PB IN PH: Using Participatory Budgeting to Promote Proper Use of Public Funds in the Philippines

Abstract:  Corruption and graft have run rampant throughout the Philippines for decades; limiting the nation’s ability to provide public goods for its people. This article discusses how government officials use public funds for themselves and explores two policy options to tackle the issue of graft: anti-corruption government task-force and NGOs in the Philippines, and the alternate method of participatory budgeting at the municipal level using examples from the Philippines, Mexico, and Brazil. It will analyze the intricacies of both these policy options. The two proposed policies outlined above will be evaluated as follows: whether they promote transparency and accountability among government officials; and whether they result in improved delivery of basic social services and infrastructure to the community. This paper will support the position that participatory budgeting at the municipal level will reduce opportunities for misuse of public funds and will ultimately result in more social services and infrastructure and a stronger economy within the municipality.  

Keywords: Philippines, Corruption, Participatory Budgeting, Public Funds, Municipal 

Introduction

Corruption has been defined as, “the abuse or misuse of public office for private gain”.[1] The Philippines suffers from institutionalized corruption, where, “corrupt behaviours are perennially pervasive in society”.[2] Indeed, in a 1998 survey of Metro Manila residents, over 70% of those surveyed believed that corruption exists in their government, with 40% believing that there is a “great deal” of it.[3] One study found that around 20% of the annual budget is lost to corruption in the Philippines.[4] In 2019, the Philippines ranked as merely the 99^th least corrupt country.[5] One of the most common types of corruption in the Philippines involves the misuse of public funds for private gain by government officials, otherwise known as graft.  Government officials often treat their budgets as personal bank accounts, as they have extremely large amounts of discretion and control over public funds, allowing them to spend as they please.[6] Often, these officials do not use public funds for the benefit of the public. They are notorious for using public funds to fund their own election campaigns, to build unnecessary infrastructure, to launch projects that go unfinished, and to pad their own bank accounts.[7] While there are no statistics on the misuse of public funds, likely due to these officials’ lack of accountability in reporting their own crimes, there is a multitude of anecdotal evidence supporting this position. For example, residents in barangays (city districts) in Davao City will attest to the daily shower of dust and the piles of rubble left by road projects languishing past their deadlines.[8] Delays have been attributed to awarding of projects to contractors, less known for their capability as they are for their strong political connections.[9] For a decade spanning the years 2000 to 2010, Davao City’s top contactor was CLTG Builders. CLTG Builders is owned by Christopher Lawrence Tesoro Go. Mr Go is the step-father (i.e. the father of a half-brother) of the Special Assistant to the former Mayor of Davao, Rodrigo Duterte.[10] Rodrigo Duterte has since become the President of the Philippines. While Rodrigo Duterte was the Mayor, CLTG won PHP 4.6 billion worth of infrastructure projects for Davao City.[11] Graft directly harms the public, preventing the development of needed infrastructure and corresponding economic growth.

Policy Options

Status Quo

In the last century, there have been twelve anti-graft and corruption bodies created throughout the Philippines’ history, each designed to enforce the country’s anti-graft laws.[12] These commissions actively investigate allegations of corruption among government officials and bring them to court to try them under law.[13]

These task forces, however, target wrong-doings of individual public actors and do not promote systemic reforms that would reduce opportunities for graft.[14] They have also failed to promote accountability. Many projects under the supervision of these commissions are left unfinished with millions of pesos’ worth of allocated funds unaccounted for. In 1986, a series of bridges was proposed to be built in the small province of Abra.[15] In 1987, while all but one of the bridge projects remained unfinished, the government reported that all projects had been completed.[16] This sparked outrage and prompted the creation of a task force to investigate the anomalies, revealing that the project engineers had falsified certificates of completion even before work had started.[17] The task force brought the engineers to court where they were charged with misconduct.[18] The engineers were simply suspended from office for a brief period of nine months and nine days without demotion or diminution of salary.[19] Meanwhile, the money allocated for the bridge projects is still missing.[20] These task forces have also failed to promote transparency as they do not aim to educate and empower citizens.

Further, these commissions as well as the courts are themselves susceptible to corruption.[21] Courts have consistently allowed government officials to escape sentencing and a criminal record.[22]

Multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have taken it upon themselves to fight graft throughout the country. NGOs promote knowledge through information campaigns and support citizen groups in demanding accountability and good governance from public officials.[23] They organize citizen-led monitoring and evaluation of government performance and report to authorities and media, which in turn lead to increased responsiveness of government officials and improved provision of public services.[24]

NGOs play a role in holding governments accountable through public pressure and constructive engagement. However, NGOs often encounter difficulties in sustaining their efforts, due to the challenge of maintaining active participation among volunteers as well as the difficulty of obtaining sustainable long-term funding.[25]

In addition, these NGOs may further their own agenda as opposed to what the public actually needs.[26] NGOs have shut down projects otherwise strongly needed by the public, just to make a statement or to promote an ideology.[27] In the Philippines, where thousands of NGOs operate, it remains to be seen how many are motivated by a concern for the best interests of the public vis a vis those that operate to further their own agenda.

Participatory Budgeting

The analysis underlying the 2019 Transparency International (TI) report shows that corruption is pervasive in countries where governments listen only to the voices of the wealthy or well-connected individuals.[28] Among other measures, TI recommends broadening input in political and financial decision-making as a way to combat graft.[29] Participatory budgeting broadens input by creating the mechanism by which community members will have a “say” in the use of public funds.  Participatory budgeting is a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources.[30] Through participatory budgeting, a municipality is split into different regions.[31] Each region holds government sponsored meetings throughout the year in which they discuss different parts of the budget and policy-making options.[32] In addition, a “Quality of Life Index is created to serve as the basis for the distribution of resources. Regions with higher poverty rates, denser populations […] receive a higher proportion of resources compared to better-off neighbourhoods”.[33] At the meetings, the public deliberates amongst themselves, and with the elected officials over resources and policies.[34] The officials then visit all preapproved project sites before the final vote and assess the societal needs of each project.[35] Then, elected officials vote on the interventions, with the results becoming part of the public record.[36] An elected municipal council makes final budget recommendations and monitors the programs.[37] After final approval of the annual budget, the mayor sends it to the municipal legislative chamber to be approved.[38]  Approval by the legislative chamber ensures that local governance still has a competent centre, as detailed by A. Fung in his piece “Accountable Autonomy”.[39] Also, regional and municipal groups are created to monitor the projects, and a year-end report on the projects is released.[40]

Participatory budgeting would promote transparency and accountability.  It would open communication channels between the government and the citizenry, allow citizen input, overseeing and monitoring of budget allocations and thereby reduce opportunities for misuse of public funds. Graft does not thrive when the public is informed and empowered to substantively influence decisions regarding the use of public resources and when the process requires the municipality to report back to the public and render accounting with supporting invoices and receipts.

Porto Alegre, Brazil

In Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory budgeting has spurred great progress in terms of delivering goods and promoting transparency and accountability. Brazil and the Philippines come from similar social contexts. While the Philippines ranks 99^th on the corruption scale, Brazil ranks 105^th.[41] Like the Philippines, Brazil suffers from issues of accountability, transparency, and social inequality that touches every office in government.[42]

In 1989, the first year Porto Alegre implemented participatory budgeting, only 49% of the city had access to the sewer system.[43] In 1996, after two participatory budgeting administrations, 98% of the city had access to water, and 85% had access to the sewer system.[44] From 1989 to 1996, the enrollment rates in elementary and high school doubled.[45] These outstanding results of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre indicate that participatory budgeting has improved delivery of goods and services to the public. Communication channels have been opened between the public and the government. Goods, like sanitation and pavement, are now being delivered. Graft has reportedly been minimized as a result of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre.

Naga City, Philippines

Naga City, Philippines has also seen great success with increased transparency, accountability, and delivery of goods through participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting began in Naga City through the Empowerment Ordinance enacted in 1995.[46] Naga City participatory budgeting uses the Naga City “People’s Council” composed of citizens who participate in budget and legislative actions alongside the city council.[47] The People’s Council can observe, vote and introduce legislation, giving it a major role in “ensuring the people [have] access to accurate information, and the extent of their rights”.[48] With the People’s Council, Naga City citizens can hold their elected officials accountable, and ensure transparency of the budget.

Participatory budgeting in Naga City has led to the provision of many goods in the city. Poverty incidence in Naga City is 10% less than Metro Manila levels, where participatory budgeting is not practised.[49] Unemployment rates are lower, and average household per capita rates are much better than national averages.[50] At least 10% of the annual budget is dedicated to the urban poor, and the local government provides educational materials for the public.[51] It is clear that participatory budgeting in Naga City has decreased graft through increased accountability and transparency and has improved delivery of goods and services to the poor.

However, the literature indicates that Porto Alegre and Naga City are very successful outlier cases of participatory budgeting implementation. The participatory budgeting experience of Santa Catarina, Mexico, portrays a somewhat different narrative.

Santa Catarina, Mexico

Mexico and the Philippines come from similar contexts. Mexico, like the Philippines, struggles with issues of corruption and clientelism preventing the delivery of public goods.[52] Both rank near the bottom of Transparency International’s corruption scale, with Mexico in 138^th place.[53]

Participatory budgeting in Santa Catarina was instated from the years 2000 to 2003 and modelled after Porto Alegre style participatory budgeting.[54] The program was designed to implement participatory budgeting in schools.[55] Santa Catarina was suffering from a deteriorating school infrastructure, a rapidly increasing population due to migration from other Mexican provinces, and accusations of corruption in the municipal administration.[56] Participatory budgeting was aimed at directing the flow of public funds into dilapidated schools.

Participatory budgeting in Santa Catarina municipal level struggled. Municipal administrators, school officials, and prominent citizens failed to inform the citizenry that participatory budgeting was an option for them to consider. In a survey of the population of Santa Catrina, 82% of the population of Santa Catarina reported not being aware of participatory budgeting.[57] Despite this, the people who participated reported feeling optimistic that this method was ending cycles of corruption, and that they could decide how to help their community.[58] Even though participatory budgeting did not take hold for the long term, there was, for a brief time, a marked increase in transparency and accountability over previous practices. There was also a higher level of voluntary citizen monetary contributions creating almost 50% of the budget.[59] By this metric, it can be said that participatory budgeting increased population participation between 2000 to 2003. Further, 105 out of 148 schools received necessary repairs or supplies, benefitting 28,432 students.[60]   

The literature makes it clear that even in situations where participatory budgeting is “imperfect”, its implementation has promoted transparency and accountability and has resulted in improved delivery of basic social services and infrastructure to the community.

Implementation

Benjamin Goldfrank, in his work, “Lessons in the Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting” highlights 7 conditions to ensure the successful implementation of participatory budgeting based on his research in participatory budgeting implemented throughout Latin America. These include:

1. Political Will: The incumbent party and especially the mayor should have a commitment to opening channels of citizen participation in order to share decision-making power.[61]
2. Social Capital: The locale should possess civil society associations, preferably disposed to participate in municipal affairs, organized in networks, and relatively autonomous.[62]
3. Bureaucratic Competence: The municipal administration should be staffed by a substantial number of technically qualified employees.[63]
4. Small Size: The locale, or at least the decision-making units of participatory budgeting should not be so large as to discourage collective action.[64]
5. Sufficient Resources: The municipal government should control revenues sufficient to enable investments in public works projects and social programs.[65]
6. Legal Foundation: Existing laws should allow and preferably promote citizen participation in budget decisions.[66]
7. Political Decentralization: Municipal office-holders should be democratically elected.[67]

The Philippines is in a strong position to fulfil these 7 conditions and fully and successfully implement participatory budgeting as a nation for the following reasons:

1. Political Will: The idea of opening channels of citizen participation is already present in Philippine society, as demonstrated by the Naga City experience. Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 is designed to increase decentralization and provide a more responsive government for citizens.[68] Citizens must advocate for open channels of communication, and greater decision-making ability to propel these issues into the national conscience.  Strong citizen advocacy will encourage political parties and figures to open communication channels themselves, providing a safe zone for participatory budgeting to blossom.
2. Social Capital: There are currently around 60,000 NGOs operating within the Philippines, many of which operate autonomously, and are involved in municipal affairs, as seen in the Naga City case.[69] This provides a firm base for holding officials accountable, promoting dialogue among civilians with regard to their concerns, and a sense that their actions can make a difference. The Philippines has built a strong social capital, through active citizen engagement using NGOs.
3. Bureaucratic Competence:  Filipino governmental organizations struggle with promoting proper bureaucratic competence. Nepotism and cronyism have played a role in the appointment of government officials and fraud, vote-buying, violence and other irregularities have tainted elections.[70] There is however a heightened sense of vigilance among citizens exercised through poll watchdogs and NGOs which has curbed the influence of anti-democratic elements in the appointment and election processes.[71] Once installed, officials are held to strict accountability by a highly engaged citizenry and a vociferous free press. 
4. Small Size: The Philippines possesses a city district called a barangay, which are small, elected, decision-making authorities.[72] The barangay is the ideal small-size unit where collective action through participatory budgeting can succeed.
5. Sufficient Resources: Municipalities in the Philippines receive an Internal Revenue Allotment from the central government in addition to collecting revenue themselves.[73] While the size of their budgets and revenue vary from one municipality to the next based on the needs of the locale, these funds represent sufficient resources which citizens can allocate toward projects and programs they deem most needful.
6. Legal Foundation: The Local Government Code of 1991 envisions the barangay as the forum for citizen involvement and participation. The Code defines the role of the barangay as follows:

SECTION 384. Role of the Barangay. – As the basic political unit, the Barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.[74]

The Code sets out a ready framework for participatory budgeting through the creation of barangay assemblies. As defined in Section 397 of the Act, barangay assemblies are composed of all persons who are actual residents of the barangay.[75] Section 397 (b) of the Code require barangay assemblies to meet at least twice a year to hear and discuss the report of the barangay officials concerning its activities and finances as well as problems affecting the barangay.[76]

7. Political Decentralization: The Local Government Code was enacted into law, precisely to transfer control and responsibility of delivering basic services to the hands of local government units, namely the barangays. The Code has promoted political decentralization through the devolution of powers, authority, responsibilities and resources to the barangays to promote their fullest development as self-reliant communities.[77]

Conclusion

The Philippines has perennially suffered from institutional corruption, impeding the delivery of goods, services and infrastructure to its citizens. Graft has taken away from the country’s ability to improve the quality of life of its citizens. The current conventional approach to combatting graft is ineffective. Corruption investigative agencies, and NGO monitoring have failed in promoting accountability, transparency, and delivering goods to the public. Participatory budgeting offers a method which places the budget decision-making power in the hands of the people, cutting out opportunities for graft. This method has been proven to better promote accountability, transparency, and improved delivery of public goods and services, as opposed to the status quo. The cases of Porto Alegre, Naga City, and Santa Catarina demonstrate this to be true. The Philippines is in a strong position to implement participatory budgeting, lower graft, increase transparency and accountability, and improve delivery of goods and services. A deliberate and purposeful adoption of participatory budgeting among barangays, along with implementation of concrete transparency and accountability measures and sustained involvement and monitoring by the citizenry, will ensure the government’s responsible use of public funds for the benefit of the community. 

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Liam Culp is a second-year undergraduate student at the University of Toronto completing a double major in Contemporary Asian Studies and International Relations. He enjoys politics, and research, specifically in the region of South-East Asia.

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[1] Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (Washington, USA: The World Bank, 1997), 8.

[2] Eric Batalla, “De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines,” Lessons from East Asia Conference, no. 1 (2000): 2. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/7618293/unpan013117.pdf?1326741838=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DDe_institutionalizing_Corruption_in_the.pdf&Expires=1603817468&Signature=DoNcAmTHKSThCpp84GrAmFF6~kDLveN3DNkdU6wlSk-JsEnTzP097yNbD6D0DX-xgtAuh-6NYmU9r3ZcipKmZovscJtq-DBdAYgTI5VWA~vg5BdAPnj6K2LptjLHGcxQ43ApQEhIPZ0zIbDaOhUXTpG2XVK~oeLlpeZERdi6msb~nu3PMb2oRlUaPIDLtyy26t9u7Vxavmsl8mCdr7IascJVXX5u0yeUakzhzAIiipcXsFYHgEiCx5hwI~Nntxvm4-vgqNBf3OkxcjoEiTx5rVJdVO75t~mXVqEmrs-bS2R73XoNQt~nAKbNnO7jFGHz7b0nVWn1rWemR4EkglqtTA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

[3] Batalla, “De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines,” 2.

[4] Sarah Bracking, Corruption and Development. (Hampshire, ENG: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 121.

[5] “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Transparency International, Accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019

[6] Sheila Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines. (Quezon City PHL: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1998), 4.

[7] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 4.

[8] Amer Husain Laut et al, “Graft and Corruption Practices Among Selected Public Officials in Mindanao, Southern Philippines,” Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan 4, no. 2 (2013): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2013.0013

[9] Laut et al, “Graft and Corruption Practices Among Selected Public Officials in Mindanao, Southern Philippines”, 9.

[10] Laut et al, “Graft and Corruption Practices Among Selected Public Officials in Mindanao, Southern Philippines”, 10.

[11] Laut, “Graft and Corruption Practices Among Selected Public Officials in Mindanao, Southern Philippines”, 11.

[12] Batalla, “De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines,” 6.

[13] Batalla, “De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines,” 5.

[14] Batalla, “De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines,” 20.

[15]Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 15.

[16] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 15.

[17] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 16.

[18] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 17.

[19] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 18.

[20] Coronel et al, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 18.

[21] Raul Pangalangan et al. New Courts in Asia, (London, ENG: Routledge, 2010), 304-306.

[22] Pangalangan et al. New Courts in Asia, 304-306.

[23] Rommmel Martinez, “Strategies of Corruption Prevention in the Philippines,” Asia Pacific Press, (1999): 2.

[24] Martinez, “Strategies of Corruption Prevention in the Philippines,” 2.

[25] Martinez, “Strategies of Corruption Prevention in the Philippines,” 5.

[26] Sebastian Mallaby, “NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor,” Foreign Policy 144, (2004): 57.

[27] Mallaby, “NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor,” 57.

[28] “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Transparency International, Accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019

[29] “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Transparency International, Accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019

[30] Brian Wampler et al. “Participatory publics: civil society and new institutions in democratic Brazil,” Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 2 (2004): 74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3177175

[31] Anwar Shah, Participatory Budgeting. (Washington USA: The World Bank, 2007). 26.

[32] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[33] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[34] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[35] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[36] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[37] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[38] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[39] Archeon Fung, “Accountable autonomy: Toward empowered deliberation in Chicago schools and policing,” Politics & Society 29, no.1 (2001): 73-103. https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/0032329201029001004?casa_token=qUih0gdb8EsAAAAA:GR_xitVc1qa-oqgw36cbLjpivVHBIaETBVLNK19_nxbI2-xsNNPLNHGO5O8uK6BjlMM9MjUl7LGHsQ

[40] Shah, Participatory Budgeting. 26.

[41] “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Transparency International, Accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019

[42] Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre,” Politics & Society 26 no.4 (1998): 462.

[43] de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre,” 485.

[44] de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre,” 485.

[45] de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre,” 485.

[46] Alex Brillantes Jr, and Jose Tiu Sonco II, Participatory Planning and Budgeting at the Sub-national Level, (New York, USA: United Nations, 2005). 66.

[47] Brillantes Jr, and Jose Tiu Sonco II, Participatory Planning and Budgeting at the Sub-national Level, 67.

[48] Brillantes Jr, and Jose Tiu Sonco II, Participatory Planning and Budgeting at the Sub-national Level, 67.

[49] Brillantes Jr, and Jose Tiu Sonco II, Participatory Planning and Budgeting at the Sub-national Level. 68.

[50] Renze Santos, “Participatory Budgeting and the Philippines,” University of Philippines: National College of Public Administration and Governance, (2015), 13-14 https://www.oidp.net/docs/repo/doc632.pdf

[51] Santos, “Participatory Budgeting and the Philippines,” 13-14 https://www.oidp.net/docs/repo/doc632.pdf

[52] Veronica Herrera, Water and Politics: Clientelism and Reform in Urban Mexico, (Ann Arbor USA, University of Michigan Press, 2019), 10.

[53] “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Transparency International, Accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019

[54] Lesley DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities 2, no. 1 (2011), 96.

[55] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 96.

[56] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 96.

[57] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 100.

[58] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 99.

[59] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 99.

[60] DeNardis, “Democratizing the municipal budget in Latin America; citizen participation in Brazil and Mexico,” 99.

[61] Benjamin Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, (Washington, USA: The World Bank, 2007). 14-15.

[62] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[63] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[64] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[65] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[66] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[67] Goldfrank, Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting, 14-15.

[68] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.

[69] Joanna Moshmann, “The Philippine’s NGO Sector,” World Association of Non-Governmental Associations, (2009). 1. https://www.wango.org/ngonews/february09/philippinesngos.htm

[70] Coronel, Pork and other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines, 4.

[71]Moshmann, “The Philippine’s NGO Sector,” 1. https://www.wango.org/ngonews/february09/philippinesngos.htm

[72] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.Philippine government

[73] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.

[74] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.

[75] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.

[76] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.

[77] Philippine Local Government Unit, “The Local Government Code of the Philippines – Title 1, The Barangay”, Manila PHL, 1991.