Rethinking China’s Non-Intervention Policy: Examining China’s Stance in Global Governance and Possible Policy Reforms

Abstract

The twenty-first century is a rapid time of change, both for China and for the world. The age of integrated globalization is changing China’s foreign policy from a domestic to an external focus. A critical principle of China’s engagement in international relations is the doctrine¹ of non-intervention. As China rapidly emerges as an economic and political powerhouse, now is the time to re-evaluate the efficacy of this policy in light of China’s political future. This paper will examine how this long-standing doctrine originated and came to shape China’s perception of its own role in global governance. It will address the controversies of the implementation gap and how current applications of this policy reflect China’s underlying interpretation of sovereignty. Weighing the costs and benefits, this paper will conclude that China should not abandon this policy; however, the policy can be modified on the basis of China’s current approach. China should seek to develop a more comprehensive framework around the principle of non-interference in order to ensure sustainable diplomatic success and government autonomy in the future. There is scholarly disagreement over whether this is a policy, a doctrine, or merely a statement by the Chinese government. For the purposes of this paper, this differentiation is not included as part of the discussion. Synonymous terms are used interchangeably to refer to the same thing.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Non-intervention, China, Peacekeeping.

---

Emergence of the Non-intervention Policy

China’s non-intervention policy originated in the 1950s immediately following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. It emerged as part of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which acted as the underlying tone of China’s diplomacy.² The policy gained new significance in the 1970s under Deng Xiao Ping’s economic liberalization, pushing China to the forefront of international relations.³ For the purposes of this paper, intervention refers to a political decision to act upon a crisis in another state, ranging from humanitarian emergencies to violent civil conflicts. The non-intervention policy in China constitutes the refusal to take proactive measures to interfere with domestic decisions of other state governments, particularly through military or political means of coercion.

The origins of the non-intervention policy are central to Chinese nationalism and historical identity. After the ‘century of humiliation⁴’, a long period of foreign domination, Chinese policy-makers today are heavily influenced by a concern for self-preservation. They believe that China’s statehood is constantly subject to antagonism from the dominant power of the democratic west ⁵. In this historical context, the non-intervention policy can also be viewed as a defense mechanism that guards against foreign intervention in China’s internal affairs.⁶ It stems from a sense of insecurity and mistrust to foreign interference. It is also worth noting that the non-intervention policy is special because it is an inherently passive stance. It is only enacted in response to an event or another state’s policy. This reflects China’s perception of its own role in global governance as being fundamentally passive and reluctant to challenge the world order.⁷ Foreign interference is not the emphasis of Chinese policy, and thus this policy has not been critically addressed by the government recently. This accounts for a large portion of China’s past opposition to NATO’s actions in Kosovo, because the minority seeking independence in Serbia reminded the government of its own separatist demographics.⁸

However, non-interference is not a Chinese invention or monopoly. It is a commonly held position by many countries and in different variations. The ideology is also substantiated by international legal documents, which is often overlooked by scholars in the field. For example, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/91 on December 14^th, 1976, reaffirms the principles such as territorial integrity and political independence.⁹ This resolution also upholds national identity as an inalienable right, and draws upon a wide range of actions that constitute intervention, such as to “organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist, armed activities… [or] civil strife”.¹⁰ It is written in harsh terms against external intervention, and constitutes the legal basis for China’s justification. The policy was also supported by non-aligned states during the Cold War such as Cuba and several members of the Eastern bloc.¹¹

Shifting Perceptions of Sovereignty – Blurred Boundaries

Non-intervention directly clashes with the modern trend of increasingly blurred lines and diminishing role of state sovereignty. This awkward dissidence for a centralized state like China is key to understanding its insistence on this policy. Firstly, the definition of sovereignty has experienced rapid change since the 1990s, when the notion of responsibility to protect (R2P) was introduced. Non-intervention came under undeviating attack when the R2P doctrine re-framed sovereignty to mean an obligation of the government, rather than an entitlement or power of the state.¹² R2P sharply weakened the state-centric political view, and China refused to allow its own domestic actions to be subject to the digression of other states. Secondly, controversy lies in what constitutes “intervention”. According to the Chinese government, it refers to any “comments, suggestions, or criticism” of domestic issues.¹³ As domestic policies have more capacity to shape international relations, the boundary between domestic and international issue areas has been blurred.¹⁴ The interests of different states are becoming more entangled, providing momentum for ideas of interventionism.

Along with the theoretical change in sovereignty was also an increasing belief in the role of human rights as a prerequisite for peace. Following the humanitarian atrocities of the 1990s, the international community became invested in the idea that human rights sometimes even trumps a nation’s right to self-determination or uninterrupted governance.¹⁵ As a sensitive area for China, the non-intervention policy acts as a defense mechanism in this case. The 1990s also witnessed the diverting trend of power towards regional, grassroots, and international organizations. China’s interpretation of sovereignty presents theoretical inconsistencies between the state’s role and that of other actors in global governance.¹⁶ As the role of the state declines internationally, governments, especially those that are authoritarian, are struggling to grasp the traditional and modern perceptions of state power, while manifesting it in policies and actions. China’s loyalty to the Westphalian definition of sovereignty ties itself to the non-intervention policy. Conceding this will not be easy nor pragmatic in the short-term.

Application Versus Statement

The non-intervention policy is once again being scrutinized today because China’s actions are increasingly interpreted as shifting away from this policy. Its involvement with the United Nations and bilateral relations over the past few decades do not accurately reflect absolute adherence to this principle, leading scholars to question if the policy is solely rhetorical.¹⁷ From its arms sales to the Burmese government, to abstaining on the UNSC resolution establishing a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011, China has displayed an upward trajectory in its economic and political involvement in complex security environments.¹⁸

A prominent example of this is China’s attitude towards Sudan during its civil crisis. Similar to countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan is a recipient of China’s aid and debt cancellation program.¹⁹ When this agenda item was discussed at the United Nations, not only did China endorse the UN arms embargo on the country, it even prided itself on “diplomatically persuading” Khartoum to allow the entry of the UN peacekeepers in 2006.²⁰ On April 28^th of the same year, China even allowed Resolution 1674 to pass unanimously in the UN, reaffirming the principles of R2P.²¹ In 2014, China sent 700 combat troops to join the UN mission deployment in Sudan.²²  Such actions have caused scholars to point at the commercial interest of China in the region, specifically noting its position as the single largest investor in oil and energy security in Sudan.²³ The implementation gap between the stated policy and the actions taken insinuate concessions to the principles of intervention from the Chinese government.²⁴

Similarly, China’s involvement in Myanmar has been interpreted as motivated by its demand for natural resources.²⁵ But China’s stance regarding intervention is completely different in Myanmar. Despite sustained criticism of the military regime in Burma, China has never stopped demonstrating a willingness to cooperate.²⁶ The two countries both value maintaining an autonomous and independent foreign policy.²⁷ Consequently, China vetoed a Security Council resolution it viewed as overly interfering in 2007, “urging [the Burmese government] to respond [to the UN Secretary-General’s efforts] in a complete, concrete, timely manner”.²⁸

China’s actions are seemingly contradictory and inconsistent with its stated policy. There is a significant lack of official clarification from the Chinese government, but it does send one clear message: non-intervention does not equate absence of influence. China’s policy refers to a rather particular form of political engagement, rather than inaction.²⁹ As China’s global interests extrapolate in diversity and in geography, it inevitably will have to re-examine this policy. Currently, there are no visible efforts by the Chinese government to reform this policy, both on a theoretical and practical level. Further recommendations are outlined below in the following sections.

China’s Foreign Relations with the Developing World³⁰

By abandoning the non-intervention policy, China will suffer high costs of endangering its relations with the developing world, more specifically, states in Africa and Southeast Asia. China has established firm partnerships with these states through investment, aid, and political alliance. Perhaps sharing a similar history of western domination, African states are more receptive to China’s offers, especially its model of unconditional aid. In comparison, western states leverage the developing world’s need for assistance with the prerequisites of economic reform and political liberalization.³¹ China’s stance on this matter seems comparatively more “softened”.³² The beneficiary states, and even some non-governmental organizations, are extremely welcoming of this policy.³³

The lack of conditionality of aid has become of major concern to western democracies, criticizing China for prolonging corrupt and abusive regimes.³⁴ From the perspective of improving the political situation in Africa, China acts as a counter-force for increased government transparency in authoritarian regimes.³⁵ China does not use development assistance as a tool of diplomatic persuasion. The responsibility to ensure positive change in governments elsewhere is one that China has relieved itself from, while democracies see this as their fundamental obligation. This alludes to a completely different policy agenda from China’s perspective. It views others states as equal and sovereign partners, regardless of their domestic structures.³⁶

African states already face immense pressure to liberalize domestically from the western sphere.³⁷ Their relations with China will be severely hampered even by the slim possibility of interference in internal politics. The affinity of the developing world is contingent upon China’s non-intervention policy, and immediate withdrawal of this statement will damage China’s credibility to many of its allies in Africa.³⁸ On a more tangible level,  China is too economically invested to afford losing its immediate ties to the developing world, both in the private and public sector.³⁹ Liberal thinkers suggest that political stability is an element to ensuring economic growth, but the majority of Chinese investment in Africa is more focused on short-term returns than an interest in the progressive development of African states. Because of this fundamental disagreement with the west, China’s strict non-intervention policy forces the choice between its relations with the developed versus the developing world. The dilemma between reputational costs of being an accessory to authoritarian regimes versus the tangible cost of risking its financial assets is not unsolvable.⁴⁰ The Chinese government can maneuver these crossroads simply by modifying how it frames its criteria on non-intervention.

Benefits of Adopting Interventionism

China can reap several benefits from withdrawing its official commitment to non-intervention. Firstly, this action “rides the wave” of internationalization, as China’s economic and human footprint proliferates quickly around the world. The “exodus” of Chinese presence inevitably demands a more outward-looking foreign policy to safeguard China’s capital.⁴¹ The need to ensure resources such as energy will prompt the Chinese government to focus on its investments. As China rises in global influence, it is critical that it be viewed as a responsible power.⁴² Non-intervention during a humanitarian crisis often comes across as immoral and cold-blooded, contrary to the image China wishes to project. Notably, blocking proactive aid to peoples in complex security environments is an inherently emotional proposition. When China is the only P5 country to veto such a Security Council resolution, elaborate criticisms ascend upon China’s actions.⁴³ By blocking life-saving intervention from entering a conflict region, the reputational costs for China are too high relative to the policy itself.

Another unique facet about this policy is that it knows no boundaries. It has been a politically expedient mechanism for the Chinese government to justify its non-ideological calculations. Due to this flexibility, the Chinese government can frame its intentions on intervention to constitute influence, or suggestions.⁴⁴ This simultaneously resolves the government’s concern about exerting violence as a means of intervention, a reputation that is more controversial and “western” in its course of action. The details of this policy cannot all be included in this policy brief, but the non-intervention policy has the potential to become a “blank cheque” for the Chinese government. It carries an opportunity to establish a new image to the international community – one of willingness to cooperate.

Domestic Accountability

Contrary to the widespread belief that only democracies are concerned with government accountability, China’s public opinion is a priority in the policy-making process. The primary goal of the Chinese government is to maintain its domestic legitimacy and stability.⁴⁵ To the domestic population, intervention triggers a painful historical memory because the norm of humanitarian intervention is largely associated with hegemonic tendencies.⁴⁶ To the public, rescinding non-intervention even seems like an act of concession to western pressures and norms.⁴⁷ The Chinese public may be divided about China’s political future, but it is largely in agreement on the interpretation of inalienable sovereignty and nationhood. As the Chinese delegate Li Baodong stated at the Security Council on May 4^th, 2011, the “fate of Libya must be left up to the Libyan people to decide”.⁴⁸ This quote encompasses the Chinese conception of the state, one that is very dependent on notions of nationality and self-determination.⁴⁹

A major issue in amending this policy is the ‘slippery slope’ problem, where China will be obliged by previous commitments to intervene in excessive quantities of socio-political conflicts. The precedent of the United States is alarming because its interventionist actions consistently receives criticism. Intervention is a complex task that China is not yet ready to take on, and this sentiment is echoed by the public consciousness in China.⁵⁰ Furthermore, intervention is not a simple process. The different facets of the responsibility to protect can be cost ineffective, entangling, and risky to enact. China is not ready to invest itself in this complexity, especially when the finite resources are diverged from domestic development and other aspects more related to the daily life of the Chinese people.⁵¹ China’s foreign policy is heavily characterized by a traditional and sensitive interpretation of sovereignty, and it guides China’s bilateral outreach to other sovereignty-conscious states.⁵² On a pragmatic level, China’s current priority is domestic development, or ensuring the basic economic rights of its people, rather than seeking deeper unenthusiastic foreign entanglements.⁵³ Under the five point plan, incremental change and political stability are the two crucial pillars of the government’s current platform, and democracy is viewed as a fifth modernization after living standards have been met.⁵⁴ This hierarchy of developmental order should be consistent to China’s policy direction and the intervention is currently not at the top of the policy agenda. The domestic public is much more receptive to government actions ensuring socio-economic rights for subsistence survival compared to interventionism, which is popularly viewed as burdensome to the country or unnecessarily ambitious.

The Cost of Intervention: Material and Reputational

The two types of costs associated with the willingness to intervene are material and reputational. Primarily, forsaking the non-intervention policy would inevitably impose a more active role in global governance on the Chinese government. From a practical perspective, it would result in an out-pouring of economic and military resources to foreign missions. Any increase in military expenditure or presence seems politically sensitive for international actors who distrust the Chinese government. This reputational shadow outweighs an empty commitment to intervention.

On the reputational front, by signing on to interventionist actions in multilateral forums, China is conceding part of its “safety assurance mechanism”. It allows other states to comment on China’s domestic controversies, ranging from alleged human rights abuses to ethnic disobedience domestically.⁵⁵ For example, the Chinese government is haunted by the fact that intervening in ethnic conflicts may fuel the separatist inclinations of Uyghur groups in Xinjiang or political exiles from Tibet. In addition, a commitment to intervention would translate into an inability to withdraw freely from diplomatically irrelevant operations, and thus not be able to measure its international actions on the basis of pure national interest. This fundamentally shifts the realist measurement of the Chinese government to a commitment to political well-being elsewhere. The prioritization of global norms over the realpolitik mentality is not an easy shift for China.

Clearly, the reputational benefit of being seen as a more responsible global power is a double-edged sword. The stakes are high for China’s participation in interventionist missions. It threatens China’s current perception, long term commitment to constitutional independence and juridical equality, national interests, etc. All of these aspects are crucial prerequisites to relations with China’s political partners all around the world.⁵⁶

Next Steps

To boil down the pros and cons, the most important element for the Chinese government to balance is its autonomy versus international image. Both long-term goals can only be achieved through modifying its current stance on non-intervention, in order to provide the government with more leeway. In fact, by establishing consistent and elaborate criteria for China’s participation in interventionism, China will be able to maintain a more credible demeanor in the international community. This section offers several suggestions to potential modifications for China’s policy on intervention.

Firstly, China must address and mitigate the potential political harm done to diplomatic relations between countries of the developing world, most notably African states; the Chinese government should seek to maintain its current policy on non-conditional financial assistance. Not only is this a vindicating strategy to respond to African governments, but also a mechanism to ensure that China’s commitment to socio-economic rights is dependable both at home and abroad. Secondly, non-intervention does not need to mean no influence over the policies and stance of other international actors, as the government of China surely understands.⁵⁷ For example, the Chinese government has offered constructive advice to the Burmese government to resolve differences among opposition parties and armed ethnic groups.⁵⁸ As shown from this example, influence over another state’s policy can often align with Chinese interests, and the role of China’s policy on intervention is greatly undermined in this policy process. This is a step in harnessing ideational power while maintaining the right of other states to political independence.

Diplomacy and global governance is highly contingent on the “social capital” accumulated by a state’s long-term reputation, while state action is shaped by perceptions of interest. China must change its interpretation of world affairs through purely historical lens. Perhaps due to profound insecurities and sensitivities around imperialistic intervention, China’s attitude largely mirrors any ethnic or political conflict with its own domestic dimensions. In order to change this narrative, China’s must maximize control over its own policies. This can be achieved by clearly delineating the terms and conditions of Chinese intervention. Instead of rhetorically rejecting the entire notion of intervention, China will benefit from a more elaborate and cohesive stance on this issue. One can draw from the precedent of China’s post-2005 intervention policies, derived from China’s involvement in Sudan.  The established criteria are 1) the consent of the target state, 2) sanctions by international and regional organizations, 3) cooperative implementation by the actors mentioned above.⁵⁹ The merits of this policy are exactly what is missing from the enforcement from global governance issue networks. For example, as the western scholar Scott outlines, regional and local organizations are better equipped with practical knowledge.⁶⁰ This set of standards also present consistency in the government’s response while ensuring that a threshold is established against unsuitable intervention.

Conclusion: China’s Overall Role in Global Governance

Based on the analysis above, China’s priority in global governance should be to appear as a responsible power while maintaining accountability at home. Modifying the non-intervention policy is a crucial step to progress towards China’s goal of creating “a multi-polar world order with democratized international relations”.⁶¹ As China becomes a prominent political actor, its decisions directly impact multilateral policies and actions. Clearing, blocking humanitarian efforts or harboring human rights abuses are detrimental to China’s global image.⁶² The West perceives this as a hindrance not only in its intervention efforts, but also to its liberal value system, and thus progression towards peace and security. Although the promotion of ideas such as democracy and government accountability are not an objective of China’s foreign policy, the lack of incentive for the government to act upon these ideals, along with the costly terms of intervention, should not constitute the sole reasoning to oppose intervention in general.⁶³ China is currently exploring avenues through which to establish a more constructive role in international engagement.⁶⁴ Its influence has extended beyond China’s immediate territory, and the policy of non-interference remains theoretically unchanged since the 1950s. A diminishing role for the state and ever-so-complex sovereignty is a struggle commonly felt by governments around the world. At this crossroad of foreign policy, it is crucial for China to disassociate itself from the historical stereotype of a retrogressive and self-reliant regime. China’s interests are changing constantly, and intervention enters the range of options when the passive stance on foreign policy is no longer sustainable for advancing China’s global interests. One must keep sight of China’s long-term political trajectory, and incorporate “intervention with Chinese characteristics” to its international engagements, both with developed and developing states around the world.

References

Amnejad, Maziar, Michael Wood. “The Principle of Non-Intervention.” Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2): 345-381. 2009 http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/09221565/v22i0002/345_tpon.

Chan, Gerald, Pak K. Lee, Lai-Ha Chan. “China Engages Global Governance: A New World Order in the Making.” New York: Milton Park, Routledge, 2012

Chaziza, Mordechai, Ogen S. Goldman. “Revisiting China’s Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1): 89-115, 18 January 2014. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/17508916/v07i0001/89_rcnptiw

Chenyang, Li, and Lye Liang Fok. “China’s policies towards Myanmar: a successful model for dealing with the Myanmar issue?” China: An International Journal 7.2: 255-287. September 2009 http://go.galegroup.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=utoronto_main&id=GALE|A219451210&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon&userGroup=utoronto_main&authCount=1#

EIU ViewsWire. “MENA/Sub-Saharan Africa politics: US military expansion in Africa” The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 August 2014. https://global-factiva-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EIUCP00020140817ea8f00001&cat=a&ep=ASE

Garwoods-Gowers, Andrew. “China and the “Responsibility to Protect: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention.” Asian Journal of International Law 2, no. 2: 375-393. July 2012. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1032796626?accountid=14771.

Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben. “The Limits to China’s Non-Interference Foreign Policy: Pro-State Interventionism and the Rescaling of Economic Governance.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69 (2): 205-223. March 2015. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10357718/v69i0002/205_tltcnfatroeg.

Justynska, Izabela. “The Principle of Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States in the Context of Globalization.” Contemporary Legal and Economic Issues 4: 53-64. 2013 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1691261927?accountid=14771.

Kia, B., Ojie, P.A., Kidi, Z.D. “Veto Power as a Diplomatic Cover for National Interests of Bearing Members in the United Nations Security Council: Implications on the Management of Global Peace and Security.” International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2010. http://getit.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/access?http://www.icidr.org/ijalsg.php

Le Pere, Garth. “China and Africa: Dynamics of an Enduring Relationship.” Global Dialogue 9, no. 1: 69-78. Winter, 2007. http://search.proquest.com/docview/211518133?accountid=14771.

Li, Hak Yin and Yongnian Zheng. “Re-Interpreting China’s Non-Intervention Policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention.” Journal of Contemporary China 18 (61): 617-637. September 2009. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10670564/v18i0061/617_rcnptmliai.

Mishra, Rahul. “China – Myanmar No More Pauk Phaws?” Himalayan and Central Asian Studies 17, no. 3: 184-0_4. July 2013. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1470421341?accountid=14771 .

Möller, Kay. “China and World Order: Between Non-interference and Intervention.” French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, China Perspectives, no. 29. 4–10. May-June 2000 http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/24050720.

Naidu, M.V. “China’s Foreign Policy: Quotations and Critique.” Peace Research 29 (2). Canadian Mennonite University, 29 (2): 1-5, May 1997. http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/23607442.

Neethling, Theo. “China’s International Peacekeeping Contributions and the Evolution of Contemporary Chinese Strategic Considerations.” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37, no. 2: 7-28. November 2015. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1764183602?accountid=14771.

Pang, Zhongying. “China’s Non-Intervention Question.” Global Responsibility to Protect 1.2 (2009): 237-252. 5 November 2008. http://heinonline.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gloresp1&id=251.

Scott, James C. “Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed” 1998. Print

Tull, Denis M. “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 3: 459-479. September 2006. http://search.proquest.com/docview/196405768?accountid=14771.

The content of this article does not represent the positions, research methods, or opinions of the Synergy Editorial Committee. We are solely responsible for reviewing and editing submissions. Please address all scholarly concerns directly to the contributor(s) of the article.

---

Angela Hou is an undergraduate student pursuing a major in International Relations. She is interested in contemporary Asian affairs, particular topics in the East Asian Region. She currently serves as a copy-editor for Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.