China’s Leadership Transitions: Successor’s Dilemma and Paradox of Institutionalization

Weijian Shi is a political science and American studies student at the University of Toronto. His main areas of focus include Middle Eastern, American, and Chinese politics. Past research and course experience include American foreign policy, comparative electoral politics, and authoritarianisms in East Asia. In his final year in university, he expects to further his pursuit in political science after a year of world traveling.

Abstract

China’s economic success and the Communist regime’s adaptability are often cited as factors contributing to its authoritarian resilience. However, elite strife has been described as the “Achilles’s heel” of the regime. This paper examines the content of China’s leadership transition and selection processes and their significance, the role faction politics plays in selecting the next-generation leaders, and the institutionalized nature of the transitional procedures.

Keywords: Leadership transition and succession, Chinese Communist Party, democracy and institutionalization, Chinese politics, Successor’s Dilemma

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China’s economic success and the Communist regime’s adaptability are often cited as factors contributing to its authoritarian resilience. However, elite strife has been described as the “Achilles’s heel” of the regime.¹ Leadership successions often generate fierce contests and attest much to the state of Chinese politics. The tumultuous experience of Mao’s era as evidenced by multiple succession crises and bouts of fervent mass mobilizations led Deng Xiaoping to attempt to normalize the power transition process in the 1970s to the 1990s. The three leadership transitions following the reforms from Deng to Xi have been largely without hiccups. To shed some light on the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian resilience — or the lack thereof —going forward, this paper analyzes the behind-the-scene processes of the CCP’s leadership changes. In this paper, I examine (1) first the content of the transition and leader selection processes and its significance, (2) the role faction politics plays in selecting the next-generation leaders, (3) and finally the institutionalized nature of the transitional procedures. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the arguments presented and a speculation on the future based on these discussions.

Learning the lessons of earlier periods, Deng initiated a series of reforms institutionalizing the power transition arrangements in the post-Mao era. Limits of two five-year terms on top government positions were imposed and constitutionally entrenched.² Since the supreme power of the state and party converged into the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), following Deng’s retirement from politics, the term limits on top state officials in effect carried over to top party positions as well.³ This development signifies China’s transition from being under a single-personality authority to what has been called the “collective leadership” of the PBSC.⁴ The transformed nature of the regime’s leadership meant that the game of succession was now played in the institutional context of the PBSC. The political rules and norms in regard to the selection and reappointment of its members, thus, are the primary focus of this paper.

In addition to term limits, age limits are a significant institutional restraint in the selection process. Under Jiang Zemin, the lines were drawn first at 70 for PBSC members. The age limit is eventually set at 68, hence the “67 stay and 68 retire” rule.⁵ Moreover, internal polls were also conducted among Central Committee members and alternate members in the latest 2012 transition.⁶ Some scholars go so far as to suggest that the use of internal polls will become another institutionalized requirement for selecting PBSC members in the future.⁷ In all, these informal political rules have largely been followed in the immediate Jiang-Hu and Hu-Xi transitions. Notable examples include Zhu Rongji’s and Zeng Qinghong’s retirements after their first term.⁸ Other norms related to the topmost position of party secretary general are also in the making. Hu Jintao’s giving up of all three positions at once, the party secretary general, state president, and chair of the Central Military Commission, was also lauded as a future model of institutionalized power transition.⁹

An immediate effect of these institutional rules is increased political mobility among the top elites. The turnover rate of the PBSC members in the latest leadership change exceeds 70% while more than half of all Politburo and Central Committee memberships changed hands.¹⁰ As a result of this “rapid and routinized turnover of political elites,” the Party can easily co-opt emerging young cadres by absorbing them into the epicenter of power ¹¹ while also providing a fairer exit route for aging top leaders.¹² Scholars argue that these arrangements ensure political stability that is rarely present in authoritarian regimes. In turn, political stability in the leadership, economic performance and social stability, facilitate the current regime’s claims to legitimacy.¹³ Additionally, this sense of political stability does not imply political stagnation. Another advantage of the rapid turnover of leadership is the newly gained flexibility of the regime. The constant waves of younger politicians replacing their elder, more conservative comrades would allow the Party leadership to resist the static inertia of authoritarian regimes and become more adaptable to the changing environment with constant supplies of new blood.¹⁴

Institutional procedures and norms, however, do not complete the whole picture of the selection process. One interpretation of today’s power dynamics behind the formal process focuses on elite compromise. As strongman politics gave way to party factionalism as the defining feature of the politics in the top leadership, elite consensus became essential to the selection of next-generation leaders.¹⁵ Compromise and power sharing among various party elders, factions and patron-client alliances, and constituency interests determine who gets a seat on the now all-powerful PBSC.¹⁶ On the contrary, some scholars argue that institutional rules trump even power politics when it comes to PBSC membership. Zeng finds that seniority can explain the outcome of a leadership transition better than all other factors.¹⁷ Following the logic of this observation, all eligible candidates were given a fair chance of gaining a seat on the PBSC regardless of their factional affiliations and other qualifications. Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang’s losing bids in 2012 thus can be understood as not due to their status as protégés of Hu but as a result of their relatively younger age and future eligibility in the next term.¹⁸ This school of thought interprets the current seat assignments as maximizing all eligible candidates’ chances of promotion to the PBSC, thus maintaining the satisfaction of all factions. In turn, this seemingly mechanical and arithmetic distribution of PBSC seats prevents a concentration of power on one person or one faction.¹⁹

At the core of this debate is whether factional politics or institutional norms play a more important role in the leadership transition process. Conventional analysis lists the princelings, Shanghai gang, tuanpai (the Youth League faction), and Qinghua clique ²⁰ among the main factions.²¹ However, these inner-partisan lines are flexible and ambiguous. One politician can be a princeling by birth or marriage but also have extensive connections with the Shanghai gang through work or with the Qinghua clique through education. Since these divisions are never formalized, scholarly interpretation of their existence remains as “informed guesswork” at best.²² The fluidity of factions also means that the CCP’s rule largely relies on broad consensus building around a number of elite interests, according to this view.²³ Cheng Li came to a similar conclusion but identified two broad coalitions, elites and populists, playing the power game at the very top of the Party. According to this categorization, Xi Jinping belongs to the elitist camp and Li Keqiang the populist group.²⁴ The two sides have enjoyed general parity in terms of representation in the PBSC and other party organs. As a result, most decisions are made out of compromises between the two camps. In all, if this characterization of loose political alliances either in the form of factions or two broad coalitions were to be true, it is only logical to imagine a space for an institutionalized succession procedure emerging out of the necessity to balance competing elite interests.

Opinions, however, differ on how institutionalized the succession process is and its implication on China’s political development. Those favoring the institutional view argue that these mechanisms helped China resolve a so-called “successor’s dilemma”, which happens when the heirs apparent develop their own political power base in authoritarian regimes. If the successor is sufficiently independent and powerful, he or she will unavoidably threaten the current leader in power. However, if the predecessor keeps their successor too weak for too long, the incumbent risks damaging their own legacy in that the regime could falter in the future as a result of a weak leadership.²⁵ To solve this dilemma, CCP leaders put the institutional safeguards in place to serve as “checks and balances” among various actors, especially between predecessors and successors.²⁶ Institutionalized succession, therefore, ensures that neither the incumbent nor the heir would be able to dominate at the expense of the other, and by extension, the survival of the regime. The restoration of the balance of power by institutional restraints can be seen at work in the two latest transitions in 2002 and 2012. The retiring Jiang Zemin and his allies could not continue to dominate the political scene because of term limits; the growth of Hu’s tuanpai seemed to be checked by the new leadership after his term ended.²⁷ Moreover, placing this view of institutionalization in the analytical framework of political development, other scholars suggest that institutionalization would have a positive impact on democratization in China. The established succession norms would open up the political space for all eligible candidates regardless of faction politics. Thus, as institutionalization moves forward, participation of all actors is formalized and strengthened in the process. In turn, contestation among different groups will be fostered in this more open political environment, which would complete the “three stages of political development” leading up to democracy.²⁸

Sceptics cite the opaque nature of China’s political system to point out that outside speculations about the leadership succession process remain to be mere speculations. None of the arrangements were formalized as ironclad rules. China watchers do not have a list of all the candidates considered for the top spots, making any evaluation of how much institutional restraints mattered in the actual process is  nearly impossible.²⁹ Some suggest that all of the institutional arrangements have been used in favor of whoever was in real position of power. Deng Xiaoping instituted term and age limits on state and party positions only because as the established number one of the party, he did not need to derive authority from official titles. Since the beginning, age limits were put in place for political calculations. Jiang set the retirement age first at 70 to conveniently deny his rival Qiao Shi a chance. Not soon after, the limit was changed to 68 when Li Ruihuan, another foe of Jiang, happened to turn 68.³⁰ Jiang himself never followed his own “67 stay and 68 retire” rule. In 2012, the age limits were kept intact in the latest power transition only because the most senior candidates in the 18th Congress were allies of Jiang. Candidates close to Hu, who lacked Jiang’s influence in the end, were less lucky. The latest institutional change of downsizing the nine-member PBSC to seven could be seen as cutting two of Hu’s associates, Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao, off the top body.³¹ At the end of the day, critics dismiss the effects of institutional rules to merely be subordinate to elite power politics. Institutional checks on factional or personal power did not perform as well as the proponents of the institutional view would have liked.³²

To sum up, the CCP instituted political reforms such as term limits, age limits, seniority preference, and internal polls to ensure smooth power transitions after Mao. These constraints on state and party position-holders have resulted in rapid leadership turnovers, greater space for political mobility, and checks on personal and factional domination. However, questions remain as to whether these selection rules are merely the tools top leaders’ use to their political advantage or in fact meaningful institutionalized procedures that constrain all political actors. Given the opacity of the political process, neither view offers a definitive answer. Factionalist politics does certainly exist and blatant disregard for the institutional rules has not happened. The fatal flaw of the institutionalization view, however, is that the succession mechanisms are political in nature and the consequence of violating them is purely political too. As long as a dominating leader can withstand the political costs of breaking the established norms, they are free to do so. In fact, relapses from institutionalization back to chaotic power politics have happened many times in the People’s Republic’s history. As Gilley points out, the limits of CCP’s authoritarian resilience are the Party’s relative ease with reversing institutional development as much as its willingness to institute these reforms.³³ If reforms can always be reversed, institutionalization alone cannot solve the problem of succession. The core of the issue remains as how these regimes can impose effective, irreversible checks on personal and factional power. In addition, the political development school is wrong to assume that these institutional restrains would lead to democratization. In fact, the succession rules came with the Communist leaders’ explicit intent to strengthen their one-party rule against the threats of multi-party democracy. Going forward, Xi Jinping’s ten-year tenure would be a turning point for China’s political development. If he or other top leaders resist the temptation of monopoly and continue to honor and further institutionalize existing transition arrangements, it is more likely that the regime will survive. Conversely, if institutionalization is not followed through, bigger problems of regime instability will arise. Such a development might plunge China back into the chaos of Mao’s time or, paradoxically, open up the political system for democratization.

References

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Weijian Shi is a political science and American studies student at the University of Toronto. His main areas of focus include Middle Eastern, American, and Chinese politics. Past research and course experience include American foreign policy, comparative electoral politics, and authoritarianisms in East Asia. In his final year in university, he expects to further his pursuit in political science after a year of world traveling.

Endnotes