Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed below represent the opinions of the article’s author. The following work does not necessarily represent the views of the Synergy: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
On 11 February 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte formally announced that the Philippines would withdraw from the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This notification began the six month grace period afforded to the Philippines and the U.S. to end the agreement.[1] Despite having a combat record of fighting briefly in South Korea during the Korean War, counterinsurgency operations against pro-Communist and Muslim nationalist rebels, as well as against local Islamist terrorist groups, the Southeast Asian state has a reputation for having one of the weakest militaries in the region. Thus, the decision made news throughout the country as it has historically been an ally of the U.S. which has relied on the VFA to help enhance the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The decision to withdraw from the VFA was made after the U.S. State Department revoked the visa privileges of Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, who led a major anti-drug war effort when he was the chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).[2] A 2018 report made by the State Department mentioned a high level of extrajudicial measures throughout the country during Bato’s term as PNP chief.[3] Situated in a broader context, this was a strategic move from Duterte to give the Philippines an “independent foreign policy” which does not favour one country over the another.[4] Civilian and military officials in Manila and Washington have opposed Duterte’s plans to withdraw from the agreement due to China encroaching near Philippine territory over the years. These concerns also include the dispute over the Spratly Islands, which manifested when China took control of Mischief Reef, which is considered to be part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and continental shelf through a ruling passed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016.[5] Formally withdrawing from the VFA undermines the Philippines’ national security because it gives China an opportunity to further encroach on Philippine territory as the AFP is not strong enough to protect its sovereignty from another potential incursion in case of a regional conflict that may involve China. This is especially true when domestic political indifference to the situation hampers efforts to bolster the Philippines’ military power.
The announcement to withdraw from the VFA is a major concern for officials in both the Philippines and the U.S. With the latter party being concerned about the former’s ability to secure its territory in a worst-case scenario due to a lack of minimum credible defense. The Philippine Department of National Defense defines minimum credible defense as “the establishment of an effective force presence inside the Philippines and its exclusive economic zone”.[6] According to a 2019 Asia Power Index provided by the Lowy Institute, the Philippines is ranked 19th out of 25 countries in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of military capability.[7] This is in contrast to the U.S., which is ranked 1st in the index, followed by China in 2nd.[8] The report also indicated that the Philippine Navy has only one frigate[9] with no destroyers or cruisers.[10] This assessment stands out because it shows that security is a serious issue that needs to be addressed. During the administration of former President Benigno Aquino III, the AFP started to undergo modernization in an attempt to orient itself from conducting internal security operations to external security ones (while being under the U.S. security umbrella).[11] Renato Cruz de Castro explained that initial modernization efforts were hampered due to a lack of planning in building up a credible defense before American troops stationed in the Philippines were withdrawn in 1991.[12] He also mentioned that another reason for this decision was due to the willingness of a poor nation’s politicians to not take responsibility in strategic affairs and instead pay attention to the quantifiable costs in defense matters (including domestic arms buildup).[13] This is emphasised when a state has limited resources that the price of additional resources would exceed against the marginal cost of entering a military alliance, thus placing them in a difficult position.[14] When an unforeseen threat appears, especially if a state faces internal and external threats at the same time, the situation would force said politicians to use external resources to ensure the nation’s survival.[15] And in this case, it is the Philippines not using the opportunity under the VFA to reshape the AFP to face external security challenges that pose a threat to the nation.
If or when the VFA is not renewed by the Philippines and the United States after six months, China would have the opportunity to take advantage of the former country by positioning itself strategically in the Spratly Islands. Thereby, China would gain an advantage over the Philippines and to a certain extent, over other Southeast Asian states that have claims in the area. It has become daily news in the region, even prior to the VFA withdrawal, that the Chinese are rapidly asserting their influence by positioning naval assets in the Spratly Islands to claim more territory. In 2016, five Chinese Coast Guard ships made their presence known in Jackson Shoal, located 140 nautical miles off the coast of Palawan, and expelled Filipino fishermen to secure the disputed island.[16] The presence of the Maritime Militia harassing and spying on Filipino ships and civilians conducting construction work on Thitu Island, or Pagasa in the Philippines, is used by China due to their ambiguous status with civilians manning fishing ships while having military training.[17] This tactic has been used not only against the Philippines, but also against the U.S. This was seen when the USS Impeccable was near the waters of Hainan Island in 2009 after Maritime Militia ships were deployed to get close and block its movements. This was followed by the use of grappling hooks to secure its towed sonar array while the ship’s crew had their attention focused on the Chinese navy and coast guard ships.[18] The use of such force by China to maintain its influence is something the Philippines is concerned about. This reflects the ability of the People’s Liberation Army to simply use their naval forces to easily take territory in the Spratly Islands and use the reluctance of observers to confront them without suffering consequences for their actions.[19]
Withdrawing from the VFA with the U.S. is not in the best interest of the Philippines despite what Duterte believes. Even with American military support, the AFP is at best still struggling to modernize its forces to keep them up to date. The projection of Chinese military power in Asia serves as a harsh reminder that a rising China can and will force other states to simply accept its economic and military power as the new reality. Using the provisions of the VFA to help the AFP modernize itself and train to survive a conventional fight would increase the Philippines’ chances to not be intimidated and ensure the country’s sovereignty. At the same time, the AFP needs to be proactive in learning as much as it can from the U.S. in improving its capabilities, regardless of whether it is in battle or in humanitarian work. As Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Junior testified in a Senate hearing, the loss of the VFA will “negatively impact the Philippine security and defense arrangements, as well as the overall bilateral relations of the Philippines with the U.S., and perhaps even on the sub-regional level.”[20]
Mark Soo is a recent graduate of Simon Fraser University (BA’ 18 – Political Science) with research interests in Japanese, East Asian and Southeast Asian politics, including defense and foreign relations. He is currently a volunteer with the Filipino NGO Gawad Kalinga.
Bibliography
Amador, Julio S. “Eyes on the Prize? Philippine-US alliance and defense modernization.” Foreign Service Institute. December 2014. Accessed March 6, 2020. http://www.fsi.gov.ph/eyes-on-the-prize-philippines-us-alliance-and-defense-modernization-by-julio-s-amador-iii-issue-12-december-2014/.
de Castro, Renato Cruz. “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 403-422. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40023723.
Department of State. “2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice: Philippines.” Department of State. March 13, 2019. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/philippines__trashed/.
Lowy Institute. “Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2019.” Lowy Institute. 2019. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Lowy-Institute-Asia-Power-Index-2019-Pocket-Book.pdf.
Mahadzir, Dzirhan. “U.S. warns China will gain edge if the Philippines ends Visiting Forces Agreement.” USNI News. February 12, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://news.usni.org/2020/02/12/u-s-warns-china-will-gain-edge-if-the-philippines-ends-visiting-forces-agreement
Manthrope, Jonathan. “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the scourge of the South China Sea.” Asia Times. April 28, 2019. Accessed March 6, 2020. http://asiatimes.com/2019/04/beijings-maritime-militia-the-scourge-of-south-china-sea/.
Neuman, Scott & Julie McCarthy. “Philippines says it will end U.S. security agreement.” National Public Radio. February 11, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804751958/philippines-says-it-will-end-u-s-security-agreement.
Panda, Ankit. “Report: Chinese Coast Guard Vessels take over Spratly Island feature from the Philippines.” The Diplomat. March 2, 2016. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/report-chinese-coast-guard-vessels-take-over-spratly-island-feature-from-philippines.
Permanent Court of Arbitration. “In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration.” PCA Case Nº 2013-19. July 12, 2016. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf.
Philippine Star. “Minimum credible defense: Still a long way to go.” Philippine Star. August 17, 2015. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/08/17/1489364/minimum-credible-defense-still-long-way-go.
Pitlo III, Lucio Blanco. “The Philippines Post-VFA: No Easy Choices.” The Diplomat. February 27, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/the-philippines-post-vfa-no-easy-choices/.
Schaus, John. “What is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and why does it matter?” Center for Strategic & International Studies. February 12, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. http://www.csis.org/analysis/what-philippines-united-states-visiting-forces-agreement-and-why-does-it-matter.
Viray, Patricia Lourdes. “Philippine military capability among weakest in Asia-Pacific – report.” Philippine Star. May 8, 2018. Accessed March 6, 2020. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/05/08/1813321/philippine-military-capability-among-weakest-asia-pacific-report.
Voice of America News. “Philippines break major security agreement with US.” Voice of America. February 11, 2020. Accessed March 6, 2020. http://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/philippines-breaks-major-security-agreement-us.
[1] Voice of America News, “Philippines break major security agreement with US,” Voice of America, February 11, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/philippines-breaks-major-security-agreement-us.
[2] John Schaus, “What is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and why does it matter?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 12, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-philippines-united-states-visiting-forces-agreement-and-why-does-it-matter.
[3] Department of State, “2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines,” Department of State, March 13, 2019, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/philippines__trashed/.
[4] Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, “The Philippines Post-VFA: No Easy Choices,” The Diplomat, February 27, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/the-philippines-post-vfa-no-easy-choices/.
[5] Permanent Court of Arbitration, “In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration,” PCA Case Nº 2013-19, July 12, 2016, 260, accessed March 6, 2020, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf.
[6] Philippine Star, “Minimum credible defense: Still a long way to go,” Philippine Star, August 17, 2015, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/08/17/1489364/minimum-credible-defense-still-long-way-go.
[7] Lowy Institute, “Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2019,” Lowy Institute, 2019, accessed March 6, 2020, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Lowy-Institute-Asia-Power-Index-2019-Pocket-Book.pdf.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Patricia Lourdes Viray, “Philippine military capability among weakest in Asia-Pacific – report,” Philippine Star, May 8, 2018, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/05/08/1813321/philippine-military-capability-among-weakest-asia-pacific-report.
[10] As of March 2020, the 2019 Asia Power Index still maintains that the Philippine Navy only has one frigate in service.
[11] Julio S. Amador, “Eyes on the Prize? Philippine-US alliance and defense modernization,” Foreign Service Institute, December 2014, accessed March 6, 2020, http://www.fsi.gov.ph/eyes-on-the-prize-philippines-us-alliance-and-defense-modernization-by-julio-s-amador-iii-issue-12-december-2014/.
[12] Renato Cruz de Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 408, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40023723.
[13] de Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy,” 405.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, 405-406.
[16] Ankit Panda, “Report: Chinese Coast Guard Vessels take over Spratly Island feature from Philippines,” The Diplomat, March 2, 2016, accessed March 6, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/report-chinese-coast-guard-vessels-take-over-spratly-island-feature-from-philippines.
[17] Jonathan Manthrope, “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the scourge of the South China Sea,” Asia Times, April 28, 2019, accessed March 6, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2019/04/beijings-maritime-militia-the-scourge-of-south-china-sea/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Scott Neuman & Julie McCarthy, “Philippines says it will end U.S. security agreement,” National Public Radio, February 11, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804751958/philippines-says-it-will-end-u-s-security-agreement.
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