Academic Articles, Op-Eds, and Event Reports about East, Southeast, and South Asia

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A special thank you Daniela Zaks for her contributions as the Interim Editor-in-Chief. Our gratitude also goes out to the staff and faculty of the Asian Institute for their continued support of the Synergy Journal.
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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

It is my pleasure and honour to present to you the fourth volume of the Synergy Journal’s annual publication. It is a showcase of the finest works on the Asia-Pacific received by Synergy this academic year, and features undergraduate scholars from institutions across the world.

When work began on the online journal at the beginning of the 2019-2020 academic year, no one could have anticipated the unprecedented circumstances we would find ourselves ending the year in. Despite a global pandemic, the Synergy Editorial Team continued to review and edit incoming submissions and managed changing circumstances with the utmost grace and diligence. For that, I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to all members of the Synergy team—this edition would not be possible without the commitment you have shown over the course of the entire year. To all graduating members, I wish you all the best and hope we may work together again in the future.

The Synergy Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies was founded in 2015 with the vision of being a premier journal for undergraduate work that showcases the complexity, vibrancy, and importance of the Asia Pacific region on the international stage. Over the course of the past five years, the journal has grown to reach an international audience, and has built a strong reputation for consistency and diversity.

As you explore Asia through the bounds of this year’s compilation, I hope you will take time to traverse through East Asia, where the historical failure of the Ming dynasty to patrol its coasts will eventually lead you to an analysis of the Hong Kong democratic movement. In Southeast Asia, readers will find highly important discussions around the genocide of the Rohingya, which holds implications for the international legal regime at large. Pay particular attention to the developments in Myanmar’s democracy to watch for in 2020—a comprehensive report on the event co-hosted by Synergy and our friends at the Contemporary Asian Studies Students’ Union. The journey concludes in South Asia, where timely issues of sexuality, mental health, colonialism and race are scrutinized artfully in writing that is poetic in its own right. Through a diverse range of academic articles, op-eds, and event reports, we hope you will gain diverse and unfretted insight into the historical and contemporary issues shaping
our world today.

More than ever, Asia is proving itself to be a pertinent location of academic inquiry, and I sincerely hope that you will continue to follow the Synergy Journal’s online publication to deepen your understanding of Asia’s link to the world. Thank you for your continued support and patronage, and I hope you enjoy this year’s volume of Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.

Sincerely,

Hui Wen Zheng

*Editor-in-Chief*

Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies
Foreword

I was thrilled to be asked to introduce this volume in a foreword, because these finely researched articles, event reports, and op-eds reflect so faithfully and fully the vision of our institute to think through critical issues of world importance from a perspective informed by Asian historical trajectories. The issue of *Synergy* you are about to dive into is also interdisciplinary in the best sense of the term: crossing the boundaries between scholarly distance and more normative appraisal, as well as between approaches informed by more “realist” conceptions of power dominant in political science and poststructuralist interpretations grounded in the humanities, none of which allow for easy answers to difficult questions.

The research articles in this issue engage with ongoing academic debates that speak across regional boundaries, despite the journal’s tripartite structure separating East, Southeast, and South East Asia. I am particularly interested in themes that cut across temporal and spatialized diversity. From the Ming Dynasty’s geographic imaginary to the plight of African students in contemporary India, for example, we learn about the degree to which problematics that are often thought of as specific to localities must be understood in more global contexts. The spectres of earlier Afro-Asian international solidarities along anticolonial nationalist lines shed critical light on contradictions between aspirations to attract globalizing capital and the prominence of a newly racialized nationalism in contemporary India. The newly homogenizing thrust of Hindu nationalism in India is furthermore demonstrated to rest upon the gendered and sexed body of the imagined Muslim Other in an astute analysis that borrows from Euro-American Queer Theory. Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Revolution” is lifted out of debate around a particular law and placed in the context of a more active clash of national imaginations, informed by differing paths to the postcolonial condition. In another more historical piece of research we learn how a World-level war was narrativized very differently along the victim-aggressor binary depending on where one stood in Japanese society and in relation to the lived experience of violence, but also as mediated by the post-war occupying force’s own ideas about the distribution of blame. Canada, never claiming the hegemonic role of its neighbor to the South, is demonstrated to nevertheless have a vexed relationship to the People’s Republic of China, at times conciliatory and at others claiming the mantle of human rights. In each of
these finely written pieces we see how analysis of a particular country simply cannot proceed in isolation, a problem more common to Euro-American studies than to the traditions of Asian Studies developed here.

The event reports and op-eds round out this fine collection with astute observations that invite non-specialists to understand the deeper stakes in topics they might otherwise only read about in newspapers. Indeed, the great success of the Contemporary Asian Studies program that so many of the contributors have been trained in has to do with translating between specialist and generalist registers of knowledge production. We teach our students with the hope that they will be able to read journalistic accounts with a more penetrating and informed eye while also using in-depth expertise gained through painstaking research to illuminate the world in a publicly accessible and attractive way.

So, it is my pleasure to invite you, dear reader, not only to learn from the wonderful work published here, but also to enjoy it as a mark of the optimism of the intellect in dark times.

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East Asia
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Isolation, Neglect, and Decay: A Study of the Ming Dynasty’s Coastal Consciousness

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Abstract

Wokou pirate incursions battered the Ming’s extensive coastline for most of the dynasty’s 276 year-long lifespan. The social dislocation and suffering endured by coastal communities presented a serious crisis to the Ming court. Yet, it responded to the persistent harassment of its coastline with an apathetic attitude and inadequate measures that were defensive rather than offensive. As such, this paper attempts to demonstrate that the Ming predominantly lacked a coastal consciousness. It begins by investigating the Ming’s isolationist maritime policies as enforced by a series of Ming emperors and the precipitous decline of the Ming’s coastal fortifications. It then attempts to explain the Ming’s lack of an acute coastal consciousness by examining three underpinning factors. Specifically, it studies China’s land-based condition as derivative of its continental consciousness, its historical relationship with the ocean, and its anxiety toward the Northern Steppe. This paper concludes that the Ming was predisposed to neglecting its maritime problems in favor of its continental ones, and that its proclivities would have serious consequences for China’s maritime future.

Keywords

Ming Dynasty, Navy, Decline, Maritime Policy, Northern Border
Part I: Setting the Context

Introduction

Lin Daoqian was well-known to the Jiajing Emperor’s court. During Jiajing’s reign, the Ming’s extensive coastline was frequently subjected to pirate attacks, many of which were led by Lin, a Chinese collaborator in the infamous Wokou incursions. In 1563, Lin once again launched a raid on the Chinese coast; the military general Yu Dayou, whom the Ming had dispatched to curb such attacks, was swift in pursuing the pirate leader. Yet, Yu only pursued Lin, who went into hiding in Taiwan, as far as the Penghu Island chain, where Yu established a temporary garrison. After Lin fled to Champa, Yu’s garrison quickly disbanded and withdrew back to the mainland. Why Yu did not put an end to such a significant source of the Ming’s maritime troubles is indeed puzzling. A question that not only underpins this historical incident, but also the larger context in which it occurred, serves as the primary issue that this paper attempts to address: did the Ming possess a coastal consciousness? With 14,500 kilometers of exposed shoreline, it would be reasonable to expect that the Ming would have ventured beyond its coast to take proactive steps to ensure its security. Yet, as this essay argues, the Ming in fact lacked this awareness: instead it chose to deliberately ignore maritime affairs. This paper begins by examining the predominantly defensive maritime policies enforced by a series of Ming emperors, focusing on the Hongwu, Tianzhun, and Jiajing Emperors. It then examines the rapid rate at which the Ming’s coastal fortifications fell into disrepair, with both naval technology and personnel suffering from neglect. In particular, the Zhengtong Emperor’s reign is identified as the juncture at which this process accelerated considerably. In order to explain the absence of a coastal consciousness, this paper then delves deeper by exploring the Ming’s continental consciousness, as derived from China Proper’s environmental characteristics, its historical relationship with the ocean, and its fear of the Northern Steppe. The paper concludes that as inherited from its dynastic predecessors, it appears that the land-based Ming was indeed predisposed to turning its attention away from the ocean and instead toward the continent.

Maritime Policies and Fortifications

Maritime prohibitions came to largely characterize the Ming’s strategy for dealing with the piratical incursions. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty, spared no time in shutting down China’s maritime borders by issuing a
series of edicts. In 1371 he declared, “It is forbidden that any person living along the coast venture out into the sea.” In 1381, he expanded his ban to include the people’s economic livelihoods: “It is commanded of General Tanghe to monitor the Zhejiang and Fujian coastal regions; it is forbidden for the people in this region to fish in the sea. This is a measure to ward off pirates.” Only six years later, Hongwu then decreed that those living in Haitan Island off the coast of Fujian Province were to move inland in a further attempt to prevent attacks from Wokou pirates. Moreover, Hongwu’s explicitly defensive posture established a precedent that most of his successors followed. The Tianshun Emperor (r. 1457-1464) issued such an edict: “The servicemen and people of Zhejiang and Zhili are strictly prohibited from privately manufacturing ocean-going vessels. Weapons that may be used by the people to engage in maritime piracy are to be collected. Should anyone violate this order, they will be punished to the most extreme extent; in addition, their familial dependents will be sent to the border regions for punitive military service.” Finally, the Jiajing Emperor became the author of a formidable maritime ban that, in 1525, shut down the Ming’s entire coastline. It was only when Jiajing passed away in 1567 that so too did his isolationist policy. As can be seen here, Hongwu’s infamous proclamation in December of 1371 that “not a single plank is allowed out to sea” set the tone for the Ming’s maritime policies. Aside from the Yongle Emperor’s brief flirtation with maritime expeditions, thehaijin 海禁 policy reflected the prevailing opinion in court that the Ming should extricate itself from maritime affairs.

These policies illustrate willful neglect toward establishing a meaningful form of coastal security. Given that the court prohibited its people from venturing into the ocean for leisure or business, engaging in travel and commerce with foreign countries, or even manufacturing ocean-going vessels, the Ming appears to have been disinterested in pursuing a proactive solution for its coastal troubles. The court believed that by preventing contact between its people and pirates, in addition to cutting off the pirates’ access to its coastline’s economic incentives, it would effectively stymie their activities. Yet, these policies, rather than exterminating the pirates, simply created more problems. First, the total maritime prohibition, particularly the one authored by the Jiajing Emperor, resulted in a sharp increase in piratical activity. In Jiajing’s reign alone, the coast suffered an estimated 267 Wokou incursions. Despite the prohibition’s inability to prevent piracy, the court stubbornly refused to revise its coastal policy. Second, it shut the coastal people away from the outside world, causing them to suffer greatly. Tan Lun, a military official during the Jiajing reign, petitioned the emperor concerning the maritime ban’s effect on coastal populations: “The
Fujian people living along the coast largely depend on the ocean to make a living; without it, they are unable to survive... Locals need to trade their fish products; Guangdong merchants need to trade their rice; Zhangzhou merchants need to trade their sugar. As this is all prohibited, how is it that the people cannot but resort to piracy just to subsist?" Indeed, the hajjin policy even pushed suffering coastal peoples to lives of piracy, exacerbating the original problem the Ming was trying to solve. In effect, maritime bans demonstrate that the Ming court was disinterested in pursuing an active resolution for its coastal troubles. Rather than opt for eradicating the enemy at their roots, the Ming distanced itself from them. At the dismay of officials like Tan Lun, it even did so at the expense of its own people’s livelihoods. In other words, had the Ming possessed a coastal consciousness, it would have pursued proactive and offensive policies rather than defensive ones.

Coastal fortifications during the Ming likewise suffered from neglect. In particular, it was during the reign of the Zhengtong Emperor (r. 1435-1449) that the symptoms of decay spread across the Ming coastline with considerable speed and severity. Dengzhou Garrison in Shandong Province was one such case. In the early 15th century, the coastguard reported having a fleet of 100 warships. By 1448, eighty-two warships had been scrapped; out of the remaining eighteen, four more were later scrapped and another four were diverted for the shipping of raw materials such as cloth to Manchuria. Finally, out of the remaining ten warships, seven were distributed to other regions, utterly crippling Dengzhou’s maritime defense capabilities. In 1524, the Jiajing Emperor issued an edict ordering Dengzhou to cease producing warships altogether. In addition, the Ming court went beyond passive neglect to pursuing proactive withdrawal. Shenjianmen was a naval base located just beyond the shore of Zhejiang Province, established by the Yongle Emperor in 1409. Despite being a strategic location from which to spot and defend against incoming pirate attacks, the garrison was withdrawn in its entirety in 1452 at the repeated requests of local officials. Rationalizing the withdrawal from Shenjianmen, officials remarked that “the transfer of their garrisons to the mainland would bolster the defenses in order to resist enemy invaders more effectively after they had landed.” In spite of the officials’ confidence, the warships were instead anchored along the shore and rotted from neglect. Making matters worse, pirates took advantage of the Ming’s inward retreat and began to occupy the abandoned bases, giving them an offensive advantage. Moreover, the decline of Dengzhou and Shenjianmen’s naval defenses were by no means isolated incidents during the Ming. As Supervising Imperial Censor Li Kui reported in 1440, “During the Hongwu reign, the coastal garrisons along Zhejiang Province were originally equipped
with 730 warships. Many years have passed, and they have suffered from rot and neglect. There now only remain 132 warships. This is nowhere near enough to hold the pirates at bay.” Furthermore, the Ming’s apathetic attitude toward maintaining a strong coastal defense system resulted in the widespread desertion of naval garrisons. By 1550, coastal garrisons along Zhejiang Province had shrunk to 22 per cent of their original strength, and the rate of desertion in Fujian Province was as high as 44 per cent. Indeed, the Ming’s defensive and isolationist maritime prohibitions, the neglect of naval defensive systems, and apathy toward desertion all point toward the Ming lacking a coastal consciousness. While piracy was indeed a thorn in its side, the Ming made it clear that its maritime problems were of low priority.

Part II: Underpinnings

The Continental Consciousness

Three main arguments may be made to explain the absence of the Ming’s coastal consciousness. First, the Ming’s maritime policies were informed by the continental consciousness of those who staffed its bureaucracy. Like its dynastic predecessors, the Ming conceptualized itself as a landlocked empire bound by natural geographic features. The barren flatlands of the Northern Steppe and the Gobi Desert demarcated the boundary between China Proper and the north; the hostile conditions of the western frontier (in what is modern-day Xinjiang) and the Tibetan Plateau kept China in its traditional heartland; lastly, the ocean served to contain China within the continent. That political and economic power was historically concentrated in the North China Plain further turned successive Chinese empires’ attention inland. Under such circumstances, China thus came to view the ocean as an empty expanse of water, which had neither political, economic, or military significance. Moreover, the atlas of the Ming-era scholar Luo Hongxian, the Guang Yitu (“Expanded Terrestrial Atlas”) supported this perception. Luo served in the Jiajing Emperor’s court as a geographer, providing for the emperor an atlas containing forty-eight maps. In his chart, the “General Map of the Terrestrial Territories” (see Fig. 1), Luo indeed depicts China as a continental-bound empire. The ocean is depicted simply as an empty expanse of water bordering the Ming Great State, with no major oceanic territories having been charted aside from Hainan; the Gobi Desert is shown hanging above the Ming; and to the west lies the barren expanse of Central Asia. It is the East Asian landmass that clearly occupied Luo’s attention, and precisely what he designed his atlas to
plot. Moreover, Luo’s continental design was consistent with his contemporaries’ designs, who sought to, according to Emma Teng, “naturalize the spatial image of a territorially bound China.”17 Therefore, China’s predisposition toward continental affairs and aversion to maritime ones may be partially explained by its environmental circumstances.

![General Map of the Terrestrial Territories](image)

Fig. 1: *General Map of the Terrestrial Territories*

**China and the Sea**

Additionally, the Ming’s lack of a coastal consciousness was informed by the Chinese empire’s history with the sea. Historically, as military threats had not arrived from the ocean, China had little reason to install heavy fortifications along the coast. The only oceanic polities with which it had long-standing historical interactions were the Ryukyu Kingdom, various polities in Southeast Asia, and Japan, the latter of which had been no cause for alarm until the surge of Wokou activity in the Ming.19 Supervising Censor Qian Wei confirmed this situation. He reported to the Jiajing court the reason for China’s maritime weakness, stating that “Ever since the Tang and Song Dynasties, [the Japanese] had consistently sent tribute and had never harassed our coastal regions. Because China satisfied their needs, there was never any need to install fortifications along the coast.”20 In other words, the ocean had never produced a sufficiently significant reason for the Ming to be concerned about maritime security.
It comes as little surprise then that the Ming responded to initial European contact in the same way. One of the earliest official points of correspondence occurred in 1517 when a Portuguese trade envoy arrived in Guangzhou. The embassies began to entrench themselves off the Guangdong coast on Tunmen Island by constructing fortifications and residences, a place in which the Portuguese hoped to freely engage in commerce.\(^3\) Despite its displeasure toward the Portuguese overtures, the Ming did not view the Portuguese as seriously threatening dynastic security. Rather, they were assumed to be seafaring peoples intent on using islands as bases for piracy; such an assumption was conditioned by the Ming’s experience with Wokou pirates.\(^2\) Confirming this, censor He Ao in a 1521 court memorial described their fortifications as a “stockade intended for long-term residence.”\(^3\) It can be seen that the Portuguese were not treated as an imminent threat, but rather a new form of piratical pestilence. In response to the potential problems posed by the Portuguese presence off the Chinese coast, He Ao requested of the Ming court that:

“The old regulations be examined and resorted, that all the foreign ships in the bays and all the foreigners who have secretly entered and reside there be expelled, that non-official interactions be prohibited.”

In effect, He’s memorial requested that the same maritime ban that was being used to unsuccessfully curb Wokou piracy be extended to include the Portuguese. His recommendation was met with praise from the court, which readily adopted his isolationist approach. Moreover, in consideration of the Ming’s experience with the Japanese and Portuguese, it becomes clear that the dynasty could not conceive that genuine threats to its security could originate from the ocean. As such, there was no impetus to drive innovation in naval defense technology or to devote greater resources to coastal fortifications. Instead, the Ming simply sought superficial solutions to its maritime problems. Now, this paper will shift its focus to the Ming’s long-standing and complex relationship with the Mongols, an issue that was key to shaping its apathy towards the ocean and its continental consciousness.

The Northern Steppe

Luo Hongxian’s atlas reflects the Ming court’s anxiety toward the northern border. In the postface following the section entitled “Comprehensive Maps of the Nine Frontiers”, Luo elaborates, “I inquired with the thinkers about the current concerns of the realm. They informed me that the Mongols in the north were of grave concern - no other concern was greater.”\(^25\) The Ming
overthrew the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in 1368. Despite being fragmented, the Mongol state survived, with numerous confederations continuing to operate in the north. That the Mongols continued to be active along the northern border kept the Ming on high alert. Many Ming emperors launched northbound offensives in hopes of finally extirpating the Mongol threat, but more often than not failed to achieve their objective. In 1449, after personally leading the disastrous Tunhu Campaign in which 500,000 Ming troops perished, the Zhengtong Emperor was held prisoner by the Mongols until his release in 1457, igniting a political crisis in Beijing. Furthermore, by the middle of the 16th century, several Mongol tribes had been unified under the leadership of Altan Khan, a descendant of Kublai Khan. He led several raids south of the Great Wall, and even ventured into the outskirts of the imperial capital in 1550, ransacking people’s homes and lighting them ablaze. Indeed, that the Mongols could reemerge from the steppe to challenge the Celestial Empire’s authority was the court’s chief security concern. Wang Gong, the Deputy Minister of War, spoke to his anxiety toward the Ming’s northern border in 1544: “I deployed 30,000 soldiers to defend a border that stretches 800 里. The enemy (Mongols) attacked with ten times the number of soldiers on horseback to punch through an area of only ten 里… they have five times as many foot soldiers and twenty times as many horsemen.” With the looming possibility of another invasion from the steppe, the Ming had to weigh its priorities: either to spread itself thin by simultaneously fighting on both a continental and oceanic front, or to devote the bulk of its resources to the northern border. The fact that it chose the latter was not only informed by its lack of a coastal consciousness, but also by its continental one. In light of the above, it can be seen that the Ming’s detachment from the coast through prohibition policies, which resulted in the decay of coastal fortifications, can be largely attributed to the military situation in the northern frontiers. In the words of Jung-pang Lo, “The strong pull of the continent and its multitudinous affairs turned the attention of China to the land and away from the sea.”

Part III: The Ming’s Coastal Consciousness

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to accomplish two tasks. First, it set out to demonstrate that the Ming Dynasty, and those who ruled it, lacked a coastal consciousness. Counterintuitive maritime prohibition policies and the consequential decay of the Ming’s coastal fortifications illustrate that the Ming
paid little heed to the harassment suffered by its coast and the communities inhabiting it, and further that its attention was not directed toward the coast. Second, it set out to explain the reason for this absence using a three-pronged approach. Natural geographical constraints served to contain China within the East Asian landmass and 14,500 kilometers of continuous coastline acted as a boundary that separated the Ming and the empty expanse of the Pacific Ocean. This was conducive to producing in the Chinese psyche a continental consciousness that deprived it of a coastal counterpart. Furthermore, military threats to dynastic security had never originated from the sea, which additionally provided China with a reason to not be concerned about establishing a meaningful form of coastal security. Therefore, its preoccupation with defending the northern border, upon which the Mongols loomed with intent to restore the Yuan, continuously captured its attention. Indeed, while the Ming’s maritime weakness would not bring about its collapse in 1644, it certainly left a lasting legacy.

Owing to the efforts of military generals like Qi Jiguang during the Longqing and Wanli eras (r. 1567-1620), in addition to the reunification of Japan in 1603, the piracy crisis finally abated in the late Ming. While the emperors of the late Ming did indeed work to rectify their predecessors’ coastal neglect, their efforts were to be short-lived. When the Manchus in 1629 captured four Ming cities south of the Great Wall, the court’s attention was once again diverted northward until it succumbed to the Manchu invasion from the Northern Steppe.\textsuperscript{39} Arguably, after the Qing achieved ascendancy over the Dragon Throne in 1644, it quickly became preoccupied on the continent with not only pacifying the Chinese people, but also expanding its territories westward to incorporate Xinjiang and Tibet into the imperial domain. Indeed, the legacy of the Ming’s continental consciousness lived on. As a result, the Qing similarly found itself trapped in the continent, neglecting its coastal fortifications while pursuing isolationist policies in the face of increasing pressure from the West. While withdrawing from the ocean it went so far as to restrict its legitimate purview to the shallow waters of the “inner sea”.\textsuperscript{37} Without a coastal consciousness, the Qing only came to understand the consequences of its inferior naval technology vis-à-vis the Western powers in the mid-19th century. As Imperial Censor Niu Jian remarked in 1842 after the Qing’s defeat at the hands of the British at Wusong, “Our troops fired the cannons directly into the hull of the British warship, but the cannonballs simply rebounded upon impact, killing those manning the cannons. We could only stare in disbelief. This could not be...”\textsuperscript{55} The Qing would soon come to learn that true power lay not on land, but on the sea.
台湾文献丛刊资料库，“台湾关系文献大集零” (55), http://tcss.iith.sinica.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?ccd=bR_Ck6&record=r1=2&h1=0 [accessed 21 January 2019].
“嘉靖四十二年，海寇林道乾作乱，都督俞大猷追剿及于澎湖，道乾遁入台湾。大猷不敢追，留偏师驻澎湖，时哨鹿耳门外，徐俟其敝。道乾复遁入海，澎湖驻师亦罢。”

高扬文, 陶_TB, 明代倭患史略, 71. “禁海沿海不得私出海。”
5 Ibid., 71. “命信国公汤和巡视浙江，福建沿海城池，禁民入海捕鱼，以防倭患也。”


Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties, 223.

刘成, “论明代的海禁政策”, 41. “片板不许入海。”

高扬文, 114, 140, 158.


It is worth noting that this ruling was not supported unanimously. As one official memorialized in August of 1443, “During the Yongle reign, there originally were three naval bases established in Shanxi and other locations. Troops and warships were stationed there to defend against Wokou pirates; during this time, the sea was tranquil. During the second year of the Zhengtong reign, however, these naval garrisons were ordered to be withdrawn. Since then, pirates have begun appearing in ever-increasing numbers... In Linshui and other (mainland) garrisons, where no warships are docked, the arrival of pirates is met with great alarm. It is difficult to hold them at bay. I implore that the old system be reinstated.”

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This further evinces that, despite the obvious inefficacy of its withdrawal strategy, the Ming was unwilling to confront its maritime problems. Unfortunately, the voices of these more liberal officials fell on deaf ears.

郑梁生, 明代倭寇史料: 第一辑, 89. “永乐中, 耒于沈家门等处立三水寨, 会兵聚船以备倭寇, 海道一向宁息。正统二年, 始掣散水寨, 各守地方, 自此海寇益多…临山等卫无港泊船, 遇有倭急, 拒敌良难。乞复旧为便。”

Lo, 158.

高扬文, 207.

17 Young-tsuo Wong, China’s Conquest of Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century, 14.

18 Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 3.

19 Teng, 37. For instance, see The Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Ming Realm (1461); the Map of Imperial Territories (1526); and the Comprehensive Map of the Great Ming Realm (1636).


21 During the Ming, the Japanese were only permitted to send tribute once every ten years. Upon each occasion, they were restricted to bringing precisely three ships with no more than 100 men; with such limited capacity, Japan was simply unable to satisfy its desire and need for trade with China. Indeed, such draconian regulations were responsible for pushing Japanese traders into raiding the Chinese coastline. The infamous Ningbo Incident of 1523 exemplifies Japanese frustration with the Ming’s unreasonable regulations. Moreover, increasing violence from the Japanese should also be attributed to the Sengoku Period, during which Japan underwent serious social, political, and economic upheaval. See 胡宗宪(明), 筠海图编: 卷十二 (219), https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=4120666&remap=gb [accessed 12 February 2019].


24 Fujitani, 98.

Luo opens his preface with this dialogue, “有问于论者曰：‘今天下之兵何居?’ 论者曰：‘北虏最可忧，余无思焉’。”


Thomas Laird, *The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama*, 141.

明实录世宗实录, “大明世宗肃皇帝实录卷五百四十六” (19), https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=824575 [accessed 4 February 2019]. 800 li (里) is approximately equal to 400 kilometers; ten li is approximately equal to five kilometers.“我以三万之兵散守八百里之外。贼以十（万）之众。驰操十里程碑中...贼之数伍倍于我多步卒...贼之马二十倍于我贼尽驰士。”

Raymond Huang’s study of the Ming’s 16th century military expenditures serves to confirm this. The fiscal administrative systems designed by the Ming to support the northern frontier defense were far more complex and were directly supervised and funded by the Ministries of Revenue and War; in contrast, the financial burdens of the southern coastal defenses were left in the hands of provincial governors, county magistrates, and local prefects, with no direct central oversight. In other words, the contrast between centralized and decentralized fiscal systems underscores the Ming’s military priorities. See Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth Century Ming China,” 52, 55.

Lo, 168.

William Rowe, *China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing*, 18.

As Po elaborates, “[Qing] provincial officials tended to discern the inner sea as the farthest extent of their maritime authority, a region legitimately subject to sustainable governance and state possession. They saw the outer sea space as an uncertain blue-water domain that increasingly lay beyond the purview of administrative governance and economic extraction.” Po, *The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire*, 51.

王宏斌, 清代前期海防: 思想与制度, 169. “我兵用炮击中大船正身，反将炮子碰回，毙我守炮之兵，提臣见此光景，顿足长叹，自言事不可为...”
References


Contested Memories: Narratives of WWII Among Japanese Civilians

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Abstract

There is a multiplicity of narratives in Japan about WWII, each of which casts wartime Japan in a different light - typically as either victim or aggressor. This paper examines these differing narratives in the testimonies of Japanese civilians given 40 years after WWII, relying on theories by Lawrence Langer, Fujitani et al., and some quantitative analysis. I find that these narratives vary based on the information emphasized in the testimony: the victim narrative emphasizes personal accounts of suffering whereas the aggressor narrative emphasizes suffering Japan caused other nations. Furthermore, these narratives are not mutually exclusive, but rather can co-exist within the same testimony, as the aggressor narrative often must appeal to the societally dominant victim narrative in order to be heard. Also, testifiers are aware of other narratives of the war, so they often respond to those narratives within their own. I also find significant discrepancies among subgroups of Japanese civilians in their narrativizations of WWII. Females are more likely to lapse into a victim narrative, as are the testimonies of the generation who survived the war. These discrepancies can be explained by differing levels of subjection to the dominant narrative, differing wartime experiences, or total lack of wartime experiences.

Keywords

WWII, Narrativization, Memory, Victim, Aggressor
Introduction

Despite its advances in democratization since 1945, contemporary Japan still struggles to come to terms with its wartime past. The Japanese government has received international criticism - notably from China and Korea - for its wartime atrocities, and their answer has been deemed less than satisfactory by the international community. Yet, the Japanese government continues to deny reparations to comfort women and prominent public officials regularly visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which has caused other countries to view Japan's statements of apology as insincere. Furthermore, the war is also a controversial issue within Japan itself, especially with the continued censorship of textbooks by the Ministry of Education, which has been brought to public attention most famously by Ienaga Saburō. The Ministry of Education attempts to limit mentions of Japanese wartime atrocities in history textbooks in an effort to portray a more positive view of Japanese history. This general inability to take responsibility for the war can be traced back to the Occupation of Japan by Allied powers immediately after the war, as Occupation authorities decided to limit responsibility to a handful of wartime military leaders. As such, the Japanese public and even the emperor himself were acquitted of war responsibility. Coupled with the fact that many Japanese civilians experienced much suffering on the home front during wartime due to shortages and Allied bombings, many Japanese people even today consider themselves victims of war, with only limited interrogation of Japanese responsibility for the war. Such a phenomenon demands scholarly investigation into the precise ways in which Japanese civilians remember WWII, and the extent to which they acknowledge responsibility in the war.

Indeed, this subject has been given plenty of scholarly attention already, as scholars since the immediate postwar time have been concerned with understanding the causes that led Japan on the path to war. Most famously, Maruyama Masao had written a number of essays in during this time trying to explain wartime Japan and its ultra-nationalism. Maruyama, along with most other scholars of the time, ultimately accept the narrative of the war supported by Occupation authorities, which was that ordinary Japanese people were deceived by the military elite, and as such, ordinary Japanese civilians were also to be considered victims of the war. He argues in “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” that the entire wartime structure can be understood as a vertical chain with the emperor at the apex, where everyone was simultaneously being regulated by authority from above while imposing their own authority
Thus, no one in wartime Japan could be considered truly free, which means that it becomes near-impossible to attribute responsibility for the war.

In the years since, more scholars have devoted their attention explicitly to Japanese remembrance of WWII, and they have come up with a multiplicity of narratives about the war in Japan. Generally speaking, scholars have identified three main types of narratives about the war: the victim narrative, the aggressor narrative, and the hero narrative. The names for these categorizations come from Hashimoto Akiko’s book *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan*, though Walter Hatch makes a similar tri-fold distinction in his essay “Bloody Memories: Affect and Effect of World War II Museums in China and Japan.” The victim narrative follows in the footsteps of Maruyama Masao and the immediate postwar Occupation, portraying Japan as a victim of the war and emphasizing the oppression of ordinary Japanese civilians by the wartime military state. This narrative is also associated with movements in Japan pushing for universal pacifism, which deems all wars as unequivocally bad and holds that Japan, having experienced such suffering in WWII, should devote itself completely to peace. Takenaka Akiko’s paper titled “Collecting for Peace: Memories and Objects of the Asia-Pacific War” serves as a contemporary example of this narrative. Takenaka understands the obsessive drive to collect materials related to wartime Japan as a reaction to wartime trauma, and suggests that Japanese people today need to learn to forget the war to a certain extent. The victim narrative also enjoys the most institutional support, given its long history of legitimation by both the Japanese government and the U.S. Occupation. The aggressor narrative, on the other hand, emphasizes Japan’s role as an aggressor in the war, demanding reflection and apology on the part of the Japanese people. This narrative focuses on Japanese wartime atrocities and believes that only proper atonement will allow Japan to retake its place in the international community. An example of this narrative can be seen with the Japan-China Friendship Association, as described by Franziska Seraphim in her book *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005*. Finally, the hero narrative is a resurgence of wartime ultra-nationalist ideology, portraying wartime Japan as a hero who valiantly fought against Western imperialism but faced an unfortunate defeat. Eldad Nakar and Inuzuka Ako examine the existence of the hero narrative in 1960s manga and the 2005 Fusosha textbook, respectively. There have also been a great number of scholars who have generally acknowledged a multiplicity of narratives about the war in Japan, including Ian Buruma, Haruko Cook, Philip Seaton, and the duo of Ingvild Bode and Seunghoon Heo. In general, the scholarly consensus in the last 20 years is that there is no uniform way of remembering the war in Japan, as
different people all push their own narrative of the war.

Methodology

The present paper hopes to contribute to this discussion on Japanese remembrance of the war, specifically focusing on civilian narratives of the war. The primary research question of this paper is therefore how Japanese civilians remember the war, with an emphasis on how they deal with responsibility for the war. Given that existing scholarly literature points at the existence of multiple narratives of the war among different subgroups of Japanese people, this paper also pays special attention to discrepancies between subgroups of Japanese civilians in how they remember the war, as well as the relationship between different narratives of the war.

I will rely primarily on testimonies of the war by Japanese civilians, obtained from three sources: Haruko and Theodore Cook’s Japan at War: An Oral History, the Soka Gakkai’s Women Against War, and Frank Gibney’s Sensō. Each of these sources presents its own problems, as well as a different context for the testimonies they contain. The testimonies in Cook’s Japan at War can be understood as individual testimonies, as each person was interviewed individually. However, the testimonies likely reflect the bias of the authors, as the authors selectively published only parts of each interview. Women Against War can be understood as group testimonies, since everyone who gives their testimony in that work does so according to their identity as a member of the Soka Gakkai. As such, the Soka Gakkai testimonies demonstrate a remarkable uniformity in the narrative they advance about the war, which is clearly influenced by the message of the religious Soka Gakkai organization. Finally, Gibney’s Sensō should be understood as societal testimonies, as it is a collection of testimonies taken from the Asahi Shimbun and its column calling for testimonies of the war from its readers. The Asahi testimonies thus often respond to other testimonies, as everyone gives their testimony as part of a larger Japanese society that is embroiled in a debate over war memory. Furthermore, the Sensō testimonies have at least two layers of selection bias: first, the Asahi Shimbun was able to select which testimonies from its readers to publish in its column, and second, Gibney himself was able to select which Asahi testimonies to translate and publish in Sensō. Despite the problems with each source, together, they still represent a great variety of viewpoints and narratives of the war.

In addition, this paper will also rely on two theoretical approaches in its
analysis of these testimonies. The first one, explicated by Lawrence Langer in his book *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory*, focuses on Jewish testimonies of the Holocaust, and is concerned with how they recall past trauma within the context of the present. He establishes that there are two types of memory: deep memory and common memory. Deep memory primarily operates in the time frame of the past, as it attempts to recreate the past self and past trauma exactly as it was. Common memory, on the other hand, operates in the present, as it attempts to restore some logical continuity to the speaker's life and provides reflection on past events. Langer writes, “Deep memory tries to recall the Auschwitz self as it was then; common memory has a dual function: to restore the self to its normal pre- and postcamp routines but also offers detached portraits, from the vantage point of today, of what it must have been like back then.” However, there are problems in applying a theory of memory based on Jewish testimonies of the Holocaust to Japanese testimonies of the war, most of all in terms of the direction of guilt. While Jews are undeniably the victims of the Holocaust, Japanese people must be acknowledged as bearing a certain level of responsibility in WWII. Furthermore, while the Jewish experience in the Holocaust can be understood as pure trauma, Japanese memories of WWII can contain non-traumatic moments. These considerations demand an expansion of the scope of Langer's theory, in order to allow for the possibility of a non-traumatic deep memory. I argue that non-traumatic deep memory is possible in Langer's theory, as the primary distinction between deep and common memory is the difference in time frame, where deep memory must operate in the temporal past and common memory in the temporal present. Thus, even if the event in question is non-traumatic, as long as it is remembered in such a way as to recreate the self exactly as it was in that moment, one can still call such remembering deep memory.

The second theoretical approach used in this paper is one articulated by Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama in their book *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific Wars*. Their theory was explicitly crafted based upon Japanese memories of WWII, and so they are primarily interested in the relationship between different narratives of the war. Fujitani et al. establish a dominant narrative which occupies a central position in the way society recalls a certain event, while there can be many resisting narratives which challenge that dominant narrative. Fujitani et al. write, “If a particular way of remembering became dominant through the homogenization and naturalization of knowledge about the past, examinations of diverse, localized, and situated memories may constitute ‘critical’ memories that challenge and unsettle historical common sense.” Their theory is thus concerned with the power relations involved in the
creation and perpetuation of different narratives. Within the context of Japanese remembrance of WWII, Fujitani et al. hold that the dominant narrative is what other scholars have called the victim narrative, where “the Japanese people, including even the emperor, are imagined to have been a singular and uniform collectivity that was victimized by the military elite.” For the purposes of this paper, I accept Fujitani et al.’s definition of the victim narrative as the dominant narrative, and will consider the aggressor narrative to be the primary resisting narrative. The sources I utilize in this paper had little to no cases of the hero narrative, and so this paper will largely overlook the hero narrative as a significant resisting narrative. Finally, this paper will also contain a certain amount of quantitative analysis in order to find discrepancies among subgroups, given the sheer amount of testimonies it deals with.

This paper gives special attention to narratives of the war among the generation of Japanese people born after the war. This topic has been severely underexamined in the current scholarly literature on Japanese war memory, as most scholars tend to focus on testimonies by the generation that lived through the war. Scholars who have dealt with the generational transmission of narratives tended to exclusively deal with the transmitting side, examining textbooks or museums, without much consideration of how these narratives of the war are actually received, or the extent to which the later generation consumes them. Only Bode and Heo’s paper titled “World War II Narratives in Contemporary Germany and Japan: How University Students Understand Their Past” has explicitly dealt with consumption of war narratives by the later generation, but their analysis has been limited to a survey they handed out themselves to university students. The present paper hopes to analyze testimonies of the war given by the later generation, differentiating them from testimonies given by the survivor generation. As such, it will divide the testimonies into four subgroups for the purposes of its quantitative analysis: male survivor generation, male later generation, female survivor generation, and female later generation. At this point, I should briefly comment on the temporal context of these testimonies, as differentiating between generations is only possible given that the sources I use were published 40-50 years after the war ended\(^1\), meaning there has been time for an entire generation of Japanese people to grow up who have never experienced war. Therefore, knowledge of the war is not a given, and many of these testimonies strive to transmit stories of the war from the survivor generation. Ultimately, this paper focuses on the relationship between each type of narrative about the war, as well as discrepancies between various subgroups of Japanese civilians regarding these narratives. I argue that, far from being mutually exclusive, the different narratives of the war are actually closely
intertwined with each other, and that one can find notable discrepancies among gender and generational lines.

At first, however, this paper will not differentiate the testimonies into various demographic subgroups, but will focus instead on a purely Langerian or Fujitianian analysis of the testimonies. Beginning with Langer, I hope to apply his concept of deep and common memory to testimonies of both the victim and aggressor narrative, looking for significant differences in the application of deep and common memory in each narrative type. Langer’s theory is valuable because it allows one to problematize memory, acknowledging that memory is not a perfect recall of past events, but is rather continually influenced by present circumstances. Precisely because the past is not remembered perfectly, different narratives become possible, as people selectively remember events in different ways to create a unique narrative of the past. In other words, with a Langerian approach, one asks the question, what differences exist in the function of deep and common memory between the victim narrative and the aggressor narrative? I will begin by discussing each narrative separately, then examine the precise elements that differentiate the two narrative types.

Victim Narratives

Starting with the victim narrative, a Langerian analysis immediately reveals the presence of deep memory in accounts of personal trauma. The key characteristic of deep memory, as mentioned earlier, involves the requirement to enter into the context of the past and recreate that past self, with all the emotions one felt at the time. Langer writes, “these testimonies invite witnesses to re-create ‘me, yes me, just as I know I was.’” This tendency can be most clearly seen in the Japanese testimonies which center on the experience of Allied firebombing raids or the atomic bomb, which were concrete events of mass destruction. Take, for example, Ogawa Sumi’s description of the March 10 Tokyo air raid: “The town was a blazing hell, lit by the swirling and roiling flames. At dawn Asakusa was filled with so much smoke it was hard to keep one’s eyes open. Everyone was dazed and could only gaze dumbly at one another.” Ogawa’s testimony here is clearly attempting to recreate a picture of Tokyo during the firebombing and show the utter impossibility of logical reaction to the experience at the time. In this case, Langer’s original focus on Jewish survivors of the Holocaust applies itself well to the Japanese experience of firebombing, as one cannot deny the severe trauma Japanese civilians must have faced due to the bombings. Furthermore, Japanese civilian suffering was
not limited to bombing raids, as one can also find accounts of suffering in testimonies centering on food shortages experienced in wartime, or reactions to hearing about the death of a drafted family member. For example, Tsuji Hisayo’s account of seeing her teacher’s reaction to being drafted states, “We heard his stifled sobs, and tears flowed unceasingly from his large eyes. This was the first time I had seen a man’s tears. I caught my breath. Like a child, Mr. Noguchi raised his arm to cover his eyes and wailed aloud.” 10 The primary function of deep memory in the victim testimony, then, is to recreate a portrait of Japanese suffering for the audience.

Associated with such accounts of trauma is what Langer calls the “skin of memory,” which operates in the realm of deep memory. For Langer, an experience of extreme trauma leaves its mark on the witness, and even in the present, the witness can never forget that moment – the witness can never quite escape the clutches of deep memory. He writes, “deep memory continues to infect their experiences of time[...]Life goes on, but in two temporal directions at once, the future unable to escape the grip of a memory laden with grief.” 11 There is no shortage of examples of this phenomenon in the testimonies of Japanese civilians which fall into the victim narrative; Ōkubo Michiko’s account of accidentally letting go of a small child during the Tokyo March 10 firebombing, for instance, states, “I have never been able to forget the feeling of her soft, little hand, like a maple leaf, in mine. My heart still aches even after the passage of forty years.” 12 This skin of memory, then, serves as a constant reminder for Japanese civilians as to the horrors of war and the suffering they experienced.

The other key function of deep memory in the victim narrative is to suspend moral judgment when discussing the war. Langer argues that deep memory, in describing the abnormality of the traumatic past, presents the problem that the witness was often forced to make choices that would normally be judged as immoral. However, the context of the past elucidated by deep memory shows that the victim truly had no choice but to make that decision, creating what Langer calls “choiceless choice.” He writes that deep memory, with its requirement to enter into the context of the past, requires the audience to “suspend judgement, to revise our notion of the ‘good,’ to allow the sheer integrity of the narrative and the stubborn honesty of the narrator to forge before our eyes that I have elsewhere called ‘choiceless choice,’ but which our witness describes more vividly with her final words, ‘So this wasn’t good and that wasn’t good: so what choice did we have?’ 13 In the Japanese testimonies advancing victim narratives, this tendency can be seen most frequently seen in descriptions of being forced to take on extreme hardships, turn on other Japanese people, or
engage in smuggling due to wartime and immediate postwar circumstances. Kōno Chiharū, for instance, describes losing all five of her sons during her flight from Manchuria after the war ended, stating, ‘With no hope of any kind, we stared death in the face: if we stayed there, we would die; if we went on, we would die.’¹⁷ Such a statement almost perfectly parallels Langer’s earlier description of choiceless choice, where neither option resulted in a good outcome for the witness. Such a close parallel makes sense, given that the victim narrative paints Japanese civilians as a victim of the war, and Langer’s theory was crafted based upon the victims of the Holocaust. However, deep memory’s tendency to suspend morality can also end up pardoning Japanese civilians of any and all war responsibility. Specifically, victim narrative testimonies seize upon the requirement of deep memory to suspend morality in their assertions that resistance was impossible during wartime. Furusawa Atsuo, for example, states that he was raised to believe in the justice of Japan’s cause, writing, ‘I thought it was a matter of course to go to war. I thought it would be a matter of course to defeat foreigners. That was how I was raised.’¹⁸ Here, the witness calls upon deep memory to recreate the wartime context, but in a way that pardons the witness for failing to resist. These testimonies argue that, if one understood what living under the wartime system was truly like, then one should understand that Japanese civilians were completely oppressed and resistance was impossible. Deep memory’s tendency to suspend morality, then, operates in the victim narrative testimonies so as to assuage the person’s guilt and eliminate the need to morally reflect on their actions.

Instead, reflection on their wartime experiences in the victim narrative leads one to a conclusion of universal pacifism, where witnesses emphatically claim that all wars are bad, and everyone is a victim of war. These statements can be understood as a type of common memory, which centers on reflection upon the past events brought up by deep memory. As Langer states, testimonies rarely operate purely in the realm of either deep memory or common memory, but rather, ‘the two [types of memory] interact and intersect continually, and the challenge to us as audience is to recognize and interpret those moments.’¹⁹ In the case of the Japanese civilian testimonies of the victim narrative type, common memory is closely linked to deep memories of trauma. As the witnesses operate within common memory to reflect upon their experiences, they conclude that war must be avoided at all costs and the key lesson Japan must learn from WWII is to devote itself to peace. Haneda Hiroko’s testimony is emblematic of this tendency, as she states, ‘The War was an irredeemable evil. I had many personal sad experiences[...] I want to ask how that War might
have been prevented.” Haneda’s testimony condemns the war and is concerned with how Japan may act so as to not repeat that mistake of going to war, a moral judgment which is obviously a part of the later reflection that can only exist in common memory. However, such condemnation of the war arises from experiences of personal trauma, rather than reflection upon atrocities Japan committed upon other countries. Some of the Soka Gakkai testimonies take this universal pacifism a step further, to the point where they attribute the cause of much of their suffering even in the postwar to the abstract entity of “war.” Take, for example, Shinohara Miyako’s testimony about her life as a pre-natal atomic radiation victim. Much of her testimony describes the discrimination she faced from the rest of Japanese society as a result of her being “branded” as one who was exposed to radiation from the bomb. Importantly, however, she states at the end: “mothers must take the firmest possible stand in the name of peace and the protection of their children.” In other words, instead of attributing the blame for her suffering to the rest of Japanese society who held unreasonable notions about radiation and discriminated against her, she ultimately blames WWII in general and affirms universal pacifism. To American eyes, who were raised to be aware of issues of discrimination, we find Shinohara’s attribution of blame strange, as she could have used the opportunity to instead critique Japanese society for holding such prejudiced views. This misattribution of blame becomes even more obvious in the cases of testimonies which describe the individual’s suffering as a result of being a mixed-race child or ones which describe experiences of being with abusive husbands. Yet, these testimonies notably refrain from critiquing the problems of Japanese society, placing all the blame on “war” instead.

Aggressor Narratives

Turning one’s attention to the aggressor narrative, now, one also finds examples of both deep and common memory at work in the testimonies. Deep memory continues to require that one enter into the context of the past, but it does so in order to force the individual to acknowledge that they were complicit with the wartime system. Shimojō Tetsu, for instance, describes his village’s eager compliance with “bamboo-spear defense” policy when they discovered foreigners off the shore, stating, “Eager to show off their training, the village women gathered on the beach, holding spears fashioned of bamboo. Some showed up with hoes and sickles as well. Their comments ranged from, ‘Come on ashore, come ashore and we’ll kill you!’ to ‘Here’s revenge for my man’s death – get ready for your end!’” In Shimojō’s testimony, the victim narrative’s
image of the innocent Japanese civilian completely breaks down, as he paints a picture of a village caught up in wartime militaristic fervor. Thus, his testimony forces one to acknowledge that even ordinary Japanese civilians were completely accepting of the wartime ideology, which raises important implications for the responsibility of every Japanese person. What is important to note here is that much of the deep memory in these testimonies belonging to the aggressor narrative revolve around non-traumatic events – or at the very least, events that were not personally traumatic to the witness. Therefore, the aggressor narratives call for an expansion in scope of Langer’s theory to allow for the possibility of non-traumatic deep memory. Shimojō’s testimony is certainly not traumatic to Shimojō himself, as he was not on the receiving end of the villagers’ aggression. However, his testimony still clearly carries elements of deep memory, as he vividly recreates the context of the time and all the excitement everyone felt then. As such, Shimojō’s testimony stands as evidence that non-traumatic deep memory is possible – the key differentiating factor between deep and common memory should be understood as a difference in timeframe. Certainly, traumatic experiences may be more conducive to deep memory; humans tend to remember negative experiences more strongly than positive ones. However, as many of the aggressor narrative testimonies show, trauma is not a necessary component in deep memory – as long as the testimony effectively recreates the past self and enters into the context of the past, it can be understood as deep memory.

As for the aggressor narrative’s common memory, it typically takes the form of reflection on Japan or one’s own moral shortcomings in the war. Kaga Seiichi, for example, states in his testimony, “Rather than simply passing off responsibility for the War onto others, haven’t each of us who were adults at that time neglected to come to grips with our own guilt for the prosecution of the War?” Kaga clearly uses common memory to reflect on the war, but this reflection takes the form of taking responsibility for the war. Whereas the victim narrative’s reflection focuses on the horrors of war in general, the aggressor narrative’s reflection emphasizes moral responsibility in prosecuting WWII in particular. In other words, whereas the victim narrative broadens common memory’s later reflection to generalize about all wars, the aggressor narrative tends to limits itself to the particular war that was WWII, in which Japan committed numerous atrocities. As such, reflection upon this war focuses on the immorality of Japanese acts in the war, as well as Japanese civilians’ complicity with those acts. This characteristic of the aggressor narrative makes sense given how deep memory worked in this narrative. Since deep memory focused on acts
that were not traumatic to oneself but rather may have been traumatic to others, reflection upon that act focuses on one’s moral responsibility for participating in an act that caused suffering to others.

Comparing the Aggressor and Victim Narratives

In short, a Langerian analysis of testimonies of both the victim narrative and aggressor narrative type reveals that the key difference between the two narratives lies not in the application of deep and common memory themselves, but rather the events to which deep and common memory are applied. The victim narrative focuses on events of personal trauma, using deep memory to recall the past self which underwent extreme suffering. When one reflects upon that experience of suffering through common memory, they reach the conclusion that they must never again engage in war so that they can avoid repeating such an experience of trauma. On the other hand, the aggressor narrative focuses on events that were personally non-traumatic, but may have caused trauma to others. Deep memory here operates so as to force oneself to acknowledge that they were complicit in that event. Later reflection upon that event through common memory, then, forces one to take moral responsibility.

The difference between these two narrative types can be seen most clearly when one examines the testimonies of Japanese civilians who lived in colonial territories during the war. Specifically, by focusing on what is not related in each testimony, one can see the selective remembering involved in each narrative. For example, Miyamoto Kazuyo’s testimony describes her experience being in Korea after Japan’s surrender, and how her principal was taken away by Koreans. She states regarding that principal:

“*He was taken away by some youths who came to raid the school. I heard a rumor that he was later imprisoned. I also heard that he died from being tortured. The figure of the elderly principal, clad only in his cotton kimono, the man who sacrificed himself to protect us, is seared into my memory, along with his lighthearted manner.*”

Here, Miyamoto ignores the fact that the only reason she was in Korea at the time was because Japan had colonized it. She also ignores the fact that Japanese colonial rule treated Koreans extremely harshly, which was likely why they lashed out at her principal after Japanese surrender. Instead, Miyamoto’s story simply presents a villainous group of Koreans who tortured and killed her poor, innocent principal. Indeed, many of the victim narrative testimonies from
Individuals who lived in colonial territories wholly ignore wartime Japanese imperialism, framing their living in such areas as a natural fact. Aggressor narrative testimonies, on the other hand, do acknowledge Japanese mistreatment of colonial subjects, which in turn explains why they lashed out at Japanese people after the war ended. Maejima Daijirō’s testimony is an excellent example, as he describes how a Japanese soldier drove away looters who were attacking him. However, the soldier then tells him immediately afterwards, “The peasants in that area were on the receiving end of all sorts of violence, from pillaging to rape, at the hands of the Japanese army during the War. Please keep that in mind and be tolerant.”25 In other words, testimonies from Japanese civilians in colonial areas can be differentiated into victim or aggressor narratives based on what they remember. The victim narrative arises if the witness focuses on the immediate event of Japanese suffering, ignoring Japan’s colonial history at the start of the war. The aggressor narrative arises if the witness moves outside of their personal suffering and considers harms Japan inflicted upon other people as well. Tanaka Tetsuko’s testimony is a highly illustrative example, as her testimony begins by conveying a victim narrative as she describes the suffering she experienced working in a balloon bomb factory. However, her testimony ends with the moral reflection seen in aggressor narrative testimonies, when she realizes that the balloon bombs she made brought suffering to other nations. She states,

“We only learned some forty years later that the balloon bombs we made had actually reached America. They started a few forest fires and inflicted some casualties, among them children.../When I heard that, I was stunned. I made those weapons. Until then, I had felt only that our youth had been stolen from us, and that I'd missed my chance to study. I thought we were victims of the war.”26

The transition from the victim narrative to the aggressor narrative only comes with the introduction of new information – information which causes one to consider the harms Japan inflicted upon other countries due to their wartime acts. This consideration, while definitive of the aggressor narrative, is wholly absent from the victim narrative. In summary, then, while both narrative types contain elements of deep and common memory, the victim narrative applies these modes of memory only to personal accounts of trauma, whereas the aggressor narrative broadens their consideration to include non-Japanese trauma.
Resistance Narratives

Moving on to Fujitani et al.'s theoretical approach, one continues to differentiate the testimonies based on whether they advance a victim or an aggressor narrative, but now, one focuses on the relationship between these two narrative types instead of the differences between them. The value of a Fujitanian approach is that it allows the examination of the power relations at play in the proliferation of different narrative types and how rival narrative types interact with one another. Given that the victim narrative is the dominant narrative in Japan today, what enables aggressor narratives and to what extent do they resist the dominant narrative? Just as with the Langerian approach, my findings will call for an expansion in scope of Fujitani et al.'s theory. Specifically, I argue that the dominant and resisting narratives are not always mutually exclusive – rather, it is possible for both narrative types to co-exist in the same narrative. Such an application of this theory will rely on expanding the Foucauldian elements of Fujitani et al.'s theory, focusing on the power of dominant institutions to limit the field of possible action.

Indeed, resisting narratives rarely seems to be purely resisting; rather, testimonies which do advance a resisting narrative seem also to contain elements of the dominant narrative. Perhaps the most obvious example is Mogi Yoshio’s testimony, which reads,

“When I recall that there were people in the prewar period who resisted war to the death – even in the face of powerful national authority – I feel most acutely the depth of the sins that I committed in my position as an educator. War is a horrible act that suppresses the conscience and thought of the people and tramples on their basic human rights."

Mogi’s testimony starts by acknowledging his own responsibility for complying with the wartime system; such acknowledgement obviously challenges the dominant narrative which holds that ordinary Japanese people were not responsible for the war. However, in the very next sentence, he seems to return to the dominant narrative and affirm universal pacifism, also stating that war oppresses ordinary people. Many testimonies thus oscillate between the dominant narrative and the resisting narrative in this way, advancing a message of Japanese responsibility in one section while advancing a message of Japanese victimization in another.

Even if some resisting testimonies do not literally oscillate between the two narrative types, they contain elements which imply the dominant narrative.
For example, numerous testimonies discuss the heroic efforts of sole voices of resistance to the wartime system. Such accounts of resistance clearly must be differentiated from the orthodox victim narrative view that holds that resistance was impossible during wartime, as ordinary Japanese civilians were completely oppressed. Accounts focusing on resistance, unlike the victim narrative, not only imply that wartime Japan was unjust, but also that Japanese people can be held responsible to the extent that they failed to resist. Yet, these testimonies of wartime resistance also play into the victim narrative insofar as they reaffirm the notion that the wartime state was in opposition to its people, and took acts to suppress ordinary Japanese people's freedoms. They advance the idea that not all Japanese people were fervent militarists, and that there were some good Japanese people who resisted the wartime state. In other words, just as much as these testimonies of wartime resistance should be differentiated from the victim narrative, they should also be differentiated from the orthodox aggressor narrative which holds that all Japanese people should bear responsibility for the war. A good example is Nakamura Kyōko's testimony of her classmate who claimed that she would respect the U.S. flag instead of trampling on it. She states regarding this classmate, "I bow with admiration for the courage required in that period for her mother to instill a sense of respect for a national flag, even the enemy's [...] And I also admire the courage that it took for [that girl] to be the only one to raise her hand and say what she did." Nakamura clearly believes that that girl did the right thing in resisting wartime ideology and asserting that she would respect the U.S. flag, which in turn implies that other Japanese people should also have done the same thing. Yet, Nakamura never explicitly makes this judgment of responsibility, as her testimony instead focuses on the courage of this particular girl. By shifting the focus from the Japanese people's failure to resist to the particular cases of resistance by a few heroic Japanese people, Nakamura is ultimately able to avoid critically probing the question of ordinary Japanese civilians' war responsibility. These testimonies which focus on wartime resistance, then, should be understood as occupying a middle ground between the dominant (victim) narrative and the resisting (aggressor) narrative.

Yet another example of testimonies that occupy this middle ground are those which probe the responsibility of the emperor or media outlets, while not questioning the responsibility of ordinary Japanese civilians themselves. Consider Hakota Atsuko's testimony, which recalls a classmate who flung a flag onto the ground as a sign of protest to welcoming the emperor. Hakota writes, "'The Emperor made my father die in the war,' he said. 'Why do I have to respect him?" Hakota argues in the rest of her testimony that the emperor
must bear some responsibility for the war, which is a clear departure from the official narrative that the emperor should be considered innocent. What is notable about her argument, however, is that she completely accepts the aspect of the dominant narrative which holds that ordinary Japanese civilians were victimized in the war. Even if the emperor bears responsibility, he only does so because he victimized Japanese civilians by forcing them to give up their lives for him. Hakota never questions the responsibility of her classmate’s father, who clearly was a soldier and may have been a participant in the Imperial Japanese Army’s morally questionable actions. Instead, for Hakota, her classmate’s father is undeniably a victim of the war who was deceived by the emperor and the rest of wartime Japan’s elite. Thus, Hakota’s testimony presents only a limited challenge to the dominant narrative; she is attempting to expand the scope of Japanese responsibility, but not so much as to include ordinary people.

The existence of these testimonies that contain elements of both the dominant and the resisting narratives can be explained by the power of institutions - the dominant narrative, after all, is dominant precisely because it enjoys institutional support. As such, the dominant narrative might be understood as constituting a field which resisting testimonies must navigate in order to be heard. In other words, for testimonies of the war to be recognized as legitimate and accepted by society, the testifier must use to some degree the dominant narrative accepted by society at large. Resistance to the dominant narrative, then, can only be voiced from within the field already constituted by the dominant narrative, which would explain why these resisting testimonies are limited in their resistance. To put it in an explicitly Foucauldian way, one might consider his definition of power as a “mode of action upon the actions of others.”

Power, then, works to limit the field of possible actions of others. In the context of Japanese war memories, the dominant institution limits the field of possible action for testimonies of the war. If one attempts to present a testimony entirely different from established ways of remembering the war, one runs the risk of being completely ignored or not understood by the rest of society. One might take the Foucauldian analysis even further in the case of the Asahi and Soka Gakkai testimonies by looking at the power relations at work in the selection and publication of testimonies. Since the Asahi Shinbun and the Soka Gakkai committee have the power to choose which testimonies to publish, individuals who submit their testimony to these organizations must tailor their testimony to match the ideology of the publishers to a certain extent or else their testimony will never even be published in the first place. Here is a direct example of power working to limit the field of possible actions of others - those writing their testimony only have a limited set of ways to write their testimony if
they hope to be heard at all. Thus, resisting testimonies must use the dominant narrative to a certain extent, which explains why most of these testimonies are not purely resisting, but rather occupy a middle ground.

But what of the Cook testimonies, which are individual testimonies and thus not necessarily subject to the power relations that the Asahi and Soka Gakkai testimonies were? Considering the testimonies’ oscillation between resisting and dominant narratives in light of the distinction between individual and group / societal testimonies offers yet another explanation of this oscillation, separate from the Foucauldian analysis offered by Fujitani et al.’s approach. Starting at the societal level with the Asahi testimonies, one must realize that those who were submitting their testimonies to the Asahi Shimbun did so while being aware of all the other testimonies published in the Asahi Shimbun which they have read. This awareness can be most plainly seen in the Asahi testimonies which reference other testimonies and respond to them. For example, Fukushima Toshio’s testimony states, “Several letters have described people who criticized the military or made antiwar statements before and during the War. If the majority of the Japanese people had been opposed to the war, it would have been impossible, solely by police and military oppression, to mobilize the entire country to fight a war as total as that War was.” Fukushima directly references the existence of other letters submitted to and published by the Asahi Shimbun, and his testimony explicitly aims to respond to some of the ideas presented in those other letters. Fukushima hopes to respond to testimonies focusing on particular cases of resistance and push a more orthodox aggressor narrative instead. This tendency can be seen throughout most of the Asahi testimonies, as writers agree or disagree with the views brought up by other people. In other words, the Asahi testimonies show that those who give their testimonies of the war do so in the context of a field already populated with other narratives of the war. Especially in the context of the Asahi testimonies, people do not give their testimonies into a void, but rather are constantly coming into contact with rival narratives. As such, they may encounter a viewpoint which they disagree with and thus hope to refute, as Fukushima did. Or, they may find elements of a rival viewpoint that they find appealing and thus incorporate it into their own testimony. In the case of societal testimonies, then, the existence of a vibrant debate and the mixing together of different narrative types is to be expected, as Japanese society continues to struggle to come up with a uniform way of remembering the war.

As for group testimonies like the Soka Gakkai ones, people primarily give their testimony according to their identity as members of that group.
Indeed, what is most remarkable about the Soka Gakkai testimonies is their uniformity, as every single one advances a victim narrative of the war, complete with emphasis on universal pacifism. Such uniformity makes sense given that these testimonies are supposed to represent the views of Soka Gakkai women. In other words, the women who submitted their testimonies for the Soka Gakkai are not doing so in the spirit of the Asahi testimonies, which represents differing viewpoints of the war. Instead, their testimonies are based on their identity as a part of the Women’s Division of Soka Gakkai, which stands wholly opposed to war. The most obvious example would be the testimonies that discuss their conversion to Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism, the sect of Buddhism associated with the Soka Gakkai. Kobayashi Kiniyo, for instance, states, “I experienced an awakening, however, when I became a believer in Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism and a member of Soka Gakkai in 1951.” While faith in religion does not necessarily relate to the victim or aggressor narrative, the fact that some of these testimonies so openly discuss their faith clearly shows that these people wrote their testimonies not necessarily according to their individual identity, but instead according to their group identity as part of the Soka Gakkai. Thus, the narrative of war presented in the Soka Gakkai testimonies is completely in accord with the pacifism of the Soka Gakkai organization, as the testimonies are able to achieve uniformity through group identification.

The individual testimonies presented in Cook’s Japan at War, however, offer a more complicated picture. First, one must acknowledge that many of the individual testimonies, like the Asahi ones, present a mix of different types of narratives. One can find examples of testimonies in Japan at War that oscillate between victim and aggressor narratives, focus on particular cases of wartime resistance, or generally offer only a limited challenge to the dominant victim narrative. However, given that these testimonies are those of individuals, they do not explicitly respond to other people’s testimonies, as was the case with the Asahi testimonies. Just because they do not explicitly mention other testimonies, however, does not mean that these individual testimonies are not subject to social influence. Rather, many of these testimonies acknowledge the existence of other views about the war, citing the viewpoints of friends and family members, official commemorative programs, or speak generally of how Japanese society views the war. Miyagi Harumi’s testimony serves as an excellent example. First, her testimony, which discusses the group suicides of Okinawans at the end of the war, oscillates between a victim and aggressor narrative. She begins by claiming that Okinawans themselves hold responsibility for the group suicides, stating, “Everyone used to believe that the troop commander issued an
order for the killings to begin, but that order, in fact, came from men of importance within our village.” Such a statement clearly challenges the dominant narrative of ordinary Japanese people being victimized by the military elite. However, she does not reject the dominant belief that the military elite did not care for ordinary Japanese people; instead, she relies on that belief to justify her attribution of responsibility to ordinary people. For Miyagi, the military elite thought so little of ordinary Japanese people that they could not possibly have cared enough to even issue a suicide order in the first place. In describing her encounter with the man who was the garrison commander at the time of the Battle of Okinawa, she states, “such a man wouldn’t have thought to issue an order for the villagers to kill themselves. The military were only concerned with their own units, their own commands.” Like many other testimonies, then, Miyagi’s also occupies a middle ground between the victim and aggressor narratives. Second, Miyagi’s account of war events is entirely second-hand, as she was born after the war. She discusses how she owes her interest in the war and knowledge of the war to her mother and grandmother. As such, Miyagi’s testimony is an example of individual testimonies being aware of and influenced by other people’s testimonies. Not only that, Miyagi attempts to respond to what she perceives as the dominant way of remembering the war among Okinawans, stating “It’s an unhealthy way of living. We are dragging along the war even now. We are living off the dead.” Thus, despite being an individual testimony, Miyagi’s account is clearly aware of other testimonies, as she is influenced by and responds to rival narratives. The Cook testimonies, then, are still influenced by social pressures, which explains the oscillation between different narrative types. However, because they are individual testimonies, they at least have the potential to be purely resisting, as long as the individual is able to resist the societal pressure of dominant narratives. The most notable example of a testimony which is purely resisting is Ienaga Saburō’s, who has gained fame for challenging the Ministry of Education’s textbook censorship as unconstitutional. His testimony puts complete emphasis on Japan’s role as an aggressor in the war, Japanese mistreatment of other Asians, and the responsibility of each and every Japanese person.” Ienaga is likely more able to resist because he has gained a certain amount of personal fame for advancing a resisting narrative - in short, he is not subject to the same level of social pressure to conform to the dominant narrative because of his personal fame. Ienaga’s testimony, then, shows that the individual testimonies presented in Cook’s work have the potential to be purely resisting, as long as the testifier him/herself is able to resist the societal pressure of the dominant narrative.
Narrative Distinctions by Subgroup

Having discussed Japanese civilian testimonies in general, I would now like to focus on discrepancies between subgroups of Japanese civilians in their narratives of the war, which calls for a certain amount of quantitative analysis. Specifically, I divided the testimonies into four subgroups based on gender and generation: the male survivor generation, male postwar generation, female survivor generation, and female postwar generation. The survivor generation refers to the generation which directly experienced the war whereas the postwar generation refers to those who were born afterwards. This division, however, creates the awkward problem of how to categorize those who were children during the war — that is, those who were alive during the war, but did not experience it in the same way as adults who had fully developed mental faculties. I decided to use the age of 15 as the dividing line between the survivor and postwar generation, since those who were 15 years old experienced mobilization that those who were younger than 15 did not. Furthermore, each testimony was categorized according to the narrative they advanced, assigned to one of five categories: victim, aggressor, hero, victim and aggressor, and other. However, this methodology presents potential problems. First, there is quite a bit of room for debate on how to categorize each testimony. For example, how should one categorize Nagaoka Eiko’s testimony, which reflects on the necessity to pass down stories of the war? She writes, “I, too, will hand down those stories to my own children. Perhaps that is the responsibility of us Japanese.” Nagaoka does not clarify here whether this “responsibility” to pass down war stories is meant to be a way of promoting universal pacifism or a way of atoning for Japanese wartime atrocities. One can obviously see how the categorization of Nagaoka’s testimony would change between victim or aggressor depending on what this responsibility refers to. The second issue is that the uniformity of the Soka Gakkai testimonies represent a bias that could skew the data, as every single one of the 34 Soka Gakkai testimonies fall under the victim narrative category. To account for this potential skew, I did two separate analyses — one including the Soka Gakkai testimonies and one excluding them. The results of this categorization are illustrated in Table 1. The number in parentheses represents the number of testimonies if one includes the Soka Gakkai testimonies. There are no parentheses in the male testimonies’ columns because none of the Soka Gakkai testimonies came from males.
Table 1: Number of testimonies in each narrative type divided according to gender and generation of testifier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Survivor</th>
<th>Male Postwar</th>
<th>Male Total</th>
<th>Female Survivor</th>
<th>Female Postwar</th>
<th>Female Total</th>
<th>Survivor Total</th>
<th>Postwar Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37 (62)</td>
<td>19 (28)</td>
<td>56 (90)</td>
<td>69 (94)</td>
<td>27 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>11 (11)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hero</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim and</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>17 (17)</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>19 (19)</td>
<td>11 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>48 (73)</td>
<td>33 (42)</td>
<td>81 (115)</td>
<td>119 (144)</td>
<td>53 (62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Percentage of testimonies in each narrative type divided according to gender and generation of testifier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Survivor</th>
<th>Male Postwar</th>
<th>Male Total</th>
<th>Female Survivor</th>
<th>Female Postwar</th>
<th>Female Total</th>
<th>Survivor Total</th>
<th>Postwar Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>77.1% (84.9%)</td>
<td>57.6% (66.7%)</td>
<td>69.1% (78.9%)</td>
<td>58.0% (65.3%)</td>
<td>50.9% (58.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>4.2% (2.7%)</td>
<td>9.1% (7.1%)</td>
<td>6.2% (4.3%)</td>
<td>9.2% (7.6%)</td>
<td>11.3% (9.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hero</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.1% (1.4%)</td>
<td>3.0% (2.4%)</td>
<td>2.5% (1.2%)</td>
<td>2.5% (2.1%)</td>
<td>3.8% (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim and</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.3% (5.5%)</td>
<td>12.1% (9.5%)</td>
<td>9.9% (7.0%)</td>
<td>14.3% (11.8%)</td>
<td>13.2% (11.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>8.3% (5.5%)</td>
<td>18.2% (14.3%)</td>
<td>12.3% (8.7%)</td>
<td>16.0% (13.2%)</td>
<td>20.8% (17.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One should note the differing amount of total testimonies in each category, which makes direct comparison difficult. To compensate, Table 2 shows the percentages of testimonies in each category. Again, the number in parentheses represents the percentage if one includes the Soka Gakkai testimonies.

The results that immediately stand out is that while victim narrative testimonies are the most frequent across all demographics, female testimonies are far more likely to be advancing a victim narrative than male testimonies. Correspondingly, male testimonies are more likely to advance an aggressor or victim and aggressor narrative than female testimonies. In addition, survivor
generation testimonies are somewhat more likely to be advancing a victim narrative than postwar generation testimonies, though this difference is nowhere near as significant as the gender discrepancy. However, if one focuses on the discrepancy between the female survivor generation and the female postwar generation, this generational discrepancy becomes much more significant. Furthermore, there are very few examples of the hero narrative, which likely reflects the liberal bias of the Asahi Shimbun, which was where the majority of these testimonies came from. The rest of the paper will discuss potential explanations for why these gender and generational discrepancies exist.

Beginning with the more significant gender discrepancy, there are two potential explanations. The first, which relies on Fujitani et al.’s theory, is that women’s testimonies can be understood as comprising a key part of the dominant narrative. As Lisa Yoneyama has pointed out, postwar reconstruction had a gendered dimension, as women were touted as the symbol of innocence victimized by war, and women became charged with a duty to reconstruct Japan into a democratic and peaceful nation. One can find acknowledgment of this gendered duty in the Soka Gakkai testimonies, especially the one by an anonymous woman detailing her struggles to survive in the immediate Occupation and working in a brothel for U.S. soldiers. Most importantly, she writes at the end of her testimony, “I think it is true that women are the greatest victims of war.” The phrasing of this sentence would imply that this woman is not advancing a new idea about women suffering the most from the war – rather, she is simply affirming an already existing idea of the uniqueness of women’s wartime victimization. In this sense, the dominant postwar narrative of Japanese victimization was always tied up with the female image, and female testimonies are thus more subject to the dominant narrative than male ones. As such, female testimonies tend to be more in line with the dominant victim narrative.

The other explanation for the gender discrepancy, however, focuses on differing wartime experiences and ability to resist the wartime system. If one were to examine the wartime diaries of males and females, one finds that females generally exhibited greater individualism and more resistance to wartime ideology. Males, on the other hand, tended to feel more acutely the pressures exerted on Japanese people to conform. With Japan’s defeat, however, the dominant ideology underwent a complete reversal, as the postwar ideology emphasized the rejection of wartime ultra-nationalist ideology. Thus, those who resisted wartime ideology suddenly found themselves part of the postwar mainstream ideology. Stories of individual resistance then showed that one was victimized and oppressed by the wartime state, which in turn proves one’s
innocence. Since females were more likely to exhibit resistance during wartime, their postwar testimonies tend to advance a victim narrative, as they discuss how they felt oppressed by the war. As for males, who were more likely to conform during wartime, the postwar reversal meant they had to confront their conformity and all the issues of responsibility that raises. As such, male testimonies are more likely to advance an aggressor narrative where they reflect on their own responsibility in prosecuting the war. For example, Sakai Manabu states in his testimony, “I acknowledge that my teaching during the War was misguided, and I don’t make excuses for it. What was wrong was my ignorance.” Faced with the undeniable fact that they conformed to the wartime system, which has been proven to be unjust in the postwar, these male testimonies must reflect on their own guilt – the guilt of ordinary civilians, which in turn leads one to an aggressor narrative. However, this argument can only apply to the survivor generation, as it is based on the differing wartime experiences of males and females. Interestingly, however, this argument also helps explain why there is less of a discrepancy between the male survivor generation and the male postwar generation, as compared to the female survivor generation and female postwar generation. The testimonies from both generations for males exhibited an almost equal likelihood of advancing a victim narrative, with only a gap of 5 per cent. The female survivor generation testimonies, however, was 20 per cent more likely to advance a victim narrative than the female postwar generation testimonies. Since male survivor testimonies are more likely to advance an aggressor narrative, they are more consistent with the postwar generation testimonies which in general are more likely to fall under the aggressor narrative category. As such, one would expect less of a discrepancy between male survivor generation testimonies and male postwar generation testimonies, and that this generational discrepancy should be more pronounced for females, since the female survivor generation does not share such tendencies toward the aggressor narrative. Indeed, this argument explains why female survivor testimonies are uniquely more likely to advance a victim narrative than all other demographics.

Examining the generational discrepancy in general, now, one finds a potential explanation in Langer’s theory as to why the survivor generation is more likely to advance a victim narrative. Specifically, only the survivor generation has deep memory of the war, whereas the postwar generation can only ever operate in the realm of common memory, since only the survivor generation actually had first-hand experience of the war. And, because deep memory requires suspension of moral judgments whereas common memory is all about moral reflection, the survivor generation is more likely to advance a
victim narrative while the postwar generation is constantly concerned with moral judgments of the war. Suda Atsuko’s testimony is most illustrative of this difference, as her testimony discusses the postwar generation’s response to hearing stories of the war from the survivor generation. She writes, “To us [the postwar generation] they [the survivor generation] exhibited no self-reflection about the War. When we point that out to adults, they respond that their education and ideology were different from those of present times.” Suda’s testimony effectively sums up the differences between the generations’ testimonies through the differential operation of deep and common memory. The postwar generation, which always operates in common memory, is concerned with reflection about the war, and thus accuse the survivor generation of not showing enough self-reflection. The survivor generation, which has deep memory, responds by appealing to the requirement of deep memory to enter into the context of the past and suspend present judgments. In fact, Langer seems to make this argument about the generational differences in deep and common memory exactly when he writes,

“Younger audiences still persist in asking ‘Why didn’t they know what was coming? and ‘When they did, why didn’t they do something about it?’ [...] How could we foresee gas chambers [...] when we had never heard of them? The average imagination, in other words, perceives what it or someone else has already conceived.”

Thus, the survivor generation is able to appeal to deep memory as a sort of defense against the judgments of common memory, pointing out the impossibility of resistance within the context of the past. Because of the exclusive existence of deep memory in the survivor generation, then, the survivor generation is more likely to advance a victim narrative.

Conclusions

The testimonies of Japanese civilians about World War II reveal a multiplicity of views and narratives about the war, but they can generally be differentiated according to the extent to which they advance a narrative of Japan as victim or aggressor during the war. Both narrative types contain Langerian deep and common memory, but those modes of memory are applied to different events, emphasizing different pieces of information. The victim narrative tends to focus on personal accounts of trauma, as deep memory works to recall the past self which was put in a position of immense suffering. The later reflection of common memory in the victim narrative accordingly leads one to a
conclusion of universal pacifism, as individuals hope that they never again have
to experience such trauma. The aggressor narrative, on the other hand, focuses
on accounts of harm Japan inflicted upon people of other nations, therefore
utilizing a deep memory that is non-traumatic in nature, but nevertheless works
to recreate the past self which was in full compliance with the wartime state.
Common memory in the aggressor narrative, then, is characterized by moral
reflection on the individual’s own role in the war.

Yet at the same time, the two narrative types are far from mutually
exclusive, as numerous testimonies either oscillate back and forth or occupy a
middle ground between the two narratives. Examples of the latter include
testimonies which center on particular cases of wartime resistance or interrogate
the responsibility of the emperor but not that of ordinary people. The co-
existence of both narrative types can be understood in a Fujitanian lens through
the power of the dominant institution to limit the possible extent and methods of
resistance. Those who advance an aggressor narrative, which is the resisting
narrative, must at least appeal to the dominant victim narrative in order to be
heard and accepted as legitimate by society. Indeed, the societal context of these
testimonies are of utmost importance, as testifiers are always subject to societal
pressures and are aware that their testimony is only one voice within the greater
field of Japanese society which continues to debate over how to remember the
war. These testimonies therefore attempt to respond to others, or adopt
elements from different narratives as they encounter other testimonies. The key
exception is if the testimonies are given within a group context instead of a
societal one, in which cases the testimonies take on a remarkable uniformity
within their group, since all the testifiers give their testimony according to their
identity as a member of that group.

Furthermore, one can also find notable discrepancies between
subgroups of the Japanese population as to the likelihood of advancing a victim
or aggressor narrative. Specifically, female testimonies are far more likely to
advance a victim narrative than male testimonies, and survivor generation
testimonies are somewhat more likely to advance a victim narrative than postwar
generation testimonies. If one focuses specifically within the female
demographic, however, one finds that the generational discrepancy becomes
much more pronounced. There are two potential explanations for the gender
discrepancy. First, female testimonies comprise a key part of the Fujitanian
dominant narrative, as females were held up in the post-war as a symbol of
innocence and wartime victimization. The second explanation, which also helps
account for the more significant generational discrepancy within females than
males, is that the wartime experience of females and males differed significantly, which translates into differing postwar ways of remembering. Specifically, since females were more likely to exhibit resistance during wartime while males were more likely to conform, the reversal of the mainstream ideology in the postwar period simultaneously vindicated females for resisting and indicted males for conforming. As for the generational discrepancy in general, it can be explained by the fact that only the survivor generation holds Langerian deep memory, which means that the survivor generation testimonies can require a suspension of morality whereas the postwar generation emphasizes precisely moral judgments of the war. As such, the survivor generation points out the impossibility of resistance during war, falling into a victim narrative while the postwar generation demands reflection on personal responsibility, leading them to an aggressor narrative.

Future studies of Japanese war memory should continue to examine the postwar generation and how they may remember the war differently from their parents/grandparents. This paper showed that narratives of the war are not cleanly transmitted from one generation to the next; rather, the postwar generation has demonstrated a notable difference in the way they remember the war. As such, researchers should focus on the consumption of narratives of the war by the postwar generation, looking at what aspects of these narratives are consumed or not by the postwar generation, and why. Indeed, while many seem to emphasize the importance of studying narratives of the war before the survivor generation dies out, one also needs to turn one’s eyes to the future, where Japan will inevitably come to be comprised of a population that has never experienced the war first-hand. As the generation shifts, Japan’s war memory issue will only become more complicated and ever more worthy of scholarly attention.
1 Japanese names in this essay will be given following the Japanese tradition of surname, then given name. Non-Japanese names will be given following the Western tradition of given name, then surname.


6 When citing this source, I will abbreviate “Women’s Division of Soka Gakkai” as WDSG.


9 Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, 7.

10 The *Asahi* testimonies were originally published between 1986 and 1987, *Women Against War* was published in 1986, and *Japan at War* was published in 1992.

11 Langer, 7.

12 Frank Gibney and Beth Cary, *Senso the Japanese Remember the Pacific War: Letters to the Editor of Asahi Shim bun* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 204. See also the testimonies of Shinoda Tomoko (Gibney 204), Hiratai Yasuko (Gibney 205), Ōkubo Michiko (Gibney 207), Mitomi Hideko (Gibney 209), Komatsu Mineko (Gibney 212), Wada Michiyo (Gibney 213), Funato Kazuyo, (Cook 343), Kobayashi Hiroyasu and Tomizawa Kimi (Cook 349), Yamaoka Michiko (Cook 384), Matsushige Yoshito (Cook 391), Saegusa Kazuko (WDSG 118), Takeuchi Yasu (WDSG 121), Egi Kikuno (WDSG 127)

13 Gibney, 186. See also the testimonies of Yoshitake Tōzō (Gibney 114), Takamizawa Sachiko (Gibney 181), Satō Rokurō (Gibney 189), Hashimoto Kuniko (Gibney 191), Aihara Yū (Gibney 193), Watanabe Fukumi (Gibney 199), Takezawa Shōji (Gibney 255), Tanaka Toki (Cook 181), Nakajima Yoshimi (Cook 199), Imai Shike (Cook 438), and all of the Soka Gakkai testimonies
14 Langer, 34.
15 Gibney, 208. See also the testimonies of Kimura Takashi (Gibney 19), Hase Hideo (Gibney 103), Hashimoto Yukio (Gibney 181), Komatsu Mineko (Gibney 185), Kiga Suni (Cook 230), Kinjō Shigeaki (Cook 366), Kawashima Eiko (Cook 471), Kōno Chiharu (WDSG 31), Goseki Setsuko (WDSG 42), Inaba Aiko (WDSG 223)
16 Langer, 26.
17 WDSG, *Women Against War*, trans. Richard Minear (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986), 27. See also the testimonies of Yashiro Mieko (Gibney 174), Kunagaya Motokazu (Gibney 192), Yanami Yoshimi (Gibney 247), Maki Sakie (WDSG 35), Goseki Setsuko (WDSG 38), Kagi Kiyoko (WDSG 103), Noritake Mitsuko (WDSG 185), Aoshika Nobu (WDSG 243)
18 Gibney, 15. See also the testimonies of Kumai Masao (Gibney 9), Kawanura Fusako (Gibney 279), Takamura Mieko (Gibney 306), Kawachi Uichiro (Cook 214), Maruki Iri and Maruki Toshi (Cook 253), Yamane Ikuko (WDSG 225)
19 Langer, 7.
20 Gibney, 19. See also the testimonies of Watanabe Fumumi (Gibney 200), Satō Yasuko (Gibney 275), Gamō Hideo (Gibney 280), Hakoto Atsuko (Gibney 285), Yamatsu Sumiyuki (Gibney 286), Satō Shigeru (Gibney 288), Katō Mieko (Gibney 294), Kawaguchi Ikuo (Gibney 302), Sakuraba Mieko (Gibney 303), Kaneko Naomi (Gibney 313), Taguchi Tomiko (Gibney 317), Senda Yuriko (Gibney 318), Kobayashi Hiroyasu and Tomizawa Kimi (Cook 349), Kagi Kiyoko (WDSG 105), Tatebayashi Kimi (WDSG 111), Noritake Mitsuo (WDSG 188), Anonymous (WDSG 192)
21 WDSG, 142. See also the testimonies of Anonymous (WDSG 64), Mayumi Yoshida (WDSG 147), Nobuko Davis (WDSG 196), Kamiya Shizuko (WDSG 204), Anonymous (WDSG 214), Inaba Aiko (WDSG 216)
22 Gibney, 171. See also the testimonies of Yoshida Akio (Gibney 22), Shiobara Suzue (Gibney 103), Haseba Sueto (Gibney 104), Namekawa Matao (Gibney 179), Sachimoto Kyōko (Gibney 257), Izumoto Akira (Gibney 258), Sasaki Fumiko (Gibney 277), Kunagaya Tokuichi (Cook 50), Asai Tatsuzō (Cook 206)
23 Gibney, 256. See also the testimonies of Fukushima Toshio (Gibney 18), Hase Hideo (Gibney 104), Ume Yasuzu (Gibney 183), Tomoda Shōji (Gibney 197), Tsumoda Tsutomu (Gibney 292), Serizawa Nobuo (Gibney 295), Mogi Yoshio (Gibney 300), Suda Atsuko (Gibney 305), Sakai Manabu (Gibney 306), Itabashi Toshinori (Gibney 307), Okada Chūken (Gibney 316), Hatanaka Shigeo (Cook 67), Tanaka Tetsuko (Cook 192), Ienaga Saburō (Cook 442)
Gibney, 244. See also the testimonies of Ōno Yumiko (Gibney 105), Iwamura Enji (Gibney 108), Ōba Tatsuō (Gibney 111), Katayama Yukiko (Gibney 113), Mio Utako (Gibney 117), Miyamoto Kazuya (Gibney 244), Murakami Ayane (Gibney 245), Ishitaki Keiko (Gibney 246), Yanami Yoshimi (Gibney 247), Makino Hideo (Gibney 247), Bazura Yoshiko (Gibney 250), Chiba Tomoko (Gibney 265), Tanaka Tokiko (Gibney 267), Shibahara Kenzō (Gibney 273), Fukushima Yoshie (Cook 56 and 407), Yokoyama Ryūichi (Cook 97), Kōno Chiharu (WDSG 26), Maki Sakie (WDSG 31), Nakaue Mitsu (WDSG 42)

Gibney, 266. See also the testimonies of Shiobara Suzue (Gibney 103), Haseba Sueto (Gibney 104), Nagashima Shigetoshi (Gibney 251), Sasaki Funiko (Gibney 277)


Gibney, 300. See also the testimonies of Aoyama Akihiro (Gibney 10), Namekawa Matao (Gibney 179), Ume Yasuzō (Gibney 182), Tomoda Shōjirō (Gibney 197), Nagashima Shigetoshi (Gibney 251), Maejima Dajirō (Gibney 266), Imagawa Nobuhiro (Gibney 290), Fujiwara Toshiko (Gibney 291), Tsunoda Tsutomu (Gibney 292), Suda Atsuko (Gibney 305), Itabashi Toshinori (Gibney 307), Okada Chūken (Gibney 316), Muramatsu Hiroaki (Gibney 318), Kunnagaya Tokūichi (Cook 47), Tanaka Tetsuko (Cook 192), Hirosawa Ei (Cook 248)

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Satoshi (Gibney 309), Ichikawa Satoshi (Gibney 314), Okada Chûken (Gibney 316), Taguchi Tomiko (Gibney 317), Muramatsu Hiraoki (Gibney 318)

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I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Samuel Yamashita, for helping me with this point.

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The 2014 Hong Kong Protests: A History of Youth Identity

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Abstract

In 2014, the Umbrella Movement involved a series of protests that led to the practical shut-down of Hong Kong. Studying the history of this movement through the lens of student activism reveals a newfound generational divide in the political support of local rule projects. The standard view is that the movement was a reaction to the August 2014 decision in Beijing to continue the approval of Chief Executive electoral candidates. However, placed in the context of youth identity developments, it is evident that a clash of nationalisms led to the development of this system. This paper explores the notion that Hong Kong is not passive, instead suggesting that colonialism and educational systems gave rise to student activism and collective memory.

Keywords

Hong Kong, Umbrella Movement, Localism, Occupy Central, Citizenship, Beijing

The world remembers the 2014 occupation of Hong Kong through the images of pro-democracy protestors holding up umbrellas against tear gas sprayed at them by riot police. These protests were seen as a reaction to Beijing’s decision to continue vetting all candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong in order to maintain control over the Hong Kong government. However, this protest has a more complicated history, rooted in Hong Kong’s possession of a separate political entity. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration
states: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy,” and “[t]he current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style” for 50 years post-1997. However, Beijing stated in 2017 that the Joint Declaration was a “historical document that no longer had any practical significance.” This affront to an international agreement stems from Beijing’s position as per the “One-Country, Two-Systems” ideology, emphasizing the “One-Country” side of the agreement. The dominant participation of youth in forming the 2014 Umbrella Movement (UM), also known as the Umbrella Revolution (UR), qualifies as what Benedict Anderson describes as “provincial creole printmen” who “played the decisive historic role” in imagining Hong Kong. In this history we see the interplay between national political ideologies in the framing of Hong Kong. Hong Kong youth and Chinese-imposed Official Nationalism intersect at the UR because of the expression of handover anxiety in popular culture in the 1980s-90s, backlash from youth education reforms from 2003-2012, the Tiananmen Square massacre, the rise of student solidarity from 1998-2014, and social media and student identity becoming legitimate modes of political mobilization.

Hong Kong’s colonial history is traced in its multi-ethnic community; as one of Britain’s most important ports and then as a capital anchor after the Second World War, the colonial government diminished the role of nation-building in Hong Kong to prevent the decolonization movement from reaching the city’s shores. The administrative-led bureaucracy, albeit a non-democratic government, contributed to the economic success of Hong Kong from a set of rocky islands to a commercial powerhouse of over 6 million people. The political system in Hong Kong has never been purely democratic, although, after 1996, it became the goal of the British-led administration to implement a full democracy, despite Chinese opposition. As a result, pro-Chinese political and business leaders formed a political alliance focused on local issues. During the 2000 Hong Kong legislative election, a dominant pro-Beijing political alliance won by directly addressing post-handover anxiety, wherein Beijing would protect democratic rights. However, a divided electorate between pre-1984 voters, who were likely to be pro-Beijing, and post-1984 voters was created. Between 2003 and 2007, the pro-Beijing faction pursued the rapid integration of Hong Kong, both economically and socially, with China as a result of foreign direct investment ties between Hong Kong and the Shenzhen Pearl River Delta Special Economic Zone. This led to disillusionment beginning in 2010 with the anti-High Speed Railway protests, a protest against the development of a bridge that would connect Hong Kong with mainland China. In addition, integration
entailed dominating public broadcasting stations wherein outlets played the Chinese national anthem at the beginning of all broadcasts, and news stations used Mandarin Chinese. \textsuperscript{11} Reforms to the Hong Kong electoral system at this time called for an end to prescreening of Chief Executive candidates by the Chinese Communist Party. However, on August 31, 2014 the Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress in Beijing asserted their right to the prescreening process, representing integration as Official Nationalism that “is an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally imagined community.” \textsuperscript{12} By late September of 2014, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), a pan-Democratic movement, was growing among pre-1984 voters, in part due to an article entitled Civil Disobedience’s Deadliest Weapon (2013) by Benny Tai Yiu-ting, a professor of law at the University of Hong Kong. His article called for the creation of an occupy movement as a result of Beijing’s encroachment. \textsuperscript{13} This seemed to be a legitimization of students’ ideas, and opened up the Hong Kong government to negotiation. However, it failed to differentiate between pan-Democratic and Localist movements. \textsuperscript{14}

The intersection of the internationalization of Hong Kong Arts and the anxiety surrounding the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong back to China resulted in the development of youth culture and identity that was highly influential in shaping localism. I locate the development of this identity in the public debates surrounding handover anxiety, and its role in shaping film culture in Hong Kong. Hong Kong film culture was essential to visualizing the city and inherently contributed to the naming of Hong Kong people as manzuk (民族), a semiotic term which identifies ethnic groups. Internationalized throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, film culture in Hong Kong played an essential role in setting the parameters of Hong Kong identity. Hong Kong film “creates a world that includes different values and attitudes that is full of conflicts and inconsistencies, making particular references to the issue of cultural identity.” \textsuperscript{15} The creation of a visual discourse on identity through film culture is a contemporary form of Anderson’s print capitalism, and the implications of this are deeply rooted in handover anxiety. For example, Wong Kar-wai’s Chungking Express (1994) is an allegory to the 1998 anxiety of handover, referencing obsessive interest in time and dates and the sense of loss and abandonment. \textsuperscript{16} At that moment in history, contradicting identities are forming along the intersections of conflict, cultural identity, and abandonment, which are all represented throughout Hong Kong’s long history of protest. Locating these themes in film uniquely defines
Hong Kong as a separate entity from China, with its own history, born out of the 1967 Hong Kong riots. These riots, which came out of a leftist labour dispute, grew and were defined by the use of terrorism and bombing to achieve the aims of Communist sympathizers. The fear created by the protests directly contributed to a rejection of Communist China. While the leftists failed to take Hong Kong, the British colonial government worked with Hong Kong manufacturers in the creation of a “Hong Kong Week,” wherein “the theme of Hong Kong Week would be repeatedly tied to the development and prosperity of the city, the security of the working populace, and the new sense of community pride.” Through the initial rejection of Communism and the acceptance of consumerism, the anxiety surrounding the return of Hong Kong to China represented in film culture led to the naming of the Hong Kong people as manzuk, with a distinct identity based on individuality and consumption.

The effects of film culture as a means of creating identity are exacerbated in the education system of Hong Kong post-handover. Education is a contested field in Hong Kong because it pits Official Nationalism against a quasi-Creole Nationalism. In 2002, the Chinese government implemented the “Basic Education Curriculum Guide” which directly states that:

“In order to meet the challenge of the 21st century, as well as to respond to the change of sovereignty, students are also expected to show concern for their well-being; understand their national identity and be committed to contributing to the nation and society.”

These changes include the use of Mandarin as an official language for instruction, changes to the history curriculum that name the Hong Kong people as “Hong Kong Chinese” (中华香港人), stating that the Cantonese language is a dialect of Mandarin, and discussing differences between democratic and authoritarian political systems by highlighting Beijing’s system as ideal to maintaining the peoples’ happiness. As a result of these changes, contestations occurred because of the use of these examination subjects as a vehicle for promoting Chinese nationalism and destabilizing Hong Kong identity.

After the 1967 Leftist Riots, the British colonial government introduced an education curriculum that was notably devoid of any national attachment, where “national” history focused only on Ancient Chinese history. However, in Communist China, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was a particular mobilization to destroy connections to Ancient China. These historical differences have contributed to direct contestations by new youth identities, juxtaposed against a hegemonic-nationalist Official Nationalism being
promulgated within the Hong Kong education system by China. As a result of these contestations in education, a majority of 18–29-year-olds reject Chinese national identification. Due to contested curriculums and film culture, conclusions have been made regarding the specific identity of Hong Kong Youth, which has direct repercussions in framing the nation:

“As a group, they lay claim to an indigenous Hong Kong identity. Students are willing to engage with each other, and with interested listeners, about their individual processes of identity formation and negotiation... this process is a hybrid of hope, realism, and duality and possibly multiplicity - of cultural identification.”

Hong Kong youth, through their contested position, have an identity based in contestation, negotiation, individualism and choice, which is being challenged by Chinese hegemony.

Hong Kong youth have not been passive about the education system’s changes. If Hong Kong youths’ identity is one that is contested, then the fabric of their society should be contested too - and it is, which is seen through the development of social movements. In 2011, Joshua Wong, a student activist and a future UR leader, founded the Scholarism Movement. Scholarism was founded as a reaction to a new curriculum in 2010 that mandated patriotic education that is friendly towards Beijing. Through protests, the implementation of the curriculum was withheld until 2014. Within three years, Scholarism became a deeply developed grassroots organization, and would consequently come to play an essential role in organizing students in the UR.

The youth identity developments that I have explored are anchored by conflicts in cultural identity. A significant crisis that spurred the reverence for democratic ideals in Hong Kong youth, continually counter to Beijing’s anti-democratic propaganda in schools, is the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Immediately after the massacre, vigils were organized all around Hong Kong by the Hong Kong Federation of Students, and to this day this event occurs every June 4th in Victoria Park; a large park in the middle of Causeway Bay, the busiest and most economically productive area of the city which would later become a site of the UR. Every year, a candlelit vigil is held in solidarity for those killed. The actions of Hong Kong students in the organization of these vigils have given rise to the role of collective memory in framing a set of ideals and superimposing them on “our Hong Kong”. The creation of a geographic location that is a site for the outlet of political expression legitimizes and accepts youth identity as a form of political mobilization.
The important role of the Hong Kong Federation of Students - as the dominant organizers of the vigil - in shaping collective memory and contemporary youth identity cannot be overstated. As China wants to tear down physical borders with Hong Kong, this vigil is one way in which the people of Hong Kong are constructing social borders. Therefore, “[c]ollective memory should be understood as those representations that serve as the basis of a group’s identity and sense of community.” Images of Tank Man, along with journalists and arrested authors, are hung in Victoria Park and have become icons that Hong Kong collectively remembers as symbols of the democratic rights they are entitled to but which have not been respected. These vigils have taken on power in recent years wherein:

“the vigil in Hong Kong is a stark departure from the situation in China, where protests are banned and the mentions of the Tiananmen crackdown, in which hundreds if not thousands of protestors died, are scrubbed from social media.”

The vigils have become a way to create and contest memories, and by extension history, as a form of political mobilization that foils Hong Kong against China. China has responded to the growing power of these vigils through contesting this political memory. Donald Tsang, a former pro-Beijing Chief Executive of Hong Kong, stated in 2008 to a question posed to him regarding the public release of information regarding the June 4th massacre that “China had achieved great development in various areas” and that “people should look at the past more objectively.” These comments were viewed as a departure of democratic representation of Hong Kong society and led to the pan-Democratic and Localist coalition boycotting Hong Kong SAR government meetings. Thus students’ role in shaping collective memory politicizes history, and also contests memories by shaping and spreading local values through visual movements like the Victoria Park vigil.

Where these vigils have highlighted free speech and gathering as something that could be lost if China were to absorb Hong Kong, the power of these vigils have been explored as an outlet for expression in fighting for the survival of the Hong Kong and its people. The vigil in memory of those killed has become one that has taken on a distinctly nativist flare, wherein:

“refrains had taken a more aggressive, defiant, and vulgar tenor as exemplified by banners, hats, T-shirts, and placards bearing slogans like “Better Dead than Red”, “Fucking Chinese Dictators”, “Fuck the Police”, “FUCY”74, and “Nice Day for a Revolution.” One pro-democracy political banner posted at the entrance of the park declared “Hong Kong Comes First!”75

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The turns to violence in the Hong Kong protests that have become noticeable since 2012 make this the first time that Hong Kong society is collectively visualizing a movement in the protection of their specific Hong Kong identity. While this stems from original pressures on Britain to negotiate the return of sovereignty without consulting the people, this highlights an evolution in the practice of democratic rights wherein the people of Hong Kong are fighting for their survival. Hong Kong has some of the world’s highest costs for living, and at present, half of Hong Kong’s legislative council is elected by “Functional Constituencies,” which represent business interests. This issue is exacerbated by constituents who have traditionally held ties with Beijing due to structural transformations that benefited them after the turnover. Hong Kong Functional Constituencies represent a failure in democracy, and an inability to solve the needs of the Hong Kong people, and are therefore the recipients of the anger of these vigils. The Functional Constituencies’ proximity to Beijing is a point of anger that has given rise to the acceptance of youth identities based on the notion of Hong Kong for Hong Kong people as well as in the creation of a fully functioning democratic society.

The presence of nativist anger at these vigils has contributed to the rise of student politicians becoming official politicians through movements such as Scholarism, a pro-Democracy political party most made up of students, and Civic Passion, founded in 2012 by radio host and television producer Wong Yeung-tat. Both parties found political success by utilizing the collective memory created by student unions at vigils in shaping constructed realities regarding national identification. Thus, youth identity, cultures, ideas, and realities become accepted political practice in the creation of the Hong Kong imagined community through political legitimization. Furthermore, geography plays an integral role in creating spaces for these ideas to flourish. Whereas in mainland China the practice of assembly is illegal, in Hong Kong, student unions are building grassroots assemblies within geographic spaces which have allowed students to form a biased collective memory in favour of localist rule sentiment.

Where the Victoria Park Vigils have been a space to legitimize the ideas of Hong Kong students through political movements, these movements mobilized online from 2012 through 2014. As a result, both defined their own political messages and turned Hong Kong’s UM into a negotiation regarding citizenship within the definition of Hong Kong as a nation. Internet mobilization through social media platforms has become a form of creole print capitalism, similar to that which Anderson explores through the Jose Rizal novel “Noli Me Tangere” in the Philippines. Twitter and YouTube have become mediums for
political organizations to imagine, define, and exclude boundaries on Hong Kong. Studies have been conducted regarding Twitter usage and the hashtag #hongkongprotests in the days leading up to and during the Umbrella Movement. Kwok and Chan find that “[t]he rise of digital media enabled a crucial form of mobilisation in the Umbrella Revolution - that is, a seemingly "leaderless" connective action.”. The seemingly grassroots connotation of the Umbrella Movement’s broadcast turns Twitter into a publication medium that masks differences within localist political messaging. Pro-government voices are rarely seen in #hongkongprotests and therefore, Twitter becomes a space where localist and student leaders both dictate their message and hide the extremist tendencies of their messages. For example, Scholarism and Civic Passion are both localist movements, but they both have their own goals for which they have been pursuing and negotiating through online and physical spaces. Civic Passion is a Hong Kong fundamentalist group that practices a form of xenophobic localism, and Scholarism practices a comparatively progressive localism. However, both of these organizations use Twitter as a way to mobilize followers and expound idealistic goals.

YouTube has played a role in visualizing Hong Kong values by becoming the dominant website to which music has been published. Music and music videos play a similar role to that played by movies in the 1980s. However, they are strengthened by the power that music has in the ability to build solidarity around protest songs." By studying discourses on themes of these music videos, it becomes apparent that Hong Kong citizenship is contested and that their use in framing UM highlights public anger towards Beijing; public anger is fractured by different political organizations negotiating space through their arguments. The music video for Gau Wu /Shopping/ Everyday, a 2014 song that was highly influential in as a protest song during the Umbrella Movement, creates a sense of shared and consumerist identity that is bound together by the use of the Cantonese language. In fact:

"music is an essential part of forming and expressing identity, it contributes to group solidarity, cohesion, and collective identities that are essential to mobilising and maintaining support for protests."

Gau Wu’s widespread distribution brought out political differences between localist camps that Twitter did not. With the rising cost of living in Hong Kong, and with consumerism entrenched in Hong Kong society, rising costs impede consumption as a social practice. Groups like Civic Passion have blamed immigrants from China and the Philippines for making it harder for Hong Kong people to get jobs and increasing the cost of living. A political
divide between Scholarism and Civic Passion developed, and this had implications for the cohesiveness of the UR, blurring the lines of who the movement was for, as all actors involved in it had their own goals. September 22, 2014 was the beginning of the 926 Boycott, in which students boycotted classes for one week and met for a massive protest on the night of September 26 as a direct response to the Beijing Standing Peoples’ Committee’s decisions. This was organized by Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students to reopen Civic Square in the Admiralty District. The Civic Square is government property, and its July 2014 closure was a representation of the closure of the public debate regarding free elections of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. The UM is thought to have begun as a response to these two events, which were predicted by Benny Tai Yiu-ting’s article mentioned earlier. His work in setting up the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement called for an Occupy movement, however, the OCLP appropriated the goals of what would become the UM. The OCLP movement is ideologically aligned with the pan-Democratic parties in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and therefore its goals were to remain within the ‘One-Country, Two-Systems’ agreement, but to assert Hong Kong’s handover rights. The presence of this pan-Democratic movement in UM had the effect of delegitimizing a mass civic uprising. After Scholarism announced the 926 Boycott, OCLP announced that it would participate in the movement in Civic Square. This was an appropriation of Scholarism’s goals, and it shows, as only 17.1 per cent of participants found Occupy Central with Love and Peace to be a legitimate leader during the Umbrella Movement, whereas 56.5 per cent found the Hong Kong Federation of Students to be the legitimate leader, thereby defining the Umbrella Movement as a movement concerned with framing Hong Kong, but also fundamentally a student movement. On September 27, Joshua Wong and other student leaders stormed the barricades of Civic Square. However, because of fractures in the UM’s message, as well as misreporting naming OCLP as the main organizer of the event, the world did not process this as a legitimate and focused movement, and Beijing decided to do the same.

Throughout this paper, I have posited that the history of the Umbrella Movement is an international history that formed the identities of youth in Hong Kong. Two forms of nationalism have intersected in the development of a national identity of the Hong Kong people, owing itself to international contexts. Youth have then built their own political movements which have become accepted through outlets such as the Victoria Park Vigil. These new political movements have cemented themselves through grassroots support, yet the medium they use to communicate their message actually ended up splintering
localism as a movement. The days leading up to September 27th, 2014 saw conflict between a pan-Democratic movement and localist movements that further fractured the Umbrella Movement’s legitimacy. The world saw tear gas sprayed onto a sea of umbrellas, but that moment in contemporary history is still not over. The rise of groups such as Hong Kong Indigenous, and events such as the “Fishball Revolution”⁶⁶, highlight the power of youth identity in Hong Kong in shaping a new nationalism. Hong Kong is not a passive city, and its values are rooted in a history of identity contestation.
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A series of civil conflicts, from 2016 until now, between Hong Kong food hawker and police who were shutting down food stalls that violated recently passed health and safety legislation. Hong Kong Indigenous posits that this was done as a way of further removing Hong Kong iconography as a way to destroy its culture. Source: Antony Dapiran, “Control and Resistance in Hong Kong,” in Control, ed. Jane Golley et. Al., (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017).
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The Age of the Pacific, or Nasty Business: A historical outline of Canadian relations with the People’s Republic of China, 1970-2015

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Abstract

This paper argues that since 1970, Canadian relations with the People's Republic of China has been on a trajectory of increasing political and economic significance, and that this trend is evident in three of the most important watershed moments of this relationship, which include the establishment of formal diplomatic relations by the Trudeau government in 1970, the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, and the increasing focus on human rights and economic trade by the Harper government in the late 2000s. By doing so, this paper emphasizes the importance of Canada and China as two large Pacific partners who must further cooperate on various issues in the Asia Pacific region.

Keywords

Foreign Policy, Canada, China, Tiananmen, Diplomacy

Many centuries ago, after being cut off by the conquests of the Ottoman empire, Western European explorers set sail across the Atlantic in search of a new route to a land of great wealth and prosperity, known as China. In their attempts to reach the middle kingdom, they instead stumbled upon the riches of the New World. While the St. Lawrence ultimately did not lead directly to China, it instead became colonized by French settlers who would eventually help create modern-day Canada.1 And so, in a way, the search for China indirectly
gave birth to Canada. China would continue to play an interesting role in the
development of Canadian society, as many Quebecois missionaries would travel
to China during the 1900s and bring home stories about the vast and exotic land,
which captured the imagination of Canadians. Thus, China became deeplyenterenched in the Canadian, and specifically French-Canadian, psyche. This
paper will explore the relationship between these two pacific nations, and how it
has evolved from 1970 to 2015. While Canadian Chinese relations have many
cultural, demographic, religious and political components, it will be
predominantly the diplomatic relationship that shall be examined for the
purposes of this paper. In doing so, it shall be argued that since 1970, Canadian
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been on a trajectory of
increasing political and economic significance, and that this trend is evident in
three of the most important moments of this complicated relationship. These
watershed moments for Canada-China relations include the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations in 1970, the Canadian response to the Tiananmen
Square massacre of 1989, and the increasing focus on human rights by the
Harper government in the late 2000s.

This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will give
a brief historical context to the events which lead up to 1970. The second
section will then focus on the Trudeau government’s policy towards the People’s
Republic of China, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, and the
eyears of the relationship. The third section will then examine the effect of
the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre on Canada-China relations, particularly
how the Canadian government chose to respond, and whether the response
impacted relations. The fourth and final section will attempt to examine the
complicated diplomacy of human rights, and the burgeoning economic and
cultural ties under the Harper government in the late 2000s.

Historical Context

While it is often difficult to pick a starting point when it comes to
historical trends, 1949 seems like a particularly apt date to choose for such a
subjective task. It was the final year of the Chinese Civil War, a war in which
socialist Canadians, such as the famous Norman Bethune, lost their lives
fighting. The civil war resulted in the defeat of the nationalist Republic of China
at the hands of the socialist People’s Republic of China, the former of which was
forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan. The survival of the nationalist regime
on the island of Taiwan would eventually prove to be quite problematic,
particularly in the United Nations. Specifically, the question of which government would represent China in the U.N. arose immediately after the war, despite the clear numerical and geographical advantage of the Peking regime’s claim to sovereignty. This issue was further exacerbated due to the Republic of China’s refusal to compromise on any of its U.N. privileges, a hardline position it could afford to take due to heavy support from the United States. 1949 was also the year when a young and adventurous 30-year-old French Canadian by the name of Pierre Elliot Trudeau decided to visit the middle kingdom, a trip during which he claims he: “...slipped into the territory still held by the Kuomintang [nationalists]. It was in a state of anarchy. I got myself as far as Shanghai while the Red Army was on the other side of the Yangtze.” This experience would impact the future prime ministers’ views on China, which would later help shape his government’s China policy.

After the victory in the civil war, socialist China was cut-off from the West, thus ending the movement of people between China and Canada. This included Canadian Christian missionaries, who at the time constituted the largest group of Canadians in China; after all, Maoists were not fans of Jesus. Thus, between 1949 and 1970, interaction between Canada and China virtually disappeared, with the exception of large-scale exports of wheat to China which began in 1958. In fact, while Ottawa did not officially recognize the Communist Party in Peking, a deal was made in 1961 to export 422 million dollars’ worth of wheat from Canada to help with China’s famine in the early sixties. For the most part however, bilateral trade with China in the 1950s and 1960s seemed unlikely to increase in the near future. Thus, early relations were mostly non-existent, and because of that, the main issue of political recognition became the primary challenge that was needed to be overcome for better relations to take hold.

**Trudeau’s Rapprochement with China, ‘The Honeymoon era’**

The formal political recognition of China by Canada was the beginning of modern Canada-China relations, and it began with the same French Canadian who first travelled to China in 1949, Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Serving as prime minister from 1968 to 1984 (ignoring Joe Clark’s brief tenure), Trudeau was a womanizing and flamboyant francophone academic thrust into the political scene by Prime Minister Pearson to help Canada survive the rise of Quebec separatism in the 1960s. He also had a complex relationship with China, which was shaped by his personal ideology of ‘flirtatious socialism’ and ‘Christian humanism,’ as well as his multiple trips to China, the first being the aforementioned 1949 trip,
and a second trip in 1960. The 1960 trip was later immortalized in his book *Deux Innocents en Chine Rouge*, with ‘innocence’ referring to, according to Trudeau, the: “innocence of not knowing any better”, an apt description of Canadian knowledge on China in this era. These trips to China, according to Trudeau’s son Alexander: “left him [Pierre Trudeau] with a profound sense of awe for China, a mix of both fear and respect,” and forced the Quebecois intellectual to “suspend his judgement, surrender it his dominion and accept China on its own terms.” In other words, it seemed as if Trudeau was enchanted by the scale of Chinese civilization and the vastness of its history, especially in comparison to that of his minuscule Quebec society. This led him to the realization that China was too big to ignore, and for Canada to continue to do so was an arrogant act of ignorance towards the history and relevance of both societies’ impact on the story of mankind. Simply put, according to Trudeau: “it seemed to us imperative that the citizens of our democracy should know more about China.”

Thus, with the goal of recognizing China ‘on its own terms,’ the negotiations that would lead to recognition began swiftly after Trudeau’s victory in the 1968 election. It became one of the key aspects of the new government’s foreign policy agenda, with Trudeau declaring on the 29th of May 1968 that “our aim will be to recognize the People’s Republic of China government as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy the seat of China in the U.N.” There were many reasons why the Trudeau government pushed for recognition, even though it was a very controversial political decision at that time. Firstly, it was part of the greater *third option*, anti-American strategy of a cabinet that wanted to show the world that Canadian foreign policy was independent of the United States, and that Canada was to begin ‘distancing’ itself from the U.S. under Trudeau. Therefore, Canadian policy towards China became a key aspect of this new foreign policy. There was also growing domestic support for relations with China, as many leftist Canadian nationalists (some of which Trudeau knew personally) idolized Mao’s China for its’ independence from Soviet and American hegemony, and thus wished to support what they saw as an alternative for third world development. Furthermore, Canadian enthusiasm for the nationalists in Taiwan waned in the 1960s, as the regime was seen by many as a symbol of the many oppressive right-wing dictatorships propped up by American imperialism. Ottawa also wished to recognize China because there was the growing belief that by ending its isolation, and integrating China into the world order, it would allow China to ‘play a constructive global role.’ Trudeau further emphasized this argument by stating that since China had a quarter of the world’s population, their cooperation
would eventually be needed in solving future global crises. This belief would become a recurring theme in Canada’s strategy towards China, as it will resurface in the policies of future governments.

There were however, two main problems that came along with recognition: Taiwan and the United States. Because neither Chinese governments wished to compromise, governments around the world were forced to only recognize and maintain relations with one of the two China’s. Therefore, the Trudeau government had to devise a strategy with which to circumvent this reality, with Secretary of State Mitchell Sharp explaining that the negotiations must “bring about a situation in which the existence of a separate government in Taiwan is recognized and that we can, at the same time, recognize that the PRC government is effectively in control of the mainland area.” The other elephant in the room was the United States. Their president at the time, Richard Nixon, personally hated Trudeau so much so that when his own national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, went to visit the Chinese, he instructed him that “future contacts or channels with the Chinese could take place anywhere except Ottawa.” There was thus a fear that Canada could face repercussions from the United States. This fear did not last long however, as it seemed that anything as extreme as economic sanctions would be unlikely. After all, the Americans did not retaliate against Canada’s controversial relationship with Cuba.

From the Chinese perspective, while relations with Canada were not a priority (at the time Mao’s government was focused on the Cultural Revolution as well as dealing with increasing Sino-Soviet tensions), it was something that was seen as potentially helping Peking in achieving better relations with the Americans. Therefore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted the offer from the Canadians, and negotiations began in Stockholm. The end result was the creation of a ‘Canadian formula’ for recognition, which meant that Canada would recognize the People’s Republic of China, and simply ‘take note’ of Peking’s claim over Taiwan, without officially recognizing any sovereign claim. The Taiwan-based Republic of China would then be de-recognized by Canada. With the Taiwan issue solved, Canada officially recognized the People’s Republic on October 1970, with the immediate effect being Canada’s export of wheat to China nearly doubling within a year’s time. This successful formula was even adopted and used by subsequent Western nations who also began recognizing Peking over Taiwan after 1970. This watershed moment thus marked the official beginning of modern Canada-China relations, and was described by third option-enthusiast Mitchell Sharp as: “among the most important developments in Canadian foreign policy of the last two decades.”
The relationship between the two Pacific nations post-1970 saw the rapid growth of cultural and economic ties, and could be described as being in a honeymoon-like state until 1989. Following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Trudeau paid an official visit to China in 1973 (his third time in the country by then), where he became close friends with China’s new leader Zhou Enlai, with whom he: “discussed politics far into the night.” During his stay in China, he praised Zhou for his effort to: “instill equality and greater social justice,” and stated that Canada-China relations: “have achieved such variety, depth and warmth.” Upon returning to Canada, Trudeau established a family reunification program, which allowed over 25,000 Chinese to rejoin their families in Canada, marking the first significant flow of Chinese immigrants into Canada since 1949.

Economic ties also began to rapidly expand during this era, as Canada extended a 2 billion dollar line of credit for the expansion of economic relations in 1979. In addition to this money, as well as the ever-growing sale of wheat to the growing Chinese market, an agreement on development cooperation was signed in 1983 as part of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This was a huge departure for the Chinese from their previous refusals of Western foreign aid, and came as a result of policy changes within China led by reformist Deng Xiaoping, who wished to orient China away from class struggle and more towards economic reform (a policy known as 

While Trudeau retired from politics in 1984 and a new conservative government under Quebecer Brian Mulroney took power, the song remained the same when it came to Canada-China relations, with one Canadian official stating that: “we hardly missed a step in the transition from Trudeau to Mulroney.” This was likely because Mulroney was preoccupied with domestic constitutional reforms, and therefore he chose a policy of staying on course on the October 11th 1985, when he explained to the House of Commons that: “I have indicated to the Premier of China and the President of China the fact that the intention of this Government is to pursue the policy set out by my predecessor, Mr. Trudeau, with which I agree. We have honoured that in all circumstances.” In the lead-up to the creation of an official ‘China Strategy’ (which ended up falling apart due to unforeseen circumstances in 1989), Mulroney visited China in March of 1986, where he commented on the success of Deng’s reforms, saying that: “I was struck by the tremendous changes
in the last six or seven years, tremendous progress that we can see visibly on the streets.” He also commented on his desire to enhance collaboration between Canadian business and the Chinese government, declaring that his government will make the next century “the age of the Pacific”, with an obvious focus on trade between the two nations. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Canada-China relations witnessed much political optimism and economic expansion, with trade growing from 161 million dollars in 1970 to over 3.5 billion by 1988, causing China to become Canada’s fourth largest export market. This honeymoon era, however, ended abruptly in the summer of 1989.

Canada’s Response to Tiananmen, 1989

The Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4th, 1989, otherwise known in China as the day when nothing happened, was the shockingly violent suppression of a student-led protest in the city of Beijing, in which the Chinese army killed thousands of protesters. The graphic visuals of the massacre were immediately broadcast in news reports around the world, including Canada. Even the windows of the nearby Canadian embassy were fired upon and damaged, as many Canadian exchange students evacuated to the embassy for protection. A sense of disgust, anger and revulsion was felt immediately by Canadians following the massacre, prompting Mulroney to express solidarity with the victims, stating the following:

“I say to those young heroes: Do not despair, victory must eventually be yours because liberty cannot be denied. Canada abhors the great tragedy that has been inflicted on those brave young leaders in Tiananmen Square. Indiscriminate shooting have snuffed out the precious human lives, but they can never snuff out the fundamental urge of human beings for freedom and democracy.”

This was a drastic change in rhetoric towards China, as the idea of human rights being an important part in diplomacy with the Chinese regime began to take hold in mainstream Canadian political discourse.

The fallout from Tiananmen on Canada-China relations was immediate, as the Mulroney government no longer viewed China with ‘rose-coloured glasses’ and adopted several retaliatory measures against Beijing. Firstly, there was to be a strict political shunning of China, as all high-level visits were suspended for three years following the massacre. Any contact between diplomats and officials was also to be put on hold, and the ban was to remain until “a more appropriate time”, according to Ottawa. An important thing to
note about these measures is that they were not unique to the Canadian response, as many others in the West, such as the European Union, enacted similar measures against China.\textsuperscript{44}

Additional symbolic measures were made, especially in regards to arms, as the Canadian government would place a ban on the trade of any weapons or military equipment by declaring that they “would not grant export permits for military sales of any sort,”\textsuperscript{35} and that defense programs between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Chinese Army were to stop.\textsuperscript{36} Even aid programs such as the aforementioned CIDA were halted, with negotiations for additional aid programs, worth 60 million dollars, being suspended as well.\textsuperscript{5} It is important to note, however, that these measures were mostly symbolic, as the gross domestic products of both Canada and China (each at 565 and 461 billion respectively in 1989) greatly dwarfed any value lost from these measures.\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, the Canadian government chose to respond to the Chinese post-Tiananmen misinformation campaign by creating their first Mandarin language program on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio Canada International broadcast, which was to be broadcast to China and deliver a “Western perspective” on international news.\textsuperscript{9} Arguably the most quantifiable retaliation against Chinese actions, however, was the granting of asylum and visas to Chinese international students, many of which participated in the student-led protests. By April 1990, over 7,600 applications for permanent resident status from China were accepted by Canada.\textsuperscript{60} Along with the other more symbolic measures, the extension of visas for fleeing Chinese nationals was a move which soured relations with the Beijing government, bringing the 20-year relationship to an all-time low.\textsuperscript{64} Given all these retaliatory measures, it became clear that China’s blatant violation of human rights would from now on have some impact on diplomatic and economic relations with Canada.

It is also important to note that many of these measures did not last as long as they were intended, especially the political shunning of China, which began to fall apart in the early 1990s. The moratorium on high-level meetings with communist party politicians became dubious rather quickly, as multiple cabinet ministers would quietly travel to meet with Chinese officials in Beijing within months of the massacre.\textsuperscript{67} Trade with China quickly bounced back as well in the ensuing years, despite critical rhetoric from Ottawa.\textsuperscript{65} In fact, while ‘securing democracy and respect for human values’ was declared in 1991 as one of the key principles of Canadian foreign policy towards China\textsuperscript{64}, by April of 1992, Minister of International Trade Michael Wilson enthusiastically led a delegation of Canadian business leaders to China to facilitate trade expansion,
thus ending any illusion of political and economic shunning on the part of Canada. In short, while some damage was done to China-Canada relations, the sanctions were mostly short-lived and symbolic.

Part of the reason why this withdrawal from political and economic shunning took place was the ascension of Quebecois Jean Chretien to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1993, who argued that instead of shunning China, the promotion of economic trade would help foster political democratisation over time. He would then lead multiple trade missions to China, alongside an array of business leaders, provincial premiers, territorial leaders and relevant cabinet ministers known as ‘Team Canada’ in 1996, 1998 and 2001 to help facilitate the expansion of economic links between Canada and China. This new strategy was met with much criticism, especially from human rights and anti-China advocates, against which Chretien would defend himself by stating that: “I’m the Prime Minister of a country of twenty million people. He’s [leader of China] the President of a country with 1.2 billion. I’m not allowed to tell the Premier of Saskatchewan or Quebec what to do. Am I supposed to tell the President of China what to do?” Thus, Chretien illustrated a fundamental problem in Canadian foreign policy towards China: the futility of a middle power dictating rules to a rising superpower, a futility which was further exacerbated by China’s ever-growing market and thirst for Canadian goods. Simply put, as one business consultant would explain, “Canadian firms had done nasty business in the past and would continue to do nasty business in the future because they could not ignore 25 per cent of the world’s population.”

Therefore, the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre was largely symbolic and economically ineffective, as trade relations eventually picked up from where they left off. There was, however, a noticeable change in the rhetoric of Canadian politicians towards China. If in 1986 Mulroney could confidentially say that the issue of human rights was “not a government concern, but a concern to some Canadians,” by 1990 human rights became, at least officially, a government concern, and one that would play an increasingly complicated role in Canada-China relations.

Hence, there was great uncertainty about Canadian policy towards China going into the 21st century. Despite the return to the trend of growing economic ties between the two Pacific partners, there was an uncomfortable silence on human rights and the political differences between Canada and China, which could no longer be as blatantly ignored as in the past. As Trudeau described the post-Tiananmen mood: “It is hard to know how China needs to move forward, missteps in this immense country lead to death and suffering on a
gargantuan scale.  

**Harper Arrives on the Scene**

By the turn of the century, Canada-China relations reached a point of maturity, especially as the economic rise of China accelerated in the 2000s. As China’s economy grew, so did its trade with North America, which from 2001 to 2005 rose by 163 per cent. In terms of Canada-China trade, it seemed as though Chretien’s Team Canada missions did their job, as Canadian trade with China grew by 350 per cent between 1998 and 2007, compared to the 33 per cent growth rate of Canadian trade with the rest of the world. Unsurprisingly, this led to China emerging as Canada’s largest trading partner (second only to the United States) in 2006.

There was also a new aspect of Canada-China relations which would become increasingly important in understanding the relationship: demographics. As the 21st century progressed, immigration from China sky-rocketed, with China becoming one of the largest sources of newcomers to Canada. In fact, by 2006, over 1.2 million (out of 31.2 million total) Canadians identified themselves as Chinese (nearly 4 per cent of the total population), meaning Chinese was now the most common non-official language in Canada. It is also important to note that this did not raise much alarm among Canadians, as despite the fact that 40 per cent of Canadians agreed that ‘China will soon dominate the world’, 60 per cent did not see China as a threat to world peace in 2005. And from the Chinese perspective, due to Canada being seen as one of the friendlier Western states, the bilateral relationship in 2005 was declared by Chinese President Hu Jintao to have evolved into a strategic partnership; an important characteristic in Beijing’s foreign policy terminology.

This all changed in February 2006 when Stephen Harper’s conservative government took power, disrupting the previous Liberal’s China policy in the process. The shift in Canadian policy towards China was swift, and harkened back to the summer of 1989. It was part of a greater foreign policy vision of Harper, which he summarized in the following statement from 2006: “I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values; they don’t want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar.” In other words, while trade and economics were important, the issue of human rights was, from now on, to take precedence when dealing with other states, China included. This had
an immediate impact on the ‘strategic partnership’ between Canada and China, as China was removed from the list of foreign policy priorities for the new government.\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, along with openly criticizing the human rights record of China, Harper’s first minister of foreign affairs, Peter Mackay, ignored meeting requests from China’s ambassador to Canada, and didn’t even bother to go over China policy with the Cabinet until October 2006 (nearly eight months into the new government).\textsuperscript{42} This neglect of China, and further emphasis on its human rights failings, understandably became frustrating for the Chinese.

The trend of animosity towards Beijing continued in 2007, as the House of Commons gave unanimous support to a motion which would grant honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibet; one of the many regions of the People’s Republic vying for independence.\textsuperscript{43} While this move was likely done by the Harper government to further emphasize its focus on human rights abroad, it had an unintended effect on Chinese officials, who interpreted this (along with other actions by Harper and his government) as support for separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, due to the optics of supporting separatism abroad, Ottawa muted its rhetoric by the spring of 2008, when there was civil unrest in Tibet. This was also perhaps the first time the Canadian government experienced domestic pressure to take a more pro-China policy from anti-Tibetan immigrants from mainland China, who became a significant voting demographic for the minority government to consider.\textsuperscript{45} Important to note, there was also considerable domestic pressure from the Canadian Chinese community in the opposite direction (especially immigrants from Hong Kong or political refugees), with several groups lobbying Harper’s foreign ministers, such as Lawrence Cannon, also in 2008.\textsuperscript{46} There was even Harper’s refusal to attend the opening of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, which along with all the other actions, were seen as deeply disrespectful towards China and a violation of a Chinese diplomatic concept known as mianzi, which roughly translates to honour or saving face.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, with the re-emphasis of human rights in foreign affairs, Canada-China relations worsened considerably.

A shift in tone came in 2009, as Harper finally had his first trip to China in December of that year.\textsuperscript{48} Many factors played into this trip, such as the global recession of 2008 and the recent election, which left Harper with another minority government.\textsuperscript{49} His trip marked a significant departure from previous China policy and was interpreted by the Chinese leadership as a step towards reconciliation.\textsuperscript{50} One of the most important achievements of this trip was Canada being given ‘approved destination status’ by Beijing, which increased the number
of Chinese tourists in Canada from 40,000 to 50,000 per year, and therefore increased revenue from tourism by around 100 million dollars.\(^9\) This was an important factor in strengthening Canada-China relations, as it not only increased the number of Chinese visitors in Canada, but also greatly improved interactions between Chinese Canadians and their Chinese counterparts from Asia.\(^9\) One of the likely reasons why China reached out to the Harper government despite their human rights rhetoric, was that China was hoping to increase its soft power over Canada, and to leverage Canada as a means to better U.S. relations\(^8\), hence reflecting their strategy towards Trudeau’s Canada from 1970. Thus, despite the Harper government’s prioritization of human rights in dictating foreign policy towards China, it seems that the ever-growing trend of greater economic ties between Canada and China was ultimately irresistible and irreversible, as by 2012, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, and Canada-China trade was valued at over 50 billion dollars annually, with questionable improvement on China’s human rights record.\(^9\)

**Conclusion**

Thus, Stephen Harper’s failure on human rights advocacy in the 2000s, along with the short-lived Canadian retaliation in the early 1990s and Trudeau’s initial recognition of the PRC are all watershed moments that demonstrate the growing political and economic importance of the Canada-China relationship from 1970 to 2015. It is a special relationship, which has increasingly become the most important foreign policy relationship for the Canadian government outside of the United States. Furthermore, while this paper focused primarily on relations between 1970 and 2015, more recent developments have illustrated the increasing relevance of this topic for Canadian foreign policy. There is an ever-increasing imbalance of power between Canada and China, and this will continue to undoubtably influence relations. As the history shows, it is critical for Canadian national security in the 21st century to have the best possible China policy this country can muster, because with the numerical advantage so clearly not in our favour, Canada cannot afford to continue a lackluster effort. Extradition hearings, arrests abroad and global pandemics are all current developments which support this conclusion. In the words of scholar Robert Bothwell, Canada has “never been this alone. We don’t have any serious allies. And I think that’s another factor in what the Chinese are doing. ... Our means of retaliation are very few. China is a hostile power.”\(^9\) And it is with that information in mind that Canada must embrace the upcoming Age of the Pacific.
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84 Ibid, 898.
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[Event Report]

Japan: Leader in Climate Change?

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On 4 March, 2020, the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy hosted a panel presentation entitled “Japan: Leader in Climate Change?” on the topic of Japan’s contemporary climate change policy challenges and possible solutions. This event was sponsored by the Centre for the Study of Global Japan and the Consulate General of Japan in Toronto, and was co-sponsored by the Munk School’s Environmental Governance Lab. The event was moderated by Dr. Matthew Hoffman, a professor of political science at the University of Toronto, and the panellists were Dr. Philip Y. Lipsy and Mari Yoshitaka.

Dr. Lipsy is an Associate Professor at the University of Toronto and Director for the Centre for Studies of Global Japan. His research focuses on international cooperation, international organizations, politics of energy and climate change, international relations of East Asia and the politics of financial crises. He has also published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

Mari Yoshitaka is the chief consultant on clean energy finance at Mitsubishi and Morgan Stanley Securities. She is a leading expert in environmental business and finance. At the international finance group at the World Bank Group, she worked on impact studies on environmental projects in developing nations. She now serves as a member of numerous policy divisions within the Government of Japan and is a lecturer at Keio University.

The event began with Professor Phillip Lipsy’s presentation, which provided an overview of climate change politics in Japan and explained why
Japan has struggled to reduce its emissions in recent years. He started by pointing out that Japan had been a leader in energy conservation from the 1970s through the 1990s. This was made evident when it hosted the Kyoto Protocol in 1992, where it tried to highlight its energy conservation efforts and significant advances in reducing emissions. However, he notes, within recent years, Japan’s performance in the sector of energy conservation has been dismal. For example, by 2008, Japan was the worst performer in absolute terms for average annual domestic emissions according to its Kyoto Protocol target.

The question Professor Lipsy posed is “How did Japan go from being an energy conservation leader prior to the 1990s to becoming a laggard in the field today?” First, he explained the reasons why Japan had performed well in the past. The short answer is that, prior to the 1990s, Japan’s energy policies purposely imposed high prices on various forms of energy (electricity, gas, and transportation), which discouraged Japan’s population from high energy consumption, allowing Japan to appear as a world leader in energy conservation.

He used Japan’s transportation and household energy consumption behaviours as examples. Compared to other advanced, industrialized nations in the world, the average Japanese person travels less in total, and travels disproportionately more by train and less by automobile. In terms of household energy consumption, Japanese households generally do not use central heating systems but instead use space heaters, which consume significantly less energy. Professor Lipsy explained, “these kinds of behaviours were attributed to policy measures that made consuming energy very expensive in terms of electricity, natural gas, and automobile use.” He also noted that these energy consumption costs were also some of the world’s highest at the time.

But why were such policies implemented in the first place? The answer is politics. The ruling government at the time, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), devised a tax-redistribution system wherein taxes accrued from energy consumption policies (like highway tolls systems, automobile use taxes, electricity taxes, etc.) would enter a complicated mechanism that would then “redistribute the money to political supporters and interest groups of the ruling LDP,” namely members of Japan’s infrastructure and construction sectors.

This practice is what Professor Lipsy calls “efficiency clientelism,” suggesting that although the policies led to energy efficiency, this was merely collateral; they were in fact primarily clientelist, as their purpose was to reward interest groups for supporting the ruling party. He said, “these were political bargains made among politicians who were interested in redistribution to
supporters and bureaucrats who were interested in energy efficiency."

As a result of these policies, the Japanese population as a whole opted to consume less energy so as to reduce personal costs, and Japan was able to hold the title as a world leader in energy conservation. However, as previously noted, Japan is no longer at the forefront of energy conservation—in fact, it is considered one of the poorest performers in this area today.

So, what led to this change in energy consumption behaviour? According to Professor Lipscy, the answer lies in the electoral and administrative reforms that Japan underwent in the 1990s. In 1994, Japan experienced electoral reforms that changed Japan’s electoral system from one that enabled politicians to win elections with only a small section of the population to one where politicians need to win nearly 50 per cent of the vote within their district. As well, Japan underwent administrative reforms between 1998 and 2001 that elevated the role of Japanese politicians over bureaucrats.

The combination of these two sets of reforms fundamentally changed the way energy policies were created in Japan. Under these circumstances, Professor Lipscy noted, “not only do you have politicians caring about appealing to the broader public, but they are much more empowered than they used to be.” This changed the style of policy-making in Japan from sectoral to majoritarian. As a result, politicians have endeavoured to reduce or eliminate high energy consumption charges in order to appeal to more voters, who disliked the policies.

Professor Lipscy exemplified this trend by demonstrating how all of Japan’s successive governments since 1994 have each contributed to increasing Japan’s energy consumption through methods such as freezing increases on energy costs, reducing fees on electricity and gas, targeting the old tax-redistribution schemes for LDP supporters, and reducing feed-in tariff schemes that encouraged the adoption of renewable energy.

Japan’s current political arrangement is why the country has performed so poorly in terms of energy conservation. However, Professor Lipscy believes there is hope yet for Japan to improve in this area.

To end his presentation, he suggested that although Japan’s electoral reform led to the current problem, it can also be used to rectify it: “Administrative reforms have given politicians greater authority. If the prime minister says climate change is a number one priority, the Japanese government is now organized in such a way that big movements are possible.” He therefore
also suggested that public opinion will play a crucial role in influencing politician’s policy decisions: raising general awareness of Japan’s recent poor performance could contribute to increasing general desire for environmentally friendly policies.

Professor Lipsy’s presentation was followed by Mari Yoshitaka’s presentation, which focused on efforts from Japan’s industry and the Japanese government to improve the nation’s performance in energy conservation within recent years.

Mari Yoshitaka acknowledged that the Japanese government has been slow to implement policies to advance the nation’s efforts to conserve energy, but she stated that this has not stopped Japan’s industry sector from taking initiative in this area on its own. “Japanese industry has realized that it must do something to address the issue of climate change even though the government itself has not taken great steps towards new policies,” she said.

One example of Japanese industry initiatives in energy conservation was related to Japanese membership in ‘RE100’ (Renewable Energy 100), a global initiative where member companies aim to procure 100 per cent renewable energy for their business operations.

She stated that Japan currently has the third-largest number of members; however, this is due to companies going to the government on their own volition to request membership in the group—not the other way around. According to Ms. Yoshitaka, the companies believed that “because the global market is changing, if they cannot be involved in that kind of trend, they may be kicked out of the global supply chain. This is their main concern and why they want to take part in the initiative.”

These concerns have also pushed companies within Japan’s industry sector to independently implement their own policies related to climate change and energy efficiency. She proceeded to give examples of companies that have already begun to implement such policies.

Hitachi Ltd., an electrical equipment company, established long-term environmental targets to reduce the CO2 emissions of its entire value chain by 50 per cent by 2030 and 80 per cent by 2050, compared to 2010. The company has also introduced its own ‘Internal Carbon Pricing’ framework, which incorporates climate-related risks (like carbon taxes and trading costs) into its equipment investment decisions. This has made investing in low-carbon equipment a higher priority for the company.
The CEO of Idemitsu, an oil company, is coping with external pressure from international investors regarding climate change by proposing to ensure that half of its business will be involved in the non-oil industry by 2030. Lastly, the leaders of Toyota have stated that the company intends to decarbonize its entire supply chain by 2050.

“So, as we can see,” said Ms. Yoshitaka, “even though the government has had a hard time introducing environmentally-friendly policies like internal carbon pricing, the Japanese industry [sector] has had to introduce it itself to convince overseas investors that all the risks involved in climate change that can inform business decisions have been evaluated.”

Ms. Yoshitaka also informed the audience of the various climate change initiatives that the Japanese government has openly endorsed. These include Japan’s emissions reduction initiative, which was submitted to the U.N. in 2013 and set a target of 26 per cent reduction by 2030, with a long-term target of 80 per cent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Japan’s government has also prepared a medium- and long-term action plan to significantly reduce CO2 emissions through innovation and global cooperation. This action plan involves “decarbonizing power and heat with carbon-free hydrogen,” “contributing to global reduction in emissions through international private sector-led initiatives such as a ‘global deployment of low-carbon products and services,’” and “network reconstruction focused on the introduction of large-scale renewable energy on the supply side.”

Another international climate change initiative in which the Japanese government has recently become highly engaged is the ‘Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures’ (TCFD). Established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2015 in New York, its purpose is to “develop voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for companies to use when providing information to investors, lenders, insurers and other stakeholders.” Under the TCFD, member companies have to disclose all climate-related information in terms of risks and opportunities in the future as related to their impacts on climate change and the financial industry.

Ms. Yoshitaka stated that, prior to the 2019 G20 TCFD Osaka Summit, Japan was below the UK and the US in terms of member entities within the TCFD; however, following the Summit, it superseded both the US and UK, and now has the highest number of member entities in the TCFD in the world.

“So, why did the Japanese government encourage Japanese industries to support the TCFD?” she asked. “Because Japan is aware that it is widely
criticized for lagging in active involvement in climate change issues, but [it knows] the industry itself is doing well in this sector, as they have already been actively implementing climate change measurements themselves. Japan wanted to showcase [these efforts] by asking them to support the TCFD.”

In summary, Mari Yoshitaka’s presentation showed that the pressures for Japan to become more proactive in domestic and global climate change efforts flow both ways: between Japan’s industry sector, which wants to stay competitive within the global economy, and the Japanese government itself, which feels international pressure to prove its commitment to climate change initiatives.

Mari Yoshitaka also ended her presentation on an optimistic note, stating that “there are so many available technologies to combat climate change risks in Japan, so I hope that the Japanese industry [sector] can contribute to this type of risk mitigation in the world.”
1 Chartered Professional Accountants Canada, “Task force on climate-related financial disclosures (TCFD): Overview”, 2019
Southeast Asia
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[Op-Ed]
Withdrawing from the VFA can make the Philippines Vulnerable

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On 11 February 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte formally announced that the Philippines would withdraw from the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This notification began the six month grace period afforded to the Philippines and the U.S. to end the agreement. Despite having a combat record of fighting briefly in South Korea during the Korean War, counterinsurgency operations against pro-Communist and Muslim nationalist rebels, as well as against local Islamist terrorist groups, the Southeast Asian state has a reputation for having one of the weakest militaries in the region. Thus, the decision made news throughout the country as it has historically been an ally of the U.S. that has relied on the VFA to help enhance the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The decision to withdraw from the VFA was made after the U.S. State Department revoked the visa privileges of Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, who led a major anti-drug war effort when he was the chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). A 2018 report made by the State Department mentioned a high level of extrajudicial measures throughout the country during Bato’s term as PNP chief. Situated in a broader context, this was a strategic move from Duterte to give the Philippines an “independent foreign policy” which does not favour one country over the other. Civilian and military officials in Manila and Washington have opposed Duterte’s plans to withdraw from the agreement due to China encroaching near Philippine territory over the years. These concerns also include the dispute over the Spratly Islands, which manifested when China took control of Mischief Reef, which is considered to be
part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and continental shelf through a ruling passed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016.\textsuperscript{5} Formally withdrawing from the VFA undermines the Philippines’ national security because it gives China an opportunity to further encroach on Philippine territory, and the AFP is not strong enough to protect its sovereignty from another potential incursion in case of a regional conflict that may involve China. This is especially true when domestic political indifference to the situation hampers efforts to bolster the Philippines’ military power.

The announcement to withdraw from the VFA is a major concern for officials in both the Philippines and the U.S. With the latter party being concerned about the former’s ability to secure its territory in a worst-case scenario due to a lack of minimum credible defense. The Philippine Department of National Defense defines minimum credible defense as “the establishment of an effective force presence inside the Philippines and its exclusive economic zone.”\textsuperscript{6} According to a 2019 Asia Power Index provided by the Lowy Institute, the Philippines is ranked 19th out of 25 countries in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of military capability.\textsuperscript{7} This is in contrast to the U.S., which is ranked 1st in the index, followed by China in 2nd.\textsuperscript{8} The report also indicated that the Philippine Navy has only one frigate\textsuperscript{9} with no destroyers or cruisers.\textsuperscript{10} This assessment stands out because it shows that security is a serious issue that needs to be addressed. During the administration of former President Benigno Aquino III, the AFP started to undergo modernization in an attempt to orient itself from conducting internal security operations to external security ones (while being under the U.S. security umbrella).\textsuperscript{11} Scholar Renato Cruz de Castro explained that initial modernization efforts were hampered due to a lack of planning in building up a credible defense before American troops stationed in the Philippines were withdrawn in 1991.\textsuperscript{12} He also mentioned that another reason for this decision was due to the willingness of the poor nation’s politicians to not take responsibility in strategic affairs and instead pay attention to the quantifiable costs in defense matters (including domestic arms buildup).\textsuperscript{13} This is emphasized when a state has limited resources that the price of additional resources would exceed against the marginal cost of entering a military alliance, thus placing them in a difficult position.\textsuperscript{14} When an unforeseen threat appears, especially if a state faces internal and external threats at the same time, the situation would force said politicians to use external resources to ensure the nation’s survival.\textsuperscript{15} In this case, it is the Philippines not using the opportunity under the VFA to reshape the AFP to become capable of facing external security challenges that poses a threat to the nation.
If or when the VFA is not renewed by the Philippines and the United States after six months, China would have the opportunity to take advantage of the former country by positioning itself strategically in the Spratly Islands. Thereby, China would gain an advantage over the Philippines and to a certain extent, over other Southeast Asian states that have claims in the area. It has become daily news in the region, even prior to the VFA withdrawal, that the Chinese are rapidly asserting their influence by positioning naval assets in the Spratly Islands to claim more territory. In 2016, five Chinese Coast Guard ships made their presence known in Jackson Shoal, located 140 nautical miles off the coast of Palawan, and expelled Filipino fishermen to secure the disputed island. The presence of the Maritime Militia harassing and spying on Filipino ships and civilians conducting construction work on Thitu Island, or Pagasa in the Philippines, is used by China due to their ambiguous status with civilians manning fishing ships while having military training. This tactic has been used not only against the Philippines, but also against the United States. This was seen when the USS Impeccable was near the waters of Hainan Island in 2009 after Maritime Militia ships were deployed to get close and block its movements. This was followed by the use of grappling hooks to secure its towed sonar array while the ship’s crew had their attention focused on the Chinese navy and coast guard ships. The use of such force by China to maintain its influence is something the Philippines is concerned about. This reflects the ability of the People’s Liberation Army to simply use their naval forces to easily take territory in the Spratly Islands and use the reluctance of observers to confront them without suffering consequences for their actions.

Withdrawal from the VFA with the U.S. is not in the best interest of the Philippines despite what Duterte believes. Even with American military support, the AFP is at best still struggling to modernize its forces to keep them up to date. The projection of Chinese military power in Asia serves as a harsh reminder that a rising China can and will force other states to simply accept its economic and military power as the new reality. Using the provisions of the VFA to help the AFP modernize itself and train to survive a conventional fight would increase the Philippines’ chances to not be intimidated and ensure the country’s sovereignty. At the same time, the AFP needs to be proactive in learning as much as it can from the U.S. in improving its capabilities, regardless of whether it is in battle or in humanitarian work. As Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Junior testified in a Senate hearing, the loss of the VFA will “negatively impact the Philippine security and defense arrangements, as well as the overall bilateral relations of the Philippines with the U.S., and perhaps even on the sub-regional level.”
8 Ibid.
10 As of March 2020, the 2019 Asia Power Index still maintains that the Philippine Navy only has one frigate in service.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, 405-406.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

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[Op-Ed]

The Challenge of International Accountability in Mass Atrocities: Myanmar and the ICJ

Anushka Kurian is an MA candidate in Political Science at the University of Toronto, specializing in the Political Economy of International Development. She is interested in issues of international justice and human rights.

In late January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an order to Myanmar stipulating that the state take “all measures within its power” to prevent further acts of violence against Rohingya Muslims by the state.¹ This order was a sweeping move by the court, as it marked the first international order to Myanmar that implied state responsibility for the forced deportation of over 700,000 of its Rohingya ethnic minority group in 2017.² In the two years since the massive state-provoked outflow of refugees, there has been an ongoing investigation into Myanmar’s security forces by the United Nations³ and international cries for state accountability, including the Canadian government’s condemnation of the treatment of the minority group.⁴

The history of Buddhist-Muslim conflict in the region is a longstanding feature of the buildup that led to Rohingya fleeing Burmese military encroachment in 2017.⁵ In the decades following Myanmar’s independence from the British, the country was shrouded in an isolationist military regime that targeted Muslims, and Rohingya especially, as being “other”; in 1982, a law was passed that stripped Rohingya of their citizenship rights, removing any legal protections that accompanied state recognition of the minority group as a “recognized group” under the state.⁶ As the country transitioned into a fragile democracy in 2010, the international community – in supporting the country’s transition out of junta rule – turned a blind eye to its ongoing internal mistreatment of its Rohingya minority group.⁷ To this day, the 1982 citizenship law remains in place, rendering the Rohingya both within and driven out of
When mass Buddhist-Muslim violence broke out in 2012, it marked the beginning of a massive state-sponsored campaign of violence that would go on to target the Rohingya for nearly a decade to come. In 2015, the community became known by the international community as Myanmar’s “boat people” - fleeing to surrounding countries that would provide refuge from the ongoing violence and destruction.\(^9\) In the years between 2015 and 2017, the state implemented apartheid-like conditions that segregated and persecuted Rohingya communities across Rakhine state.\(^10\) This included the burning of Rohingya villages, widespread mob violence, state enforced restrictions on mobility, and sexual violence alike. The ethnic violence was both supported and endorsed by the state – massive propaganda and hate campaigns over Facebook fuelled organized mobs against the Rohingya, and Myanmar’s military was eventually condemned internationally for its ongoing support of the violence, as well as the policies of segregation it implemented in response to the conflicts.\(^11\)

Now in 2020, over 1.2 million of Myanmar’s Rohingya refugees are living in camps in neighbouring Bangladesh with no immediate end to their statelessness in sight.\(^12\) Given the role of the Burmese state in this crisis, and the scale of the suffering and persecution that Myanmar has launched, international states have turned to the question of how to hold Myanmar accountable for the harm it has caused the Rohingya. It is certain that the actions of Myanmar’s military were in direct contravention of the UDHR and of the basic norm of human rights that has purportedly taken shape around the globe since the Second World War. The recent case launched by Gambia seeks to address these deep human rights violations – but what recourse does the case stand to have?

**Why not the International Criminal Court (ICC)?**

The systemic nature of the violence in Myanmar led the Prosecutor for the ICC to attempt opening an investigation into the Rohingya crisis in 2018. The ICC, a new “human rights” tool, was created in 2001 with the Rome Statute with an intent of holding perpetrators of mass atrocities accountable for specific human rights violations, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and more. Bringing a case against Myanmar’s military was a delicate process – Myanmar is not one of the 122 member states party to the Rome statute of the ICC\(^{11}\), which brought forward the question of whether the international court could prosecute
a state that is not under the court's jurisdiction. The court ruled that if a component of the crime of forced deportation occurs on a state that is a Rome statute member (in this case, Bangladesh) then the court may move forward.\textsuperscript{14} In short, this means that despite patterned, systemic evidence of attempted ethnic cleansing and genocide, Myanmar’s top officials will only be investigated for the crime of forced deportation.\textsuperscript{15} While the fact-finding mission proved to be useful for evidence gathering, it was by nature limited in its scope and potential because the evidence it collected had to have been restricted to evidence applicable to forced deportation – this is tricky, given that there was ample evidence for genocide, but this evidence would be irrelevant in a case taken up by the ICC against Myanmar.

Regardless, even in prosecuting forced deportation, the ICC’s effectiveness is questionable at best – the court has faced escalating criticisms in recent years which seriously question its ability to deliver justice, especially because of the racialized nature of its prosecution list.\textsuperscript{16} To be sure, the ICC is not in the business of granting miracles. Case precedents, like the arrest warrant of Omar Al Bashir, caution that legally enforcing accountability for top officials will be unpredictable and unlikely. The absence of the United States, Russia, and China among the Rome Statute’s signatories implies a stark truth: the consequence of a court created to prosecute criminal states that is opt-in is that criminal states will simply opt-out.

The ICJ: Another Avenue for Accountability?

Recognizing the stagnation that the ICC’s route leads to by its narrow forced deportation case, international actors have now pursued a different avenue for accountability. In January 2020, Myanmar’s top officials appeared in the Hague to testify before the ICJ, an international court for states traditionally akin to dispute resolution courts in domestic jurisdictions. The testimony was in response to a case brought by Gambia against Myanmar for its violation of the Genocide Convention in 1948.\textsuperscript{17} While the case brought forward by Gambia on behalf of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s actual decision could well be years away, in January 2020, the court ordered that Myanmar take steps to prevent genocide against the Rohingya that remain within its borders, cease the destruction of evidence of genocide, and going even further, ordered Myanmar file a report every six months until the resolution of their case that lays out the steps it has taken to protect Rohingya.\textsuperscript{18} As far as international justice responses go, this is a strong one. The trouble is simply that the court does not
have any enforcement mechanisms. It is currently unclear whether Myanmar will comply – after all, what incentives does it have to do so? At worst, the findings of the ICJ can be acted on by the U.N. Security Council – something that the state will likely have to reconcile with regardless of whether it complies with the ICJ’s present order. Myanmar has consistently denied that it has committed a genocide, and continued to do so after receiving its ICJ order. One New York Times article noted that the state’s present “PR strategy” is accepting that war crimes were committed, but denying their constituting genocide.\(^9\)

Historically, while international law has tried to prosecute war crimes, it has only ever rallied its slow-moving silos to bring actionable, consequential rulings and political action forward for the most severe crime of genocide (and even still, this has not been successful for all cases of genocide). This was true of the Nuremberg trials, of the international response to the Rwandan genocide, and stands potentially be true as well should the ICJ case find Myanmar guilty of genocide. Unfortunately, mass atrocities that are still mass, but do not meet the highest bar of human rights violations, have not received the same international attention and action. They have certainly not received similar accountability. This is true of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the forced displacement of Palestinian refugees, and many more international human rights crises that have not received thorough accountability from their perpetrators.

**Why is International Legal Accountability Important?**

Do the apparent difficulties with enforcement mean that we abandon hope in international accountability mechanisms altogether? In a world as interconnected as ours, this does not promise much more justice than is already being delivered. It is true that with over a million Rohingya trapped in Bangladesh, solutions to the refugee crisis are not going to be solely from the arm of international law. The Rohingya case will likely require continued lobbying from diaspora, organizations, governments, and allies for their citizenship rights in Myanmar to be respected, and for effective peace processes to be initiated to make safe return a possibility. Nonetheless, a ruling from the ICJ would be a start – it would add legitimacy, international recognition, and solidarity with Rohingya diaspora and those currently trapped in statelessness. Given that a finding from the ICJ allows for the U.N. Security Council to take action, there is promise yet for the international community to use the legal mechanisms in place more effectively today and in the future than they have been used in the past. Even if only to spur political will from other states, or
international financial support for the Rohingya trapped in Bangladesh’s camps, the potential for international justice is still large, and the fight for more just mechanisms to protect human rights still vital.
3 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.


15 Ibid, 42


17 The Conversation. “Rohingya genocide case: why it will be hard for Myanmar to comply with ICJ’s orders.”


19 Ibid.
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[Event Report]

Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition Across Southeast Asia

Kana Minju Bak is a fourth-year student majoring in Contemporary Asian Studies and Diaspora and Transnational Studies. She specializes in Southeast Asian migrant labour policies and practices with a strong interest in Asian diasporic experiences.

On 26 February, 2020, the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies hosted Dr. Diana Kim, Assistant Professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This was the first public talk since her book, “Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition Across Southeast Asia,” was published fresh off the press only a week before. Dr. Matthew Walton opened the event on behalf of the Centre with a land acknowledgement, tying Dr. Kim’s work on historical colonialisms to the settler colonialisms of today.

Dr. Kim described her work as an exploration of the “inner life of the bureaucratic state told through opium,” claiming that the rise of opium prohibition is often overlooked and misunderstood. This phenomenon, she argued, is especially seen in Southeast Asia – a region dense with countries that continue to enforce the death penalty for drug-related crimes. Her main research question was derived from the shift in European colonial narratives from the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century. Whereas opium was initially defended as crucial to colonial governance in terms of taxation and maintenance of fiscal power, it later became an illicit substance unanimously disavowed by these countries and was institutionally condemned in the 1936 Geneva Trafficking Convention. From this, Dr. Kim argued that the local administration which previously taxed and regulated opium flows were uniquely armed with discretionary power to turn the tide from fiscal dependency to prohibition.
Southeast Asia, Dr. Kim performed twenty-two months of archival research spanning across temporal periods and spatial repositories. This included Cambodia, France, Myanmar, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States and ranged from the 1890s to the 1940s. She discovered that while these opium regimes may seem similar from first glance, the internal operations and administrative challenges recorded in daily reports are specific to the region.

Burma (now Myanmar) was highlighted as a case study where local administrative processes have put in place a nation-wide ban of opium since 1894. This made it the first of colonial states to do so — even before the international conventions in 1909 and 1912 — despite its fiscal dependency on the taxation of the substance. She said that twenty years of Burma’s bureaucratic records show a link between petty theft and opium consumption, with the substance being blamed for causing “moral wreckage”. Dr. Kim located the first instance of logged opium misuse to Akyab Jail in 1874. She traced the moral life of opium in these records with marked cases of opium related deaths and illness. These cases accumulated in the standard practice of collecting inmate statistics of opium use and fatalities by 1877. This practice of opium user observation was then expanded to towns and eventually moved upward to the national administrative body, provoking anxieties about the effects of the substance in generating a disorderly, crime-riddled, and “morally wrecked” population by the 1890s.

Dr. Kim pointed to colonial administrator Donald Mackenzie Smeaton as the proponent of opium prohibition by calculating Burma’s suspected demographic portion of drug users through collected reports of opium deaths (amounting to 11 per cent of the population). She explained that the label “morally wrecked” was also Smeaton’s handiwork— a term which then spread to European colonial bureaucratic rhetoric in discussions concerning opium. She stated that Smeaton was a strong proponent of the claim that the use of the substance causes crime and pushed for the opium ban which was already in consideration by 1892 and enacted in 1894.

The lecture concluded with the proposition by Dr. Kim that the state is more vulnerable and prone to collective influence than it is assumed. She maintained that the everyday practices of administrators, who forge the work of the state from the inside, can even inspire a change in international moral consciousness. She emphasized that, due to financial dependency on the substance, prohibition was especially difficult for the Southeast Asian region and that these contemporary post-colonial states are essentially built upon the reserves of opium revenues. It is in this context that Dr. Kim stressed the
adoption of an anti-drug stance in the 1950s as a mechanism used to
delegitimize political rivals and to renounce a nation’s own involvement in the
commercial opium trade. Such findings can reveal insights into why the region
has some of the harshest drug penalties in the world today.
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[Event Report]

Democracy in Myanmar: What to Watch for in 2020

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On 6 February, 2020, the Synergy Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies and the Contemporary Asian Studies Students' Union (CASSU) hosted the panel discussion entitled “Democracy in Myanmar: What to Watch for in 2020”. The conversation featured Dr. Jacques Bertrand and Dr. Matthew J. Walton, with Dr. Joseph McQuade acting as the moderator. The panel was structured as a formal Q&A, such that the speakers could introduce the topic and relevant issues associated with it, before an open question period allowed audience members ranging from students to members of the community to participate in the discussion.

All panellists are active scholars at the University of Toronto. The moderator, Dr. McQuade, is the Richard Charles Lee Postdoctoral Fellow at the Asian Institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and a former SSHRC Postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies. Dr. Bertrand is a Professor and Associate Chair (Graduate) of Political Science as well as the Director of the Collaborative Master’s Program in Contemporary East and Southeast Asian Studies at the Munk School. He is currently finalizing a book with Ardeth Thawngmung and Alexandre Pelletier, entitled Winning by Process: The State, Democratic Transition, and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar. Dr. Walton is an Assistant Professor in Comparative Political Theory and was the honorary guest speaker as he was previously the inaugural Aung San Suu Kyi Senior Research Fellow in Modern Burmese Studies at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
The event began with introductory remarks from Mia Nguyen, the President of CASSU, and Hui Wen Zheng, the Editor-in-Chief of Synergy. They highlighted the relevancy of studying Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) considering the Rohingya crisis, which has cast scrutiny on the domestic changes the country is undergoing from military dictatorship to democracy. Given that Myanmar is expected to hold a national election this year, these considerations to its political institutions and history provides grounds to make projections for the future as international audiences attempt to make sense of the domestic affairs occurring in the Southeast Asian state.

To give the audience context to the issues at hand, Dr. McQuade first gave a brief presentation of the history of Myanmar. Prior to its creation as an independent nation-state in 1948, Burma was subject to colonization by both the British and the Japanese. The legacy of these historical events can be observed in the way that power has manifested in Myanmar — such that there exists a tension within its multiculturalism as well as between its political institutions.

In order to understand the circumstances of Burmese politics, its demographics must first be analyzed. There are seven states, designated with the name of the ethnic majority population of the state, and seven regions, with ethnic Burma majorities. Some of these ethnic states may be characterized by “ceasefire capitalism”. Originally coined by geographer Kevin Woods, Dr. Walton introduced this concept to the audience to explain how the military and private economic interests of the state have benefitted from strategic ceasefires with ethnic groups. What is important to note, however, is that agreements with different states entail different dynamics of peace. Bertrand revealed that ethnicity has been an important notion within the state since the conception of Burma. Having an ethnically diverse population, the recognition of peoples within the state has implications for who can receive privileges afforded to citizens. As evidenced by the Rohingya crisis, Walton noted that this identification process is not so clear-cut. The effects of British colonization means that colonial-era records enumerated Muslim populations with different titles, allowing the contemporary Burmese state to claim (inaccurately) that Rohingya are illegal immigrants allowed in by the British. Thus, they are not deserving of citizenship. This prompted the questions from Dr. McQuade of who the Rohingya are, and why they are being singled out now.

The panel shared that the Rohingya people are an ethnic group who predominantly practice Islam and reside in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Since 2016, they have been subject to heightened persecution and violence from Buddhist communities and the military. However, they have been the targets of
military violence since the 1970s. As such, the recent stripping of citizenship is part of a broader system of discrimination. The increase in violence has brought about a positive slew of support for the military domestically at a time where some groups are losing patience with democratisation. Both Walton and Bertrand approach this problem as one of politicization. Dr. Walton draws connections between anti-Muslim sentiments in Myanmar to those occurring elsewhere. Particularly, he states, the influence and legitimation of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror discourse has allowed violence against the Rohingya to proliferate. Adding on to this, Dr. Bertrand spoke about threat creation through factors such as ideology and education. This has created widespread suspicion of borders, which has fueled the perception of the Rohingya as a threat by those “trained to be xenophobic.” It is in this context that the symbolic significance of ethnic recognition impacts the quality of Burmese democracy.

Myanmar is in an active process of transitioning into a democracy. Dr. Bertrand stated that while there was no pressing need for Myanmar to democratize, an internal realization by the military regime having low access to economic opportunity was self-harming motivated the move. As such, there has been a limited degree of democratic progress as the civilian government must exist alongside military rulers. The military was responsible for formulating the current constitution, which has resulted in a tug-and-pull relationship between the two ruling groups.

A key actor in this transition is Aung San Suu Kyi – the State Counsellor and de facto leader of Myanmar. She is the daughter of the former General Aung San, who helped in establishing independence for the country. While she is a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and is considered to have played a vital role in the state’s democratic transition, Aung San Suu Kyi has gained criticism internationally for allowing the Rohingya crisis to persist. Upon analysis, however, it appears that her character is consistent with the rational-actor analysis. Walton argued in support of this claim with reference to her personal worldview coming from a privileged background and anti-Rohingya sentiments of the Burmese. There is little domestic support for the Rohingya, and the ethnic cleansing may be interpreted as a callous sacrifice for democratic progress. Of course, such a sacrifice exists in stark opposition to traditional democratic principles.

One last element of the Rohingya crisis considered by the panel was the role of social media. Although both Walton and Bertrand supported each other’s claims thus far, they slightly differed in opinions about how this technology has affected domestic reactions. Dr. Walton saw social media as a
“pushing back” and suggests that the Burmese are now able to fact check through their increasing digital literacy. This is reinforced by local civil society groups that have been applying pressure to third parties such as Facebook to flag hate speech. On the other hand, Dr. Bertrand cast doubt on the educational distribution amongst the population, as misinformation has historically been used to strip the Rohingya of rights.

A key theme that emerged from this discussion was the complexity of domestic affairs in Myanmar due to its history of colonialism and dynamics between ethnic minorities, who exist within a politics of recognition. Throughout the discussion, the panel members acknowledged the limitations of this discussion as each sub-topic could even be further explored on its own. Dr. Bertrand stressed that resolution to the current issues in Myanmar requires meaningful political development. Drawing on current trends, he suggested that the upcoming elections in Myanmar could be crucial to the development of peace because it serves as an opportunity to gain political leverage against the military. Moving forward, all eyes will be on Myanmar as it moves into a new stage of democratization led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
South Asia
Replacing Anxious Hindu Masculinity with the Muslim Body: Hindu Right-Wing Nation Building Through Hindu-Muslim Sexual Delineation

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Abstract

Hindu nationalist sentiments have grown in the past few decades partly as an emergent ideology that relies on framing the idealized masculine Hindu body against the Muslim form. The Hindutva movement, especially nationalist efforts during the 2002 anti-Muslim mobs in Gujarat, sought to reassert Hindu dominance through discursive and physical violence towards the Muslim community to reclaim the ‘ideal’ Hindu nation. Here, historical narratives contextualize the conflict, especially the violent anti-Muslim mobs. This paper seeks to apply Judith Butler’s work, Bodies that Matter, to understand how the materialization of sexuality plays into the productive forces that regulate the Hindu and Muslim body in the context of Hindutva activism. Thus, this paper will argue that the Hindu Right materializes a ‘unified’ masculine Hindu man through knowing and dominating the ‘Other’ — the Muslim body — through reiterative discourses and disciplinary, violent sexuality.

Keywords

Hindutva, anxious masculinity, abject bodies, emasculation
Introduction

Hindu nationalist sentiments have grown in the past few decades partly as an emergent ideology that relies on framing the idealized masculine Hindu body against the Muslim form. In earlier Hindutva writings, the Muslim “is simply assumed to pre-exist, always-already constituted” and fundamentally challenges the existence and strength of the Hindu nation and the Hindu male body.¹ The Hindutva movement, especially nationalist efforts during the 2002 anti-Muslim mobs in Gujarat, sought to reassert Hindu dominance through discursive and physical violence towards the Muslim community to reclaim the ‘ideal’ Hindu nation. Here, historical narratives contextualize the conflict, especially the violent anti-Muslim mobs. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), one of India’s prominent nationalist organizations, portrays through educational and political campaigns male Muslim invaders raping the Motherland as fundamental in India’s history, thus providing motivation for Hindu men to gather and organize to protect out of “love of the Mother-nation”.’

This paper seeks to apply Judith Butler’s work, Bodies that Matter, to understand how the materialization of sexuality plays into the productive forces that regulate the Hindu and Muslim body in the context of Hindutva activism. “Sex,” as outlined by Butler, is a highly reiterative and citational practice, “whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce - demarcate, circulate, differentiate - the bodies it controls”.² Butler further argues that this understanding of “sex” becomes a regulatory mechanism “whose materialization is compelled”.³ Thus, this paper will argue that the Hindu Right materializes a ‘unified’ masculine Hindu man through knowing and dominating the ‘Other’ - the Muslim body - through reiterative discourses and disciplinary, violent sexuality.

Where do Women Fit in?

Women in the context of Hindutva politics are by no means passive actors. This paper is specifically concerned with how discourses and engagement with these women contribute to the emasculated Muslim and hyper-masculine Hindu, and how delineating these boundaries forms what the nation ‘should’ be according to the Hindu Right. In this manner, Hindu right-wing politics in relation to women serve as a mechanism to enforce disciplinary structures by which to establish Hindu dominance through discourse and sexual violence. In Sikata Banerjee’s article discussing Hindu armed masculinity and female
political participation in India, she explains that within Hindutva, the idealized Hindu woman under “masculine Hinduism” is framed as a “heroic mother, chaste wife, and celibate warrior”. She further argues that even if this ideal is not attained, it is “worthy of emulation”. Thus, even if one falls short of becoming the ideal Hindu woman, one is still subject to emulating this Hindu nationalist vision and essence. “Failed” Hindu women are still brought into the fold of scrutiny in order “to differentiate, accommodate, and supervise” these bodies and to understand what the idealized, unified, and masculine Hindu nation should look like. In line with similar logic of the success of the ‘failing’ carceral system as outlined by Foucault, regulation of the abject Hindu woman is a success of Hindu Right ideology. The abject Hindu woman is not a failure: every Hindu female body has now become a subject to be known and scrutinized. Thus, Hindutva ideology essentializes the Hindu woman to be chaste and pure in order to uphold the Hindu nation.

Additionally, Hindu women who are part of the Hindu Right claim that “Love Jihad” – Muslim sexual seduction – is one of the paramount concerns of the Hindu Right. Love Jihad refers to a set of discourses utilized by the Hindu Right, specifically female nationalist leaders, that instills “a moral panic against the alleged seduction, marriage, forced conversion and trafficking of young Hindu girls by Muslim men”. Public spaces are seen by nationalist women as unsafe and, therefore, it is the duty of the Hindu woman to prevent herself from falling prey to these schemes by rendering herself invisible in public. Tyagi and Sen argue, however, that these groups of female Hindu Right nationalists educating young Hindu girls are primarily concerned with proving Hindu masculinity and dissuading “masculine anxieties”. Through creating standards of proper Hindu female conduct, self-regulating mechanisms materialize the idealized Hindu nation devoid of morally unworthy Hindu women.

The women who do fail to adhere to these values are not failures of these disciplinary structures – instead, they serve as a necessary component of the reiterative process of reinforcing the idealized pure Hindu woman. As Butler argues, the abject subject creates “the possibility to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ into a potentially productive crisis”. This idealized essence then serves as an embodied form for the masculine Hindu man to protect, especially in place of rhetoric that decidedly imposes the Muslim man as violating and threatening the chastity of the Hindu woman. Rumors of Muslim men raping Hindu women served as moral justifications for Hindu militant organizations to unleash violence in the city of Ahmedabad in 2002. This appeared in defenders of Love Jihad as well, who argued that Muslim men were attempting to procreate
with Hindu girls to change their minority demographic status. Nationalist leaders of Love Jihad even spread rumors of young, suave Muslim men ensnaring Hindu girls to sell them to older Muslim men for procreation. Women were thus essentialized to the role of Hindu child-bearers, a way of bringing forth and sustaining the nation to maintain hegemonic Hindu masculinity.

On the other hand, Hindu men raping Muslim women during the Gujarat riots was seen as a way of emasculating ‘weak’ Muslim men and hyper-masculinizing themselves as the dominant and superior men. Rape was inextricably linked to “Hindu communal discourse, which sees Muslims as an iminical collective body and views individual Muslims as legitimate targets” – rape was thus seen as a way to “other” Muslim communities through physical violations of communal honour. These violent acts became a way to support the ‘Self’ versus ‘Other’ dichotomy. The Hindu woman thus became the symbol of a pure and unsullied nation, a symbol worth protecting from “the treacherous Other” – the Muslim male – “who not only fractured the physical boundaries of the Indian subcontinent to create...Pakistan” but also continues to undermine Hindu nationalism in the eyes of the Hindu Right. First, the Hindu woman becomes a mechanism by which to understand the threat of the Muslim male; second, violations of Muslim women become a way of emasculating the Muslim community, both with the goals of sustaining the Hindu nation through violent sexuality and its discourse.

How the Threat Is Internalized and Justified: Hyper-Masculinizing the Muslim Man

Part of establishing a discourse of superiority through sexuality is to frame the Muslim man as a genuine, hyper-masculine threat. In manufacturing the essence of Hindutva, Tyagi and Sen argue that the threatening image of the Muslim man allows for “a signifying practice within a particular discourse that constitutes ‘reality’” [emphasis added]. This connection links well to Butler’s understanding of the materialization of ‘sex’ – discourse matters because of the active and reiterative processes of citing the Muslim male body as one that is threatening to Hindu nationalist ideals. Discourses propagated by the Hindu Right detail the “irresponsible sexuality” of Muslim males that overpopulate the Hindu nation and threaten the fertility of the Hindu female. Within this, fears of the lure of Muslim males for Hindu girls becomes a constant trepidation of “a kind of penis envy and anxiety about emasculation that can only be overcome by doing violent deeds”. The concern about Muslims overpopulating, especially
with Hindu women, is less about the realities of population demographics but more about uncovering ways in which the Hindu Right can know and justify violence towards the Muslim body, especially in relation to how it positions itself as a threat to Hindu nationalist masculinity. Among Hindu Right groups, including the aforementioned RSS and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), alarm over Muslim male sexuality is so rampant that some argue only the intense education of Hindu girls can prevent them from falling victim to the ‘sexiness’ of the Muslim man. This is seen in the emotional lure of the Muslim male but also in physical appearance, including the anxiety over the attraction of Hindu girls to Muslim men, such as “hard foreskin due to circumcision”. Conversations between young girls and female Hindu Right activists detail similar worries and utilize a politics of fear to steer young Hindu girls away from Muslim men—members even argue that young Hindu women run the risk of being trafficked in the wrong company. In this way, the Hindu Right understands the Muslim ‘Other’ as a reasonable and justifiable threat that must be acted against with violence. Dibyesh Anand, an International Relations scholar, summarizes the ‘Othering’ of the Muslim male succinctly: “Fear, disgust, and desire work together in creating the image of the Muslim, a stereotyped Muslim hypersexual masculine figure that performs the function of the constitutive Other against which the new Hindu (read Hindutva) Self is called for.” Thus, the Muslim male body is framed as hyper-masculine, a seeming contradiction in the efforts of the Hindu Right to position themselves as the proper and true version of strong masculinity. However, the ‘Othering’ of the Muslim creates an opportunity for Hindu and Muslim masculinity to be framed against each other, and for Hindu masculinity to be understood in juxtaposition to the over-populating, hyper-masculine, and lustful Muslim male. This phenomenon has been referred to by Anand as a form of “porno-nationalism” in which Hindu male activists publicly assault the Muslim body in order to denigrate the ‘Other’ to a base form of “pornosexuality”.

**Translations to Anxious Hindu Male Sexuality**

In dialogue with the framing of the hyper-masculine Muslim comes the need to recover the masculinity and sexuality of the Hindu male. Namely, how does anxious masculinity translate into physical and discursive violence; additionally, how does Hindu male sexuality translate into ‘Othering’ the Muslim body to reassert Hindu dominance? Riots in Gujarat took on forms of sexual violence – in rioting mobs, Hindu men, including the police, exposed their genitalia to demonstrate that they were “real men”. Hindu women
handed out bangles and saris, symbols of the feminine, to Hindu men that were not engaging in the rioting. Interpellations towards the masculine and feminine become clear here: the Hindu woman shaming the Hindu man for failing to protect the feminine Hindu nation and Hindu men exhibiting their penises as a display of dominance over the Muslim male. These articulated forms of Hindu masculinity interpellate the Hindu body to adhere to the unified, masculine Hindu nation, as expressed through materiality and fixity within the body. Blom Hansen adds to Anand’s analysis by understanding Hindu male rioting and violence as a way of “shedding...perceived humiliation” in order to recover their masculinity.

Additionally, discursive violence in anti-Muslim poetry is linked to physical violence during the Gujarat riots. From a collection of well-distributed hate speech from the Hindu Right in 2002, one brochure read:

“The people of Baroda and Ahmedabad have gone berserk
Narendra Modi you have f*cked the mother of miyas
[Muslim men]
...
It has burnt the arse of miyas and made them dance nude
We have untied the penises which were tied till now
Without castor oil in the arse we have made them cry
...
Wake up Hindus there are still miyas left alive around you
...
With a Hindu government the Hindus have the power to annihilate miyas
Kick them in the arse to drive them out of not only villages and cities but also the country
Let the fuckers know that
The fucking of fuckers will not work.”
Discursive calls to subdue the Muslim body rely on establishing dominance through sexuality of the Hindu male to quite literally clarify who the “fuckers” are and who is getting “fucked”\textsuperscript{32}. References to the Hindu government also link Hindu masculinity to the superiority of the Hindu Right inspired nation, one in which the Muslim body fades into the background and is no longer a threat to Hindu dominance. Further anxieties over Hindu masculinity are evidenced in the “homoerotic (anti-)desire” towards Muslim men.\textsuperscript{55} This example demonstrates how historical narratives, poetry, and other propaganda fuel and materialize violence towards the Muslim population. In Gujarat, discourse became practice: Hindu male rioters wore saffron underwear – a colour that has traditionally been associated with religious abstinence and salvation but has been co-opted by the Hindu Right to demonstrate that rape was religiously obligatory, materializing Hindu male genitalia into “instruments of torture”\textsuperscript{54}. Emasculation of Muslim men through violations of Muslim women became embodied ways of reclaiming and reaffirming previously anxious Hindu male sexualities. Hindu men that did not adhere to such discursive or physically violent practices were labelled by the Hindu Right as eunuchs, literally lacking their embodied form of ‘manhood’.\textsuperscript{55} In this, Hindu male genitalia become a way of materializing masculine dominance over the Muslim body. Upholding the essence of the ideal Hindu nation thus requires upholding Hindu masculinity to protect and prevent the rape of the Motherland as referenced in Blom Hansen.

**Conclusion**

This paper investigated ways in which the Hindu Right justifies their nationalist vision through anti-Islamic discourse and violence. Within this, the Hindu woman is crucial in Hindu Right activism as evidenced through Love Jihad – the chaste and pure Hindu woman at home and the invisible one in public become symbols to represent the ideal Hindu nation. The Motherland must therefore be protected by the hyper-masculine and dominant Hindu man. These images are inspired from historical narratives of the “always-already” Muslim, the one that seeks to ‘out-populate’ with their hyper-masculine tendencies and their “irresponsible sexuality”. In this, the Hindu Right justifies the notion that the Hindu nation has always been threatened by the Muslim body and must be regulated, known, and therefore, punished through discursive emasculation and physical violence. Divisive rhetoric between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ sexuality; ‘real’ and ‘weak’ manhood; and ‘chaste’ and ‘flagrant’ women, is essential to craft this narrative. Physical violence, including exposing
genitalia, indicates that there is a need to materialize and prove one’s masculinity. Applying Butler, Hindu masculinity is thus materialized through the domination and abuse of Muslims. Discursive forms of mobilization become essential to mobilize physical violence for the Hindu Right, demonstrating how rhetoric and practice are inextricably linked to the active materialization of anti-Muslim efforts within right-wing nation building.

2 Ibid., 148.


4 Ibid., 532.


6 Ibid., 76.


8 Ibid., 231.

9 Aastha Tyagi and Atreyee Sen, “Love-Jihad (Muslim Sexual Seduction) and Ched-Chad (Sexual Harassment): Hindu Nationalist Discourses and the Ideal/Deviant Urban Citizen in India” Gender, Place, & Culture 27, no. 1 (May 11, 2019): 104.

10 Ibid., 104.

11 Ibid., 115.

12 Ibid., 112.

13 Butler, 536.

14 Banerjee, 76.


18 Tyagi and Sen, 109.

19 Ibid.

20 Anand, 260.


22 Anand, 260.

23 Tyagi and Sen, 110.


26 Anand, 265.

27 Ibid, 265.

28 Ibid, 261.
Butler, “Introduction to Bodies That Matter.”
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African Students in India: The Conflicting Narratives of Capitalism and Nationalism

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Abstract

In 2018, India launched the ‘Study in India’ initiative to attract international students to Indian higher education institutions. India ranks among the top destinations for African students to migrate for higher education. According to the Ministry of Human Resource Development of India, Sudan and Nigeria are the fourth and fifth largest contributors to India’s foreign-student rolls. Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations in the Global North, India is a relatively inexpensive option for Africans to avail superior levels of educational and medical services. The significant exchange of capital and resources between India and Africa – a partnership that began with the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s – can be described as an ideal model for cooperation within the Global South. The Indian economy enacted economic liberalization reforms in the 1990s which were geared at attracted foreign investment to the market and service sector. International students from Africa bring significant foreign investment to the education sector of India. However, discrimination and violence against individuals of African descent have been a rampant phenomenon in Indian society. Mob lynching, sexual harassment, and casual discrimination against black people are common in the Indian subcontinent. This reality has been disregarded by mainstream Indian media and scholarly research. The colonial legacies of colourism, racism and caste remain salient in Indian culture. This paper will analyze how the objectives of India’s capitalist political economy are in conflict with the “nationalist project of subject making” in the Indian state and society.
Keywords

Study in India Initiative, International Students, Africa, Global South, Cooperation, Racial Prejudice, Colonialism, Globalization, Colourism, Foreign Investment

Introduction

In February 2016, a 21-year-old Tanzanian student was attacked by a mob when she was driving in her car in Karnataka, India; they beat her, tore off her shirt and set her car ablaze.¹ Earlier that year, a Congolese teacher was beaten to death over asking for an auto-rickshaw in Delhi.² In a series of attacks on Africans in Greater Noida near Delhi in March 2017, a young Kenyan college student was pulled out of a cab and assaulted by a group of angry men.³

Numerous cases of violence against people of African descent have been characterized by Indian law enforcement bodies as “regular cases of road rage” with “no element of racism.” A government official said: “it is not as if there’s a public movement against African nationals. The attacks happened at different locations, at different times for different reasons.”⁴

India is a country where light-skinned Bollywood actresses dominate the billboards, fair-skinned Gods and Goddesses are celebrated in myths and fables, and where the world’s largest fairness cream industry thrives. The Indian population comprises of several distinct racial groups with a diverse variety of skin tones and features but the fair-skinned Indo-Aryan continues to dominate the racial and social hierarchy. The construction of the Aryan race which began as a European idea, seeped into the Indian subcontinent through its interaction with British colonialism in the 1700s.⁵

Due to this prolonged colonial interaction which spanned roughly two-hundred years, fair-skin was consolidated as the currency of power and privilege in the mind of the ordinary Indian population. Subsequently, the struggle for freedom from the British empire and the surge of nationalism in India culminated in a unique foreign policy set-up for the independent Indian government post-1947. In partnership with other nations from the Global South with similar interests, India pioneered the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War era to protect the sovereignty and interests of developing, post-colonial nations.⁶ This mutually beneficial relationship between countries in Africa and Asia took a drastic turn in the 1990s, when India opened the doors of its economy to liberalization, international trade, capitalism and privatization to
join the rest of the world in one of the biggest moments in history: the definable event of rapid globalization. The Indian economy was then, characterized by capitalistic policies aimed at increasing the role of the market and service sector, with a focus on private and foreign investment. Indian interaction with Asian and African countries was heavily focused on attracting foreign investment to the Indian educational, scientific and medical sectors. Most recently, the Indian government announced the Study in India initiative aimed at attracting international students from Asia and Africa to Indian universities in order to transform India into a regional education hub with a diverse student population. In light of these developments, the conflict between the ordinary Indian population’s apparent distaste for dark skin tones and the Indian government’s strategy of attracting racially diverse groups to Indian soil becomes starkly visible.

Contrary to the views of law enforcement officials, the incidences of violence against individuals of African descent mentioned above do, in fact, seem to have a common theme: they can be related to the palpable tension between the objectives of India’s capitalist political economy and the “nationalist project of subject making” in the Indian state and society.

The longstanding relationship between India and Africa is an ideal model of South-to-South cooperation, as cited by many scholars. The Indian government has launched several scholarships, schemes and programs in order to attract African students and teachers to gain from the relatively superior universities and educational facilities since the 1950s. “As of 1965, there (were) about 600 African students on fellowships in several of India’s universities.” In present times, ambitious initiatives like the Study in India program mentioned earlier, offer scholarships to many nations in Africa, most notably Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania amongst others.

On the surface, these programs seem like capitalist success stories - attracting foreign potential to both the African and Indian education sector. However, the complexities of racist and ethnic tensions in post-colonial India complicate this project. The legacies of colonial racial and ethnic politics from the British Raj (1757-1947) continue to persist in Indian society. Through the colonial legacies of white supremacy, colourism, caste-ism and racism, xenophobia based on communal and ethnic lines remains a major component in general attitudes of the Indian public. The exclusionary idea of nationalist “subject-making” based on skin-colour, caste and race (specifically Indo-Aryan nationalism) is at odds with the project of the Indian capitalist political economy to stimulate the flow of migration, trade and cooperation within the Global South, and in this context, African nations. The result of this combination is the
creation of hostile environments enabled by the xenophobic public for African immigrants attracted by the Indian capitalist political economy.

This paper will present a historical account of the impacts of European colonialism on the attitudes of caste, race and skin colour in Indian society. Second, it will give a brief background of the 1990 liberalization reforms in India and the origins of South-to-South cooperation through Non-Aligned Movement and India-Africa relations in the education sector. Finally, it will address how the persisting colonial mindset of caste and race relations in Indian society defeats the goals of the Indian capitalist political economy by cultivating a hostile environment for people of African descent in India.

Impact of European Colonialism and Development of Indo-Aryan Nationalism

The colonial state under the East India Company (1757-1857) and the British Crown (1858-1937) relied on exploiting religious, ethnic and caste differences in India’s diverse population in order to strengthen its control over the colony. The British solidified and institutionalized caste differences in order to appease upper-caste Hindu political leaders that opposed the colonial state. The European idea of racial hierarchy coupled with the Indian system of caste formed a new basis of discrimination in colonial India, a perception that remains stubbornly persistent in present-day India.

To understand the intersection of caste and race, it is necessary to define both of these concepts. The caste system is a Hindu tradition which dates back to 1200 BCE. It assigns the role of people in the social hierarchy based on occupation. For example, the four broad divisions of caste are Brahmin (upper caste priests), Kshatriya (kings and warriors), Vashiya (farmers, merchants, traders and craftsmen) and Shudhra (labourers.) There is a fifth-lowest section of caste which is not included in the formal system as they are considered to be in a “permanent state of impurity.” This community is the Dalits or the ‘untouchables’, who were prescribed to perform jobs such as cleaning toilets and taking out the garbage. Caste was the primary basis of stratification in Hindu society, but it was also employed by other religious communities as a legitimate basis for discrimination.

The ideology of European imperialism has often been justified by racist science which legitimizes the idea of a “racial hierarchy” that deems the white race superior to other races. The relations between the colonizers and the
colonized have always been those of domination and subjugation. Initially, the East India Company employed the strategy of “orientalism” to study Indian society, especially the caste system, from a Eurocentric point of view by using local interlocutors and intermediaries to understand the social and political landscape of the colony. Orientalism was the guiding ideology behind the European method of studying the ethnography of the East in order to learn how to best approach the imperial exploitation of these conquered territories. According to Edward Said, orientalism is a school of thought that studies the “Orient” from a euro-centric point of view. “Orientalism as a Western style for dominating restructuring and having authority over the Orient.” After ideas of the Enlightenment surfaced in the late eighteenth century, the strategy of British rule shifted from merely observing and understanding the population of India to “civilizing the uncivilized race.” The “civilizing mission” of the colonial administration placed those with brown skin below those with white skin through discriminatory policies and violence. The class of Indian elites, usually lighter-skinned Indians of the Aryan race, who received English education were a small and privileged portion of the population who were entitled to a higher place in the social hierarchy by virtue of having a closer association to the ‘white’ ruling race.

Caste has been a salient aspect of Indian society since ancient times, and thus, it remained the focal point of the ethnographic research conducted by British colonizers. During the Census of 1901, the Census Commissioner Herbery Hope Risely, attempted to combine anthropometry (the scientific study of measurements of the human body used in racial science) and the ethnography of caste in India by advancing an exclusively racial theory of caste. According to Risely, “invading ancient Indo-Aryans married indigenous women, creating groups of less racially pure individuals who became the lower castes.” Thus, he stated that the division of caste was purely a “grotesque scheme of social evolution.”

The Aryan race which typically occupied the highest place in the caste order was associated with lighter skin, whereas the Dravidian race was typically associated with the tribal and lower caste communities. Thus, the British Raj solidified the relation between caste, which is solely an occupation-based system, and race. The concept of privilege that was initially associated with the “Brahmin” caste was then, also associated with the Indo-Aryan race of “lighter skin.” In British Orientalist research and discourse, Brahmins have always been painted as the dominant social group of India. It is argued that this image of India was not simply produced by the British, it was “dialogically produced”
through interaction with Brahmin pandits, who were educated in English to make ideal “allies” for the colonial administration. Arguments advanced by German Orientalist Max Muller were responsible for broadening the term “Arya” to Indians by finding linguistic connections between Sanskrit, Latin and Greek. Indo-Aryans were recognized as “kin of Europeans and founders of civilization.” This is interpreted as the reason for British inclination to favour Aryans and recognize India as a primarily Hindu nation. The “myth of the pure race” advocated by Indo-Aryans, seen in their practices of strict endogamy, served to establish a hierarchy wherein Aryans remain supreme and other castes are deemed inferior. This “myth” is instrumental to the very existence of the rigid caste system of India.

The use of both race and caste as a system of stratification in policy intensified the connection between darker skin and lower castes. The view which is regularly taken by many scholars is that “the Dalits are among the darkest skinned people in the Indian subcontinent.” It should be noted that this relationship is true only for a majority of cases as there are some cases of lower-caste Indians with light skin, and upper-caste Indians with darker skin. However, race is an important variable to consider, as scholars argue that light-skinned lower-caste individuals would be deemed more socially acceptable than dark-skinned lower-caste individuals.

British colonialism was not the first time that the Indian population was conquered by fair-skinned rulers. British rule in India was preceded by the Mughal dynasty and the Delhi Sultanate: rulers of Persian and Turkish descent. However, these rulers did not exploit caste and race differences as effectively as the British. Centuries of domination by fair-skinned foreign rulers have had a deep impact on the Indian psyche - an impact which was exponentially magnified during the British Raj.

Like many post-colonial societies, India suffers from the colonial legacy of colourism. In present-day India, white skin is directly correlated to higher levels of privilege and social acceptance in society. The capitalist market of post-1991 India cashed in on the colourist mentality of the public to fill a gap in the market for fair-skin products such as whitening creams and bleach. India’s fairness cream market stood at an astounding 450 million USD in 2016. The prominent industry of matrimonial ads and arranged-marriages in India is incomplete without advertising the fair and therefore, desirable, upper-caste Brahmin Hindu partner. In many ways, most aspects of the social status of the average Indian are connected to standards of fairness and caste - two variables that have been closely related to each other since the colonial period.
Although the Indian Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of caste, race and colour, skin colour continues to be a regular form of discrimination in everyday life. The notions of Aryan superiority and the Hindu-characterization of India from Orientalist theories of the colonial period have persisted and infiltrated the present-day nationalism in India. The “nationalist” agenda of “subject-making” in India society is based on excluding those with darker skin, while including the lighter-skinned, upper-caste Indo-Aryans. In some ways, a parallel for this observation could be drawn to the concept of “racial distancing” and “racial alignment” as described by Professor Anju Paul, an international migration scholar from Yale-NUS College. In a similar vein, as Filipino migrant workers racially distance themselves from Indonesians in order to align themselves with Western values, and increase their demands in the American market, Indo-Aryans disassociate themselves with darker-skin, in order to align themselves closer to Europeans. The recent surge of Hindu nationalism under the current government of India has given way to the right-wing views of upper caste Indo-Aryan Brahmins. According to Reuters, incidences of cow vigilante violence and mob lynchings of lower caste Dalits and Muslims have been on a steady rise - a phenomenon that indicates the rapid surge of upper-caste Hindu nationalism in India.

Anthropologist Karen Brodkin, in her work “Global Capitalism: What has it got to do with race?”, cites Verdery, who suggested that “notions of purity and contamination, of blood as a carrier of culture, or of pollution are fundamental to the projects of nation-making” and that the homogeneity insisted on by nationalist projects requires those who do not fit to be “assimilated or eliminated.” Similarly, another scholar Andrea Louie argued that the projects of nation-building and racial homogeneity are closely linked. In her article, she argues that the idea of “Chinese-ness” is associated with the racial Chinese ethnicity. In other words, if one is racially Chinese, they have a claim to the Chinese national identity. Correspondingly, the fair-skinned, upper-class Hindu Indo-Aryan has been constructed as the ideal racial subject of the Indian nation-state. The vast, historical diversity of the Indian population is under threat due to casteism, colourism and racism.

The trends of colour-based and caste-based discrimination can be traced far back in history and they remain stronger than ever in present-day India due to the rising influence of capitalism in the fairness cream sector, Western cultural soft power as a consequence of the rise of the United States and the everlasting influence of British colonialism in the present day.
Non-Aligned Movement, Liberal Market Reforms of 1990, and Indian-African Cooperation

While it can be argued that British colonialism had a long-lasting effect on the perception of race and colour in the Indian population, it is important to note that there was widespread discontentment with British colonialism in the sub-continent. The economic drain of wealth and exploitation of various sections of the Indian population triggered a large-scale nationalist mass-movement against colonialism. After the long struggle for independence and a violent partition of the territory, the Union of India formally gained independence on 15 August, 1947 under the leadership of the first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru restructured the economic policy of India based on a socialist model of government control, industrial subsidies and protectionism inspired by the Soviet Union. Nehru was one of the pioneers of the international Non-Aligned Movement which was geared at protecting the interests of post-colonial nations in a period of power polarization during the Cold War.

The non-aligned countries faced the common challenges of decolonization and undoing the large scale de-industrialization of their nations due to colonial economic policies. The Bandung Principles of the Non-Aligned Movement highlight the importance of sovereignty and non-interference, while stressing the need for cooperation within the Global South. The relationship between India and Africa can be attributed to the shared commitment to these principles. The anti-colonial movements of Africa and India shared the principles of non-violence and self-sufficiency. Additionally, the presence of a large volume of Indian diaspora in Africa which settled there as colonial indentured labourers made Africa an important part of India’s foreign policy. The relationship between India and Africa is marked by a large flow of human resources and capital in the education, science, technology and health sectors. As such, India has aided African countries by providing scholarships and programs for students to immigrate to Indian universities.

The liberal market reforms to India’s economy in the 1990s had a significant impact on India’s engagement with the global market and India-Africa relations. After encountering a balance of payments problem in 1991, which required a bail-out by the International Monetary Fund, “controls started to be dismantled, tariffs, duties, and taxes progressively lowered, state monopolies broken, the economy was opened to trade and investment, private sector and competition were encouraged and globalization was slowly embraced.” The growth rate of the Indian economy accelerated by a record rate of 7.5 per cent
in 1994-1997. This marked a change in the Indian political economy from left-leaning objectives towards a more capitalist approach, which envisioned India’s rise as a regional superpower and one of the most economically powerful countries from the Global South. The policy geared at economic liberalization was a marked shift from the Non-Aligned Movement. A mutually beneficial relationship that surfaced through the Bandung Principles of cooperation was therefore characterized by India’s ambitious capitalistic objectives of increasing economic growth by attracting foreign investment and international students from Africa.

Recently, the government of India has announced the ambitious “Study in India” initiative to increase international student enrolment in Indian universities with the aim to generate more revenue from foreign international students while increasing India’s soft power as a global hub of education. In order to attract more foreign students, the government has decided to make the visa process easier for international students and has included fee-waiver schemes. In 2018, 15,000 seats were offered by 160 institutions. “India has the advantage of education being delivered in English as well as a big competitive advantage in terms of cost, along with world-class colleges and universities,” according to Diptiman Das, chairman & MD of EdCIL India, the public sector undertaking that is the nodal agency to implement Study in India.

The third aim of this program is to offset the large outflow of Indian students to education destinations like the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom by attracting foreign students to study in Indian universities. According to the Reserve Bank of India, spending on tuition and hostel fees by Indian students studying abroad was $2.8 billion in 2017-18. In comparison, foreign students in India spent only $479 million in the corresponding period. In addition to South Asian nations such as Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan, Nigeria and Sudan contribute 4.8 per cent and 4 per cent respectively to the total number of foreign students in India.

African students continue to avail the benefits related to immigration and fee-waivers provided by the Indian government. On the surface, this program sounds like the perfect example of South-to-South cooperation in the education sector. However, the influence of Indo-Aryan nationalism and xenophobia in Indian society have created increasingly unsafe conditions for African international students, as evidenced by the news reports cited above.
India: A Safe Education Hub for African Students?

The intersection of the Indian government’s objectives to attract African international students and the nationalist impulses based on skin colour and race present in Indian society has resulted in the creation of a paradoxical reality for African students. Upon arriving in India, African students experience a shift in their social status based on their race. This new “situational identity” places them at the centre of xenophobic discrimination and attacks triggered by the strong presence of Indo-Aryan nationalism. African students have often been associated with charges of harassment, drug trafficking and crime by Indian law enforcement, media and the general public. While the goals of the capitalist political economy require that Indians embrace “diversity”, the general attitudes in society remain unquestionably exclusionary towards those with dark skin. In her paper, Brodkin asks, “how then, to reconcile this apparent dissolution of national boundaries with the staggering upsurge of racial, ethnic, and religious conflict mainly within nations at precisely the time when capitalism’s global hegemony seems most secure?”

Similarly, the ill-treatment, intolerance and growing violence against people of African descent in India begs the question: what are the stakes of acknowledging and investigating the impact of liberalization on the Indian economy on how race is lived in India? The Indian capitalist economy is trying to advance the image of an environment of diversity and acceptance to attract foreign nationals to Indian universities in order to attract investment. African students that travel abroad with hopes of an elevated lifestyle and high-quality education suffer unparalleled levels of discrimination and violence in India. In some ways, Indian society may not be ready for the racial and cultural diversity that accompanies globalization reforms. The question of how to reconcile the objectives of globalization and South-to-South cooperation with the staggering upsurge of Indo-Aryan nationalism in India remains unanswered. Brodkin cited Fukuyama, who suggested that “both capitalism and nationalism are part of the human condition, whether we like it or not.” These two parallel impulses of the nation-state need to agree with each other in order to prevent violence and discrimination against vulnerable groups. In order to bring the objectives of globalization of the Indian political economy and the Indian perception of race on the same page, addressing the deep psychological impacts of colonialism on the Indian population would be a step in the right direction.
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[Op-Ed]

‘All izn't well’: The Challenges Facing Mental Health Policies and Interventions in India

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“All izz well,” shout the inimitable trio of college students that helm the storyline of Three Idiots, a Bollywood comedy-drama from 2009 that remains a pop-culture icon today. The film pioneeringly delved into themes of parental pressure, unfulfilled aspirations and student suicide through the lives of a group of engineering students in India. This clarion call, claiming that “all izz well,” represents an attempt at self-assurance, an illusory affirmation that despite the nearly systemic and relentless assaults on their confidence, aspirations and mental health that these students must confront every single day, their situation is alright, bearable and perhaps even acceptable.

However, ‘all ‘izn’t’ well’. Deteriorating mental health, increasing suicide rates, an absence of accessible interventions and a lack of a cohesive framework to confront these challenges is an exceedingly prevalent reality faced by the Indian populous. A recent report, based on the National Mental Health Survey of India, states that more than 30 million adult Indians have considered committing suicide and 2.6 million have attempted to do so within the previous month. This marks a disproportionately high contribution to the global burden of suicide deaths and attempts.1 Furthermore, while reliable data on levels of general mental wellbeing is rare, a study by the National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health in 2005 does reveal that “at least 71 million people
in India have a serious mental disorder," and that nearly 76-85 per cent of such cases are left untreated. These towering numbers, often accompanied by claims that they are underreported and constantly rising, indicate that attempts at providing accessible services and interventions at national, regional or selective levels in order to alleviate this burden are either absent, minimal or plagued by debilitating challenges.

I have spent my summer at Dasra, a strategic philanthropy organization in India, where I worked on a project proposing the establishment of a suicide helpline, through private funding, as a last-mile intervention for suicide prevention in India. This opportunity provided me with a window into understanding the specific barriers that challenge the successful and widespread implementation of cohesive responses to this mounting health problem. These insights along with a review of available academic literature helped me to identify three of the most critical challenges faced by the various policy-based or NGO-driven attempts at tackling this immense problem: an absence of reliable data and research, a lack of cooperation amongst various stakeholders, and the continued prevalence of stigma. For more successful implementation of policies and interventions, these hurdles must first be assessed and addressed.

The first and possibly most foundational of these challenges is the lack of available data and research around the complexities of mental health issues in India, and the continued failure of appropriate tracking and monitoring. As I learnt quickly at Dasra, the first step towards the successful and catalytic employment of philanthropy is building an understanding of the policy-level, ground-level and academic background of the targeted problem. As I attempted to aid the team in accomplishing this first step, the prevalence of this challenge became evident as we were confronted not only by minimal academic literature, but also an absence of reliable data that tracks the occurrence, risks and causes of suicide within the diversity of the Indian populous. This experience was echoed by sector experts and NGOs that had been making attempts at various forms of selective interventions, and promised to be particularly debilitating since it manifested itself at the very inception of any such attempts.

Most significantly, this lack of data and research hinders an understanding of what the more obscure ground-level realities, underlying dynamics and unique characteristics of the targeted problem are. It therefore impedes the possibility of interventions being effective and efficient in addressing these otherwise obscured ground-level realities and consequently in affecting sustainable change. One study, conducted by scholars Dandon et al. from the Public Health Foundation of India and the Institute of Health Metrics and
Evaluation, attempts to bridge the information gap. Using records in the National Crime Records Bureau, it builds an understanding of which groups are particularly vulnerable to suicide. This study and subsequent investigations reveal that “housewives recorded the highest proportion of suicide deaths over the decade” in India and that the “suicide death prevalence in Indian women is twice the average global suicide prevalence rate for women.” This is a surprising discovery since the Indian media and popular and political discourse “have generally highlighted only farmer suicides,” leading to a greater allocation of attention, conversations and resources around this demographic, and causing an effective ignorance of the scale at which suicide is a health problem amongst young women and housewives. Thus, the lack of reliable research and data collection can directly result in policies and interventions being dangerously blind to the most appropriate and efficient methods of allocating their resources.

This absence of data is further exacerbated by extensive inefficiency in the tracking and monitoring systems of existing interventions and policies, such as the latest iteration of the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP). The NMHP is a policy framework, flounderingly implemented by the Indian government, in accordance with recommendations provided by the WHO. Although the policy includes a monitoring and database system, a lack of central support has led to the “non-maintenance of the database by many states” and made the evaluation of the policy’s effectiveness extremely difficult. Not only does this impede any attempts to adapt or improve the program’s implementation, it also makes it exceedingly difficult to provide appropriate training to community members and health professionals, exacerbating a cycle of ineffective provision of services. Therefore, this lack of data and research, prevalent at both the inception and implementation levels, poses an immense hurdle to the alleviation of mental health issues within India.

The second critical obstacle faced by the policy-based or NGO-driven interventions in India is the absence of cooperation within implementation. For past iterations of the NMHP, its regional elements, also known as the District Mental Health Programmed (DMHP), and other policy-driven strategies, this manifests specifically in a lack of cooperation and engagement with the community and other stakeholders such as NGOs and philanthropists. A lack of community participation has led such programs to lag in “areas of creating awareness, reducing stigma and continued community care,” making it difficult to expand, sustain and ensure the effectiveness of their application. Additionally, despite the fact that NGOs and private stakeholders
have been critical to the delivery of other similar programs such as family planning and TB control, these policies have frequently failed to engage the cooperation of these participants, slowing down and hampering the effective delivery of such programmes.\textsuperscript{10}

The prevalence of this lack of cooperation and cohesion also extends to the more selective and targeted interventions implemented by NGOs and private stakeholders. While working on the suicide prevention project at Dasra, we learnt that there were more than 14 functional suicide helplines in India, run either by NGOs or private foundations, and yet none of these engaged in any attempt to cooperate with each other, often resulting in the inefficient overlapping of provision of resources. An example of this was the fact that, due to limited resources, each helpline could only work for a limited number of hours during the day, many of these helplines functioned during the same time periods, leaving other parts of the day completely un-serviced. This inefficiency could be avoided by an attempt at greater cooperation and coordination between each of these organizations. Furthermore, while each helpline was collecting its own datasets, there was absence of networks that could allow this information to flow between these groups, preventing greater learning for each organization. Consequently, the pervasive lack of cooperation, network-building and cohesion between the various stakeholders and independent efforts towards providing mental health support services is a significant hurdle in the tackling of this issue.

Finally, it is important to address the role of stigma in hindering the accessibility and efficacy of policies and interventions targeting mental health issues in India. Its most significant impact is in hindering the utilization of mental health services already available and therefore drastically reducing the efficacy of such services, even if they are efficiently allocated and cohesively designed, overcoming the challenges previously discussed. Ranging from internalization to socially reinforced prejudices, the various manifestations of stigma motivate “families to contain the affected person at home,” and “substantially [delay] or even [preclude] timely access to treatment.”\textsuperscript{11} The misattribution of poor mental health and mental disorders to social and economic factors, rather than biomedical causes also results in the failure to even consider medical support and services.\textsuperscript{12} This challenge is further exacerbated by the significantly low literacy rate, particularly among the Indian rural population, “leading to a lack of awareness and recognition of mental illness and often causing marginalization of and discrimination against mentally ill individuals.”\textsuperscript{13}

Furthermore, the stigmatization of mental health issues, including suicide, often results in the underreporting of these issues, contributing to the
lack of reliable data and analysis faced by intervention attempts. For example, the NCRB data used by Dandona et al., which is based on the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) with the police regarding a particular death most certainly underestimates actual numbers. This is because “family/kin/community members” may tend to avoid reporting suicides due to the “stigma attached to suicide deaths.” This arises partly from the fact that, until very recently, suicide was criminalized in India and also partly from a large spectrum of misplaced perceptions that tend to view mental disorders, illnesses and poor health as “shameful,” possibly infectious, unlucky, potentially inheritable and even as a punishment for past sins. Therefore, the prevalence of such stigma is a significant impediment to more effective provision of mental health support services and the alleviation of this massive issue of health and wellbeing in India.

In conclusion, while the scale and complexity of the landscape of mental health issues in India are wide-ranging and immense, it is possible to identify some of the critically debilitating challenges that are faced by any attempts made to alleviate the burden of these issues. Tackling these hurdles may possibly be the critical first step that future initiatives and adaptations, whether policy-driven, NGO-led, privately initiated, or cooperatively conducted, must take in order to more effectively enact change. Firstly, it is necessary to initiate and encourage better systems of data collection, analysis and the subsequent employment of this information for any intervention attempt to be more efficient and effective. Additionally, any such attempts require a greater commitment to holistic cooperation and coordination between the various stakeholders and participants that are affected by or are engaging in addressing this immense problem. This will not only ensure greater sustainability of solutions but will avoid the wasteful repetition or failed employment of already limited resources. Finally, it is imperative to address the various forms of stigmatization that surround any discourse on mental health in India in order to allow for better utilization of available services and also to enable more accurate information accumulation and discourse. Perhaps then, India may be able to take a first step towards the boisterous shouts of “all izz well” sounding less hollow as they continue to blare across the country to the homes, school corridors and radio-sets of its population.
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[Op-Ed]

The Ordering and Reordering of Empire in Lutyens’ Imagining of Delhi

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Edwin Lutyens’s official master plan for the creation of New Delhi, published in 1913
In 1912, it was decided by an English government, the words formed so perfectly by an English tongue, that the capital of British India be moved from Calcutta on the Bay of Bengal to Delhi, at the heart of the subcontinent. Though Dilli had existed for millennia as the jewel of the Mughal dynasty, the Indraprastha of the Mahābhārata, it was to be recut in Her Majesty’s own image. A new map of an old city was fashioned; architects employed in the service of the Empire descended upon Delhi, bringing with them a lavish enthusiasm for the map as a method of cultural production and destruction. Their pen would subjugate India’s traditional seat of power in the making of an ideology of the Raj and its sublime dominion: for “there could be no obstruction to the free planning of an ideal city”. These notions are reflected in Edwin Lutyens’s official master plan for the creation of New Delhi”, published in 1913, and would guide the development of the legislative sector of the imperial capital until its completion and formal inauguration eighteen years thereafter.

In its ordered boulevards, excluded buildings, its bungalows and its durbars, Lutyens’ vision infects the city like a virus, spreading in axial direction as an imposition of the colonial identity and a sublimation of the indigenous. Its proposed lines are thick and bold, so strong in red; juxtaposed with the fading edifices of destitute ruins, as washed out as the river Yamuna upon which they rest, and emasculated in palest blue. Where river ends and (un) civilization begins is of scant concern to the imperial eye. Rather, it is the new formulation of an Indic future which attracts the gaze. Lutyens chooses his city carefully, subsuming and appropriating the extant symbols where apposite. India is the land of gods and kings, so the ‘Lord Sahib’ deliberately entraps and encircles the numinous and the royal – see the intersections with Safdarjung’s Tomb, the connections to Jama Masjid and Humayun’s Tomb, the vestigial organs of the Purana Qila and Indrapat. The strategic identification of alternate authorities leads to a systematic disembowelment of the spiritual body: a legend in the bottom left corner subordinates “temples, mosques, tombs, satis, idgahs, and graves” alike. Britain’s “battle of science and faith” would pit the once and future capital against “association and sentiment”, reifying the new and the “clean” against the existing “dirty architectural slate”.

The map, clotted in blossoming hexagonal menaces, orders and regulates India’s naturally diffuse zones. Modernity was to be brought to the Indians, but not for them. Inked in black, for example, lies space for a railway station – that civilizing angel embodied in steam. Undoubtedly, the products of the rail’s ‘commerce’ would have been shipped off to the ports of Bombay or
the Carnatic coast, destined eventually for Mombasa or Singapore or London itself. 1912 hypothetically the colonial imaginary, becoming a temporal marker in the history and spatiality of the city. Delhi could be divided into a before and an after, for Lutyens and his ilk came as conquerors on sun-drenched soil. The power and might of Britannic architecture would dominate the skyline, rising above the verdant greens and wild forests, the bazaars and the dirt that resided therein. New Delhi, in its stilted legislature and its grand secretariat buildings, would come to inescapably dramatize “human control over the world stage” and the linkages of Britain’s splendid transcontinental Empire, celebrating the winsome glory of the British race.⁵

Of course, in 1912, seven years before the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, eighteen years before the Mahatma drew salt from Dandi⁶, this map did not depict what was; but rather, what was to be, and what was to come for a decidedly British India. It put forth an argument of the nature and character of the universe, in the same way the divine maps of Medieval Europe conceived the sacred and the mundane along the global gradients of time, space, and geology. Indeed, the quadripartite plans of water gardens in Lutyens’ Delhi were said to have similarly figured in “Muslim conceptions of paradise, Hebrew visions of Eden, and the Hindu mythological geography of the world”.⁷ The reinvention of Delhi via survey collates the arrogance and self-righteousness of the British colonial experience - for in bringing one vista of civilization, the exponents of that island-abode deigned to subvert another.

The story of the map of Delhi is a story of the nodes and nexuses of mapping power. The map’s principles of architecture and design wished to portend a thousand more years of Britain’s brilliant sun over India’s vital dusk. The buildings Lutyens has manifest on paper, his orientation of a New Delhi over and upon the old, are made so as to protect the Raj’s white skin from what he named the “tremendous violence” of India’s climate, even as its habitus legitimated a great violence of its own.⁸ His structures sit elevated as a virtual acropolis atop Raisina Hill - what Alexander of Macedon halted to realize at the Hydaspes, Lutyens and his apostles managed to accomplish at the Yamuna in all its proper resplendence. Even so, 1931 and the completion of the imperial capital marked the start of the end, prophesying the final intensification and unravelling of British authority over India. Perhaps the sight of “fairytales palaces” and “castles in the air come true” became an intolerable symbol of lordship and injustice that even the most wretched of the earth could no longer bear.⁹ By 1947, the Bastille had been stormed; Lutyens’ Delhi and all its futures were to be repatriated to the Independent and democratic government of India.

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And to this day, the tiles of Connaught Place and the streets of New Delhi are still whiter, and cleaner, and more orderly than the fantastic, autochthonous mess that abounds around it.
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[Event Report]

The Dark Night of Love in the Indian Tradition

Anna Aksenovich is a recent graduate from the University of Toronto with a degree in Diaspora and Transnational studies. Following her immense fascination with human behaviour, Anna is currently pursuing a training program in psychotherapy.

On 10 October, 2019, the Asian Institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy hosted an India-Canada Association Lecture with an intriguing name - “The Dark Night of Love in the Indian Tradition”. The speaker, Dr. Fabrizia Baldissera, discussed Indian literature and its descriptions of love and desire. Dr. Christoph Emmrich, the Director of Centre for South Asian Studies at U of T introduced the speaker as a prominent Italian Indologist and an associate professor of Sanskrit language and literature at the University of Florence. Apart from the support from the Asian Institute and the Centre for South Asian Studies, this talk was also co-sponsored by Instituto Italiano di Cultura, Toronto.

In this talk, Professor Baldissera took the audience on a walk through different literature in Sanskrit in India. The word love (‘kama’) in Sanskrit means desire and therefore is not similar to the word for love and friendship in other Indo-European languages, like the Latin ‘amor’ (love) and ‘amicitia’ (friendship). In Sanskrit literature then, desire connotes not just a sexual desire but desire as the first seed of mind as defined in the Hindu canonical text Rigveda 10:129. Without desire, one is thought of as unable to accomplish anything. Interestingly, as Professor Baldissera notes, this idea carries on in some other religious thinking in India, referring to Kashmiri Shaivism as an example.

There is a specific manner in which love stories are presented in Indian literature, but more so in Sanskrit. The conventions also differ depending on the
type of literature. For instance, in the Vedas sex is discussed very openly. In the epics, however, the type of language used around the topic is much more guarded. Feelings of love are very strong but expressed in a very poetic and delicate manner. In Kavya, the literary style of Sanskrit courtly poetry, there is a great amount of nuance to such discussions, where sex is only suggested, not described.

The name for the talk ‘dark night of desire’ is very much intentional and reflects the social life of the time period in which those literary compositions were created. People deemed to be in higher levels of society, such as the Brahmins class and warriors and princes, led a very guarded life in some sense. This was very much like Buddha during his time as a prince, who was protected from all the harshness of life. As a result, neither young women nor young men ever had an education that took love into account. There were some love manuals such as the Kama Sutra, yet the aim of those manuals was not just to show how to make love in sexual intercourse, but rather how to use it to have a harmonious life. Since high-class people had arranged marriages, the only escape from an unhappy marriage for men was resorting to an adulterous relationship risky for both lovers, or by frequenting high-end prostitutes. The latter were in fact – barring a few South Indian queens and some female ascetics – the only educated females of the time. They were supposed to know 64 arts such as speaking many languages, drawing, playing musical instruments, dancing and composing poetry... Thus, their careful education was somewhat akin to that of the geishas in Japan. 64 is indeed a big number, and the expectation was that sophisticated courtesans would need to be experienced in all of them. There were special meetings of the town’s cultivated men, where they would be discussing poetry and the arts, and the only women allowed there were the accomplished courtesans.

However, this meant that young people oftentimes were not prepared for the strong emotions aroused by love. When they fell in love, they were completely overwhelmed by their feelings and lost all notion of where they were or what they should do. This, explains Professor Baldissera, constitutes the darkness of desire. When people are so infused with love as an emotion, they are not able to think clearly. Darkness also reflects the Sanskrit word ‘tams’ (opaqueness), which in India is thought to be the lowest of the three gunas, or human qualities/tendencies. In such darkness, one doesn’t know anything and doesn’t understand what is happening.

There is a brighter side of the darkness, however. “It is the darkness of moonless nights, which protects like a velvety cloak the secret meetings of
lovers”, explains Professor Baldissera. The figure of an enamoured woman who leaves her house without anyone noticing, and braves the dangers of the night to meet her lover is a much-appreciated storyline in courtly poetry. The female figure, initially portrayed as “a shy damsel”, is here perceived as so strongly motivated by passion that she dares to go out on her own even on a stormy night.

There are two modes in which love stories are told in Sanskrit literature. We find either the mutual joy experienced in the union of the lovers, or love suffering due to separation from one’s beloved. The latter happens not only because lovers live apart, but also even before they know one another. For instance, in many stories desire awakens when they have only glimpsed each other’s face, or even more delicately, when they have only heard someone speaking of the other. From then on, the aroused person cannot be happy until being within the arms of their loved one.

In Indian literature, and especially in the religious ones, women are envisioned to be more passionate than men, and therefore personify the danger of leading men astray. Many religious texts and even the epic, Mahabharata, portray women as too prone to fall in love, and hence not to be trusted. The story of Lopamudra in the Vedas is an example. In the story, she finally manages to obtain love from her husband after many years of abstinence, but in so doing, ruins his ascetic exercises.

Professor Baldissera particularly highlights the situation in Kavya, where the total loss of one’s former persona takes place because of great passion for which the only form of relief is the embrace of the beloved. As a very refined form of literature, Kavya does not speak openly of sexual intercourse, but only suggests situations. Yet sometimes, in drama, and especially in comic plays, prose and satirical works, there are more frank expressions of love.

Professor Baldissera read directly from two dramatic works: Kālidāsa’s play Shakuntala and Bhavabhuti’s play Malati Madhava. The story of Shakuntala reveals an occurrence that happens when beautiful women are too forward: they can be seduced and abandoned. In the play, the young king courts Shakuntala. Since they cannot get married with the approval of her foster parent, who is absent, the king intends to marry her with the special Gaudharva marriage allowed to princes – the one in which two lovers run away together and make love without asking the permission of their parents. Then, though the king has promised to send for her, due to the curse of an ascetic, he forgets all about Shakuntala and when she comes to his court, pregnant with his son, he refuses...
to acknowledge her. The story then ends well but after many vicissitudes. In another Kālidāsa play, Vikramorvashiyam, a different story is told which is similar to the Greek tale of Eros and Psyche. In it, a heavenly nymph falls in love with a human king. When the nymph gets pregnant, she needs to go back to heavens, leaving the king distraught. In this, Kālidāsa exhibits another known theme of Sanskrit literature, in which the lover in his delusion starts to see likenesses of his beloved in different creatures of the forest. It is something that had already happened before, in the epic called Ramayana, when Rama, distracted by the loss of his wife, imagined he could see her as if she had assumed the shape of creatures in the forest. In Sanskrit poetry, however, this story would not be seen as a repetition, but in the words of Professor Baldissera – “as a different way of treating a universal theme, the delusion provoked by the loss of the beloved”. Though the ideas might be the same, the creatures involved, the story itself and the manner of treating it are different.

In Kavya literature, arranged marriages were often portrayed as loveless. Women could only resort to acceptance of a dismal situation. If they were very daring, they could resort to an illicit love that, if discovered, would lead to ignominy or even death. Many examples of illicit love can be found in the literature, especially in comic texts, but also in the side adventures of a main story or play.

In the 8th century play Malatimadhava by Bhavabhuti, the adolescent heroine Malati is chosen by the king’s foster brother, the villain, for marriage. However, Malati had already been arranged to marry another man, Madhava. When he happens to spot Malati, he falls in love with her, stating that his “consciousness takes the very substance of her”. Professor Baldissera reads a few passes from this text that emphasized the depth of emotion of the lovers. Later in the story, the lovers become separated, and Madhava seeks help from his friend, who is a great hero. In Indian literature, boys and girls often have their own special friends who help them in every endeavour. In this story, the boy’s friend was very close to him, also because they have had the same foster mother. Professor Baldissera notes that the expressions of love between friends border on homosexual love, although this is never explicitly spoken of. “You are sandalwood to my body” is one of the expressions Madhava’s friend says to him after he faints when Malati is taken away. These are indeed very strong feelings between friends, but despite that, both boys also have female lovers and Madhava’s friends approve of him being in love with Malati.

Since love entails difficulties for young people in these stories, friends from both sides often interfere, acting as a go-between to help one or the other.
Whereas in North Indian Sanskrit poetry, there are few instances when such a female go-between is unfaithful to her friend, there are no classical South Indian poems where the messenger betrays a friend. In Tamil poems, it is also often not the girl who goes out at night in secret, but the boy, who either descends from steep mountain paths or comes across the sea through a dangerous storm. In one of such poems, the girl’s friend talks to the boy and in guarded language to present him the risks he is running in these secret nighttime meetings. In doing so, she implies that it would be much easier if he declared his love publicly by asking her in marriage from her parents.

Professor Baldissera, remarking that a large part of Indian literature is indeed satirical, entertained the audience at the end of her presentation by showing a comical cartoon from the New Yorker called “the married Kama Sutra” (by Simon Rich and Farley Katz). She said that the comic and satirical literature were the only places where authors spoke openly about making love. The reason why we cannot find instances of people actually being engaged in the act of love is because of its perception as something gross. What was considered beautiful, however, is the anticipation: everything which precedes the act of love such as the initial trembling. This also applies to after love, where the physical signs indicating that love had been consummated, such as perspiration or uneven and fast breathing in men or scratches on the breasts in women, are depicted.

Throughout the talk, the speaker quoted a number of beautiful passages from the texts, helping the audience understand the ‘darkness of desire’ in love stories and really appreciate the depth of Sanskrit literature. Due to the limitations of this report, it is impossible to include all those passages. If you are interested in learning more, please refer to translations of Kālidāsa’s play Shakuntala and Vikramorvasya, and of Bhavabhuti’s play Malatimadhava.
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