Abstract: Since 2014, Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party have increasingly become defined by the Hindutva ideologies they champion. The association deepened in 2019 after Modi utilised his historic mandate to undermine some of the central pillars of Indian secularism. Such developments raise questions regarding the nature of Hindutva, the degree to which it has influenced Modi’s foreign and security policy, and how it might shape the trajectory of India’s international posture. Hindutva ideologues have constructed a narrative which equates “Hindu-ness” with “Indian-ness” while emphasising the need to restore traditional Hindu values of masculinity and strength. However, a coherent Hindutva prescription for foreign policy remains absent. This empowers leaders to selectively attribute ad-hoc polices to Hindutva, but also results in the continuation of established practices where innovation is lacking. Therefore, Hindutva has not fundamentally shifted the trajectory of Indian foreign and security policy under Modi. Instead, Modi has pragmatically invoked Hindutva for majoritarian purposes. Such dynamics render the prospects of a progressively more assertive international posture probable. Whilst Hindutva ideologues also draw inspiration from the more inclusive elements of Hinduism as a means of exercising soft power, these elements are arguably fading to the periphery. Ultimately, policymakers around the world should expect Modi’s India to continue its ad-hoc approach of entrenching nationalist posture to convey strength domestically.
Keywords: Hindutva, Modi, India, Nationalism, Foreign Policy
Introduction
Approximately nine months have passed since the world’s largest exercise in democracy returned Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power with a historic mandate. During this time, the BJP’s policy trajectory has reflected an understanding of Indian identity which stands in direct opposition to the country’s foundational ideals of pluralism championed by Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru emphasised the diversity of influences which shaped Indian society, celebrating a deeply-rooted unity and tolerance among its many religious and ethnic groups.[1] Contrarily, the BJP favours the concerns of Hindus, especially those of high caste who live on the Hindi-speaking Gangetic plain in India’s north.[2] The conceptual underpinnings of such developments can be attributed to Hindutva – the ideology which lies at the core of the BJP’s identity. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important for policymakers around the globe to understand what Hindutva entails, as it will contextualise the BJP’s decision-making and facilitate effective engagement with India.
This paper has three central objectives. First, is to examine the nature of Hindutva, seeking to illustrate its origins and most consequential features, noting its limited emphasis on external issues. Second, the paper will look back over Modi’s time in office to analyse the extent to which such ideas have shaped India’s foreign and security policy. As part of this section, the shift in ideological fervour from 2014 to 2019 will be explored. Finally, the paper will attempt to predict how Hindutva may impact the trajectory of India’s international posture in the future. However, such dynamics are constantly evolving; therefore, this paper will endeavour to frame the relationship between Hindutva and foreign policy as an unfolding process.
The impact of Hindutva has been far from uniform since Modi rose to power. While Hindutva certainly inspired aspects of Modi’s approach to foreign and security policy during his first term, its direct causal impact was limited due to deeply institutionalised forces.[3] Instead, this paper will argue that Modi actively employed Hindutva as an instrument of his populist political strategy,[4] rather than a guiding doctrine – selectively using it to his advantage. However, after the sweeping electoral victory of 2019, the frequency and magnitude of Hindutva-aligned decisions appeared to intensify. From one perspective, this might signal a potential shift from political pragmatism to an overt ideological commitment. However, the domestic context must also be considered. Specifically, India faces significant challenges, such as a struggling economy,[5] which provide a clear incentive to harness Hindutva as an emotively charged distraction. Therefore, the amplified Hindu nationalism witnessed in 2019 – which has highlighted by thinkers such as Pratap Bhanu Mehta,[6] is consistent with Modi’s majoritarian political strategy.
Looking to the future, it is plausible to suggest that within the foundational ideas of Hindutva, lies the potential to sway Indian foreign and security policy in two distinct directions. First, leaders will likely adopt an increasingly nationalist posture, exhibiting a heightened level of assertiveness,[7] especially against traditional rivals such as Pakistan and China. This will be carried out in a hyperbolic, yet pragmatic fashion that ultimately seeks to fuel domestic support. Second, seemingly in contrast to the first point, lies the capacity to intertwine the more inclusive elements of Hinduism into the Hindutva narrative, as a tool of soft power and cultural diplomacy.[8] However, recent trends suggest the former, more assertive strategy is taking precedence. Nonetheless, in the context of foreign policy, the ambiguity surrounding Hindutva’s prescriptions is sufficient for BJP to link a diverse set of initiatives to their ideological narrative. Therefore, the outside world should be prepared to deal with an Indian government that may sometimes appear unpredictable, but is consistent in its populist motivations. Specifically, the BJP’s international stance will primarily be designed to solidify the electoral support of India’s Hindu-majority population. It is crucial to situate any understanding of India’s decision-making within this domestic context. By developing a degree of empathy towards the BJP’s priorities, foreign administrations could reduce the risk of broader tensions stemming from uncertainty or misinterpretations.
Hindutva: Origins, Beliefs and Trends
To understand the underlying nature of Hindutva, and its potential impact on foreign and security policy, it is necessary to highlight the conceptual origins from which it emerged. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a prominent Hindu Nationalist and member of the Hindu Mahasabha, originally developed Hindutva in his pamphlet ‘Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?’ to synthesise a common Indian identity.[9] Essentially, he equated being Indian with being Hindu, arguing that Hindu identity ran deeper than religious belief. Hindu identity entailed membership of a distinct race with collective civilizational links to those occupying a common Hindu polity or “rashtra.”[10]
From the perspective of Hindutva, India – commonly referred to as Hindustan or Bharat, is the “fatherland” of all Hindus and considered holy.[11] It is believed that India’s long history of defending against invaders has solidified a collective identity through which Hindus are “united by the same blood.”[12] This identification encompasses a vast array of people who are generally not considered to be Hindus in modern India, such as Buddhist, Sikhs and Jains; however, this does not include Muslims, Parsis, Jews or Christians.[13] These beliefs have been observed to profoundly shape understandings of the “self” vis-à-vis the “other.”[14] Ultimately such dynamics can manifest in the form of a rift between the religious groups in question.
Another prominent feature of the Hindutva movement is the revivalist tendencies which call for a reassertion of masculine Hindu values; specifically, by fostering strength and national will.[15] Such desires stem from the perceived emasculation of Hindus under centuries of British and Muslim rule. This sentiment lies at the core of the guiding principles of the Sangh Parivar – an umbrella term for the collection of Hindu nationalist groups, of which the BJP is the political wing. The central driving force behind the masculine thrust of Hindu nationalism is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – a paramilitary organisation founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar which acts as the militia of the Sangh. Initially, the RSS was in large-part formed as a reaction to the Khilafat Movement; however, it now has extensive influence throughout Indian society and aims to restore a martial brand of Hinduism.[16] Fundamentally, the Hindutva movement is a push to revitalise Hindu culture and is inherently nationalist in orientation.
The aspirations of the Sangh have manifested in a way that drastically opposed notions of a pluralist Indian state. The form of cultural nationalism which Savarkar constructed was significantly more confrontational and anti-Muslim than that of thinkers such as Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru,[17] who spearheaded the push for Indian independence. However, it is necessary to consider the colonial context from which this sentiment arose. It must be emphasised that the struggle against colonialism involved a diverse array of individuals vying for a place in an emergent national dialogue, each championing narratives grounded in their respective religious, linguistic and cultural identities.[18] Despite claiming to divorce themselves from religious matters, the British took steps which drastically inflamed tensions between such groups; especially, by engaging in enumeration which identified majority and minority communities.[19] The most significant consequence of this decision was the construction of the ‘Indian Muslim’ as a political category,[20] thereby amplifying notions of a coherent ‘other’ to Hindu Nationalists. While seeking to foster support among minorities, the British also engaged in active discrimination, notably, by establishing separate electorates for Muslims in 1909, which fuelled resentment amongst the Hindu majority.[21] In the following years, such developments became conflated with the increasingly radical behaviour of some Muslims, particularly those involved in the Khilafat Movement which took place from 1919 to 1924. Although aimed at the British, the Khilafat Movement (motivated by fears that the Ottoman Sultan, their Caliph, would be suppressed after WW1) spilt into cases of anti-Hindu riots and violence; sparking broader inter-communal riots across Northern India.[22] Such developments had two central consequences for the evolution of Hindutva. First, it stoked a collective understanding of Hindu victimhood. Second, it solidified anti-Muslim sentiment among many Hindus, bolstering organisations that strengthened their Hindu nationalist orientation, such as the Hindu Mahasabha – which became increasingly stigmatising and threatening of the ‘other.’ Future Hindutva ideologues carried such worldviews forward, namely Hedgewar’s successor, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, who viewed Muslims as ‘invaders’ who were ‘tooth and nail against opposed to our way of life.’[23] In the volatility and unrest of contemporary Indian society, it is these aspects of Hindutva which have drawn the most attention.
Moreover, Hindutva adherents broadly define their movement in opposition to Nehruvian ideals, which were dismissed as Westernised and unrepresentative of Indian culture.[24] Despite the largely consistent themes that emerge from Hindutva ideologies, this trend of contrarianism is reflective of Hindutva sentiment, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Rather than constructing a coherent set of policy prescriptions for furthering Indian interests abroad, Hindutva ideologues put more emphasis on the worldviews it opposed – such as Nehru’s nonalignment. While some strategies were developed, they predominantly focused on internal threats. When the outside world was addressed, it was primarily to insulate India from foreign influence,[25] rather than foster engagement. Consequently, no clear framework for a Hindutva inspired foreign policy strategy exists, which makes it possible to selectively link ideas to the Hindutva cause when it is convenient to do so. Ultimately, this empowers leaders to situate their personal strategic objectives within the ambiguous frame of Hindutva as a means of justification. However, this can also result in a rudderless international strategy, where the established norms of the past can act as the de-facto set of guiding principles.[26] In other words, the lack of guidance which Hindutva provides can render the decisions of previous governments as the most tangible framework to follow. However, the essence of the Hindutva remains fundamentally revivalist, and the broad thrust of the movement seeks to reshape Indian society, despite its inability to do so coherently.
Hindutva: Shaping Modi’s Stance?
Since Modi rose to power in 2014, much of his governance has been viewed through the lens of Hindutva. However, the question of his intent remains difficult to confirm. One argument is that Modi wanted to push overtly Hindutva-inspired policies from the start, and was prevented by parliamentary restraints. Another view – one that appears to be more accurate– is that he is utilising the majoritarian political value of Hindutva for pragmatic purposes. There seems to be an interplay between these two factors; however, they are unlikely to have equal influence. Interestingly, the degree to which Hindu nationalism has filtered into Modi’s decision-making appears to have been amplified during his second term. Specifically, the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) point to this conclusion. The parliamentary dynamics are apparent in this regard, as the BJP’s dominance in the Lok Sabha has enabled a doubling-down on a Hindutva inspired brand of governance through legislative reforms. Significantly, this trend has coincided with mounting economic concerns. Therefore, the incentive to intensify Hindu nationalist sentiment is clear, as it acts as an emotionally charged distraction from economic woes through which Modi can consolidate popular support.
While Hindutva ostensibly held the capacity to transform India’s international posture under the BJP, it did not sway Modi into embarking on a fundamental overhaul during his first term.[27] Although Modi has come to be identified with Hindutva as a symbol of the aggressive face of Hindutva,[28] it is only one of several forces that motivated his decision making. Specifically, Modi was constrained by the deeply institutionalised norms of India’s foreign policymaking apparatus.[29] Academics Surupa Gupta and Rani D. Mullen, argue that India’s foreign and security policy decision making is shaped by an amalgamation of systemic, domestic, and individual-level factors,[30] and is therefore, unlikely to ever be exclusively driven by ideology. At the systemic level, India aims to position itself favourably within the complexity of an emerging multipolar system by carefully managing relationships with global and regional powers.[31] The nature of the international system is mixed, in which traditional realist competition remains prevalent, but the necessity for cooperation and interdependence is heightening.[32] Such dynamics have facilitated closer strategic cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia.[33] However, more broadly, India has sought to maximise its autonomy, which involves a hedging approach to foreign policy that develops relationships with as many major powers as possible,[34] notably including Russia. Domestically, the need to engage with international institutions to foster economic development poses a significant challenge to the Modi government.[35] To address this, Modi has sought to bolster bilateral relations and attract foreign investment, through initiatives such as the “Make in India” campaign.[36] In 2019, this imperative became acute, given the deteriorating health of the Indian economy; [37] therefore, this challenge will remain a high priority. Additionally, there are domestic political considerations which Modi must grapple with, but given his electoral success, they are yet to present a serious challenge.[38] Finally, at the individual level of analysis, there is Modi’s identity as the symbolic leader of the Hindutva movement. Modi has utilised this to present himself has a strong and decisive leader, though its translation into foreign policy has been minimal.[39] Instead, the Hindutva project was more visible in domestic matters which never materialised in legislation. A prominent example of this is through Modi’s ministerial appointments, such as the controversial elevation of Yogi Adityanath to Chief Minister in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh.
During Modi’s first term, Hindutva had a limited impact in facilitating a clear departure from the foreign and security policy of former governments. As previously mentioned, the lack of a coherent, strategic prescription provided by Hindutva has rendered past decisions the de-facto framework to follow.[40] Although it should be acknowledged that while Modi did intend to implement changes, his success in overseeing a fundamental shift was limited.[41] One area where such continuity can be observed is in military affairs. Modi did not deviate from the established, post-1998 nuclear policy, which imposed tight restrictions such as the storing of weapons in an unassembled state.[42] Furthermore, Modi largely adhered to recent norms concerning the use of conventional military force. Compared to the Cold War years, when India engaged in several external conflicts – such as Bangladesh (1971), Seychelles (1986), Sri Lanka (1987) and the Maldives (1988), Modi proved less willing to intervene outside national borders.[43]
The two apparent exceptions to such restraint were the responses to the Pathankot and Uri attacks in 2016 and the Pulwama attack of 2019. However, both the nature and domestic context of these responses must be considered. Firstly, both retaliations were limited. They were designed to convey strength, and uphold the seemingly humble, yet forceful “chowkidar” (watchman) persona which Modi adopted.[44] Had Modi not responded forcefully, it would have undermined his legitimacy as a decisive leader who could keep his country safe. However, he retaliated in a way that posed a relatively low escalation risk. This is partly due to the nuclear umbrella which provides a degree of stability to Indo-Pakistan relations at the strategic level, despite lower-level volatility;[45] rendering an outsized response unlikely. Additionally, the scale of the ‘surgical strikes’ in 2016 were well below that of even a low-scale conventional attack,[46] holding more symbolic weight than any tactical gains. In the case of India’s Balakot strike after Pulwama, while they were carried out across the Line of Control – a deeply provocative move – analysts argue the attack missed any noteworthy target and landed in the woods – despite Indian claims.[47] Secondly, it could be argued that the strikes were used as an instrument of populist Hindutva politics.[48] The pre-election context of the Pulwama attacks is of particular relevance in this regard, as it rendered the necessity of a strong response. However, it also provided Modi with an opportunity to shift the electoral debate and the national attention away from economic concerns to an area where he had greater credibility – national security.[49] Strongman posturing is a common populist strategy to garner support amongst voters, utilised by other world leaders such as Rodrigo Duterte,[50] Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.[51] The aggressively nationalist coverage of events such as the ‘surgical strikes’ compounds the impact of this approach, and provides a noteworthy surge in popularity.[52] Therefore, these retaliations can hardly be attributed to Modi’s adherence to Hindutva exclusively – instead, they demonstrate Modi’s political pragmatism.
This highlights a critical distinction in how the causal relationship between Hindutva and the foreign policy of Modi can be interpreted. Instead of Hindutva ideologies guiding policy per se, much evidence suggests that Modi harnessed them for political gain. To achieve this, Modi demonstrated an evolving pragmatism in his foreign policymaking; [53] posturing as a Hindutva strongman when expedient to do so, and refraining when necessary. In other words, Modi’s policies did not appear to be purely driven by Hindutva. Instead, Hindutva can be view as a source from which Modi drew justification for his policies,[54] reflecting the flexible nature of Hindutva in its application. The tense circumstances of the 2017 Doklam Standoff demonstrated the limits of his overt ideological adherence. After his initially forceful stance – which was enough to uphold his image – Modi shifted his nationalist strongman approach to that of a rational statesman, showing a willingness to initiate talks with Beijing.[55] Ultimately, much of Modi’s foreign and security policy was designed to align with Hindutva ideals when convenient; but appeared relatively insignificant in influencing it during critical events.
Regarding Modi’s second term, while the deepening of an explicit commitment to Hindutva might be illustrative of his underlying intentions, it should be considered within the context of India’s economic challenges. Two significant developments after Modi’s re-election have drawn considerable attention, as have rumours of a third. First is the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution, stripping the Kashmir region of its autonomous rights. The move dismembered the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir – India’s only with a Muslim-majority – and created Ladakh. Furthermore, it downgraded the state’s classification to a union territory that will be directly administered from New Delhi. Second was the CAA, which provides a fast-tracked way for Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians and Jains from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to gain India citizenship; notably excluding Muslims. At its core, this legislation redefines what it means to be Indian, by allowing religion to dictate the right to citizenship – posing a direct challenge to the secular identity of the country.[56] Furthermore, the Indian Home Minister, Amit Shah, has expressed his intent to roll out a National Register of Citizens (NRC) across India – like that of Assam, designed to identify apparent “infiltrators” who live in India illegally. However, it would place the burden of proof on the accused to produce identifying documentation – an unrealistic prospect in a country where many poor Indians lack such paperwork.[57]
By taking such drastic measures, Modi and the BJP have signalled a deeper, more tangible commitment to the Hindutva project. However, the question of their underlying motivations remains ambiguous. As previously discussed, Modi has incorporated the Hindutva ideology into his identity, and after securing a sweeping mandate, could now be forging a path towards his conception of an ideal India. Considering his history with the RSS – where he worked as campaigner during his youth – this position is plausible and should be taken seriously. By being immersed in the teachings of the RSS from a young age, it is understandable how such ideas might become entrenched. However, as Indian foreign policy expert Ian Hall notes, the divided nature of Modi’s motivations must be emphasised,[58] since internal party and electoral factors are also at play. As a populist who rallies majoritarian support around ‘tall promises’ – such as doubling the size of the economy to $5 trillion by 2025 – the obvious, yet toxic option available to Modi when issues arise, is to shift focus ‘from aspirations to resentments.’[59] By re-orientating the government’s narrative toward grievances, Modi stoked unrest and divisions within society. The necessity of doing so is clear while the economy is struggling, with the IMF projecting a diminished growth rate of just 4.8%.[60] Although this figure would be respectable in developed economies, it will fall very short of providing the millions of jobs required to employ India’s enormous young population. This poses a serious threat to Modi’s reputation, given that he was elected in 2014 on the back of a pro-business message.[61] However, the electoral success that Modi has enjoyed despite his inattentiveness to business, reflects the extent to which the BJP’s authority has grown,[62] and their success in shifting national attention. Therefore, as confidence in India’s economic health deteriorates, and important state elections approach in 2020, the incentive to heighten Hindu majoritarian sentiment as a distraction is clear. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A, in conjunction with the CAA, fuels the nationalist fervour which provides this distraction.
In summary, while Hindutva’s role in guiding Modi’s foreign policy cannot be dismissed entirely, it should be situated within a broader spectrum of motivations. Additionally, the intrinsic nature of Hindutva ideologies must be considered, as it ultimately dictates the capacity to shape policy. Due to Hindutva’s insufficient external focus, the ideology can be flexibly linked to the Sangh’s narrative. This has resulted in a tendency to revert to established practices when innovation is lacking. Such factors suggest that Hindutva – and the populist fervour it generates – is more suited to be a malleable, yet potent mechanism through which Modi has garnered majoritarian support. Therefore, Hindutva is particularly useful as a distraction when resentments are brewing in other areas such as the economy.
Assertive International Posture
Despite the ambiguity concerning Modi’s underlying motivations – whether Hindutva guides policy or is used for majoritarian purposes – Hindutva’s impact on the trajectory of India’s foreign and security policy is important to consider. However, it should first be noted that while understanding intent is undoubtedly significant, the objective impact on foreign policy will not necessarily be pronounced. Regardless of which case is most accurate – at least in the short term – the tangible results are likely to be similar. However, if Hindutva is truly a guiding force, then related developments are more genuine and could be longer-lasting.
Given the overtly masculine and confrontational nature of the Hindutva narrative, the potential for a BJP-led India to reflect such tendencies in its foreign and security policy is evident. An increasingly Hindutva-inspired foreign and security policy would be both forceful and divisive; reflecting nationalist logic.[63] This will be especially visible in the form of a populist agenda seeking to spur majoritarian fervour. Such developments will not necessarily draw upon Hindutva for specific guidance. Instead, it will be the essence of the ideology that policy will reflect for electoral purposes. However, due to its lack of clear guidelines, it will probably be carried out in an ad-hoc manner and sometimes be inconsistent. The brunt of this assertive, yet erratic international posture will be faced by traditional regional rivals such as Pakistan and to a lesser extent, China. Such tendencies could come to categorise how India approaches foreign policy more broadly and impact other issues such as immigration. Additionally, the uncertainty surrounding Hindutva could work in India’s favour, as other states might practice greater caution when dealing with it. However, it could also appear to be a less reliable strategic partner. Yet ultimately, inherent within the nature of Hindutva, lies the capacity for India to develop a more forceful, nationalist posture in its dealings with the outside world, despite its somewhat incoherent prescriptions.
Since independence, Pakistan has remained at the core of India’s international concerns. The growing influence of – or at least attention on – Hindutva ideologies has only amplified tensions. The geographical crux of the dispute lies in the contested region of Kashmir, where such ideologies have already inspired decisive action, including the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A. Prominent India scholar, Stephen Cohen, provides a useful lens through which to conceptualise the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as a ‘paired minority conflict.’[64] The nature of which bodes very poorly for the prospect of détente considering the prevalence of Hindutva thought. Cohen argues that such standoffs are the world’s most intractable and are the product of two states perceiving themselves as a threatened party under attack from a stronger adversary.[65] In such cases, mutual distrust is acute, and minor compromises are difficult to achieve due to fear of conveying weakness and inviting subsequent demands.[66] Such dynamics are especially challenging to overcome when ideologies deepen stubbornness.
Considering India’s advantages across several metrics, it is reasonable to question whether it truly fears Pakistan. While the extent of India’s anxiety is debatable, religious demographics provide an insight into how such fears could develop. Specifically, by viewing Pakistan as a spearhead of the broader Islamic world (as many Hindutva ideologues do), the perceived threat can appear amplified. Anti-Islamic sentiment can be very potent and destabilising in India, considering that India is home to the second-largest Muslim population in the world. Such concerns are heightened because Pakistan has a well-established history of supporting jihadist insurgencies inside Kashmir.[67] Years of collaboration between the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba significantly strengthened insurgent capabilities to the point where they could strike beyond Kashmir in the Indian heartland.[68] Chris Ogden examined the history of Indo-Pakistan relations through the analytic frame of norm creation, and established that a “Pakistan-terrorism nexus” has become normalised in Pakistani behaviour. Importantly, this association has become entrenched in Indian perceptions.[69]
Critically, the Kashmir dispute rests as much on notions of identity, perceptions and history as it does on land and resources.[70] Pakistan maintains entrenched conceptions of itself as a Muslim homeland and contests Indian control of Muslim-majority Kashmir.[71] Conversely, as a traditionally secular state, India cannot justify relinquishing its claim based on religious demographics.[72] Some argue that India’s traditional secular identity – which is now seemingly shifting towards a Hindu identity – stands in direct opposition to Pakistani assertions that Muslim-majority Kashmir is “an inherent part of the country’s Islamic identity.”[73] Furthermore, many Pakistanis claim partition was imperfectly carried out, and some of the more radical hold revanchist notions towards the Muslim population of India.[74] By Pakistan purporting to speak on behalf of Indian Muslims, it is posing a direct challenge to the integrity of the Indian state.[75] Fundamentally, the very existence of Pakistan is a threat to Indian identity.[76] This perspective frames why India has historically perceived Pakistan as a threat and why such sentiment is especially pronounced now since it is nuclear-armed and backed by China. Therefore, given the assertive image which Modi has constructed for himself, and his tendency to stir fear and resentment for political gain, the relationship will likely remain perpetually antagonistic.
The insights of Cohen can be built upon by returning the strong Hindutva emphasis on masculinity to the equation. Swati Parashar, a scholar of feminism and post-colonialism, described the perpetual standoff over Kashmir as “not just a geopolitical conflict… but a site for competing and conflicting masculinities.”[77] Such notions of masculinity have become incorporated into the national identity of both India and Pakistan, magnifying the depth of entrenchment. The call to recuperate a lost sense of masculinity deepens the emotive weight of the standoff because the endeavour becomes intertwined with the “quest for national strength and national self-confidence.”[78] Modi has sought to embody the strong, masculine nature of this sentiment, pledging to implement ‘comprehensive national security’ and deal with a ‘firm hand’ on issues such as cross-border terrorism.[79] The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution reflect Modi’s willingness to take bold steps which bolster his Hindutva credentials. Unless the BJP undergoes a drastic change of strategy in the coming years, they will need to continue pandering to their majoritarian voter-base by doubling down on such issues. Therefore, as Hindutva ideologies become more deeply entrenched, the prospect of an escalatory response to a crisis in Kashmir heightens.
However, the prospect for an assertive, nationalist stance from India is not limited to issues regarding Pakistan; it could come to categorise India’s foreign policy more broadly. This could be observed in India’s relationships with other states; particularly China. Indo-Chinese relations have historically been tense, with a war being fought in 1962.[80] Since Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has gradually encroached upon what India considers its traditional sphere of influence. Arguably the most significant point of contention in this regard is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the largest project of the BRI, and cuts through Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Modi’s decision to boycott the Belt and Road Forum in May 2018 reflects his disapproval,[81] but also indicates to his Hindutva-electoral base that the BJP-led India is strong and independent. In the future, such attitudes are likely to continue to define the stance of the BJP. Specifically, it will be in Modi’s interest to further his populist Hindutva narrative to perpetuate exclusionism, which acts as a binding social and ideological force. However, as previously discussed, Modi will only push this sentiment so far as it is pragmatic to do so. He understands the economic and military power imbalance between India and China, and the futility of conventional war, and therefore, is unlikely to press Beijing too hard. Additionally, India has deepened its economic reliance on China, providing further incentive to mitigate escalation. This imperative has become especially acute considering the struggles the BJP have faced in repairing India’s struggling economy.[82] Therefore, when the risk of escalation is relatively low, Modi will likely continue to rhetorically stand up to the Chinese – primarily to posture for his domestic audience. However, such action will be calculated and not cross any Chinese red-lines. Such predictions reflect an estimation of where Modi’s priorities lie; while his international image is important to him, his primary concerns are domestically focused.
Another prominent issue that the exclusionary elements of Hindutva will continue to affect is immigration. The BJP has utilised the notion of a distinct Hindu race,[83] harnessing Hindutva to galvanise popular support by fuelling resentment of the foreign ‘Other.’ India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval went as far as to suggest that “Muslim immigrants pose a threat to India’s civilizational identity.”[84] Such sentiment is reflected in developments such as the CAA. These themes are not only likely to tarnish India’s relations with the Islamic world, but also heighten support for a more stringent national security policy against illegal immigration. Muslim migration from Bangladesh is a primary issue in this regard; as opposed to Hindu migrants who are labelled ‘refugees,’ Muslim migrants are branded as ‘infiltrators.’[85] The problem is likely to become acute in the coming years due to rising sea-levels; the World Bank predicted that a one-metre rise could displace approximately 40 million people in Bangladesh.[86] The divisive elements of Hindutva will likely inspire stricter immigration measures to be implemented in response to this flow of people. Therefore, as Hindutva sentiment becomes further ingrained into India’s security policy, its stance will progressively align more closely with stringent nationalist logic.
Soft Power & Cultural Diplomacy
While Hindutva certainly has the capacity to fuel divisive and assertive foreign and security policymaking, the softer, more inclusive elements of Hindu thought have also been incorporated into its broader narrative and warrant attention. These features have been used as an instrument of India’s evolving cultural diplomacy and could help channel India’s massive soft power potential, which remains underutilised.[87] Modi, like his predecessors, has espoused the Sanskrit notion of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (‘the world is one family’), to bridge the divide between India and the outside world.[88] This was primarily intended to promote economic growth; by inviting foreign investment and business engagement.[89] However, the sphere in which such forces can operate is broader than just the economy; soft power can become a form of influence because it acts as a force of attraction.[90] It is ultimately uncertain how much this could impact the policy choices of other states. However, by shifting global perceptions in a positive direction, the interests of India may become a more significant consideration. However, after Modi’s series of controversial decisions in 2019, much work will be needed to repair his international reputation. Therefore, if India’s soft power potential is to be realised, the BJP must tread carefully.
India’s diaspora is becoming an increasingly important feature of its cultural diplomacy. It was once separated from politics,[91] but has now established itself as an instrumental force in the pursuit of India’s interests, notably through lobbying, forming active associations and holding seminars.[92] Moreover, the notion of Akhand Bharat, which translates to “undivided India” (or “united India”), encompassing all South Asia, broadens the possibilities of diasporic influence. For some hardliner Hindu Nationalists, Akhand Bharat represents a central goal – to reunite greater India to its pre-Partition state.[93] However, when viewed as a concept, rather than a policy prescription, it could act as a unifying force which reinforces ideas of collective South Asian identity with neighbouring states. The prominent Indian foreign policy scholar, Raja Mohan, suggests that expanding India’s focus to a broader South Asian diaspora will increase the collective weight of the region, in addition to the possibility of improving regional cooperation.[94] This potential is yet to be fully realised but could provide a powerful lever for India to pull on in the pursuit of future foreign policy initiatives. Such a sizeable diasporic population adds a physical element to India’s international influence, restraining the capacity of host nations to ignore Indian interests. It should be noted that such developments are possible without Hindutva ideologies. However, they inject a degree of emotive fervour into the situation. The formation of a “Hindu self” provides a powerful sense identity which can bind group dynamics,[95] fostering a more united force to project Indian foreign influence. Interestingly, the concept of Akhand Bharat can also be used to intertwine other religions, notably Buddhism, into India’s cultural sphere.[96] This has led to claims of shared heritage with Buddhist states such as Japan, China and Korea to encourage collaboration.[97] Ultimately, by combining cultural ties with a diaspora that is growing in both size and zealotry, India could realise a heightened level of global influence in the future.
While soft power is a noteworthy feature of a state’s international influence, it appears that during 2019, Modi prioritised a hard-line Hindutva stance. Ultimately, it was necessary to risk a degree of condemnation from the international community to realise his nationalist objectives and muster widespread majoritarian support within India. Therefore, Modi calculated that soft power was of a lower priority. This stance is likely to be carried forward in the coming years, as securing votes at home will almost always take precedence. Nonetheless, this should not discount soft power as an effective mechanism through which to extend India’s presence abroad. Instead, it merely puts its relative significance in perspective.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to provide insights into the nature of Hindutva and assess its impact on India’s international posture. These issues are becoming increasingly important to understand since the BJP and the broader Sangh Parivar are entrenching such ideas within the socio-political identity of India. Such forces became increasingly visible in 2019, with Modi doubling-down on his Hindu nationalist stance. However, while Modi has come to embody Hindutva populism,[98] the degree to which such ideas explicitly guided his foreign and security policy remained relatively low. Instead, substantial literature suggests that Modi has pragmatically employed these ideologies to spur majoritarian fervour. Such dynamics are enabled by the lack of coherent foreign policy prescriptions established by Hindutva ideologues, allowing Modi and the BJP to attribute a diverse array of policies to the ideology selectively.
The long-term consequences of these developments remain uncertain. However, the central themes of masculinity and national strength which lie at the core of Hindutva teachings could either motivate or be used to justify a more assertive international posture. This will most likely materialise in heightened tensions with regional rivals such as Pakistan and China. Yet this approach could also come to categorise Indian foreign policy more broadly. Nonetheless, the more inclusive features of Hinduism might also be intertwined with Hindutva to continue projecting a binding narrative of cultural unity – through which India can exercise soft power. However, as of February 2020, India’s soft power has become overshadowed by divisive nationalist sentiment, possibly to divert public attention from issues such as the economic slowdown. Ultimately, as long the BJP remains in power, such trends are likely to continue, especially while India faces economic challenges. Therefore, the outside world should not be surprised to witness an increasingly assertive, and sometimes unpredictable Indian government whose actions reflect its domestic political interests.
Ben Barron is pursuing a Bachelor of International Security Studies at The Australian National University. He is developing a regional focus on India and South Asia.
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[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridian Books, 1956): 49.
[2] Arun R. Swamy, “Ideology, Organization and Electoral Strategy of Hindu Nationalism: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?” in Religious Radicalism in South Asia, ed. Mohan Malik, Robert Wirsing and Satu Limaye (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004): 76
[3] Ian Hall, “Is a ‘Modi doctrine’ emerging in Indian foreign policy?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 3 (2015): 249.
[4] Christophe Jaffrelot and Louise Tillin, “Populism in India,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 185.
[5] Ravi Agrawal and Kathryn Salam, “India’s Economy Is Stalling. Critics Blame a ‘Climate of Fear.’,” Foreign Policy, accessed February 10, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/indias-economy-is-stalling-critics-blame-a-climate-of-fear/.
[6] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Modi Pushes India Into Revolt,” Foreign Affairs, accessed January 19, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-12-20/modi-pushes-india-revolt.
[7] Thorsten Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism, and Foreign Policy in India: The Politics of Representing ‘the People,’” International Studies Review 0 (2019): 15.
[8] C. Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015), 177.
[9] Gino Battaglia, “Neo-Hindu Fundamentalism Challenging the Secular and Pluralistic Indian State,” Religions 8, no. 10 (2017): 216.
[10] Battaglia, “Neo-Hindu Fundamentalism,” 216.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ashutosh Varshney, “Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (1993): 231.
[14] Edward Anderson, and Arkotong Longkumer, “‘Neo-Hindutva’: evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism,” Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4 (2018): 375.
[15] Thomas Blom Hansen, “Recuperating Masculinity: Hindu nationalism, violence and the exorcism of the Muslim ‘Other’,’ Critique of Anthropology 16, no. 2, (1996): 145.
[16] Christophe Jaffrelot, “Between Hindu Nationalism and Coalition Politics: Jana Sangh, BJP and the ‘Moderation Thesis Regarding the ‘Radical Parties,’” in Interrogating India’s Modernity: Democracy, Identity, and Citizenship, ed. Surinder S. Jodhkar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 169.
[17] Hansen, “Recuperating Masculinity,” 145.
[18] Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History Culture, Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1998), 108.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid, 109.
[21] Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1996), 18.
[22] Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 19-20.
[23] Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, 3rd edn (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1996), 142.
[24] Ian Hall, Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2019), 41.
[25] Ibid, 127.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Sumit Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign Policy?” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 2 (2017): 132.
[28] Rajesh Basrur, “Modi’s foreign policy fundamentals: a trajectory unchanged,” International Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 8.
[29] Manjari Chatterjee Miller and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Pragmatism in Indian foreign policy: how ideas constrain Modi,” International Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 28.
[30] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi: A New Brand or Just Repackaging?” International Studies Perspectives 20, no. 1(2019): 4.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Basrur, “Modi’s foreign policy fundamentals,” 14.
[33] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi,” 4.
[34] Basrur, “Modi’s foreign policy fundamentals,” 14.
[35] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi,” 5.
[36] Ibid.
[37] “IMF cuts India’s FY20 growth forecast to 4.8%,” The Economic Times, accessed January 21, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/imf-cuts-indias-fy20-gdp-growth-forecast-to-4-8/articleshow/73435183.cms/.
[38] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi,” 5.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Hall, Modi and the Reinvention, 127.
[41] Ibid, 17.
[42] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi,” 8.
[43] Ibid, 9.
[44] Ian Hall, “India’s 2019 General Election: National Security and the Rise of the Watchmen,” The Round Table (2019): 5.
[45] Sumit Ganguly and R Harrison Wagner, “India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 480.
[46] Arka Biswas, “Surgical Strikes and Deterrence-Stability in South Asia,” ORF Occasional Paper, no. 115 (2017): 7.
[47] Hall, “India’s 2019 General Election,” 4.
[48] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 14.
[49] Hall, “India’s 2019 General Election,” 5.
[50] Julio C. Teehankee and Mark R. Thompson, “Electing a Strongman,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (2016): 125.
[51] Laura Tingle, “Follow the leader: Democracy and the rise of the strongman,” Quarterly Essay, no. 71 (2018): 32
[52] Sushmita Pandit and Saayan Chattopadhyay, “Coverage of the Surgical Strike on Television News in India,” Journalism Practice 12, no. 2 (2018): 172.
[53] Miller, and de Estrada, “Pragmatism,” 28.
[54] Ibid, 35.
[55] Chao Xie, “How Status-seeking States Can Cooperate: Explaining India–China Rapprochement After the Doklam Standoff,” India Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2019):180.
[56] Bhanu Mehta, “Modi Pushes India.”
[57] Ibid.
[58] Hall, Modi and the Reinvention, 17.
[59] James Manor, “Can Modi and the BJP Achieve and Sustain Hegemony?,” in Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism is Changing India, ed. Angana P. Chatterji, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (London : Hurst & Company, 2019), 130.
[60] “IMF cuts India’s FY20 growth forecast to 4.8%.”
[61] Ronojoy Sen, “Everyone Thinks the Economy Is Issue No. 1 for India’s Modi. It’s Not.,” Foreign Policy, accessed 22 February 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/21/everyone-thinks-the-economy-is-issue-no-1-for-indias-modi-its-not/.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 12.
[64] Stephen Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 4 (2010): 32.
[65] Ibid, 33.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Chris Ogden, “Tracing the Pakistan–Terrorism Nexus in Indian Security Perspectives: From 1947 to 26/11,” India Quarterly 69, no. 1 (2013): 45.
[68] Prem Mahadevan, The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 125.
[69] Ogden, “Tracing the Pakistan–Terrorism,” 45.
[70] Cohen, “India, Pakistan,” 45.
[71] Ibid, 46.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Matthew Hill, and Nishank Motwani, “Language, Identity and (In)Security in India–Pakistan Relations: The Case of Kashmir,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2017): 123-124.
[74] Cohen, “India, Pakistan,” 38.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Rajeev Sharma, The Pakistan Trap (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors, 2001), 73.
[77] Swati Parashar, “Competing masculinities, militarization and the conflict in Kashmir,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 20, no. 4, (2018): 665.
[78] Hansen, “Recuperating Masculinity,” 138.
[79] Hall, Modi and the Reinvention, 125.
[80] David M Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52, no.1 (2010): 137.
[81] Economic Times, “Modi only world statesman to stand up to China on BRI: Pillsbury,” accessed January 28, 2020, https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/modi-only-world-statesman-to-stand-up-to-china-on-bri-pillsbury/articleshow/61682471.cms.
[82] Shezad Lakhani, “How the Modi Administration Is Hamstringing the Indian Economy,” The Diplomat, accessed February 20, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/how-the-modi-administration-is-hamstringing-the-indian-economy/.
[83] Duncan McDonnell and Luis Cabrera, “The right-wing populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and why comparativists should care),” Democratization 26, no. 3 (2019): 494.
[84] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 11.
[85] Gautam Ghosh, “An ‘infiltration’ of time? Hindu Chauvinism and Bangladeshi migration in/to Kolkata, India,” Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology 6, no. 1 (2015): 277.
[86] Jürgen Scheffran and Antonella Battaglini, “Climate and conflicts: the security risks of global warming,” Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011): 34.
[87] Shrey Khanna and P. Moorthy, “Analysing India’s Soft Power Functioning in the Twenty-first Century: Possibilities and Challenges,” India Quarterly 73, no. 3 (2017): 307.
[88] Gupta et al., “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi,” 12.
[89] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 15.
[90] Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 94-109.
[91] Amba Pande, “India and its Diaspora: Charting New Avenues of Engagement,” International Studies 54, no. 1-4 (2017): 187.
[92] Pande, “India and its Diaspora,” 189.
[93] W. J. Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[94] Mohan, Modi’s World, 188.
[95] Anderson and Longkumer, “Neo-Hindutva,” 375.
[96] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 9.
[97] Mohan, Modi’s World, 185.
[98] Wojczewski, “Populism, Hindu Nationalism,” 10.
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