In examining China, a perennial site of focus is that of relations between mainland China, known as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan, known as the Republic of China (ROC). With the key relationship between the United States and Taiwan and the recent elections of Donald Trump and of Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) respectively, a refocusing on Taiwan has occurred. Although relations between Taiwan and mainland China have generally remained tense but calm, recent issues have placed weight on the prospect of a deterioration of relations. Taiwan became a de-facto separate entity in 1949 when Chiang Kai Shek (蔣介石) and the Kuomintang (KMT) Party left mainland for Taiwan, pushed out by the Communist Party of China. From 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was placed under martial law, mirroring the intensity of KMT’s relations with mainland and the indigenous inhabitants of Taiwan. Given the unprecedented power of the military over local administration, the KMT gained a strong, authoritarian hold over the island through the “White Terror”.[1] The “White Terror” included the jailing of political dissidents and suppression of popular dissent, and it continues to bring the KMT criticisms today.
By the mid-1970s, relations between Taiwan and the Mainland began to thaw. Chiang’s death in 1975 allowed opposition and dissidents to issue greater demands to his successor and son, Chiang Ching Kuo (蔣經國). Due to US’ adoption of the “One China Policy” in 1979, which shifted their recognition of “China” from Taiwan to the PRC, Taiwan lost its main foreign supporter, which furthered its isolated position. Although Taiwan adopted the “Three Noes policy” of “no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation” [2] with China in 1979, this position of political isolationism diminished by 1987, when the hijacking of a China Airlines Flight forced Taiwanese officials to re-establish dialogue with the PRC. Marking the first of many meetings and dialogues between the two parties, the negotiations in 1987 culminated in the unofficial 1992 Consensus. The PRC and ROC both agreed on a mutual understanding of the existence of “One China”, but with different interpretations of the term.[3]
The 1992 Consensus formed one of the key dividing factors between the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition party in Taiwan formed in 1986-87 during the end of Martial Law. The DPP, as a party with political leaning towards Taiwanese independence, rejects the 1992 Consensus. The DPP states that there was no “One China Consensus” during that meeting, while the KMT believes the Consensus does exist. This crucial difference between the two parties has generally defined the ebb of mainland and Taiwan relations. Chen Shui Bian (陳水扁), the DPP President from 2000-2008, was perceived as a supporter of Taiwanese independence. His presidency led to a deterioration in Mainland-Taiwan relations.[4] The following KMT President, Ma Ying Jeou (馬英九), maintained the rhetoric of a sovereign Taiwan but generally supported policies that strengthened ties to the Mainland.[5]
In 2016, Taiwan is possibly entering a new state of relations with mainland. Firstly, Taiwan elected the second DPP and first female President, Tsai Ing Wen, in May 2016. Unlike the largely populist Chen, Tsai’s academic background and political experience shapes her technocratic approach Mainland-Taiwanese relations.[6] Quoted as being a “seasoned negotiator” following her experience in the Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and Mainland Affairs Council, her experience pointedly places her in a position to understand and utilize notions of independence beyond simply garnering greater political support.[7] In addition, her unprecedented popularity during the 2016 elections demonstrated a public identification with the DPP’s position for an independent Taiwan, rather than the other trends such as the populist notions of opposition against KMT policies. With the development of domestic movements such as the Sunflower movement that demand greater suzerainty and independence for Taiwan, the large support for Tsai among young people demonstrates greater support for the DPP’s cause.[8] Secondly, the election of Trump in the US has also led to a divergence from traditional American foreign policy viewpoints. He may take an alternative view of American-Taiwanese relations in his coming term beginning in 2017.
These two factors largely came into focus in the recent diplomatic row concerning Trump’s direct call with Tsai. On December 2, 2016, Trump became the first President in over four decades to have official, direct contact with a Taiwanese leader. They discussed Taiwanese-American relations for the future and issued mutual congratulations on their recent electoral victories. This direct call between Trump and Tsai violated the unspoken diplomatic rule of “no (direct) contact”.[9] Although the incident clearly undermines America’s policy of a “One China” understanding in regards to Sino-American relations, the impact of the incident was largely handled through a sense of moderation by both Chinese and American officials. The Chinese Foreign Minister stated that the call was a “petty action by the Taiwan side.”[10] However, it was also toned down through Trump’s general and explicit ignorance of certain traditional protocol regarding international relations.[11]
In line with an increasing sense of instability permeating, especially concerning Trump’s often unpredictable nature, China has increasingly asserted its position in forcing Taiwan to toe in line with the 1992 Consensus. The recent seizure of Singaporean Armoured Vehicles in the Port of Hong Kong by Chinese Customs is illustrative of this. En route from regular military exercises in Taiwan, nine Singaporean Armoured Vehicles were seized by Customs in a “routine inspection.”[12] Although largely claimed to be a surprise inspection by the Chinese, the logistics in mounting this seizure clearly emphasized China’s motives in isolating Taiwan and enforcing its view of the “One China Principle”. Combined, with the recent lodging of a diplomatic complaint with Singapore in concern to its cooperation with Taiwan, the mutual understanding in regards to the diplomatic purpose of this action is apparent.
Chinese-Taiwanese relations will undoubtedly be a site of tension in the near future. Although the relations will most likely continue on the current path of an uneasy peace. China will continue to contain its actions to an increasing assimilation of Taiwan through increasing diplomatic and economic pressures while Taiwan continues to rebut such efforts. The true propensity for change lies not domestically in Taiwanese movements, but in American involvement.
Trump’s call to Tsai Ing Wen made news headlines across the globe as a possible shift in American foreign policy. The comparative lack of global coverage caused by domestic Taiwanese movements such as the Sunflower Movement demonstrates the lack of external influence exerted by such groups. Although definitely not lacking in domestic power, such groups play a key part in creating a domestic notion of an independent Taiwan that is limited in the international sphere. Bridging this gap requires additional nation-state relations and recognition. Apart from the US, many other nations are generally unwilling or incapable of addressing this gap in the face of Chinese power. Although Trump’s actions have hinted at signs of pro-Taiwanese policies, they are far from re-establishing any significant American ties or official recognition of the nation. However, Trump’s general propensity to go beyond diplomatic norms and “freewheel” a risqué foreign policy, seen in his numerous contacts with other foreign leaders and criticism of Obama’s policies, could possibly further undermine the existing Sino-American understanding regarding the “One China policy”.[13]
The content of this article does not represent the positions, research methods, or opinions of the Synergy Editorial Committee. We are solely responsible for reviewing and editing submissions. Please address all scholarly concerns directly to the contributor(s) of the article.
Timothy Law is a 4th Year student studying International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies at the University of Toronto, Victoria College. Currently, Timothy serves as an event correspondent and editor for Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
[1] Sui, Cindy. “Taiwan Kuomintang: Revisiting the White Terror years.” BBC News. BBC, 13 Mar. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[2] Safire, William. “The 2 1/2 No’s.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 11 Nov. 1987. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[3] Chen, Yu-Hua, Paula J. Dobriansky, Matthew Rojansky, and Salvatore Babones. “Taiwan Is Barely Clinging to the 1992 Consensus.” The National Interest. The National Interest, 2 June 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[4] Copper, John . “Tsai different from Chen Shui-bian.” Taipei Times. Taipei Times, 21 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[5] Chen, Yu-Hua, Paula J. Dobriansky, Matthew Rojansky, and Salvatore Babones. “Taiwan Is Barely Clinging to the 1992 Consensus.” The National Interest. The National Interest, 2 June 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[6] Copper, John . “Tsai different from Chen Shui-bian.” Taipei Times. Taipei Times, 21 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[7] Chung, Lawrence. “Tsai Ing-wen is an experienced negotiator in cross-strait and international affairs, say academics and diplomats.” South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post, 16 Jan. 2016. Web. 18 Jan. 2017. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1901729/tsai-ing-wen-experienced-negotiator-cross-strait-and>.
[8] Hoon, Shim Jae. “Taiwan post-election look: Youth power dumps KMT rule.” Asia Times. Asia Times, 30 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[9] Landler, Mark, and David E. Sanger. “Trump Speaks With Taiwan’s Leader, an Affront to China.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[10] Blanchard, Ben . “China labels Trump call ‘petty action’ by Taiwan: Phoenix TV.” Reuters. Ed. Nick Macfie. Thomson Reuters, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[11] Fisher, Max, and Josh Keller. “How Trump’s Calls to World Leaders Are Upsetting Decades of Diplomacy.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[12] Chan, Minnie. “HOW SINGAPORE’S MILITARY VEHICLES BECAME BEIJING’S DIPLOMATIC WEAPON.” South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post, 3 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[13] Fisher, Max, and Josh Keller. “How Trump’s Calls to World Leaders Are Upsetting Decades of Diplomacy.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
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