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Abstract
Since its founding over seven decades ago, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and its ruling regime have presented the United States and its allies with countless foreign policy and national security challenges. The task of managing the domestic and global consequences of an ever-evolving U.S.-DPRK relationship has often been characterized as the most significant foreign policy hurdle a U.S. president must contend with during one’s time in office.
This paper identifies several ideological misunderstandings and strategic miscalculations underpinning decades of unsuccessful US-DPRK engagements. By failing to fully comprehend North Korea’s sacred “Juche” and “Military First” identities, as well as its deeply-rooted intersubjective beliefs about the United States, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus has fundamentally overlooked the critical societal norms and social identities that drive Pyongyang’s behavior. Acknowledging these shortcomings, the following paper outlines a fresh approach for U.S. foreign policy, pivoting from the unsuccessful strategies of firebrand rhetoric and strategic patience, towards a new policy of strategic accommodation. By offering symbolic provisions in accordance with North Korea’s foundational identities, this recommendation allows the United States to extend an open hand of friendship, without compromising its national security and defense.
In the year since this article was written, much has changed in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. On June 12, 2018, President Trump and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un held the first-ever meeting between the two nations’ heads of state. By reducing the visible threat of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and placing various symbolic provisions, such as the official recognition of the end of the Korean War, on the negotiating table, the Trump administration has already significantly altered this nation’s traditional foreign policy approach towards U.S.-DPRK relations. Through continued efforts to further enhance mutual understanding and improve cross-cultural dialogue, the United States and North Korea stand poised to enter a new and unprecedented relationship, one rooted in respect and dialogue as opposed to disdain and conflict.
Introduction
Former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel once stated, “engagement is not appeasement. Engagement is not surrender.” For decades, foreign policy on North Korea in the United States and around the world has been premised on the notion that North Korea is driven to ensure state security and regime survival. On the path leading to a denuclearized Korean peninsula, a long history of failed diplomatic and military efforts warrant a new constructivist perspective on Pyongyang’s ambitions, one rooted in comprehending the nation’s sacred “Juche” and “Military First” identities, as well as its intersubjective beliefs regarding the United States. America’s unsuccessful diplomacy with North Korea is the result of Washington’s inherent misunderstanding of Pyongyang’s intentions. Recognizing the founding identity of the North Korean state along with the social norms that motivate its actions is paramount to avoiding conflict.
In the short-run, the United States should pivot from the unsuccessful policies of strategic patience and firebrand rhetoric to one of strategic accommodation, extending a warm hand in an effort to ease tensions. By altering the form of interaction between the two nations from hostile rhetoric and military actions to respectful dialogue, repeated non-threatening engagement may reconstruct the relationship from one plagued by crippling doubt and suspicion to one rooted in enhanced trust and civility. The United States should implement provisions that appeal to North Korea’s “Juche” identity, scale back the perceived threat of imperialism, and work to alter the nation’s negative intersubjective view of the United States. Strategies may include the formal establishment of diplomatic relations, official recognition of the end of the Korean War, and the reduction of a visible U.S. security threat in the region. Strategic accommodation entails a hybrid approach, conceding in theory yet forceful and vigilant in practice. These symbolic concessions are far removed from a policy of appeasement. Instead, they are low-risk, low-cost strategies which may prove successful in de-escalating present tensions by offering face-value provisions while also maintaining U.S. defense structures in case of the unthinkable. Many lawmakers shudder at the very notion of accommodating an authoritarian regime as ruthless as the Kim family, and have raised the prospects of institutionalized multilateral diplomacy, regime change, and deference to China as potential alternatives. However, repeated historical failures, unfathomable costs, and misaligned interests highlight the failures of these conventional approaches. How Washington engages Pyongyang matters, not only to the nations involved, but to the entire world.
Pyongyang’s Intentions from a Constructivist Perspective
While realist policymakers and experts utilize Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions as an exemplary example of a state guided by the principle of self-help in the billiard ball structure of international affairs, closer examination of the two foundational pillars of North Korea’s policies, the “Juche” philosophy and “Military First” theory, suggests that an identity cemented in anti-imperialist sentiment combined with a desire for internationally validated sovereignty are in fact the factors that drive North Korea’s quest for enhanced nuclear strike capabilities. The first step of strategic accommodation revolves around understanding Pyongyang’s intentions and practices from an identity-based and intersubjective perspective.
Realists assert that North Korean leaders pursue deliverable nuclear weapons for the primary purpose of deterring regime change.[1] Though convincing, this theory is a surface-level oversimplification that fails to adequately reveal the full scope of Pyongyang’s intentions. The founding identity of the North Korean state was based on two rather simple principles: “the expulsion of the Japanese and the establishment of a communist-led government.”[2] Since its inception, North Korea has perceived the struggle against foreign imperialism as the only guarantor of its survival. An editorial in the state-controlled newspaper Rodong Shinmun illustrated this claim in 1999, when it stated that the “Military First” policy “is instrumental in winning a victory in the serious ideological stand-off with imperialism.”[3] In effect, the article asserted that “Military First” politics alone can defend and protect the fatherland in the face of confrontation with foreign imperialists.
The recurring theme of countering imperialism goes hand-in-hand with “Juche.” A critical tenet of “Juche” ideology dictates that “each nation has equal rights in relation to other nations,” a significant indicator supporting Pyongyang’s goal of projecting North Korean sovereignty and independence on the international stage.[4] Understanding the anti-imperialist “Military First” policy along with the self-reliant Juche ideology is crucial to comprehending North Korea’s perspective of the world. Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions are, therefore, better understood from the constructivist perspective of a nation seeking international validation of its sovereignty and independence from the influence of imperialist powers.
Strategic Accommodation Part 1: “Juche” Ideology and Symbolic Concessions
The collapse of a cooperative structure of shared knowledge due to significant misunderstandings of North Korean identity and intentions has fueled the escalating security dilemma. Although any interaction with Pyongyang may appear both counterproductive and disadvantageous, accommodation targeting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) symbolic and identity-based goals may demonstrate that mutually beneficial engagement is in fact possible.
Strategic accommodation encompasses a two-pronged strategy. The United States should first make concessions to North Korea to fulfill the DPRK’s quest for international validation of its sovereignty and equal presence on the world stage. Next, acknowledging the DPRK’s strong anti-imperialist identity, the United States should aim to reduce its visible threat to North Korean security by scaling back hostile rhetoric and reducing aggressive actions. Focusing on the first provision, constructivism holds that how states behave in the international system depend on “the identities they hold about themselves and others.”[5] Recognizing the important effect national identities have on state behavior is instrumental to crafting a successful strategy of accommodation. As previously noted, a central tenet of North Korea’s “Juche” identity maintains that all nations share equal rights and status. Therefore, Washington should extend a warm hand first, in a direct appeal to “what North Korea itself has long said it desires — to be treated as a normal country by the United States.”[6] Strategies may include offering the DPRK full diplomatic recognition, the establishment of a North Korean embassy in Washington, or a formal declaration marking the end of the Korean War. These symbolic concessions come at little cost or risk to overall national security, but it sets a new precedent of trust and confidence, signifying a significant improvement in future bilateral relations.[7] By directly appealing to a vital pillar of North Korean identity and satisfying its pursuit of international validation, strategic accommodation may reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula in the short-term, and deescalate the security dilemma in the long-term.
The Failures of Multilateral Negotiations
The notion of accommodation has long been rejected by both academic and policymaking circles, with critics citing the historical failures and consequences of appeasement. Instead, conventional policies of hardline diplomacy, including increased pressure and attempts at bilateral or multilateral negotiations, are often cited as alternatives to accommodation. While these initiatives may appear both reasonable and feasible, a history of failed negotiations reveals that the traditional approach of American diplomacy, which involves placing Washington’s interests on the table and expecting Pyongyang to comply, has been entirely unsuccessful. During the Bush administration’s multilateral Six-Party talks, former DPRK leader Kim Jong II was quoted saying that his country was ready “to resume the Six-Party Talks […] provided that the United States treated it with respect.”[8] This statement further emphasizes how Pyongyang values international validation and respect, which underlies much of its behavior at the negotiating table. However, rather than addressing and accommodating these symbolic requests for the purpose of advancing cooperation, the Bush administration appeared committed to a policy of securing America’s interests above all else, epitomized by the belief that “Washington should lead and Pyongyang follow.”[9]
Multilateral negotiations and regional security forums, such as the Six-Party Talks, are advocated as a means to achieving denuclearization and ensuring non-proliferation. However, in promoting this strategy, policymakers often overemphasize the American desire for denuclearization and nonproliferation, and lose sight of North Korea’s peripheral objectives. These objectives, if accommodated, may further incentivize North Korea to cooperate and thus increase the likelihood of diplomatic success. While critics of appeasement are justified in their concerns about dishonest compliance with the negotiated terms, this first provision of strategic accommodation encompasses neither the risks of bilateral appeasement nor the ineffectiveness of stubborn multilateral negotiation.
Strategic Accommodation Part 2: Intersubjective Beliefs and Anti-Imperialism
For years, the West has viewed North Korea as a permanent member of the so-called “axis of evil,” antagonizing and lambasting the Kim regime at every opportunity. While the regime’s human rights violations and tyrannical rule undoubtedly justify intense scrutiny and harsh criticism from the international community, aggressive American actions and rhetoric intended to threaten or intimidate Pyongyang have also proven to be counterproductive. Rather than minimizing the risk of conflict, these tactics have only further fueled North Koreans’ negative intersubjective view of the United States, providing the Kim regime with the enemy it needs to consolidate domestic legitimacy and extinguishing any possibility of bilateral cooperation. Therefore, the second component of strategic accommodation should aim to reshape North Korea’s antagonist perception of the United States by reducing America’s visible security threat in the region and altering Washington’s rhetoric and tone. Authors James Winnefeld and Michael Morell assert in an article that “the regime needs the U.S. as an enemy–the elimination of an external distraction and the increased information flow accompanying a rapprochement could very well spell the beginning of the end of the regime.”[10] Given this claim, why does the United States continue to participate in a game of brinkmanship, whose sole beneficiary is the Kim regime? Echoing Winnefeld’s assertion, Paul French argues that “American policy towards the DPRK, at least as interpreted by Pyongyang, was the legitimacy needed to reassert Military First and a more hardline stance.”[11]
The “Military First” doctrine was founded on an anti-imperialist platform and was intended to evoke nationalist fervor when faced with encroachment by a foreign power. French suggests that Pyongyang relies on its ability to frame Washington’s actions and rhetoric as an imperialist threat to legitimize aggressive actions in the eyes of its own citizenry. Although the basis for security competition lies in one state projecting more strength and fortitude than another, the aforementioned evidence suggests that reshaping the North Korean population’s negative intersubjective beliefs regarding the United States will not only de-escalate tensions in the short-run, but also delegitimize the regime in the long-run. After all, the removal or significant scale-back of the U.S. security threat would give the Kim regime the face and political capital to do what the United States actually wants North Korea to do.[12]
The Costs of Regime Change
Critics of accommodation often regard forceful rhetoric and displays of power as the only means of interaction with authoritarian regimes. President Donald Trump captured this line of reasoning in September when he criticized South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s softer stance towards Pyongyang: “South Korea is finding […] that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing.”[13] Citing the dangers of exhibiting weakness through a strategy of accommodation, critics often advocate for an approach that matches fire with fire, proposing the prospect of overt or covert regime change. The unfathomable costs of overt regime change are widely known, with near consensus that a strategy of preemptive military action would do more harm than good. However, what about covert regime change initiatives?
During the Cold War, the United States alone attempted sixty-three covert foreign imposed regime changes (FIRC).[14] While the internally-focused, transformative strategy of regime change may appear to strike at the root of the problem, in practice, due to the principal agent problem, foreign interveners are often unable to establish obedient agents with aligned interests, ultimately resulting in failed attempts to improve interstate relations. In his book Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, Joshua Muravchik asserts that “covert action has probably more often served to advance democracy than to retard it.”[15] Muravchik further argues that successful American strategy involves identifying and strengthening individuals of democratic belief and aiding their ascent to office.[16] Despite the promise of Muravchik’s theory, the principal agent problem significantly limits the probability of successful regime change. Leaders installed by foreigner actors are constrained by both powerful domestic groups and enduring national interests. Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke demonstrated that leaders who act in the intervenor’s interests at the expense of their own constituents are more likely to be “deposed by force.” The resulting governments are usually more hostile to the intervenor, raising the possibility of interstate conflict.[17] Thus, pursuing regime change in North Korea without careful consideration of the nation’s domestic political and social structures may in fact exacerbate bilateral hostilities. Changing another state’s behavior is not as simple as changing its leader. Despite revealing a degree of American weakness, a policy of strategic accommodation may ultimately incur less costs and foster better relations than foreign-imposed regime change.
The Ineffectiveness of China’s Involvement
Lastly, proponents of increased reliance on China offer a final counter to accommodation, one that goes beyond the strategies of multilateral negotiation and regime change. Supporters of this approach contend that while unilateral American economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures have largely failed to alter Pyongyang’s behavior, it is in China’s best interests to utilize its unique economic and historical leverage to compel North Korea to return to meaningful negotiations, given Beijing’s concerns about a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula and the possible proliferation of nuclear materials.[18] China is therefore left with two options. It can support or contribute to US-led international sanctions against the Kim regime, in an attempt to impose economic costs so great that Pyongyang is compelled to change its behavior. Alternatively, China may provide support or remain neutral in the event of an American attempt at regime change. Although these strategies appear both compelling and attainable, the overwhelming historical failure of economic sanctions to incentivize any adjustment in North Korea’s behavior renders China’s increased intervention ineffective. The resulting instability and uncertainty of regime change renders China’s neutrality towards aggressive American policies infeasible.
The Failures of Economic Sanctions
Vladimir Putin perhaps best captured the inherent ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions when he stated, “they’d rather eat grass than give up their nuclear program.”[19] While proponents of economically coercive strategies insist that China’s increased participation in international efforts may impose costs on the Kim regime that are too significant to ignore, the past eight years of expanded sanctions have produced little to no results while North Korea’s nuclear program has continued to escalate. The belief that choking the DPRK’s economy to the point of submission will catalyze change is both naive and unproductive. During his administration, President Obama was determined to “goad Beijing into imposing sanctions that would break Pyongyang’s nuclear will,” hailing each new UN Security Council sanction as a “game changer.”[20] However, China’s magnified participation has hardly broken Pyongyang’s will. In fact, the past eight years have yielded only a dramatic increase in the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and strike capabilities.[21]
Thus, economic sanctions have been ineffective. In order to truly reconstruct North Korea’s intentions and de-escalate the current security dilemma, the United States must give before it can take. An accommodating grand bargain, offering symbolic concessions and lessened military activity, will grant Kim a sense of security and leave him room to maneuver domestically. The past decade of American policy has shown little interest in a grand bargain, which has only served to encourage Kim to “maintain his father’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a guarantor of his security.”[22] The conventional approach of economic pressure and strategic patience has produced few productive outcomes. Rather than seeking China’s support for a fundamentally flawed strategy, the United States should request that China stand behind a new policy of strategic accommodation, an approach that may relieve Beijing of its uncomfortable role as an intermediary between two conflicting foes.
Conclusion
In November 2017, three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers sailed together for the first time in a decade while participating in joint Western Pacific exercises, a clear signal to North Korea that Washington is not intimidated by Pyongyang’s continued testing of nuclear weapons.[23] Although American policy remains uncertain moving forward, with options ranging from multilateral negotiations, economic sanctions to foreign-imposed regime change, all three strategies have proven unable to de-escalate tensions or improve interstate relations. These failures stem from narrow visions of American interests and a limited understanding of North Korean identity. A strategy of accommodation, while potentially unpopular domestically, would provide a fresh approach to a crisis that is rapidly spiraling out of control. By offering Pyongyang international validation and respect through full diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War, the United States would directly appeal to a critical tenet of North Korea’s founding “Juche” ideology: international equality amongst nations. This first provision of strategic accommodation may greatly enhance the possibility of building a constructive and even cooperative relationship moving forward. Additionally, by reducing the visible U.S. military presence in the region and altering the tone of its rhetoric, Washington would appeal to the anti-imperialist aspect of North Korea’s identity, potentially reshaping the North’s negative intersubjective view of the United States and reduce current hostilities. Although critics often cite risks to U.S. national security to illustrate the dangerous costs of appeasement, strategic accommodation is not appeasement. Accommodating North Korea’s symbolic ambitions and its concerns of sovereignty constitute little credible threat to the U.S.’ national security interests. Nevertheless, no policy approach is perfect. The uncertainty of accommodation may be frightening; however, the calamity of nuclear war is far worse.
Derek Wu is an A.B. Candidate in Economics, Secondary in Government at Harvard College.
Works Cited
Downes, Alexander B., and Lindsey A. O’Rourke. “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations.” The MIT Press Journals 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 43-89. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://www.mitpressjournals.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00256.
French, Paul. North Korea: State of Paranoia. London: Zed Books, 2014.
Hurd, Ian. “Constructivism.” Last modified January 18, 2008. Accessed November 10, 2017. http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf.
Kihl, Young Whan. “Bi-Multilateral Approaches to Defusing Nuclear Crisis: Beyond the Six-Party Talks as Peace Strategy.” In North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, 245-68. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
Kim, Ilpyong J. “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics.” In North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, 59-75. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
Lendon, Brad. “North Korea: 3 US Aircraft Carriers Creating ‘Worst Ever’ Situation.” CNN. Last modified November 14, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/12/politics/us-navy-three-carrier-exercise-pacific/index.html.
Moore, Gregory J. “AMERICA’S FAILED NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR POLICY: A NEW APPROACH.” Asian Perspective 32, no. 4 (2008): 9-27. http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/42704651.
Muravchik, Joshua. Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny. Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992. Accessed November 10, 2017. http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-exporting-democracy_10290155186.pdf.
Taylor, Adam. “Why Haven’t Sanctions on North Korea Worked? Two Very Different Theories.” The Washington Post. Last modified September 12, 2017. Accessed November 12, 2017.
“Trump Warns North Korea Leaders ‘Only Understand One Thing’.” POLITICO. Last modified September 3, 2017. Accessed November 12, 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-warns-north-korea-leaders-only-understand-one-thing/.
Winnefeld, James and Michael Morell. “Realism and North Korea.” The Cipher Brief, March 30, 2017.
[1] James Winnefeld and Michael Morell, “Realism and North Korea,” The Cipher Brief, March 30, 2017.
[2] Paul French, North Korea: State of Paranoia (London: Zed Books, 2014), 62.
[3] Ilpyong J Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” in North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 65.
[4] French, North Korea: State of Paranoia, 64.
[5] Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” Last modified January 18, 2008, Accessed November 10, 2017, http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf.
[6] Gregory J. Moore, “America’s Failed North Korean Nuclear Policy: A New Approach,” Asian Perspective 32, no. 4 (2008): 23 http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/42704651.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Young Whan Kihl, “Bi-Multilateral Approaches to Defusing Nuclear Crisis: Beyond the Six-Party Talks as Peace Strategy,” In North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, (edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, 245-68. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 264.
[9] French, North Korea: State of Paranoia, 304.
[10] James Winnefeld and Michael Morell, “Realism and North Korea,” The Cipher Brief, March 30, 2017.
[11] French, North Korea: State of Paranoia, 324.
[12] Moore, “America’s Failed North Korean Nuclear Policy: A New Approach,” 25.
[13] “Trump Warns North Korea Leaders ‘Only Understand One Thing’,” POLITICO, Last modified September 3, 2017, Accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-warns-north-korea-leaders-only-understand-one-thing/.
[14] Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations,” The MIT Press Journals 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016), Accessed November 14, 2017, http://www.mitpressjournals.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00256.
[15] Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, Washington D.C,: The AEI Press, 1992, Accessed November 10, 2017, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-exporting-democracy_10290155186.pdf.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Downes, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations.”
[18] Joseph R DeTrani, “After 20 Years of Failed Talks With North Korea, China Needs to Step Up,” Arms Control Today 44, no. 8 (2014): 20 http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/24336183.
[19] Adam Taylor, “Why Haven’t Sanctions on North Korea Worked? Two Very Different Theories,” The Washington Post, Last modified September 12, 2017, Accessed November 12, 2017.
[20] John Delury, “Trump and North Korea: Reviving the Art of the Deal,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 2 (March/April 2017): 50
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 48.
[23] Brad Lendon, “North Korea: 3 US Aircraft Carriers Creating ‘Worst Ever’ Situation,” CNN, Last modified November 14, 2017, Accessed November 14, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/12/politics/us-navy-three-carrier-exercise-pacific/index.html.
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