soft power, opting for “attracting” and “persuading” other states to their own advantage and achieving a better position in foreign affairs. A “favorable” image influences public opinion, which is critical in forming foreign policies.26
However, public diplomacy is more likely to receive negative criticism than soft power when the government effort to brand a country is more explicit. This is well outlined by American diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who once wrote, “call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda.”27 Furthermore, rather including public diplomacy as a tool of soft power, Joseph Nye in Public Diplomacy and Soft Power perceives public diplomacy as embodying both a combination of hard and soft power resources. In his terms, public diplomacy is a more forced version of soft power: “soft power arise[s] in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture.” On the other hand, Nye describes public diplomacy as, “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments.”28 For example, when utilising public diplomacy, the government tries to use broadcasting resources, support cultural exports, and organize exchanges. Hence, the main motivator of public diplomacy is the “government”, unlike soft power, which tends to emerge naturally from culture.
South Korea’s Popular Culture as a Substantial Soft Power
Small sized countries like South Korea can wield larger influence with the use of their soft power resources.29 Popular culture, one of its most dominant soft power vehicles, developed into a cultural outflow of Korean television shows, movies, music, beauty trends, and food starting in the 1990s. This became a “national asset” that attracted the likes of audiences from Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and the United States.30 This outflow of popular culture that attracts foreigners is called hallyu, the ‘Korean Wave.’
Hallyu first started to spread in Japan following the efforts of the Korean private entertainment sector. Despite the deep-rooted historical animosity of public consciousness, there hallyu promoted the building of positive national imagery. The beginning of this imagery’s production was marked by the broadcasting of Winter Sonata, a television drama series that aired in 2002.31 According to a member of a Japanese audience, “Japan has never showed such a peaceful interest in Koreans before. If Japanese are able to maintain this welcoming…this wave will become a great opportunity for restoring international relationships.”32
Likewise, popular culture can be used to enhance relationship between countries. Soon after the success of exporting Korean television shows (K-drama), hallyu grew to include popular Korean music (K-pop), with worldwide recognizable stars such as Girls’ Generation, TVXQ and BTS. The success of K-drama and K-pop contributed to an increase of exports, tourism, and cultural exchange.33 An economic forecasting firm in Seoul, Hyundai Research Institute, found that hallyu industries facilitated a four billion USD increase in business between Korea and Japan.34 Hallyu is now a significant resource that can create soft power to build a non-coercive and attractive image of the nation, while avoiding potential tensions across other dimensions.
Negative Responses of Hallyu when used in Public Diplomacy
When the South Korean government started to recognize hallyu’s influence and success in the mid-2000s, South Korean policymakers tried to use hallyu as a tool for public diplomacy. Popular culture has been fully incorporated into the government agenda as an extension of segyehwa (globalization) and the development of cultural industries.35 For instance, former Foreign Affairs Minister Myung-hwan Yoo stated in the 2010 Minister of Foreign Affairs report, “along with diplomatic efforts focused on national defense in the 1980s and the economy and trade in the 1990s, culture will be the third pillar of diplomatic power in the twenty-first century.”36 Likewise, hallyu has been explicitly implemented as a top-down and unilateral approach led by the government to brand the nation. However, the adaption of hallyu into the government’s public diplomacy agenda resulted in adverse effects.
Public diplomacy can be used as a tool to leverage soft power, however, failed public diplomacy can have large consequences. If public diplomacy degenerates into propaganda, it not only fails to convince others, but can “undercut soft power.”37 For example, the suspicion of audiences can be raised by targeting them with messages which diverge from that of their own government. Phrases in China like “American foreign policy is benign,” or saying that “the rise of China is beneficial in America,” can cause suspicions that negatively impact the soft power of the state sending the information.38 South Korea has also had a fair share of wrongly imposing public diplomacy and received negative responses as a result. This was during the time when the government started to get involved in promoting the global circulation of hallyu in order to build a more favorable image for the nation. As a result of its actions, South Korea was criticized as pursuing an imperialist form of state-led nationalistic soft power.39
As part of an agenda of cultural nationalism, hallyu was explicitly used through a top-down approach by South Korean policymakers in public diplomacy. As the public diplomacy iteration of hallyu was adopted, it became increasingly apparent that the South Korean government was trying to pass a nationalist agenda and explicitly promote hallyu abroad. The nation was criticized for its “cultural imperialism,” a criticism similar to the one faced by the United States. 40 Inevitably, backlash against hallyu and anti-Korean sentiments (yukhallyu) in Japan began to develop. For example, in 2015, an anti-Korean comic book entitled Kenkanryu or, Hating the Korean Wave, became the number one bestseller on Amazon Japan.41 The public diplomacy success of Korea’s popular culture in Japan was viewed negatively by Japan, seen as threatening to Japanese culture and the domestic cultural market.
As exemplified, imposed uses of the power of attraction can bring adverse effects if such means are explicitly state-led and state-controlled. Therefore, rather than the Korean government directly controlling hallyu, I believe that South Korea should increase indirect support by further decentralizing state control on hallyu for soft power, supporting minor companies in the industry, and initiating research projects for future guidelines.
Further Suggestions to Improve South Korea’s Soft Power
Having discussed how direct use of popular culture can bring adverse effects, the final section of this paper will recommend ways to implicitly support South Korea’s popular culture. First, government support should be given to promote cultural soft power implicitly, rather than through the central state so as to circumvent criticism from foreign governments and populations.42 The state should not attempt to aggressively obtain soft power nor improve the industrial exportation of hallyu. In the domain of popular culture, state-led institutions work less efficiently than the private sector. Hence, South Korea should work to bolster the non-governmental cultural organizations already established by South Korea’s Ministry of Culture. This decentralization of the cultural sector would support the continued production of hallyu external to the state. One such way to grant more power to the private sector is by exploring a non-economic framing for hallyu altogether.
Another policy recommendation is to focus on supporting small companies, rather than already developed large-scale companies. Small companies and start-ups are fundamental for cultural production, so the government should support space for innovation, help the cultural sector to naturally evolve and interact with other global players within the industry. Also, the government should take an active role in cultivating cultural industries by training qualified workers. All in all, the emphasis should be on motivating the growth of various means of cultural production, through engaging small firms first and ensuring potential workers based in the domestic market are of high quality and willing to export their products and services to foreign countries.
Lastly, the South Korean government should initiate new research projects to procure information about the growth of cultural production industries. An East Asian Scholar, Nissim Otmazgin, suggests that the South Korean government can maximize benefits from hallyu, if they do not impose a filter on the products and activities of private industries or attempt to promote hallyu abroad.43 Thus, rather than the government engaging in developing hallyu, they should fund research firms to develop strategic guidelines that will help the private sector; it is important to research the field because only then can private firms operate efficiently based on a knowledge of hallyu rooted in consumer demand. For example, a study found that the likability of Korean products had the most significant influence on the national image of South Korea, followed by K-pop and K-drama – but interests in Korea’s traditional culture did not affect the country’s image.44 Hence, the government can help guide private industries to shift the emphasis of resources from traditional culture to makeup products, clothes, popular music or shows. Furthermore, since hallyu has attracted young people beyond Asian borders, the South Korean government should encourage private industries working around hallyu to design more suitable products for young Asian consumers.
Conclusion
In a period of international turmoil, it has been difficult for South Korea to solidify its position as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific region. The South Korean government’s attempt to strengthen its hard power might trigger negative reactions from its already stressed neighboring countries. Thus, I argue that the government should focus on soft power by indirectly supporting South Korea’s popular culture, hallyu. However, the government’s previous utilization of hallyu as a tool for public diplomacy has prompted accusations of “cultural imperialism” from foreign populations and governments. As such, public diplomacy that appears to be a window-dressing for hard power is less likely to be successful.45 Finally, I suggest that the South Korean government should avoid adopting an explicit agenda of cultural exports and focus instead on decentralizing state control, supporting small companies, and initiating research projects to develop its popular culture and ultimately enhance its national image as a middle power.
Yuna Ban is a first-year MGA student also pursuing a Collaborative Master’s Specialization in Contemporary East and Southeast Asian Studies. She graduated from the University of Toronto with an Honours Bachelor of Arts studying International Relations, Political Science, and History. Prior to joining Munk, she worked at the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Toronto. Her previous experience with the AAS-in-Asia 2017 Conference, Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and research assistant work prompted her academic focus in security and innovation policy. Upon graduation, Yuna aspires to use her quantitative analytical skills to contribute to the international studies of the Asia-Pacific.
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1 Joseph Nye and Youna Kim, “Soft power and the Korean Wave” in Youna Kim edited, South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea, Abingdon, Oxon New York: Routledge, 42.
2 Sohn Yul, “Regionalization, Regionalism, and Double-Edged Public Diplomacy in East Asia,” in Jan Melissen and Yul Sohn’s Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia: Middle Powers in a Troubled Region. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 23-24.
3 Sookjong Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” in Jan Melissen and Yul Sohn, Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia: Middle Powers in a Troubled Region 2015, 110.
4 Sohn Yul, “‘Middle Powers’ Like South Korea Can’t Do Without Soft Power and Network Power,” Global Asia 7, no 3, 2012, 31, http://www.dbpia.co.kr.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/pdf/pdfView.do?nodeId=NODE01973471.
5 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics. London: Macmillan, 1984, 11.
6 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, 11.
7 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, 12.
8 Garth Evans, “Middle Power Diplomacy,” Inaugural Edgardo Boeninger Memorial Lecture, Chile Pacific Foundation, Santiago, 29 June 2011.
9 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 110.
10 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 108; Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, Middle Powers and the Rise of China, Georgetown University Press, 2014, 10.
11 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 109.
12 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 108-9.
13 Jongryn Mo, “South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: A Case of Growing Compatibility Between Regional and Global Roles,” International Journal 71, no. 4, 2016, 594, doi: http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1177/0020702016686380.
14 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 116.
15 Gilley and O’Neil, Middle Powers and the Rise of China, 11.
16 Jaemin Kwak, “Uniqlo 10 New Stores Last Year… Three Shops Closed This Year,” Jongang-ilbo, August 20, 2019, https://news.joins.com/article/23556263.
17 Kwak, “Uniqlo 10 New Stores Last Year… Three Shops Closed This Year,” https://news.joins.com/article/23556263.
18 Gilley and O’Neil, Middle Powers and the Rise of China, 13.
19 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 109, 118.
20 Gilley and O’Neil, Middle Powers and the Rise of China, 10.
21 Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy,” 117; Sookjong Lee, “Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy,” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 5.
22 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80, 1990, 166, doi:10.2307/1148580.
23 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, 2008, 96, http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/25097996.
24 Malone 1985, in Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 no.1, March 2008, 57, doi:10.1177/0002716207312142.
25 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 no.1, (March 2008), 56, doi:10.1177/0002716207312142.
26 Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, “The Japan-South Korea Divide,” in The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash, Columbia University Press: New York, 2015, 17.
27 Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 56.
28 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95.
29 Nye and Kim, “Soft power and the Korean Wave,” 42.
30 Sejung Park and Yonsoo Lim, “Information Networks and Social Media use in Public Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Japan,” Asian Journal of Communication 24, no.1, (2014), 81, doi:10.1080/01292986.2013.851724.
31 Toru Hanaki, Arvind Singhal, Min Wha Han, Do Kyun Kim, and Ketan Chitnis, “Hanryu Sweeps East
Asia: How Winter Sonata is Gripping Japan,” International Communication Gazette 69 no.3, 2007, doi:10.1177/1748048507076581.
32 Hanaki, Singhal, Han, Kim, and Chitnis, “Hanryu Sweeps East Asia: How Winter Sonata is Gripping Japan,” 291.
33 Kim, “Hallyu and North Korea: Soft Power of Popular Culture,” 5.
34 Hanaki, Singhal, Han, Kim, and Chitnis, “Hanryu Sweeps East Asia: How Winter Sonata is Gripping Japan,” 283.
35 Hyungseok Kang, “Contemporary Cultural Diplomacy in South Korea: Explicit and Implicit Approaches,” (International Journal of Cultural Policy 21 no.4, (2015), 440, doi:10.1080/10286632.2015.1042473.
36 Kang, “Contemporary Cultural Diplomacy in South Korea: Explicit and Implicit Approaches,” 434.
37 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 108.
38 Kim, “Hallyu and North Korea: Soft Power of Popular Culture,”11.
39 Kim, “Hallyu and North Korea: Soft Power of Popular Culture,” 6.
40 Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 62.
41 Kang, “Contemporary Cultural Diplomacy in South Korea: Explicit and Implicit Approaches,” 442.
42 Otmazgin, “A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea,” 322.
43 Otmazgin, “A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea.”
44 Deokhee Cheon and Byungwoong Jeong, “The Influence of 3rd Generation Korean Wave on Favorability, Attitudes, and Behavior Intention to Korea,” The Korea Academic Society of Tourism and Leisure, 30(8), 2018, 433.
45 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 102.
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