Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed below represent the opinions of the article’s author. The following work does not necessarily represent the views of the Synergy: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
Over the past four decades, tides of globalization and market reforms have swept across China, bringing rapid changes to almost every aspect of Chinese society. While much light has been shed on China’s dramatic economic development and sluggish political reforms, its cultural system has gained relatively little attention from scholars around the world. In this context, China Central Television (CCTV), China’s official national television network, acutely demonstrates the complexity of China’s cultural system and the “combination of market economy and state control.”[1] It is crucial to complicate the image of CCTV by explaining its Janus-faced characteristics, and unpack how young people in China perceive CCTV today. On one hand, pointing to CCTV’s role as an instrument of state control and propaganda, Chinese youth are increasingly critical of CCTV’s political content. On the other hand, impressed by its success in the cultural industry, Chinese youth simultaneously respect the authority and competence of CCTV, affectionately giving it the nickname “dad.”
The image of CCTV is often reduced to a symbol of authoritarian repression and indoctrination in contemporary discourses – sometimes rightfully so. Under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, CCTV is directly connected to the central Chinese government and widely viewed as the “mouthpiece of the state.”[2] CCTV’s iconic program is Xinwen Lianbo (Network News Broadcast), which goes on air from 7pm to 7:30pm every day, broadcasted by all television channels across China at the same time. This news program plays a crucial role as one of the CCP’s communication mechanisms, presenting the official political positions of the Chinese government on both domestic and international issues.[3] Another example of CCTV programming is the Spring Festival Gala, which is broadcasted live by CCTV on the eve of Chinese New Year. The Spring Festival Gala not only entertains large audiences spanning a wide range of ages and socio-economic classes, but also educates the Chinese public with moral messages of patriotism, dedication and filial piety. The significance of this annual gala was elevated to the status of a “national project” in 2014, signalling the intensification of indoctrination under the leadership of Xi Jinping.[4] In recent years, the authoritarian image of CCTV has been reinforced under the current administration, who uses its media outlets to champion the rhetoric of the “Chinese Dream.”
However, it is equally important to recognize CCTV’s success as the most privileged source of information in China and a major aspiring player in the commercialized cultural industry. CCTV’s direct connection with the state grants it special privileges to cover major events and exclusive access to information from the CCP.[5] 2008 was significant to CCTV, an eventful year that provided CCTV with a substantial number of opportunities to prove its extraordinary capacity to the world. When a magnitude eight earthquake hit Sichuan Province on May 12, 2008, CCTV immediately organized news reporting via rolling tickers. Within 50 minutes of the earthquake, the CCTV had prepared a special program.[6] Another highlight of CCTV’s programming that year was also the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games hosted in Beijing, which attracted over 83% of all Chinese television viewers and positively received by 98.5% of the audience.[7] According to famous political analyst Russell Moses: “this wasn’t China coming out to the world. This was the world coming around to China.”[8]
Since then, CCTV’s unique role in promoting China’s soft power has been heatedly debated by international observers.[9] Taking the popular documentary “A Bite of China” as an example, each episode of this culinary culture series generated USD 350,000 worth of revenue in foreign markets.[10] It is evident that whilst CCTV is faced with challenges brought forth by marketization and globalization, CCTV has actively employed adaptive strategies to win public support.
Overall, CCTV is a microcosm of China’s cultural system, and its Janus-faced characteristics are vividly mirrored in how young Chinese people perceive CCTV today. In China, CCTV sits at the intersection of official and popular discourse due to friction between restrictions on political participation and the participatory desire of the public.[11] What CCTV says to the public and what the public says about CCTV are equally as important. Profoundly influenced by alternative sources of information – notably Western media, popular social media networks and provincial broadcasting operators – young Chinese audiences have developed contradictory attitudes towards CCTV.
Chinese youth, a new generation that is relatively better educated and more aware of the “outside” world, are increasingly critical and suspicious of CCTV, especially with regards to the dull drudgery of its political content. This unsatisfied need for alternative narratives and growing discontent has given rise to several regional satellite television stations that are attempting to challenge the long-established dominance of CCTV. Take Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) as an example. This youth-oriented television station is one of CCTV’s biggest competitors, winning the hearts and minds of millions of Chinese youth through its innovative entertainment programming, such as Super Girls from 2004 to 2006 and Singer more recently. In 2008, HSTV generated USD 220 million in revenue, ranking first among satellite broadcasters.[12] As Ouyang Changling, the former president of Hunan Group outlined, “Chinese television has traditionally put too much weight on news programs and programs of high culture,” and it is good to break the old patterns.[13]
The rise of social media has further challenged CCTV’s built-in advantages in terms of information delivery. By 2017, China has an estimated number of 731 million internet users. Sina Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter, has 340 million active monthly users.[14] Flourishing social media networks have largely increased netizens’ access to information, with the additional advantages of public accountability and immense popularity. On Sina Weibo, millions of blog posts are produced and circulated every day. More difficult and costly for the Chinese government to monitor, this social media platform creates a more diffused space for public debates.[15] Consequently, there are millions of posts discussing “sensitive political content” such as social conflicts, protests, strikes and corruption circulated on Sina Weibo every day.[16]
However, in recent years, Chinese youth have also come to address CCTV on social media as baba, an informal word for “father” in Chinese. On social media, references to “baba” are a humorous way of articulating respect and compliments to the central national network. By addressing CCTV as baba, Chinese youth demonstrate their admiration for CCTV’s advanced capacity to produce programs relating to Chinese history or culture, as well as its impressive performance in reporting and hosting major events. The television program National Treasure is a typical example of this. Aiming to make national treasures come “alive” again, this large-scale culture exploration show presented 27 cultural relics from nine leading museums in China. The fascinating historical stories of each artefact are narrated by popular celebrities, and the artistic methods behind each relic are introduced by leading archaeological experts. Even the fabulous stage design of the show has been applauded by millions of viewers over social media.[17] National Treasure scores 9 out of 10 on Douban, one of China’s most influential websites for book and film reviews. Interestingly, among the five most popular short reviews of National Treasure that earned over 2000 likes on Douban, two literally use the reference to CCTV as “the dad” in the context of a phrase that translates roughly to “our dad CCTV shows you who’s boss” (yangshi baba jiao zuoren), or literally translated to “our dad CCTV teaches you how to be a good person”. This phrase alludes to the fact that other regional satellite channels are incapable of competing with CCTV in their productions of large-scale cultural programs. Although several comments mention “indoctrination,” “embarrassing” and “propaganda,” 91% of reviewers responded positively to this show, and a strong sense of national pride runs throughout the online discussion.[18] Such pride is often inflated with articulations of nationalist and patriotic ideas among Chinese youth.
In addition, the reference to “baba” indicates that young Chinese people yield to the authority of CCTV just like they listen to their own fathers at home. “Baba” is ultimately an authoritative figure under the framework of paternalism in China. While emotions are known to be often exacerbated on social media, in China and elsewhere around the world, references to “baba” are frequently associated with language such as “respect” and “kneel,” which points to the inherent power dynamic embedded in this reference. By addressing CCTV as “dad,” Chinese youth voluntarily position themselves in an unequal relationship with CCTV, where the acknowledgement of CCTV has symbolic meaning and idealistic perceptions.
After the Chinese e-Sports club Invictus Gaming (iG) won mainland China’s first world championship in a gaming competition of League of Legends (LoL) on November 3, 2018, CCTV News congratulated players on this unexpected victory through CCTV’s official Sina Weibo account.[19] As of November 6, 2018, this post has been liked 329,000 times and reposted over 55,000 times. Apart from celebrating this gaming victory, many young netizens poured into the comments section to thank the CCTV “dad” for “giving face” to this victory. Many netizens expressed their shock that CCTV even pays attention to e-sports. It seems that CCTV’s simple act of posting on its Weibo account was interpreted by mainstream popular opinion as a friendly gesture towards the future development of e-sports in China. It is also evident that CCTV’s strategy of embracing youth-oriented popular culture has won over a considerable number of young Chinese minds.
Observations of the CCTV and its relationship with Chinese youth opinion provide important insights into the broader picture of contemporary Chinese society. If CCTV’s successful adaptive strategies over the past three decades demonstrate the persistence and resilience of the CCP’s rule in spite of changing circumstances domestically and abroad, the perceptions of Chinese youth regarding CCTV point to the contradictions and confusions in their views of the political regime’s present and future. As Chinese youth grow increasingly suspicious and critical of the CCP’s authoritarian control, they are simultaneously emotionally attached to their country and the mediums that manifest their nationalism. CCTV is more than a television channel – it is an integral part of China’s collective memory, especially for the current generation of Chinese youth. When Chinese youth are asked to provide their first impressions of Xinwen Lianbo, CCTV’s national “Network News Broadcast,” most instantly recall its opening tunes and the everyday scenes associated with watching this daily show. For many, the CCTV experience is a memorable and unique one – when dinner is ready, Xinwen Lianbo is playing on TV, the whole family gathers around the table to have a lovely conversation and enjoy a steaming hot meal.
Jeeby Sun is a contributor for Synergy: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, East Asia Section.
Bibliography
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Feng, Dezheng. 2016. Promoting moral values through entertainment: a social semiotic analysis of the Spring Festival Gala on China Central Television, Critical Arts, 30:1, 89-92. DOI: 10.1080/02560046.2016.1164387
Huang, Li and Wei Lu. 2017. “Functions and Roles of Social Media in Media Transformation in China: A Case Study of “@CCTV NEWS”.” Telematics and Informatics 34 (3): 774-785. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2016.05.015. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/07365853/v34i0003/774_farosmcacson.
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Song, Yunya and Tsan-Kuo Chang. 2016. “A New World of Spectacle in the Post-Cold War Era: China’s Central Television and its Significant Other, 1992–2006.” Public Relations Review 42 (3), 468. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.06.002.
“Twitter user numbers overtaken by China’s Sina Weibo,” BBC News, Last modified May 17, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39947442
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Zhu, Ying. Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television (New York: The New Press, 2012), 256.
[1] Ying Zhu. Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television (New York: The New Press, 2012), 256.
[2] Zhu, 3-4.
[3] Yunya Song and Tsan-Kuo Chang. 2016. “A New World of Spectacle in the Post-Cold War Era: China’s Central Television and its Significant Other, 1992–2006.” Public Relations Review 42 (3), 468. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.06.002.
[4] Dezheng Feng. 2016. Promoting moral values through entertainment: a social semiotic analysis of the Spring Festival Gala on China Central Television, Critical Arts, 30:1, 89-92. DOI: 10.1080/02560046.2016.1164387
[5] Zhu, 4.
[6] Zhu, 1.
[7] Zhu, 252.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Voci, P. and Hui, L. (Ed.). Screening China’s Soft Power (London: Routledge, 2018).
[10] Li Huang and Wei Lu. 2017. “Functions and Roles of Social Media in Media Transformation in China: A Case Study of “@CCTV NEWS”.” Telematics and Informatics 34 (3), 776. Doi:10.1016/j.tele.2016.05.015. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/07365853/v34i0003/774_farosmcacson.
[11] Zhu, 5.
[12] Zhu, 198.
[13] Zhu, 205.
[14] “Twitter user numbers overtaken by China’s Sina Weibo,” BBC News, Last modified May 17, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39947442
[15] Bei Qin, David Strömberg and Yanhui Wu. 2017. Why does china allow freer social media? Protests versus surveillance and propaganda. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), 118. doi:http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1257/jep.31.1.117
[16] Ibid., 125.
[17]Nan Bi, “CCTV launches large cultural program ‘National Treasure’,” China Daily, Updated August 25, 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2017-08/25/content_31092385.htm
[18]“国家宝藏 第一季 National Treasure Season 1 (2017),” 豆瓣Douban, https://movie.douban.com/subject/27186619/. Accessed November 6, 2018.
[19] CCTV News, 2018. Sina Weibo, November 3, 2018, 06:45. https://m.weibo.cn/2656274875/4302342822296316
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