Abstract: For the past 10 years, Mongolia’s sustained economic growth has led many to refer to the country as the “next Asian tiger.” Between 2009 and 2019, its GDP grew three-fold from 4.58 billion USD to 13.50 billion USD, and its exports almost quintupled from 1.55 billion USD to 7.71 billion USD. Nonetheless, of all of the country’s exports during this period, China was responsible for acquiring 76% of them, 82% of which were mineral resources. Mining, the engine behind Mongolia’s outstanding growth, has generated a huge dependence on China, producing great anxiety and discontent among Mongols, herders and politicians alike. In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, as China seeks to strengthen partnerships with other nations in the region, Sino-Mongolian relations have become increasingly complex. This paper explores some of the history behind these two countries, and demonstrates that the development of the mining industry today not only heavily influences the strength of relations between China and Mongolia, but also places Mongolia’s economy and politics between a rock and a hard place.
Keywords: Mongolia mining, Sino-Mongolian relations, Mongolia growth, Oyu Tolgoi, Erdenet
Introduction
One curious fact about China and Mongolia is that they share the world’s 4th longest land border.[1] Measuring 4630 kilometers in length with the vast Gobi Desert lying right between them, one underlying concept revealed by this extraordinary distance is that relations between both countries have been as extensive as they have also been empty. Indeed, in the 800 years of history between China and Mongolia, relations have greatly oscillated between the closest of friendships during the early Qing dynasty to the fiercest of animosities during the Sino-Soviet split.
Today, as a result of former’s massive industrialization and the latter’s growing mining industry, both nations have experienced a rapprochement, one which many politicians and scholars on both sides of the border consider as perhaps the best the relationship has ever been. Nonetheless, this has also been accompanied by the growth of nationalist groups like Dayar Mongol, which spread fear and xenophobic anti-Chinese sentiments among the Mongolian population, while warning about the former’s increasing involvement in the country’s affairs and key industries like mining.
Many of the fears that are visible today among the Mongol population, which groups like Dayar Mongol seek to exploit, predates China’s current socio-economic influence over the country and can be mainly traced back to the Manchu administration of the region. Hence, to understand the current state of affairs between both countries, and the reasons behind each nation’s views about one another, one must first travel back 400 years in history, to the beginning of the Qing dynasty.
Historical background: China and Mongolia from the Qing dynasty to the Democratic Revolution
In contrast to the popular belief, relations between the Manchus and the Mongols were not always regarded negatively, at least during the beginning of the Qing government. Given their cultural similarities and earlier contacts, as well as their geographical positions north of the Ming great wall, the Manchu leader Nurhaci saw the Khalkha Mongols (the main ethnic group among Mongols) as very strategic allies in the conquest of their southern neighbour. To this end, he put great effort into not only developing good terms between both peoples, but also establishing a cultural closeness. As an example, early Manchu leaders often claimed to possess Mongol ancestry, and arranged several intermarriages between different wives and concubines of both groups.[2] Indeed, when the Manchus overthrew the Ming dynasty in 1644, most Khalkha Mongol tribes submitted voluntarily to the newly established Qing regime. In exchange, they were promised a relatively high level of autonomy over their region and received military support to stop the attacks from the western Zunghar tribes.[3]
Parallel to this, the central government also established a new imperial court that would be in charge of the colonial affairs of the regime. Known as the Lifan Yuan, its primary purpose was to oversee the administration of the western territories of the dynasty that were not previously a part of Ming China, such as Mongolia.[4] The laws passed by this court, even though they respected the autonomy of the Mongolian tribal leaders over their lands, still had strong effects on the locals, such as restricting all traffic coming in and out of the territory whether it was of Han Chinese merchants or native nomads. Indeed, one of the goals of the Lifan Yuan was to not only control internal migration within the empire but to also isolate the region from the more ethnically Chinese south and east.[5] Overall, these laws did not see any major modifications for almost 200 years, and would only be revisited again towards the end of the 19th century when growing imperialist European influence and multiple military defeats led the Qing administration to restructure its domestic policies.[6] Of particular relevance were the set of reforms denoted as the “New Administration” (1901), which marked a drastic reversal of the previously sought strategy in the frontier territories. In essence, by realizing the strategic importance that Mongolia, for instance, had as a protective barrier for the mainland, the central government determined it crucial to integrate and assimilate the region with the rest of the dynasty. To do this, the imperial court began a process of Han colonization in Mongolia that allowed the immigration of settlers coming from the bordering provinces, and also permitted free movement of merchants.[7] However, these policies were introduced at a time where the social relations in the empire was deteriorating and thus aggravated the situation. The lack of regulations with which these policies were implemented allowed many Chinese traders to begin lending money at very inconvenient rates, leaving many Mongolian noblemen indebted and with no choice other than to sell their land. Combined with very high taxation, ethnic discrimination, economic dominance and oppression from the Manchu officials, the feeling of resentment and antagonism against the Qing regime and the wealthy Chinese grew very rapidly among the Mongolian population.[8] Hence, just before the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu regime in mainland China, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia took the opportunity to declare their own independence. A new government was formed and organized as a theocracy, with the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (the Bodg Khan) as the head of state.
However, the government of the Republic of China (which had soon replaced the Qing regime as the ruling entity of the mainland) did not recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and sought for the reunification of China’s lost lands.[9] Consequently, after 6 years of struggles between Beijing and Ulaanbaator, the Kuomintang managed to regain control of the region, and with this, stationed several troops to not only exercise control but also protect the population from the possibility of an invasion from the White Russians. Nonetheless, White Russian forces took over control of Mongolia in 1919 under the command of Baron Ungern-Sternberg. By this time, the Mongol population grew tired of being controlled by foreign entities, so with the help of the Red Army, the Mongolian People’s Party troops managed to overthrow the Baron’s government in 1921. This resulted in the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, and also saw the beginning of long-standing relations with the Soviet Union. This is not only because they provided the resources for Mongolia to finally gain its independence, but they were also instrumental for its maintenance, since it would be them who would always stand up to defend its smaller neighbour every time China threatened to invade or annex Mongolia’s lands.[10]
Indeed, the years that followed were marked by very strong political and economic cooperation between both Mongolia and the Soviet Union. Relations with China, however, depended more on the state of Sino-Soviet ties. For instance, when the communist party came to power in Beijing, initially both the Soviet Union and Mongolia saw it with a positive light since it represented the arrival of another political ally in the region. Hence, interactions with Mao’s government increased, resulting in Chinese investments in key infrastructure projects in Mongolia such as the trans-Mongolian rail (which was completed in 1952), as well as multiple aid loans at convenient rates.[11] However, by the early 1960s, right when the Sino-Soviet split was in full development due to ideological differences between both communist nations, Sino-Mongolian relations aggravated abruptly as the latter naturally sided with its protector, the Soviet Union. In response, Mao’s government decided to not only stop freight shipments on the Trans-Mongolian, but also changed the rail gauge on its side to be narrower, making it incompatible with that of the rail gauge across the border.[12]
Enmity between China and Mongolia continued for almost 20 years until the early 1980s, right when the Soviet Union began its restructuring process. The change of leadership that took place during this time, which was led by a younger generation of politicians that advocated social change, added to Mongolia’s and the Soviet Union’s technological backwardness and economic problems, permitted a loosening of the previously sought diplomatic relationships between former and the world. In essence, this allowed a gradual rapprochement with China that first saw the re-establishment of flights from Ulaanbaator to Beijing in 1985, and then the signing of new trade agreements.[13] Soon after, the fall of the Soviet Bloc, combined with the democratic revolution in Mongolia and the opening up of China and Mongolia’s economies to the world market resulted in new commercial partnerships that have substantially helped in improving the diplomatic ties between them.
The history behind Sino-Mongolian relations has greatly oscillated between animosity and cooperation, and many of these historical events are still present in the minds of a great part of the Mongolian population, particularly Manchu oppression and Chinese colonization.[14] It is this history that provides the context of most of the stereotypes and views that Mongols have about their neighbours, as well as the fear that Mongolia may again lose its autonomy. As Mao himself stated, “when the people’s revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will”.[15] Today, while both these nations remain independent and are thriving economically, growing fears from the Mongol side that their southern neighbour is becoming increasingly involved in the country’s economy, particularly through mining, adds new fear to Mao’s words.
Development of Mining in Mongolia
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the Mongolian people is their attachment and connection to their land, both culturally and economically.[16] From herding to shamanism, from mining to a national identity, their land, in every dimension one could think of, has played a predominant role throughout the country’s history and is no doubt Mongolia’s single most valuable asset. More specifically, according to a report from the IMF, Mongolia is among the world’s most resource rich countries, in particular in mineral wealth, making the country very attractive for foreign investment.[17] Not surprisingly, several multinational as well as domestic companies run the country’s mining industry today, extracting tons of gold, copper and coal that supply the global market. However, what makes mining in Mongolia particularly interesting to study is that it only started to develop into the scale it is today after the democratic revolution of 1990, when foreign capital from Western nations was permitted to enter the country. In only 30 years, the country saw outstanding growth in this particular industry, which has pushed the nation into unprecedented economic development.
One of the first mines to appear in Mongolia was Mongolor, in the early 1900s.[18] Financed by Russians, Belgians and Han Chinese, the Qing government was the first one to realize the potential that Outer Mongolia, as it was known then, could have as a supplier of minerals to the regime. However, despite the promising start and the backing of foreign nations, in the years that followed mining activity remained relatively low and supply was mainly directed towards the local market. Nonetheless, by the 1950s, deep in the socialist period, this situation started to change as the Soviet government sent geologists to the country to perform mineral exploration works. In 1962, with Mongolia’s inclusion in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), investment from other socialist nations slowly began to arrive, helping restart the mining industry by developing new industrial centers in the periphery of Ulaanbaator, like Darkhan and Erdenet.[19] By the 1970s, Mongolia became such an important supplier of resources to the Soviet Union that an agreement between both governments was reached to establish a large-scale copper mine in the Mongolian city of Erdenet. Today, thanks to foreign investment since the 1990s, Erdenet has become the fourth largest Copper mine in the world.[20]
As Erdenet’s growth in the last 30 years can attest, the opening up of Mongolia’s economy in the 1990s created many opportunities that have allowed key sectors of the country to develop, in particular the mining industry. More examples of mines that have been expanded or opened in this period include the Boroo and Gatsuurt Gold mines in the north, the Chandgana Tal Coal Mine in the west, and the Ovoot Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi and Oyu Tolgoi mines in the Gobi Desert. These last three mines have recently made the headlines of many newspapers in Mongolia, not only because of their potential contribution to the country’s GDP (Oyu Tolgoi’s output is predicted to contribute towards 30% of Mongolia’s GDP), but also because of their strategic location, which is just a few hundred kilometres away from the southern border with China.[21] Figure 1 below provides an illustration of the location of these mines, together with some information about their ownership structures (domestic or international) and production capabilities.
Consequences of Mining: Dependence on China, Trade, and Environmental Degradation
One of the most significant shifts that the 1990 democratic revolution and economic opening brought was that Mongolia began a search for new commercial partners, since the Soviet Union could no longer act as a safeguard of its economy. Naturally, one of the best candidates for this was China, which was experiencing incredible growth from the reform policies led by Deng Xiaoping and needed natural resources to sustain it. Hence, China’s demand for raw materials and Mongolia’s desperate search for new markets saw the latter’s restructuring its economy to meet the former’s needs. Leaving ideological differences and 800 years of history aside, China and Mongolia were brought together once more because of trade, leading to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations have been growing ever since.
Out of Mongolia’s industries, mining would soon prove to be the only one through which the country could stay competitive when supplying China, not only because of its abundance of resources but also because it had already acquired expertise in the area and could easily expand the industry post-1990s. Expansion of this trade with China was extremely quick, and by 1999, 88% of all copper exports from Erdenet were being sent to China.[22] Today, 76% of all of Mongolia’s exports, mostly minerals (82% of all exports), go to China.[23] Hence, as the country’s single biggest buyer, China puts its northern neighbour in a complicated position of economic dependence, as Figures 2 and 3 reveal.
Similarly, while the data for imports on Figure 4 at first glance seem to portray a much less China-dependent situation, in reality it is not. As Figure 5 illustrates, most of what is brought into the country is energy (refined petroleum), which introduces yet another one of Mongolia’s pressing issues, which is its energy dependence on China.
Indeed, one of the biggest effects of Mongolia’s transition from being a supplier of the Soviet Union during the socialist era to a supplier of China in the new capitalist era was that growth occurred only in the mining sector of its economy. Despite government efforts to diversify industries and promote growth in other areas, only mining flourished since it provided the country with its most competitive edge. As can be seen in Figure 6, by 2008 this sector occupied more than 50% of Mongolia’s GDP and roughly 70% of its exports.
However, a central problem associated with the large percentage that this sector occupies in its economy is that Mongolia is susceptible to the Dutch disease, a term economists use to describe a situation where the development of one specific sector of the economy occurs at the expense of the other ones.[24] In essence, demand for Mongolia’s minerals combined with foreign investment in the mining industry produces an appreciation of the local currency, making the exports of the other industries more expensive and hence less competitive in the global market. Overall, this could pose a very serious threat to the country, and could generate inflation, unemployment, and paradoxically, less exports.[25] As a matter of fact, inflation rates have been relatively high since 2016[26], and forecasted to be 7.5% for 2020.[27] A related problem to the Dutch disease is that the supply of primary commodities like Copper, Gold and Coal (Mongolia’s main mineral outputs) makes producers (and hence the country’s GDP) prone to fluctuations on global prices, unlike the socialist period where these were fixed.
Such reliance and instability also mean that Mongolia is dangerously dependent on China’s will to buy from them, as well as on their regulatory policies on border crossings. If China were to suddenly close its land crossings to stop minerals from entering its country as they had done during the Sino-Soviet split or during the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020[28], it could not only leave hundreds of trucks carrying tons of ore with nowhere to go but would also have devastating effects in Mongolia’s economy. Another example worth mentioning took place after the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in 2016.[29] As a result of the Tibetan leader visiting Ulaanbaator, the Chinese government not only decided to unilaterally close the Gants Mod border crossing and imposed tariffs on commodity shipments between both countries, but also demanded a promise that Mongolia would never again invite him to visit the country.[30] What this example reveals is China’s economic dominance puts it in a position to indoctrinate, and guarantee behaviour from its trading partners that is aligned with its ideologies. China itself has hundreds of trading partners; when it comes to trading volume, Mongolia only occupies the 96th position[31], meaning that it is not China that needs Mongolia, but the other way around.
Beyond economic consequences, expanding the mining industry has also increased the strain on Mongolia’s environment. Most notably, this has resulted in a degradation of its land, the country’s most valued asset. In the Gobi, mines such as Oyu Tolgoi are drying up water reserves at unsustainable rates, creating large disruptions in an area where a sizable number of herding families live. Mining companies have also been found to pollute water with harmful chemicals, including cyanide and mercury.[32] These actions are further potentiated by the “Ninjas”, illegal miners which operate in previously mined land using extremely rudimentary equipment that does not adhere to environmental regulations.[33] Moreover, the Great Khural, Mongolia’s parliament, has approved a policy to increase the land available for mining from 9.6% to 20.9%.[34] Desertification in Mongolia is a serious issue, affecting between 44% to 90% of the whole territory, and while mining is not entirely to blame, it has played a substantial role contributing to its worsening.[35]
Unsurprisingly, of the foreign mining companies operating in the country that are charged with environmental degradation, a significant amount is owned by Chinese firms, as their ownership composition shows. For instance, Rio Tinto, the parent company of Ivanhoe Mines which owns 66% of Oyu Tolgoi, is owned partly by the Aluminium Corporation of China (Chalco), which has a 9% stake. South Gobi Energy Resources, which operates in the Ovoot Tolgoi Coal mine, is owned by the China Investment Corporation (a 23.8% stake) and China Cinda Asset Management (a 17% stake), both of which are central state-owned companies that operate under the Chinese government. This reveals a situation that has raised preoccupation among many politicians in Mongolia: China not only controls almost all of the country’s exports, but also has considerable stakes in the mining companies operating in the country. In a way, what China and its mining companies are doing is Machiavellian: taking advantage of Mongolia’s natural resources without paying for the costs of environmental degradation.[36] While interfering with Mongolia might not be the Chinese government’s explicit desires, the truth is that its “go out” policy[37], a form of foreign direct investment which encourages Chinese companies to seek international markets, has allowed it to use Mongolia’s institutional weaknesses to exploit the country’s resources, indirectly producing great environmental harm.[38]
Reforming Mining Policies in Mongolia
As previously outlined, a great part of anti-Chinese sentiments felt by the Mongolian population stems from the shared history between the two countries, in particular from the socialist era as a result of the Sino-Soviet Split and the latter days of the Qing regime. A consequence of increasing public awareness about Chinese dominance in Mongolia’s economy, there has been widespread Sinophobia in recent years.[39] As an example, in March 2016, thousands of protesters gathered in Ulaanbaator’s Freedom Square to complain about the environmental harm being done by the Chinese foreign mining companies in the Gobi Desert, as well as China’s dangerously large influence in the country’s affairs.[40] In the face of this growing social unrest, the Great Khural began to enact several laws aimed at targeting specific mining companies and increasing industry regulation.
One such policy was the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law, which specified that every foreign investment must first be approved by the Parliament. This law enabled the government in 2015 to detain the sale of a 40% stake of the Tavan Tolgoi mine to China Shenhua Energy[41], or the Ivanhoe stake in South Gobi Resources to the Aluminium Corporation of China (Chalco).[42] Another policy, the Mineral Law, required that at least 90% of all workers in the mines had Mongolian nationality. If a company wanted to hire more than 10% of foreigners, it would then need to pay the local government ten times as much as the minimum salary for each foreigner employed. This policy succeeded in two ways: first, it provided more on-site training, meaning that important technical knowledge about how to mine would remain in the country. Secondly, it also discouraged foreign companies from bringing their own people to work in the mines, as was the case with the Chinese workers in Oyu Tolgoi.[43] Yet, despite these regulations and policy changes, China’s economic dominance in the country continues to be widespread, and leaves the Mongolian government with less options to defend their nation’s interests.
Future of Relations with China
When President Xi Jinping announced in 2013 China’s plans to launch the Belt and Road Initiative, it was and still is one of the biggest undertakings the world has ever seen.[44] Simply, the idea of integrating East with West captivated the attention of the whole planet and promised to bring substantial economic development for all parties involved. For Mongolia, which lies perfectly along the route going from China to Inner Asia, this represented a unique opportunity to benefit extensively by acting as a logistical transit hub.
However, many scholars and politicians, both domestic and international, have doubted how much would it help Mongolia to be part of this monumental project, and whether it would be beneficial for them to further integrate and collaborate with China. One way to illustrate this debate is through the earlier example of the Trans-Mongolian railroad, which is one of the main arteries of trade in and out of the country. While in the Mongolian and Russian side, the tracks were built using a wide gauge, in China these were changed to narrow gauge as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Therefore, every train crossing from Mongolia to China and vice versa must go through a very lengthy process that requires changing the bogies (the structure beneath the wagons that holds the wheels) when it reaches the border crossing station. For kilometre-long trains carrying tons of ore, this process is not only inconvenient but also translates into lost time that incurs huge economic losses. Hence, politicians and businessmen from both sides of the border have begun advocating that the planned China-bound tracks leaving both Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi (the closest mines to the Chinese border) are built using a narrower gauge, that way they would match the Chinese railway’s system.[45] However, some Mongolian nationalists have argued that this decision would give China more power than it already has, as it would also give that country direct access to Mongolia’s land. Along similar lines, another offer that has been seen with scepticism was that of allowing Mongolia to use the port of Caofeidian in Hebei province (close to the city of Tianjin), as a way to have the landlocked country gain maritime access.[46] Compared to the port of Vladivostok, which would be the closest non-Chinese alternative, the distance from Caofeidian to Zamyn Uud (Mongolia’s dry port in its southeastern corner) is three times shorter, consequentially permitting faster trade. Nonetheless, this would come at the expense of an increase in the country’s reliance on China, this time to carry out commerce with the rest of the world.
For many Mongolians, what they fear the most is that while for now, their country is still able to make decisions independently, eventually their southern neighbour will gain too much control, to the point Mongolia will stop being Mongolia but another autonomous region of China.[47] This would be what occurred with Tibet and Xinjiang, what is currently occurring in Hong Kong, and what could potentially follow in Taiwan. Similarly, there are fears that there could be an end of the country’s democracy in favour of an autocratic government that is more aligned with both of its neighbours.[48]
Politics is like a game of chess; every single move requires careful planning and coordination. Right now, both Mongolia and China seem to both be winning in their game, benefitting from an economic partnership that has allowed both countries to grow massively and progress. As this paper has shown, relations between both countries are stronger than they have ever been, yet they are still delicate given that a move from one country could greatly affect the other one. It is through a cautious approach and a movement towards a more sustainable economy that Mongolia will be able to be less dependent on China. Otherwise, the strategy that it has been pursuing could lead to a series of checks that may end up becoming a final checkmate.
Andy Eskenazi is a third-year undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in Math and Mechanical Engineering and minoring in East Asian Studies and Civilizations. He is very interested in Chinese domestic and foreign policy, particularly with respect to Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan and Mongolia.
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[1] Sharon Omondi, “Countries With the Longest Land Borders,” August 1, 2019. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-longest-land-borders.html.
[2] Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996): 834.
[3] Dorothea Heuschert, “Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols.” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998): 311.
[4] Dittmar Schorkowitz and Ning Chia. In Managing Frontiers in Qing China: The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited, 133. Brill, 2016.
[5] Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia.” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998): 294.
[6] Billé Franck. In Sinophobia: Anxiety, Violence, and the Making of Mongolian Identity, 45. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016.
[7] Elizabeth E. Green, “China and Mongolia: Recurring Trends and Prospects for Change.” Asian Survey 26, no. 12 (1986): 1340.
[8] Ibid. 1341.
[9] Christopher Pratt Atwood, In Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, 91. New York, NY: Facts on file, 2004.
[10] Green, 1341.
[11] Ibid. 1345.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Franck, 42.
[15] Green, 1345.
[16] Franck, 98..
[17] Dhaneshwar Ghura and Catherine Pattillo, “Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries—Background paper 1—Supplement 1.” IMF. Washington DC (2012).
[18] Sara L. Jackson and Devon Dear. “Resource extraction and national anxieties: China’s economic presence in Mongolia.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 3 (2016): 350.
[19] Green, 1345.
[20] Tsetsgee Solongo, Keisuke Fukushi, Ochir Altansukh, Yoshio Takahashi, Akitoshi Akehi, Gankhurel Baasansuren, Yunden Ariuntungalag et al. “Distribution and Chemical Speciation of Molybdenum in River and Pond Sediments Affected by Mining Activity in Erdenet City, Mongolia.” Minerals 8, no. 7 (2018): 288.
[21] Emily T. Yeh, “Introduction: The geoeconomics and geopolitics of Chinese development and investment in Asia.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 3 (2016): 281.
[22] Matthew Hill, “Oyu Tolgoi to Account for 33% of Mongolia’s GDP in 2020.” Mining Weekly. https://www.miningweekly.com/article/oyu-tolgoi-to-account-for-33-of-mongolias-gdp-in-2020-2011-09-08.
[23] “Mongolia (MNG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.” Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mng/.
[24] Kadirbyek Dagys, W. J. M. Heijman, Liesbeth Dries, and Bakyei Agipar. “The mining sector boom in Mongolia: did it cause the Dutch disease?.” Post-Communist Economies (2019): 1-17.
[25] Christine Ebrahimzadeh, “Dutch Disease: wealth managed unwisely.” Finance and Development. International Monetary Fund (2012).
[26] H. Plecher, “Mongolia – Inflation Rate 1994-2024.” Statista, November 20, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/727562/inflation-rate-in-mongolia/.
[27] Nicholas Muller, “Mongolia’s New Mining Boom.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, January 29, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/mongolias-new-mining-boom/.
[28] Tom Daly,“Rio Tinto Says China Virus Slowing Copper Ore Imports from Mongolia.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 12, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-riotinto/rio-tinto-says-china-virus-slowing-copper-ore-imports-from-mongolia-idUSKBN20618F.
[29] “China ‘Blocks’ Mongolia Border after Dalai Lama Visit.” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, December 10, 2016. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/china-blocks-mongolia-border-dalai-lama-visit-161210060313417.html.
[30] “China Says Hopes Mongolia Learned Lesson after Dalai Lama Visit.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, January 24, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-mongolia-dalailama-idUSKBN158197.
[31] “China Exports, Imports and Trade Balance By Country.” China Exports, Imports and trade balance By Country 2017. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2017/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-country.
[32] Frank Langfitt, “Mineral-Rich Mongolia Rapidly Becoming ‘Mine-Golia’.” NPR. NPR, May 21, 2012. https://www.npr.org/2012/05/21/152683549/mineral-rich-mongolia-rapidly-becoming-minegolia.
[33] Louisa Lim, “Mongolians Seek Fortune In Gold, But At A Cost.” NPR. NPR, September 7, 2009. https://www.npr.org/2009/09/07/112516360/mongolians-seek-fortune-in-gold-but-at-a-cost.
[34] Elizabeth Endicott, In A history of land use in Mongolia: the thirteenth century to the present, 145. Springer, 2012.
[35] Susan Taylor, “Mongolia to Double Land Open for Exploration -Mining Minister.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, March 6, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/mining-pdac-mongolia/mongolia-to-double-land-open-for-exploration-mining-minister-idUSL2N1GI020.
[36] Jeffrey Reeves, “Mongolia’s Environmental Security: Chinese Unconscious Power and Ulaanbaatar’s State Weakness.” Asian Survey 51, no. 3 (2011): 456.
[37] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Urges Companies to ‘Go Global’.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, December 25, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/china-urges-companies-to-go-global/.
[38] Sara L. Jackson and Devon Dear. “Resource extraction and national anxieties: China’s economic presence in Mongolia.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 3 (2016): 348.
[39] Reeves, 469.
[40] Bochen Han, “The Trouble With China-Mongolia Relations.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, November 18, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/the-trouble-with-china-mongolia-relations/.
[41] Catherine Putz, “Mongolia’s Mega Coal Mine Deal Likely to Stall, Again.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, September 11, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/mongolias-mega-coal-mine-deal-likely-to-stall-again/.
[42] Charlie Zhu and Alison Leung. “Chalco Drops $926 Million Bid for Mongolian Coal Miner.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, September 3, 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chalco-southgobi/chalco-drops-926-million-bid-for-mongolian-coal-miner-idUSBRE88207220120903.
[43] “Thousands Rally in Mongolia over Foreign Mining Concessions.” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1932132/thousands-rally-mongolia-over-foreign-mining-concessions.
[44] Yiping Huang, “Understanding China’s Belt & Road initiative: motivation, framework and assessment.” China Economic Review 40 (2016): 314.
[45] Yeh, 281.
[46] Ankhtuya, “Full Steam Ahead for Tavan Tolgoi – Chinese Border Railway.” News.MN – The source of news, November 12, 2018. https://news.mn/en/785364/
[47] “China’s Caofeidian Port Launches New Rail Freight Link to Mongolia.” Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide, March 27, 2018. https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/chinas-caofeidian-port-launches-new-rail-freight-link-to-mongolia
[48] Tumurtogoo, Anand. “Mongolia’s President Is Slicing Away Its Hard-Won Democracy,” March 29, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/29/mongolias-president-is-slicing-away-its-hard-won-democracy/.
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