Understanding Transnational Korea Through Hallyu: Resilience of Developmentalism in the 21st Century

Abstract

“Gangnam Style” is emblematic of Hallyu, a term first coined by the Chinese media in the late 1990s to describe the phenomenon through which Korean cultural products were enthusiastically received and consumed by various countries in East and Southeast Asia: Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia to name just a few. Korean cultural products not only encompass different forms of media such as movies, popular songs, and television dramas but also material products such as fashion accessories, clothing, mobile smartphones, and other forms of technologies. Recently, scholars such as Dal Yong Jin and Kyong Yoon have noted the emergence of ‘Hallyu 2.0’, a term describing the spread of the Korean Wave outside of Asia’s borders into Europe and South America. What distinguishes the initial Korean Wave from Hallyu 2.0 is the way in which it is circulated online through social media; more importantly, the new mode of distribution fundamental to Hallyu 2.0 – social media – counters mainstream arguments that common cultural and traditional ‘Asian values’ are at the root of the Korean Wave’s spread. Therefore, this paper will critically assess mainstream discourses which rely on ‘culture’ to simplistically argue how the region’s common Confucian-laden and traditional Asian values in Korean cultural products are reasons for Hallyu’s popularity and expansion into East Asia. In so doing, this paper sets out to (i) overcome a reductionist ‘cultural’ explanation for the spread of Hallyu while also (ii) highlighting the role of a “corporate/state led model from above” and a “grassroots-driven model from below” in promoting a “creative contents industry”.

Keywords: Korean wave (Hallyu), developmentalism, transnationalism, cultural products

---

With a mixture of slight horror and befuddlement on my father’s normally stoic face, it was clear that Psy’s “Gangnam Style” had caught him unprepared and confused; yet his face remained glued to the computer monitor, watching, as Psy showcased his gyrating, pelvic-thrusting, horseback riding dance. My reaction to the satirical and absurd music video was of amusement, whereas my father’s reaction was completely different yet predictable given his complete lack of exposure to Korean popular culture. Why had our reactions been so different? The entire world had seemingly watched the music video overnight; how might we understand the spread of Hallyu?

“Gangnam Style” is emblematic of Hallyu, a term first coined by the Chinese media in the late 1990s to describe the phenomenon through which Korean cultural products were enthusiastically received and consumed by various countries in East and Southeast Asia: Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to name a few. Korean cultural products not only encompass different forms of media like movies, popular songs, and television dramas, but also include material products like fashion accessories, clothing, smartphones, and other forms of technologies. Recently, scholars like Dal Yong Jin and Kyong Yoon have noted the emergence of ‘Hallyu 2.0’, a term describing the spread of the Korean Wave outside of Asia’s borders into Europe and South America.¹ What distinguishes the initial Korean Wave from Hallyu 2.0 is the way in which it is circulated online through social media. More importantly, the new mode of distribution fundamental to Hallyu 2.0, social media, counters mainstream arguments that common cultural and traditional “Asian values” are at the root of the Korean Wave’s spread.

This paper will critically assess mainstream discourses that rely on “culture” to argue that the region’s Confucian-laden and traditional Asian values in Korean cultural products are reasons for Hallyu’s popularity and expansion into East Asia. In so doing, this paper sets out to (i) overcome a reductionist ‘cultural’ explanation for the spread of Hallyu while also (ii) highlighting the role of a “corporate/state led model from above” and a “grassroots-driven model from below”² in promoting a “creative contents industry”.³

By the twenty-first century, the Korean Wave has become a part of common discourse not just for Korean government policy makers but also for ordinary Korean people and overseas fans of Korean popular culture. The 2.5 billion view count “Gangnam Style” has is indicative of Hallyu’s reach and global spread. Scholars have increasingly written a number of academic writings on the topic. For instance, as of February 23, 2013, Lee Hye-Kyung cites 1,940 articles on Google Scholar tackling the phenomenon of the Korean Wave.⁴ Early scholarship on Hallyu has focused on identifying common reasons behind its appeal to Asian and South Asian audiences. More specifically, these articles point to family-oriented Confucian values as a determining factor for why Hallyu has been embraced in Asia.⁵ For instance, Sang-Yeon Sung asserts that based on her interviews, Taiwanese audiences found the “values and sentiments” in Korean soap operas were more relatable than those in Western products because they “derive[d] from Confucianism” which embodied “family values” that included, amongst other things, “respecting elders” and maintain close kinship ties.⁶ Empirical studies have also pointed to Confucius traditions as a factor for why Korean cultural products have been consumed by audiences in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.⁷ However, contrary to other scholars who have relied solely upon the Confucianism as a reason for the spread of Hallyu, Suh, Cho and Kwon point to the role of other political-economic and socio-cultural factors in the consumption of Hallyu. This paper echoes Kee-hyeung Lee’s argument that “dominant discourses on Hallyu in South Korea “utilize[s] … [an] essentialistic, homogenized … and reductionist sense of culture, which is highly problematic and one-dimensional”.⁸

A more nuanced understanding of the spread of Hallyu can be seen in the work of Ryoo Woongjae (2009) and Shuling Huang (2011). Rather than assuming the pregiven “Korean-ness” of Hallyu, Huang and Ryoo emphasize how the reconstruction of Korean-ness is contingent upon the complex relationship between media, business enterprises, and local consumers.⁹ Huang succinctly asserts that “it is hybrid modernity that makes popular culture transferable in this region”.¹⁰ Both scholars build upon Stuart Hall’s model of communication, whereby cultural consumption entails not only “decoding (interpretation) but also re-encoding (expression) by social actors in specific social contexts”.¹¹ And yet, Huang’s argument that “Korean popular culture is acceptable in places such as Taiwan, China, and Singapore because of its blending of Western cultures and Asian values” is limiting as it neglects non-Asian countries in Latin America and Europe while also continuing to use cultural proximity as a reason for the spread of Hallyu.

In “Landing of the Wave: Hallyu in Peru and Brazil”, the authors argue convincingly that the emergence of Hallyu in Latin America was grounded on socioeconomic grounds and not cultural proximity. To the surprise of even the authors, Hallyu appealed to a technologically-literate group of people of European or indigenous descent, not Korean immigrants, who were of a lower-than-average socioeconomic status¹²; whereas in Asia, the affluent, cosmopolitan youth characterized Hallyu fans. However, many Peruvian and Brazilian youth were drawn to Hallyu as a form of escape from their low economic status and social reality. Korean dramas were appealing because they “portrayed a reality of hope where ‘social upward mobility’ was possible and ‘provided a … possibility of a better life distinct from the one in which they existed”.¹³ The authors not only highlight the importance of social media in how Hallyu was embraced by Latin American youth despite “residing in a geographically, linguistically, and culturally different region of the world”, they also point out how social media provides the Korean state with the possibility of a new market for exporting its culture and products.¹⁴

The hopes and dreams portrayed in Korean dramas and yearned for by Latin American youth are not simply a by-product of an emulation of a westernized version of a better life; it is an image that is carefully maintained by the developmental state of South Korea. Although the overnight explosion of “Gangnam Style” indicates the spontaneous nature of Hallyu, a closer analysis of the Korean developmental state suggests culture was carefully controlled by the state, which ; as a matter of fact, a continuity can be traced to the developmental state of Park Chung Hee in the 1960s.¹⁵ Hyungseok Kang states, “the developmental state model, based on strong state intervention … affected all policy fields, including the arts and culture, as the state became its biggest resource provider, planner and coordinator”.¹⁶ The 1960s developmental state was interested in cultivating a cultural identity separate from Japan. More specifically, the Park regime positioned itself as an ally more valuable to the US during the Vietnam War in hopes of participating in lucrative US Offshore Procurement (OSP) contracts.¹⁷ Therefore, geopolitics in the 1960s is one of many key reasons for why culture was under strict government control and used to form the basis of a “national modernization” project.¹⁸ Jang and Paik reiterate Kang’s argument and emphasize how “Koreans … embarked on a non-stop nation building project to re-establish the political, economic, and social pillars of the country”.¹⁹ This nation-building project continued into the 1990s and three events at the turn of the century shifted the government’s conception of culture: (i) democratization of the state and neoliberalization of public policies in the early 1990s, (ii) the 1998 allowance of Hollywood to distribute movies directly to theatres, and (iii) the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. These events compelled a government reconceptualization of the potential efficacy of Korean cultural products and ushered in “the future possibility for the Korean Wave”.²⁰

The democratization of the state by the early 1990s with the election of President Kim Young-Sam “signified a critical juncture for cultural policy discourses”.²¹ Policy makers were fearful of Korea’s lack of competitiveness on the global market and therefore actively looking for “novel ways”²² to raise Korea’s status as a cultural state. Considering the influx of American and foreign goods entering the country, the state quickly initiated the Motion Picture Promotion Law by restricting foreign films and increasing Korean film representation in theatres. Jin Dal Yong elaborates on this point as he explains how the government began to use “both legal and financial resources to promote content industries”.²³ These included diverse incentives like tax breaks and subsidies which allowed chaebol capital to invest in the domestic film industry. Furthermore, “film producers financed their films by borrowing from banks directly” once the government reclassified the movie business from a service industry to a manufacturing industry, which had enjoyed unparalleled support from the government since the Korean War.

The neoliberalization of public policies was precipitated by “a new and powerful impetus to the segyehwa (globalization) of Korea”.²⁴ The Kim government framed segyehwa as an active response to external pressures in order to survive a “new world of infinite global competition”.²⁵ Coupled with the fear that a national Korean identity would disappear under the flood of foreign goods and cultural products, Korean cultural products were becoming reconceptualized, shifting “from the government’s view on culture as a vehicle for legitimization” towards an idea of culture “as a source of untapped economic potential”.²⁶ Thus, in embracing neoliberal policies, the developmental state utilized culture to situate itself in the global economy, mirroring the ways in which foreign aid was used to “infiltrate new markets in recipient … countries”.²⁷ A study conducted by Suh, Cho, and Kwon highlights “economic interaction” as a key factor for the entry of Korean cultural products into Vietnam²⁸. More importantly, economic interaction between Korea and Vietnam is primarily based on Korean ODA, and according to the OECD, Korea is the second-largest donor country to Vietnam.²⁹

The financial crisis of 1997 brought about a “7 percent loss in GNP”³⁰ and resulted in President Kim Dae-jung’s issuance of the President Proclamation on Culture. Although the proclamation was largely “symbolic”³¹, it highlights the importance Korean cultural products have increasingly played in its economy. During the crisis, Korea was forced to restructure its industry. Korean government policymakers were aware of establishing a knowledge-based society and therefore, facilitated political and economy support of the media and culture industry. Hyejung Ju reveals “Korean network television programs were exported increasingly by more than 30 percent annually from 2001 to 2005”; the increased exportation of television programs reflected a tenfold increase in revenue surpassing $10 million.³²

These numbers are pale in comparison to “Gangnam Style,” which generated over $8 million in revenue on YouTube alone.³³ Closer attention must be paid to new forms of social distribution. Jung and Shim point to YouTube as an “important platform for creative content consumption” and a “new revenue model” for major entertainment companies”.³⁴ Whereas, previous distribution models and revenue streams relied on a traditional, static and highly regulated media environment like television or film productions, Hallyu 2.0 utilized “an emerging model in the Web 2.0 environment”³⁵ that harnessed the grassroots power of fans and audiences to distribute content, generate revenue, and create value.³⁶ [value] as a model of human meaning-making which far exceeds rationalist/reductive economist paradigms” (Graeber 2001, 2). This form of meaning-making is contingent upon time; in other words, the accrued value in objects is a temporal condition: “when one recognizes value in an object, one becomes a sort of bridge across time. That is, one recognizes not only the existence of a history of past desires and intentions that have given shape to the present form of the object, but that history extends itself through one’s own desires, wishes, and intentions, newly mobilized in that very at of recognition” David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 115, http://www.palgrave.com/.. These desires, wishes, and intentions are newly mobilized in Korean cultural products within this model in the Web 2.0 environment.] Social distribution models are constructed through a collaborative relationship between “mainstream-distribution bodies and grassroots networks”.³⁷ These new forms of social distribution counter arguments that Korean cultural products were disseminated by the state and corporations in a top-down fashion. Although Jung and Shim qualify their arguments in admitting “strategic collaborations between K-pop industry and global social media companies”³⁸ were instrumental to the success of “Gangnam Style”, their emphasis on grassroots networks provides room for agency and even creativity – in the form of YouTtube “Gangnam Style” parodies and music covers – for fans who wish to participate in and profit from the music video. Even in these new forms of social distribution, Jung and Shim avoid “Neo-Weberian assumptions that presuppose and overemphasize the role of the state in controlling and regulating economic activities” in the market.³⁹ More specifically, rather than focusing on “national scale actors such as central government officials, federational Korean industries, head offices of enterprises, or central politicians”, Jung and Shim argue that transnational processes like Web 2.0 social distribution models and local actors, or online viewers, are key to the spread of Hallyu.

As Jesook Song emphasized, there is a “dominant imagination” that Korean developmentalism ended with the neoliberalization of the nation. However, a careful analysis of Hallyu and the active role of the state in pursuing nation-branding reveal the meticulous logic and practice behind economic growth in the neoliberal era. Therefore, the purpose, development, and character of Hallyu should not be construed as a cultural embodiment of Korean-ness but as a purposefully crafted manifestation of economic development and the result of a distinct form of developmentalism.

In returning to “Gangnam Style”, several points need to be made. Considering the national perception of Gangnam as the wealthiest section in the entire country, “Gangnam Style” was a localized song targeted for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, the music video became an overnight sensation breaching 2 billion views in a little over three years. Such success was made possible through social media, with YouTube functioning as a network between song and consumer. Social media exposure allows Korean popular cultural products to spread beyond national boundaries. Common discourses of Hallyu that emphasize shared “Asian values” are problematic, as “Gangnam Style” reveals how a locally targeted content, or any targeted content for that matter, can be adapted globally regardless of whether it possesses any Asian values. Therefore, as we sort through conflicting discourses on the Korean Wave and the different ways in which Korean popular culture is received and interpreted, we might construct Hallyu not only as a transnational movement defined by its “multi-layered” nature and “multi-directional mobility” but also as a new form of logic and practice of state-planned development in which culture is the new currency.

References

“Aid by Donor, Recipient and Sector – OECD.” Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.oecd.org/statistics/datalab/oda-recipient-sector.htm.

Glassman, Jim, and Young-Jin Choi. “The Chaebol and the US Military—Industrial Complex: Cold War Geopolitical Economy and South Korean Industrialization.” Environment and Planning A 46, no. 5 (2014): 1160–80. doi:doi:10.1068/a130025p.

Graeber, David. Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. http://www.palgrave.com/.

Jang, Gunjoo, and Won K. Paik. “Korean Wave as Tool for Korea’s New Cultural Diplomacy.” Advances in Applied Sociology 2, no. 3 (2012): 196–202. doi:10.4236/aasoci.2012.23026.

Jeong, Hyeseon. “Giving Like a Developmental State: South Korea’s Foreign Aid and Exportation of Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement),” 2015.

Jin, Dal Yong, and Kyong Yoon. “The Social Mediascape of Transnational Korean Pop Culture: Hallyu 2.0 as Spreadable Media Practice.” New Media & Society, October 16, 2014, 1461444814554895. doi:10.1177/1461444814554895.

Jin, D. Y. “Cultural Politics in Korea’s Contemporary Films under Neoliberal Globalization.” Media, Culture & Society 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 5–23. doi:10.1177/0163443706059274.

———. “Hallyu 2.0: The New Korean Wave in the Creative Industry.” International Institute Journal 2, no. 1 (Fall 2012). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11645653.0002.102.

Ju, Hyejung. “Transformations of the Korean Media Industry by the Korean Wave.” In The Korean Wave, edited by Yasue Kuwahara. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137350282.0006.

Jung, Eun-Young. “Transnational Korea: A Critical Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United States.” Southeast Review of Asian Studies 31 (2009): 69–80.

Jung, Sun, and Doobo Shim. “Social Distribution: K-Pop Fan Practices in Indonesia and the ‘Gangnam Style’ Phenomenon.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 17, no. 5 (September 1, 2014): 485–501.

Kang, Hyungseok. “Contemporary Cultural Diplomacy in South Korea: Explicit and Implicit Approaches” 21, no. 4 (August 8, 2015): 433–47.

Ko, Nusta Carranza, Song No, Jeong-Nam Kim, and Ronald Gobbi Simoes. “Landing of the Wave: Hallyu in Peru and Brazil.” Accessed December 4, 2015.

https://www.academia.edu/12585873/Landing_of_the_Wave_Hallyu_in_Peru_and_Brazil.
Lee, Hye-Kyung. “Cultural Policy and the Korean Wave: From National Culture to Transnational Consumerism.” Accessed December 5, 2015.
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/11333157/Lee_Korean_Wave_Chapter_11_for_CMCI_website.docx.

Lee, Kee-hyeung. “Assessing and Situating ‘the Korean Wave’ (Hallyu) through a Cultural Studies Lens.” Asian Communication Research 2, no. 2 (September 2005): 5–22.

Park, Bae-gyoon. “Developmental State and Politics of Industrial Complex Development in South Korea: A Multi-Scalar Analysis of the Development of Masan Free Export Zone in the 1960s.” University of Toronto, 2015.

Ryoo, Woongjae. “Globalization, or the Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of the Korean Wave” 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 137–51.

Shuling Huang. “Nation-Branding and Transnational Consumption: Japan-Mania and the Korean Wave in Taiwan.” Media, Culture & Society 33, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 3–18. doi:10.1177/0163443710379670.

Suh, Chung-Sok, Young-Dal Cho, and Seung-Ho Kwon. “The Korean Wave in Southeast Asia: An Analysis of Cultural Proximity and the Globalisation of the Korean Cultural Products,” 2005. http://congress.aks.ac.kr/korean/files/2_1358476377.pdf.

Sung, Sang-Yeon. “Constructing a New Image. Hallyu in Taiwan.” European Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (July 1, 2010): 25–45. doi:10.1163/156805810X517652.

The Korean Wave: Korean Popular Culture in Global Context. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137350282.

The content of this article does not represent the positions, research methods, or opinions of the Synergy Editorial Committee. We are solely responsible for reviewing and editing submissions. Please address all scholarly concerns directly to the contributor(s) of the article.

---

Eojin Lim is a 4th Year student majoring in Social/Cultural Anthropology and minoring in Contemporary Asian Studies and the Writing & Rhetoric program at New College in the University of Toronto. His interests include religion, transnationalism, Asian Canadian youth activism and the complicated and contemporary ways in which these are articulated through social media.