


Synergy

The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies

Volume 1
2016

*Academic Articles, Op-Eds
and Event Reports about East,
Southeast and South Asia*



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UNIVERSITY OF
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ASIAN INSTITUTE



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of Contemporary
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Volume 1, 2016

EDITED BY *Daniel C. Park*
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DESIGN BY** *Timothy Law*
Cathy Nguyen

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


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Forward

Editor-in-Chief 2015-2016 Academic Year

Dear Readers,

It is with honour that I present you with the first volume of Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies in print edition. Over the past year, over 20 of University of Toronto's best undergraduate and graduate students in contemporary Asian research and studies have committed themselves to the editorial production of this precious volume and the creation of exceptional scholarly works online available through Synergy's website. I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely congratulate and thank all editors, staffs, and advisory board members for being committed and supportive of the strenuous but rewarding editorial process, making this undergraduate based research volume a pilot success at the University of Toronto.

Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies was founded in the summer of 2015 with the generous support of the Asian Institute at the University of Toronto. Its vision was to stimulate and generate vibrant academic discussions on the current political, historical, societal, and/or economic developments in the Asia region. Since its inception, the journal has grown into a multi-disciplinary academic forum that has attracted worldwide institutional recognition and attention. Our growing article base and quality editorial production have attracted top undergraduate and graduate level authors from institutions such as Harvard University (US), Stanford University (US), and Jawaharlal Nehru University (India).

The journal has striven to publish academic submissions and editorial contents online on a monthly basis, consistently contributing to our growing online database of scholarly articles. Additionally, the journal engaged in hosting several prominent academic events and conferences during the year, including "One Belt One Road: A New Era of China's Geopolitical Strategies," "Road to Recovery: China, India, and Pakistan's Role in Afghanistan's Post-NATO Era," aptly supporting these in addition to numerous other events organized by the Asian Institute. In addition, the journal saw a consistent and stable expansion of editorial staff from 5 to 30 over the course of 11 months, and the establishment of a faculty based advisory board consisting of top scholarly experts in the field of contemporary Asian developments at the University of Toronto. Furthermore, Synergy Journal has now been listed with the Library and Archives Canada and has exclusive ISSNs (International Standard Serial Number) to identify both print and online publication.

This particular print volume that you are about to read strives to continue and exhibit the journal's founding vision of stimulating and generating vibrant academic discussions on the current political, historical, societal, and economic developments within Contemporary Asia. Over the various pages you are about to read, you will find carefully researched content on themes such as current cyber security, diplomatic and economic relations, cross continent geopolitical changes, and military security issues within East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asian region. The style of content has been divided between original research based articles and internal editorial based academic event coverage of events hosted by the journal or the Asian Institute. The authors published in this volume is a mix of both graduate level and undergraduate level students from various top institutions around the world, with content from the University of Toronto, the journal's founding institution, at a greater focus. The volume exhibits only the best articles accepted by Synergy for publication during the 2015 to 2016 academic season.

As the founding Editor-in-Chief of the Synergy Journal, I sincerely hope that our readers like you would enjoy the pages below and appreciate our collective efforts in gathering contemporary Asian research at the undergraduate level as focus. If you have any questions regarding the print volume publication or other matters affiliated with the Synergy Journal's editorial and/or operation in general, please do not hesitate to contact us at inquiries@utsynergyjournal.org. We appreciate inquiries and submissions at anytime, in addition you can sign-up for newsletter at anytime on our website at <http://utsynergyjournal.org>.

Yours Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Susan Cui', written in a cursive style.

Susan Cui

Editor-in-Chief 2015-2016

Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies



Forward

Director of Dr. David Chu program in Asia Pacific Studies

Much has been written about how Asian studies is a product of the Cold War. In the United States, area studies was especially a postwar creation for strategic needs by governmental agencies. While this does not necessarily imply that area specialists are always complicit with state power, the genealogy of Asian studies does remind us about the politics of studying “Asia.” Indeed, in an even earlier time, say, the nineteenth century, Asia was once a temporal concept in the Western imagination. Specifically, Asia was imagined as backward and inept. Along with other “backward” regions, it was used to justify European colonial domination.

Today, Asia is often functioned as a temporal concept of a different kind. For many writers, metropolises such as Shanghai and Tokyo represent both the excitement and horror of our urban future. Meanwhile, startup hotspots such as Bangalore and Shenzhen have equally captured our fascination about a possible techno-future. All in all, globally, the notion of futurity is increasingly rethought by way of Asia.

At the Asian Institute, there has been a long tradition of examining Asia in the global and historical context. In addition to acquiring deep knowledge about specific places, we interrogate how “areas” are constituted as geographical, cultural, and political entities. In so doing, we turn “Asia” into a method to make sense other parts of the world as well. For example, rather than just comparing China and India in the form of traditional comparative studies, many of us try to understand India through China, and China through India. And instead of making a crude distinction between “democratic” India and “communist” China, we investigate the history and politics of that distinction. Similarly, students and faculty in the humanities and the social sciences are keen on engaging in cross-disciplinary and cross-regional conversations. And we build on our collective intellectual strength and scope to push for new conceptual and methodological frontier.

Synergy, the new student journal focusing on contemporary Asian studies, represents one such effort to forge intellectual dialogues between disciplines and regions. Like our other student journals and forums, Synergy will become a critically important place where students can experiment, develop, and share their ideas. I’m very delighted to see that the collective

effort initiated by students has come to fruition, as evidence in the quality and the broad range of timely issues covered by the inaugural issue. I offer my very best wishes for a successful launch.

Tong Lam

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EAST ASIA

China's Cyber Strategy: Manipulating the Threat of Chinese Cyber Operations

Alexander Farrow is an A.B. candidate at Harvard University, concentrating in Government with a focus on national security.

Abstract

In recent years, China has increased its cyber warfare operations, including espionage, direct attacks, and much more. Its overall strategy embodies cohesively coordinated international targeting to bolster the state's raw power. However, China does this in a covert manner, parading a peaceful international image to prevent other nations from forming coalitions against its emerging strength.

Key words

Cyber warfare, China, balance of power, espionage

Introduction

In spring 2015, the United States government discovered a security breach in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) computer system. The breach, affected 22 million Americans and comprised of confidential information from American federal workers who had applied for security clearances. Their social security numbers, family connections, and more information was stolen as part of the breach.¹ The number of aggressive cyber-attacks allegedly originating from China, like the OPM hack, has spiked in recent years.²

China's deployment of cyber warfare has been contradictory to their international image. From engaging in international institutions to maintaining third-world diplomacy without political stipulations, China has been extremely conscious about its international image.³ If China is sensitive about its international image, why then, does it conduct aggressive cyber operations against other nations? China's cyber strategy suggests that it minimizes its overall threat perception while simultaneously maximizing its raw power. To logically support this claim, I will construct a threat theory argument and use historical examples to illustrate how threat theory applies to China's cyber strategy more specifically.

Threat Theory

Threat theory, as a form of psychological realpolitik, incorporates elements of both perception as well as raw power.⁴ [Walt, Stephen. *The Origin of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell, 1987. 17-49.] China, in effect, minimizes its threat perception while maximizing its aggregate power. This, in turn, changes other nations' perspectives of Chinese foreign policy. In the following sections, I will illustrate this theory more substantially by explaining balance, power, and perceptions.

By definition, balancing is the strategy of counteracting the offensive capacity of another nation.⁴ Furthermore, there are two distinct methods of balancing: external and internal balancing. External balancing most commonly takes the form of coalition-building. If we imagine a situation, for example, in which Nation A contains incredibly vast offensive capacity and intent, Nations B and C have an incentive to balance this power by aligning themselves with each other in a cohesive coalition. Conversely, internal balancing is when a nation increases its own capacity to counteract another nation. For example, if the aggregate capacity of Nations B and C is still not enough to effectively deter Nation A, perhaps each coalition nation will also internally balance by increasing military spending

respectively. By doing so, a balancing nation can maximize its chances of protecting its self-interest.

The way a nation balances against another nation is by manipulating its overall threat. Threat, as international relations theorist Stephen Walt defines it, is a combination of perceptions and raw power. If a nation increases both its threat perception as well as its actual raw power, it can maximize its overall threat. Conversely, if a nation decreases both variables, it appears less threatening to other nations in the international community.

Power indicates how much capacity a nation has to manipulate the international sphere. Power encapsulates both aggregate and offensive power. Aggregate power is the summation of a nation's resources.⁵ From population to industrial capacity to economic strength, aggregate power is an overall measure of a nation's capacity to project influence. The United States, for example, prevents balancing by voraciously controlling all resources possible. In this way, it can secure its position as a top aggregately powerful nation. Offensive power, similarly, is the ability to threaten at an acceptable cost.⁶ Modern Russian aggregate power, for example, may not be as high as the United States' aggregate power. But, its niche is offensive power and Soviet military and nuclear arsenals from the Cold War are still maintained. Russia can project power lethally as it is able to rearm rapidly in periods of conflict. This, in turn, provides Russia with an effective means of deterrence towards hostile countries.

Perception, as I will define it, is how much a nation propagates its power. Even though nations may possess tremendous amounts of power, perception is important with regards to how other nations view their power as a threat. There are two main elements that factor into a nation's perception level: (1) geographic proximity to other nations and (2) aggressive intention. In terms of geographic proximity, "states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away".⁷ For example, the United Kingdom's primary concern immediately preceding WWII was not so much instability in Brazil but turmoil in Germany. This point is intuitive, as Germany posed a much more tangible and real threat to the United Kingdom. However, I argue rather that geographic proximity is a more relevant factor in other realms of warfare than cyberwarfare. In cyber warfare, there is no added effort to attack a nation by proximity; the World Wide Web connects every nation that has access to it. China attacking Taiwan is as feasible image as China attacking Brazil, in terms of proximity. The world has become one small battlefield.

I define four different types of states: non-threatening, bluffing, hegemonic, and covert states. A non-threatening state maintains low power and perception, as it seeks to minimize its overall international threat. An example of such a state is modern Japan. With no substantial military and no vehement propaganda, Japan relies primarily on the United States' projection of power for protection. We might expect to find many other nations which free-ride security in this category. The bluffing state maintains low power but a heightening perception. States like Japan often include weak authoritarian nations that have leaders with domestic incentives to bolster perceived capacity. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is representative of this category, as Hussein's claims of a superior Air Force and hints of weapons of mass destruction from the Iraq War were inflated. The state's perception of power was greater than its actual capacity. If the domestic politics alternative hypothesis outlined above were true, China would fall under this category. But, as I have shown, the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to manipulate cyberspace for domestic politics are weak. A hegemonic state is one that boasts its capable power. It is possible that many powerful democratic states, like the United States, may fall within this category. Maintaining a high capacity through industrialization and capitalism, the state boasts its potential through transparent democratic institutions. Finally, a covert state is one that maintains high power but creates a low threat profile in the international community. An example of a covert nation would be Israel, which maintains a tremendous amount of military power but often portrays itself as a helpless victim of Islamic violence in the region. Nations may change their overall threat perception level by manipulating these variables as they see applicable to their national security strategies.

Figure 3: Threat Matrix

<i>(Perception, Power)</i>	Low Perception	High Perception
Low Power	Non-threatening state, no balancing	Bluffing state, some balancing
High Power	Covert state, some balancing	Hegemonic state, high balancing

In terms of cyber operations, China embodies a covert state. It minimizes its perception while maximizing raw power. An advantage of this strategy, of course, is to minimize the potential for other nations to balance against China. By doing so, China can covertly continue to accumulate raw power while appearing non-threatening. This strategy focuses on the international community as a whole, undermining potential American allies by

portraying a façade of innocence. This would debase potential balancing with the United States, creating a power void in which China can focus on bolstering its overall power. In the following sections, I will illustrate examples of China's covert cyber strategy.

Minimizing Threat Perception

China cares about its international reputation historically speaking. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the prime example of this phenomenon. The Chinese nuclear weapon community initially opposed the stipulations of the treaty, as China sought to increase its raw nuclear power.⁸ However, after delaying negotiations, China eventually accepted the terms of the agreement. Perhaps this is due to conscientiousness about comforting the international community. Because the Treaty represented a “great international trend”, opposing it would isolate China and perhaps portray it as an aggressive state that seeks nuclear proliferation for its own benefit. This gesture might have sparked external balancing from nations that may have been threatened by China's nuclear stance, like Japan and South Korea. They, too, might have begun to develop nuclear technology in order to balance against China's aggressive intentions. Therefore, China, to some degree, is conscientious about the image it portrays in the international community.

As I will illustrate, there are two main tactics with which China manipulates its cyber image: participating in international institutions and disavowing responsibility.

International Institutions

China engages with international institutions to converse broadly about the scope of cyber warfare. While calculatngly not understating the importance of cyberspace, “it seeks to promote vigorous discussion by taking part in academic exchanges with its international counterparts”.⁹ For example, from 2009 onward, China has engaged in bilateral discussion with nations like Japan, in order to define the scope and implications of ‘cyber power’.¹¹ Chinese diplomats have advocated through international institutions some primary interest points, including freedom of the Internet, the principle of balance, peaceful use, and equitable development.¹¹ Chinese officials have even advocated for the Law of Armed Conflict in the Geneva Convention restrictions to be applied to military cyber warfare. These principles all embody fair and non-threatening intentions to use the framework of the international community and formalize cyberspace. Other nations that observe these positions are less likely to balance against China in cyberspace because of its persona of peaceful cyber-existence. This effort increases perceived transparency on China's

cyberspace strategy, perhaps assuaging the international community's concern for potential aggression.

Disavowing Responsibility

There are examples, however, when China is caught with its hand in cyber space. But, when China is implicated as a cyber aggressor, often by the United States, it promptly disavows responsibility. It is important to note that the line between military and civilian hacking is often blurred, perhaps intentionally.¹² For instance, this makes it easy for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to dismiss evidence that a hacking operation is associated directly with the government or military. However, there are times when the connection to the Chinese government is more obvious. One such instance was when the United States indicted several PLA officers for hacking in 2014.¹³ The United States discovered a tangible connection to the PLA and chose to publically implicate the Chinese military as the sole source of an attack. The United States Department of Justice formalized the indictments, as an accusation by the Department of Defense might have been misconstrued as a military conflict or an act of war. In response, China quickly and promptly disavowed all of the allegations. Additionally, it revamped its committees on cyber regulation, in an obvious effort to portray to the rest of the world a façade of self-control. In that respect, China, by disavowing responsibility, seeks to lessen its cyber threat perception.

Maximizing Raw Power

It is evident that, China has sought to increase its raw power historically. A prominent example is when China adopted a 'lean to one side' policy with the Soviet Union. After enduring a revolution, Chinese industrialization was burdened by hyperinflation, unemployment, and low agricultural production.¹⁴ Furthermore, the nation was left extremely weak in defense. Consequently, this left China vulnerable to conquest or subordination to greater powers, like the Soviet Union or the United States. After aligning with the Soviet Union, though, China rapidly developed its economic and military capacity. In that respect, borrowing the Soviet model of industrialization helped China to quickly gain raw power. Although alliances have shifted and dissolved over time, China still maintains – at least in the cyber world – an ardent thirst for raw economic and military power.

Economic Power

Maintaining stable economic growth as the population ages is a major concern for China.¹⁵ Accordingly, industrial espionage is a large factor of offensive cyber operations, with Chinese actors stealing information such as trade secrets and research. Furthermore, these operations are actually, according to Amy Chang, a research associate at the Centre for a New American Security, directly attributable to the government itself – private economic actors are working through the medium of the government to gain an advantage. Not only does cyber espionage focus on stealing developed technology, it also bolsters China's capacity to stimulate its own research and development. The amount of damage to the United States economy (the main target of industrial espionage) is impossible to pinpoint, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the costs are fairly high.

One such example of suspected Chinese industrial theft is with the aviation industry. The Department of Defense spent billions of dollars on the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. As a fifth generation stealth fighter jet, the F-35 is far more advanced than any jet any other nation could conjure; it is advertised as unbeatable. However, in 2013, it was suspected that Chinese hackers stole the unclassified information that formed the barebones for the design.¹⁶ The allegations are only unclassified suspicions, but many questions were raised when the Chinese Air Force mysteriously developed a very similar looking aircraft after the hacks.¹⁷ No other nation has yet developed an F-35 copycat, and China's prompt replication is most definitely suspicious. In this way, China allegedly stole from the United States billions of dollars of development. Cyber warfare is a cheap tool for expensive toys.

Military Power

Cyber operations also focus on maintaining a military advantage. Firstly, cyber military espionage identifies weak points in other nations' capabilities. In wartime, cyber espionage is important to identify operational weak points, identifying and targeting infrastructure susceptible to certain direct strikes. Even in peacetime, "the main mission of computer reconnaissance is to collect and analyze the information systems of possible adversaries to identify weaknesses in order to facilitate first strikes".¹⁸ In that regard, espionage always yields the capacity to bolster military power because it allows a nation to identify striking points. This is important because when a nation finally decides to engage in conflict, it has the capacity to strike first, and strike devastatingly. First-strike advantage is important in

overall deterrence theory, as the nation that can attack first has the potential and incentive to wipe the other nation out quickly and more aggressively.

Cyber espionage leads to cyber strikes. Cyber strikes are defined as “[the destruction of] an enemy’s information network systems and network information technologies through the use of denial of service attacks, malware, and deceptions”.¹⁹ These attacks are dangerous because they can directly invade the command and control center of another nation. Disrupting satellites, targeting power grids, and shutting off water supplies are all ways in which cyber offense manifests direct damage on a nation’s infrastructure. In this way, cyber offense truly can incapacitate a society.

There exists very little open-source empirical evidence for the effectiveness of cyber military power. Rather, we must rely upon analyzing professional conversations on the subject. Substantial Chinese military doctrine, for example, spells out the necessity for conducting cyber offense in this capacity.²⁰ In fact, PLA doctrine prioritizes maintaining offensive cyber capacity in order to gain an edge, specifically over the United States. Espionage and striking remain the highest priorities of the PLA’s cyber program, indicating its voracious craving for military superiority. It seems, in this way, that the PLA is fully aware and willing to use cyber warfare to disable another military’s capacity.

Concluding Remarks

I claim that China’s cyber strategy suggests that it minimizes its overall threat perception while simultaneously maximizing its raw power. The purpose of this strategy is to increase China’s economic and military power in relation to other nations. To do so, China maintains a low profile threat perception by actively engaging in international institutions in order to define and regulate the use of cyber space. By using covert cyber warfare, China may very well continue to easily bolster its raw power. Other potential balancing nations should see past the façade, and realize China’s pervasive informational arbitrage.

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China's Leadership Transitions: Successor's Dilemma and Paradox of Institutionalization

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Abstract

China's economic success and the Communist regime's adaptability are often cited as factors contributing to its authoritarian resilience. However, elite strife has been described as the "Achilles's heel" of the regime. This paper examines the content of China's leadership transition and selection processes and their significance, the role faction politics plays in selecting the next-generation leaders, and the institutionalized nature of the transitional procedures.

Key words

Leadership transition and succession, Chinese Communist Party, democracy and institutionalization, Chinese politics, Successor's Dilemma

China's economic success and the Communist regime's adaptability are often cited as factors contributing to its authoritarian resilience. However, elite strife has been described as the "Achilles's heel" of the regime.¹ Leadership successions often generate fierce contests and attest much to the state of Chinese politics. The tumultuous experience of Mao's era as evidenced by multiple succession crises and bouts of fervent mass mobilizations led Deng Xiaoping to attempt to normalize the power transition process in the 1970s to the 1990s. The three leadership transitions following the reforms from Deng to Xi have been largely without hiccups. To shed some light on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authoritarian resilience — or the lack thereof — going forward, this paper analyzes the behind-the-scene processes of the CCP's leadership changes. In this paper, I examine (1) the content of the transition and leader selection processes and its significance, (2) the role that faction politics plays in selecting the next-generation leaders, and finally (3) the institutionalized nature of the transitional procedures. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the arguments presented and a speculation on the future based on these discussions.

Learning the lessons of earlier periods, Deng initiated a series of reforms institutionalizing the power transition arrangements in the post-Mao era. Limits of two five-year terms on top government positions were imposed and constitutionally entrenched.² Since the supreme power of the state and party converged into the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), following Deng's retirement from politics, the term limits on top state officials in effect carried over to top party positions as well.³ This development signified China's transition from being under a single-personality authority to what has been called the "collective leadership" of the PBSC.⁴ The transformed nature of the regime's leadership meant that the game of succession was now played in the institutional context of the PBSC. The political rules and norms in regard to the selection and reappointment of its members, thus, are the primary focus of this paper.

In addition to term limits, age limits are a significant institutional restraint in the selection process. Under Jiang Zemin, the lines were drawn first at 70 for PBSC members. The age limit eventually set at 68, hence the "67 stay and 68 retire" rule.⁵ Moreover, internal polls were also conducted among Central Committee members and alternate members in the latest 2012 transition.⁶ Some scholars go so far as to suggest that the use of internal polls will become another institutionalized requirement for selecting PBSC members in the future.⁷ In all, these informal political rules have largely been followed in the immediate Jiang-Hu and Hu-Xi transitions. Notable examples include Zhu Rongji's and Zeng Qinghong's retirements after their first term.⁸ Other norms related to the topmost position of party secretary general are also in the making. Hu Jintao's giving up of all three positions at

once, the party secretary general, state president, and chair of the Central Military Commission, was also lauded as a future model of institutionalized power transitions.⁹

An immediate effect of these institutional rules was increased political mobility among the top elites. The turnover rate of the PBSC members in the latest leadership change exceeded 70 percent while more than half of all Politburo and Central Committee memberships changed hands.¹⁰ As a result of this “rapid and routinized turnover of political elites,” the Party can easily co-opt emerging young cadres by absorbing them into the epicenter of power¹¹ while also providing a fairer exit route for aging top leaders.¹² Scholars argue that these arrangements ensure political stability that is rarely present in authoritarian regimes. In turn, political stability in the leadership, economic performance, and social stability facilitate the current regime’s claims to legitimacy.¹³ Additionally, this sense of political stability does not imply political stagnation. Another advantage of the rapid turnover of leadership is the newly gained flexibility of the regime. The constant waves of younger politicians replacing their elder, more conservative comrades would allow the Party leadership to resist the static inertia of authoritarian regimes and become more adaptable to the changing environment with constant supplies of new blood.¹⁴

Institutional procedures and norms, however, do not complete the whole picture of the selection process. One interpretation of today’s power dynamics behind the formal process focuses on elite compromise. As strongman politics gave way to party factionalism as the defining feature of the politics in the top leadership, elite consensus became essential to the selection of next-generation leaders.¹⁵ Compromise and power sharing among various party elders, factions and patron-client alliances, and constituency interests determine who gets a seat on the now all-powerful PBSC.¹⁶ On the contrary, some scholars argue that institutional rules trump even power politics when it comes to PBSC membership. Zeng found that seniority could explain the outcome of a leadership transition better than all other factors.¹⁷ Following the logic of this observation, all eligible candidates were given a fair chance of gaining a seat on the PBSC regardless of their factional affiliations and other qualifications. Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang’s losing bids in 2012 thus can be understood as not due to their status as protégés of Hu but as a result of their relatively younger age and future eligibility in the next term.¹⁸ This school of thought interprets the current seat assignments as maximizing all eligible candidates’ chances of promotion to the PBSC, thus maintaining the satisfaction of all factions. In turn, this seemingly mechanical and arithmetic distribution of PBSC seats prevents a concentration of power on one person or faction.¹⁹

At the core of this debate is whether factional politics or institutional norms play a more important role in the leadership transition process. Conventional analysis lists the

princelings, Shanghai gang, *tuanpai* (the Youth League faction), and Qinghua clique²⁰ among the main factions.²¹ However, these inner-partisan lines are flexible and ambiguous. One politician can be a princeling by birth or marriage but also have extensive connections with the Shanghai gang through work or with the Qinghua clique through education. Since these divisions are never formalized, scholarly interpretation of their existence remains as “informed guesswork” at best.²² The fluidity of factions also means that the CCP’s rule largely relies on a broad consensus building around a number of elite interests, according to this view.²³ Cheng Li came to a similar conclusion but identified two broad coalitions, elites and populists, playing the power game at the very top of the Party. According to this categorization, Xi Jinping belongs to the elitist camp and Li Keqiang to the populist group.²⁴ The two sides have enjoyed general parity in terms of representation in the PBSC and other party organs. As a result, most decisions are made out of compromises between the two camps. In all, if this characterization of loose political alliances either in the form of factions or two broad coalitions were to be true, it is only logical to imagine a space for an institutionalized succession procedure emerging out of the necessity to balance competing elite interests.

Opinions, however, differ on how institutionalized the succession process is and its implication on China’s political development. Those favoring the institutional view argue that these mechanisms helped China resolve a so-called “successor’s dilemma”, which happens when the heirs apparent develop their own political power base in authoritarian regimes. If the successor is sufficiently independent and powerful, he or she will unavoidably threaten the current leader in power. However, if the predecessor keeps their successor too weak for too long, the incumbent risks damaging their own legacy in that the regime could falter in the future as a result of a weak leadership.²⁵ To solve this dilemma, CCP leaders put the institutional safeguards in place to serve as “checks and balances” among various actors, especially between predecessors and successors.²⁶ Institutionalized succession, therefore, ensures that neither the incumbent nor the heir would be able to dominate at the expense of the other, and by extension, the survival of the regime. The restoration of the balance of power by institutional restraints can be seen at work in the two latest transitions in 2002 and 2012. The retiring Jiang Zemin and his allies could not continue to dominate the political scene because of term limits; the growth of Hu’s *tuanpai* seemed to be checked by the new leadership after his term ended.²⁷ Moreover, placing this view of institutionalization in the analytical framework of political development, other scholars suggest that institutionalization would have a positive impact on democratization in China. The established succession norms would open up the political space for all eligible candidates regardless of faction politics. Thus, as institutionalization moves forward, participation of all actors is formalized and strengthened in the process. In turn, contestation among different groups will be

fostered in this more open political environment, which would complete the “three stages of political development” leading up to democracy.²⁸

Sceptics cite the opaque nature of China’s political system to point out that outside speculations about the leadership succession process remain to be mere speculations. None of the arrangements were formalized as ironclad rules. China watchers do not have a list of all the candidates considered for the top spots, making any evaluation of how much institutional restraints mattered in the actual process nearly impossible.²⁹ Some suggest that all of the institutional arrangements have been used in favour of whoever was in a real position of power. Deng Xiaoping only instituted term and age limits on state and party positions because as the established number one of the party, he did not need to derive authority from official titles. Since the beginning, age limits were put in place for political calculations. Jiang set the retirement age first at 70 to conveniently deny his rival Qiao Shi a chance. Not soon after, the limit was changed to 68 when Li Ruihuan, another foe of Jiang, happened to turn 68.³⁰ Jiang himself never followed his own “67 stay and 68 retire” rule. In 2012, the age limits were kept intact in the latest power transition only because the most senior candidates in the 18th Congress were allies of Jiang. Candidates close to Hu, who lacked Jiang’s influence in the end, were less lucky. The latest institutional change of downsizing the nine-member PBSC to seven could be seen as cutting two of Hu’s associates, Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao, off the top body.³¹ At the end of the day, critics dismiss the effects of institutional rules to merely be subordinate to elite power politics. Institutional checks on factional or personal power did not perform as well as the proponents of the institutional view would have liked.³²

To sum up, the CCP instituted political reforms such as term limits, age limits, seniority preference, and internal polls to ensure smooth power transitions after Mao. These constraints on state and party position-holders have resulted in rapid leadership turnovers, greater space for political mobility, and checks on personal and factional domination. However, questions remain as to whether these selection rules are merely the tools top leaders’ use to their political advantage or in fact meaningful institutionalized procedures that constrain all political actors. Given the opacity of the political process, neither view offers a definitive answer. Factionalist politics does certainly exist and blatant disregard for the institutional rules has not happened. The fatal flaw of the institutionalization view, however, is that the succession mechanisms are political in nature and the consequence of violating them is purely political too. As long as a dominating leader can withstand the political costs of breaking the established norms, they are free to do so. In fact, relapses from institutionalization back to chaotic power politics have happened many times in the People’s Republic of China’s history. As Gilley points out, the limits of the CCP’s

authoritarian resilience are the Party's relative ease with reversing institutional development as much as its willingness to institute these reforms.³³ If reforms can always be reversed, institutionalization alone cannot solve the problem of succession. The core of the issue remains as how these regimes can impose effective, *irreversible* checks on personal and factional power. In addition, the political development school is wrong to assume that these institutional restraints would lead to democratization. In fact, the succession rules came with the Communist leaders' explicit intent to *strengthen* their one-party rule against the threats of multi-party democracy. Going forward, Xi Jinping's ten-year tenure would be a turning point for China's political development. If he or other top leaders resist the temptation of monopoly and continue to honor and further institutionalize existing transition arrangements, it is more likely that the regime will survive. Conversely, if institutionalization is not followed through, bigger problems of regime instability will arise. Such a development might plunge China back into the chaos of Mao's time or, paradoxically, open up the political system for democratization.

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The Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on Canada-China Relations

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Abstract

The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP) is a multilateral free trade agreement led by the United States, that aims to further strengthen economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. Its membership consists mostly of members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as Canada. Canada was a negotiating member during the final stages of the TPP, although as of yet it has neither signed nor ratified the TPP. The member countries of the TPP account for nearly 40% of global GDP, and about a third of all global trade. The only perceived missing element within this powerful economic agreement lies in one area — the exclusion of the world's 2nd largest economy, China, which poses a disadvantage to the growth of the Canadian economy. The implications of the TPP could fundamentally change Canada-China relations in the coming decade. As such, this paper aims to explain why Canada should commit to the TPP agreement, while at the same time exercising caution by establishing a separate free trade framework with China at the first available opportunity.

Key words

Bilateral relations, trade relations, TPP, Canada, China

Introduction

The rising significance of the Asia-Pacific in the global economy has brought about an increasing number of multilateral initiatives in the region. One such initiative is the newly negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, a multilateral free trade agreement that encompasses member states of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), including Canada as a negotiating member. The global focus on the TPP agreement is largely a result of the expansive economic coverage of the deal, as the member countries of the TPP agreement account for nearly 40% of global GDP, and about a third of global trade.² The only perceived missing element within this powerful economic agreement lies in one area: the world's 2nd largest economy,² China, is excluded, or as some preferred to say, has not yet requested to join the deal.

China has experienced rapid economic growth since its entrance to the World Trade Organization in 2001, when it first opened up its domestic economy to the global markets. As a result, China has seen an increase in its economic power, and its role in the global economic order has consequently shifted, moving to a position of dominance in the world economy and global geopolitics. However, the TPP agreement seems to be a thorn in its eye, as the multilateral free trade agreement in reality, evermore poses to be a geopolitical strategy led by the United States to stem Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific. While the Chinese government is beginning to adopt a more stringent position towards the TPP, the prospective loss of trade to Canada as a result of not having further entrance into the Chinese market becomes real. On the one hand, the TPP lays out the foundation to economically integrate Canada further with its traditional allies. On the other hand, Canada faces the risk of losing the 45 years of hard-sought relations with China if it signs the TPP agreement.

This paper will argue that the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement will bring tangible benefits to Canada, in terms of protecting Canada's preferential market status, and will grant Canada further entrance into Japan, the world's third largest economy. However, with China not being a member of the TPP agreement, Canada bears the threat of losing a prospective trading partner. As such, following the signing of the TPP, for both political and economic reasons, Canada should take the first available opportunity to set up a comprehensive free trade agreement with China, whether in a bilateral or multilateral context. Canada's goal should therefore be to preserve its traditional economic relations with the US, while continuing to move forward with Canada-China relations.

Methodology

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is a multilateral Free Trade Agreement that aims to further liberalize the economies of the Asia-Pacific.³ The framework of Canada-China relations within this paper adheres strictly to economic relations between the two countries, most specifically in the areas of trade relations and strategic economic gains and losses between Canada and China. In addition, this paper will also include some background on political relations, to help understand the current economic relations between the two countries. On a broader scale, this paper hopes to make a contribution to the literature on Canada-China relations through comprehensive coverage and analysis of the debates surrounding the TPP agreement and Canada's alternative free trade strategy with China. This paper ultimately hopes to provide a situational guideline for the consideration of Canadian policy makers, before Canada signs and moves onto the process of ratifying the TPP. Research for this paper is drawn from recent literature and news articles on the TPP, and has also included perspectives drawn from Chinese and Canadian sources. In this paper, it should be specifically noted that henceforward, the country referred to as China is the People's Republic of China.

This paper is organized in the following manner: Section one is a brief history of Canada-China relations, while section two is a brief description of the TPP and the implications it has on Canada-China relations. Section three identifies the implications that the TPP has on China's global position, as well as China's strategic response to the TPP. Section four identifies Canada's position on the TPP agreement, discussing benefits and losses, and the TPP's implications on Canada-China relations. Section five explores the possibility for Canada to form an alternative free trade framework with China. Section six looks at recent developments in the TPP and Canada-China trade relations, and identifies the possible course of action that Canada may need to proceed to best secure its interests in trade relations. Section seven concludes the paper.

Section One: A History of Canada-China Relations

Canada's relations with China can be traced back to the days of missionaries. Representatives of Canadian Protestant and Catholic denominations and orders travelled to China in the late 19th and early 20th century, with the aim of converting the faith of the Chinese population, and to improve the general well-being of the Chinese.⁴ At the end of World War I, it was estimated that mainstream Protestant churches alone were supporting two universities, 270 schools, and 30 hospitals in China.⁵ In October 1970, as one of the first

western countries, Trudeau government on behalf of Canada established the first diplomatic relations with China,⁶ setting the foundation for the next 45 years of official relations between the two countries. In 1971, Canada supported the People's Republic of China in the succession of the "China" seat on the United Nations Security Council.⁷ In June of the same year, Canada also sent its first official delegation to China, headed by Canada's Minister of Industry. In 1973, Pierre Trudeau made Canada's first official visit to China as a Canadian Prime Minister.⁸ In 1978, Paul Desmarais of Power Corporation founded the pivotal business organization that would later drive business relations between the two countries: the Canada China Business Council, the first ever foreign business group to be established with China.⁹ In 1986, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney led a small business group to China.¹⁰ During Prime Minister Jean Chretien's time, he heightened business relations between Canada and China, and made regular trips to China as part of Team Canada missions organized by the Canada China Business Council.¹¹ In 2000, Canada also assisted China in its ascension to the World Trade Organization.¹² Throughout the following decade, private sector relations between the two countries continued to grow. 2015 marked the 45th anniversary of the establishment of official relations, marking a new height in relations between the two countries and the foundation for continued growth in business relations.

Section Two: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

Although Canada-China relations have now spanned 45 years, relations have been constantly challenged through dynamic domestic and international forces. The latest challenge to Canada-China relations has been Canada's involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP). The TPP is a multilateral Free Trade Agreement, that was established with the aim to further liberalize the economies of the Asia-Pacific region.¹³ The final negotiating stages consisted of the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, Canada, Mexico, and Japan, as the 12 negotiating members of the TPP.¹⁴ The finalized TPP agreement consists of 30 chapters, ranging from market access negotiations in goods, services, and agriculture in regular free trade agreements, to intellectual property rights, services, government procurement, customs, investments, competition, and labour and environmental standards, all of which aim to raise the bar of the international market.¹⁵

The negotiation of the TPP originated from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP) agreement, initially signed between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The TPSEP aimed to eliminate 90% of all tariffs between the four member countries by January 1st 2006, and to reduce tariffs completely by 2015.¹⁶ In 2008, President Bush asked if the

US could join the TPSEP with the consideration of an expanded agreement, which was subsequently approved alongside the addition of three more negotiating parties in September 2008: Australia, Peru, and Vietnam.¹⁷ Later in 2008, President Obama succeeded Bush, and continued Bush's commitment in the TPP negotiations at the APEC summit in Honolulu.¹⁸ In March 2010, negotiations for an expanded agreement officially began; it aimed to include financial services and investment, as well as regulations on border controls.¹⁹ In 2012, both Canada and Mexico joined as full negotiating parties, followed by Japan in 2013 as the last negotiating party of the TPP agreement.²⁰ On October 5th, 2015, negotiations were finalized, and on November 5th, the full text of the TPP agreement was released to the public of all member states.²¹ The final signing ceremony for the TPP agreement has been scheduled to take place on February 4, 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand.²² The date of the formal signing ceremony will commence a two year period, in which all parties will have to ratify the TPP through their own respective governments, before the TPP as a multilateral free trade agreement can take effect.²³ The biggest problem that the TPP agreement poses for Canada is that China, Canada's second largest trading partner, was neither invited to negotiations, nor requested membership to the multilateral free trade deal, while Canada itself was a negotiating party of the deal and is expected to sign and fully join the agreement within the time frame of the next 2 years.²⁴

The TPP's Implication on China

Scholarly opinion on why China is not in the TPP agreement is varied. Some argue that China was not invited to participate in the TPP,²⁵ while others argue that China has not yet taken the initiative to request to join the TPP.²⁶ In either case, what really matters is that the TPP currently does not include China, and will most likely continue to exclude China. The rationale behind this possible situation is simple: China sees the TPP as an instrument of the United States to constrain China's rising influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and for a good reason it sees this. The first suspicious sign behind the TPP agreement was when the US initially joined the TPP negotiations. American negotiators complicated talks by introducing "NAFTA Plus" issues, such as environmental and labour issues, government procurement, and intellectual property enforcement and sanctions. These US-introduced stipulations set a high entry bar to the TPP that China does not qualify for, and would not be able to sustain even if it joined in on the agreement.²⁷ In November 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially announced the Obama administration's new "pivot to Asia" policy,²⁸ which essentially confirmed possible US motives behind the TPP agreement on the Chinese side, as well as the possibility that the US may use the TPP to control the trade front of the Asia-Pacific region.²⁹ American motives behind the TPP were confirmed by President Obama,

when he asked Congress for ratification of the TPP agreement in his final State of the Union on January 12th, 2016: “With [the] TPP, China doesn’t set the rules in that region, we do. You want to show our strength in this century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it.”³⁰ Although some scholars continue to argue that the TPP is simply a trade deal and not an anti-China deal, the series of actions taken by the US since the initiation of the expanded TPP agreement clearly positions China in a cautious position against the US administration and its leadership in the TPP agreement.

China’s rationale behind not joining the TPP agreement is more than political, also including economic calculations. Although joining the TPP will boost China’s economy, China will still experience trade growth without the TPP. However, the reverse may not be true for states that are part of the TPP, who lack further access to the Chinese market. In 2012, goods trade between TPP members amounted to over USD 2.7 trillion, while goods trade between China and TPP members amounted to over USD 1.4 trillion. This accounts for over half of all trade between TPP members, and other members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).³¹ In 2010, the average share of imports from China to TPP members accounted for more than 17% of each TPP member’s total imports.³² In addition, China already has bilateral free trade agreements with four participants of the TPP agreement (Chile, New Zealand, Peru, and Singapore), minimizing its potential market loss.³³ At the University of Western Ontario, Dr. John Whalley and Chunding Li have concluded that the TPP will harm Chinese welfare interests. This can be attributed to a prospective decline in consumption, as a result of increased exports and decreased imports, if China does not join the TPP agreement. However, they also found that China’s exports and total production may continue to increase, due to prospective increases in external demand.³⁴ Dr. Li Xin from the Institute of National Accounts, Beijing Normal University, also found similar results. Dr. Xin found that Chinese exports would be affected by a trade diversion, due to perceived competition from developing states such as Vietnam and Malaysia. However, in terms of labour, for instance, the trade diversion would be negligible due to the size of the Chinese economy and the stringent rules posed by the TPP agreement, which would bind the economic activities of its members to a risky high standard.³⁵ Ultimately, China’s potential economic losses from not joining the TPP agreement are economically insignificant. However, due to the geopolitical implications of the TPP and through considerations of the future of China’s economic development, China has responded to the TPP by setting out its own counter-strategy to maintain its own economic agenda in the Asia-Pacific.

Section Three: China’s Response to the TPP

China's counter-strategy in the Asia-Pacific against the American-led TPP agreement centres on accelerating its economic integration within the Asia-Pacific, before it is truly marginalized by the effects of the TPP.³⁶ One dimension of this counter-strategy has been to focus on accelerating progress in China's regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which includes the ongoing China-South Korea FTA and China-Japan-South Korea FTA negotiations (though the latter is facing a stalemate, due to ongoing China-Japan and South Korea-Japan territorial disputes).³⁷ Currently, China has FTA agreements or has entered negotiations for FTA agreements with 6 out of the 12 TPP members, and has entered negotiations with 9 out of the 12 TPP members if including both regional and multilateral FTA negotiations.³⁸ Another dimension of China's economic counter-strategy has been focusing on creating its own TPP-like free trade zone, through the establishment of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed 16-nation free-trade zone which will include 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. If negotiations succeed, the RCEP would be the biggest of such a trade bloc in the world.³⁹ China has also entered into ongoing free trade negotiations with ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council, to counteract possible effects of the TPP.⁴⁰ Overall, in terms of geopolitical coverage, China's counter-strategy against the TPP has been fairly extensive, although the success of such a counter-strategy is yet to be determined. For Canada, the examination of China's counter-strategy against the TPP is especially important if it wishes to further explore opportunities to extend its trade relations with China, whether in terms of a bilateral or an already established multilateral frameworks, with or without the TPP agreement.

Section Four: Canada's Position on the TPP

The importance of the TPP agreement for Canada has been marked by a statement from previous Trade Minister Ed Fast — that the deal could be worth around \$3.5 billion of additional economic activity for Canada.⁴¹ Since the expanded TPP negotiations started in 2010 and after Canada officially joined the TPP as a negotiating member in 2012, the TPP has been placed under increasing scrutiny by Canadian scholars and the public. Steward Beck, President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, has an optimistic view of the TPP. Beck urges the new Liberal government to turn the TPP into a policy victory, and to get the Canadian public on the side of the TPP.⁴² He also points out that the TPP will provide direct economic benefits through reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers, and will open Canada's doors to major economic partners beyond the United States.⁴³ Beck stresses that Canadians need to understand the losses associated with exclusion from the TPP, and what

preferential access to new markets means. In addition, by not being part of the TPP, Canada will greatly jeopardize its existing trade relations with the US and Mexico.⁴⁴

Wendy Dobson, Co-Director of Rotman Institute of International Business at the University of Toronto, also agrees that TPP could be a positive game changer for Canada. However, she points out that this is attributable to the inclusion of services and investment guidelines within the new TPP deal, which can offer a way to address the deficiencies that currently exist within the outdated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).⁴⁵ Since its implementation in 1994, NAFTA has failed to adjust to various major structural changes and geopolitical shifts in the world market, partly due to a lack of interest exhibited by the current US administration in upgrading the agreement.⁴⁶ Dobson also argues that the TPP is Canada's most efficient way of deepening its integration with other Asian economies; the other alternative being an aggressive strategy of forming bilateral or other regional economic frameworks to achieve the same level of integration in the Asia-Pacific.⁴⁷

On the other hand, Jim Balsillie, a Canadian businessman who was part of the inception of Research in Motion, has a negative outlook on the TPP. Balsillie argues that the TPP's guidelines in the intellectual property chapter will largely benefit the US, and will eventually make Canada an underdog in the market of selling ideas.⁴⁸ Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates; a multidisciplinary consulting firm that provides strategic advice on international trade, investment, and regulatory matters, also expressed pessimism on the TPP in a 2012 report. The report highlighted potential economic losses for Canada through the negotiated TPP guidelines on intellectual property, as Canada is not particularly strong in the field of intellectual property.⁴⁹ The organization further pointed out that investment, which is covered by the TPP, has already been addressed under Canada's extensive network of Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs), and therefore the TPP is only duplicating what currently already exist under FIPAs.⁵⁰ For Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, the only benefits of Canada staying in the TPP are from maintaining preferential trade status within the US,⁵¹ and from additional access to the large Japanese market.⁵²

Kevin Lynch, Tiff Macklem, and Daniel Trefler, all scholars of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada continue to hold the same critical view of the TPP agreement. They point out that although the TPP agreement encompasses 12 countries, Canada already has joint free-trade agreement with 2 out of the 12 (US and Mexico), bilateral free-trade agreement with another 2 out of the 12 (Chile and Peru), and is a Commonwealth partner with 5 out of the 12 TPP members (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei). This shows that the TPP hardly consists of any new beneficial partnerships for Canada.⁵³ In addition, authors like

Jim Balsillie and Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, are worried about how Canada will fare under the intellectual property guidelines of the TPP, suggesting that Canadian businesses need to invest more in business-sector innovations in order to prosper under the TPP agreement.⁵⁴ The authors follow the position of Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, and agree that the TPP only brings two major benefits to Canada: first, it provides larger access to the Japanese market; and second, it eliminates the potential costs of jeopardizing relations with the US, which is a NAFTA partner with Canada.⁵⁵

Overall, the general consensus is that Canada should sign the TPP. Upon examining the arguments in favour of the TPP, it becomes clear that Canada stands to incur trade losses if it chooses not to join a free trade agreement led by the US. This is especially true when one considers that Canada is currently a NAFTA partner with the US, and is heavily dependent on the US market for the majority of its exports. In addition, it is also clear that the TPP agreement will also give Canada unprecedented access to one of the world's largest markets — the Japanese market, which will help boost the Canadian economy and allow Canada to make its mark in the Asia-Pacific. However, in order to further integrate itself into the Asia-Pacific, the TPP alone will not be enough, and Canada will need to seek out additional opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region. These opportunities will need to include the possibility of joining either a bilateral or multilateral free trade framework that involves China, Canada's second largest trading partner, to further advance Canada's economic interests and eliminate its heavy reliance on the US, its long-term trade partner.

Section Five: Alternative Free Trade Agreement with China

Alternatively, Canada can initiate a free trade agreement with China, in either a bilateral or multilateral context. This will make-up for the loss of potential market gains, as a result of membership deficiencies in the TPP agreement. Wendy Dobson, the Co-Director of Rotman Institute for International Business, points out that Canada's Asia strategy should focus on pursuing regional and bilateral trade, as well as investment liberalization.⁵⁶ Dobson also states that the options of joining the TPP and pursuing a deeper economic relationship with China are by no means mutually exclusive for Canada.⁵⁷ She referred to the Australian example, which is currently at the negotiating stages with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and China on separate bilateral free trade agreements.⁵⁸ Dobson attributed this to a major shift in Australia's objectives towards the Asia-Pacific over 20 years ago. Australia adopted a model where economic integration with the Asia-Pacific was complementary to its military relations with the US,⁵⁹ an option that Canada can emulate. In addition, China already has bilateral free trade agreements with four participants of the TPP: Chile, New Zealand, Peru, and

Singapore.⁶⁰ Dobson also points out that in the new era, Canada needs to take into account the relative decline in American economic power alongside its continuing military power, before strategizing accordingly.⁶¹ Another sign that Canada should reduce its economic reliance on the US lies in the rising uncertainty surrounding the ratification of the TPP agreement in Congress, due to domestic political instability within the US, with the upcoming presidential election in November 2016. Many of the US presidential candidates have used the opportunity to criticize the American-led TPP deal whilst campaigning. Most prominently Republican candidate Donald Trump has declared the TPP agreement a “disaster”, while Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton has also voiced opposition to the deal, although Clinton’s tendency to flip-flop on policy issues brings uncertainty to her position on the TPP.⁶² As the future of the TPP is still uncertain from the leader state which initiated the agreement, Canada now has even more reason to consider another economic arrangement with its second largest trading partner and the world’s second largest economy, China, to ensure its economic interests are kept in place.

Canada-China relations have the potential to further advance in terms of trade because the two economies are currently complementary to each other. If both sides make appropriate concessions, they can achieve a historic deal that would bring distinct trade advantages for both economies. According to data compiled by Dobson on Canada’s Comparative Advantage by Industry in 2011, Canada is competitive in major sectors, particularly in natural resources where China is lagging. Dobson’s data also demonstrates that the two are direct competitors in machinery and electrical equipment, and that both are uncompetitive in the manufacturing of vehicles.⁶³ Overall, China lacks a comparative advantage in all industries in which Canada is a world leader,⁶⁴ This shows a workable area between the two countries if further market access can be achieved. In addition, China currently maintains tariffs in a number of areas, including rice, meat, processed foods, textiles, apparel, and vehicles and parts. On the Canadian side, it maintains a tariff-rate quota management system in supply-managed products, such as beef and wheat.⁶⁵ Both countries stand to gain from mutual reduction from tariffs on principal exports, by establishing closer trade relations with each other. Moreover, there is still the issue of a trade imbalance between Canada and China. This is more problematic for the Canada, which buys twice as much manufactured consumer goods from China than China buys natural resources from Canada.⁶⁶ Between 2005 and 2010, Canada’s trade deficit with China grew by nearly 50%.⁶⁷ To address the long-term issues of an increasing trade imbalance with China, Dobson points out that Canada would need to diversify its bilateral trade relations with China, by exporting more knowledge-based goods and services that China cannot produce, in order to reverse its trade deficit. This vision of trade specialization between the two

economies would only come into fruition, upon closer trade relations between the two countries. Once again, this highlights the need for Canada to form a free trade framework with China, in either a bilateral or multilateral context.

If Canada's trade relations with China are to move forward in the direction of free trade, negotiations will need to address a few key interests from each side. Canada is interested in trade liberalization, investor and intellectual property protection, and sectoral priorities. On the other hand, China is interested in facilitating flows of people, food security, market access to energy and natural resources, and the development of services such as education.⁶⁸ China will also seek to obtain recognition from Canada in support of its prospective elevated status in the World Trade Organization, from a non-market economy to a market economy. This will automatically take place 15 years after its accession to WTO in 2016,⁶⁹ although significant barriers are already in sight from key WTO members, rendering Canada's support critical.

Section Six: Recent Developments

Canada's Harper government ratified the critical Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) in September 2014. FIPA was signed with China back in 2012,⁷⁰ and demonstrated some progress in bilateral trade relations between the two countries. In January 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced his intention to lead a trade mission to China in March 2016, which was organized by the Canada China Business Council. There has been speculation that the new Trudeau government is seeking to establish a long term free a new trade arrangement with China with the long-term objective of establishing a free-trade deal with China.⁷¹ China has also demonstrated interest in a free trade deal with Canada. A week after Trudeau's announcement of a prospective trade mission to China, the Vice-Minister of Financial and Economic Affairs of China made a visit to Ottawa, to discuss the prospect of negotiating the first ever free-trade deal with Canada.⁷² If successful, this would be the first free trade deal that China has ever made with a North American country.⁷³ As expected, concessions on the Canadian side are needed, especially on investment restrictions and a commitment to building an energy pipeline on the coast. In return, the Canada China Business Council has estimated that Canadian exports could increase by \$7.7 billion by 2030.⁷⁴ The reality of a free trade deal between Canada and China is now closer than ever. If the Trudeau government makes use of this rare opportunity, it could prove to be a policy victory for the government, possibly marking a historical mark in Canada-China relations.

As for the TPP, the current Trudeau government has not yet expressed whether it will be endorsing the finalized agreement. Canada's Trade Minister, Chrystia Freeland, recently stated that the government had not yet decided on whether it will participate in the TPP signing ceremony in Auckland, New Zealand, scheduled for February 4, 2016.⁷⁵ According to press releases, the Trade Minister is still focusing on cross-country consultation of the deal, and plans to ask the trade committee of the House of Commons to prepare a comprehensive cross-country study of the TPP as a priority before any bills are passed through the House of Commons.⁷⁶ In the end, the initial hesitation of the new Trudeau government should not affect Canada's commitment to the TPP, especially if US Congress officially ratifies the agreement later this year. If Canada withdraws from the TPP without considering the appropriate consequences, it could face the loss of the US, a historically important ally. It could also possibly lose preferential economic access to the US market, as well as a loss of prospective trade gains which it may have achieved through the Japanese market.

Section Seven: Conclusion

As China embarks on a more assertive approach to counteract American influence in the Asia-Pacific, Canada must strive to find a balance between its economic interests, its long-term relations with the US, increasingly important relations with China, and further economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. Signs of China's assertiveness in recent years should be understood in terms of its rising economic weight, in contrast to the relative economic decline of the US.⁷⁷ As China embarks on establishing its own version of regional economic integration, Canadian policy makers must keep in mind the possibility that perhaps China, and not the US, may be leading the future of Asian economic integration, and plan its strategic framework accordingly. They should also be mindful of the fact that US is a traditional ally of Canada, both politically and economically, and that there may be important economic implications for Canada if it does decide to drop out of the TPP. These implications will also be compounded if both US and Japan end up ratifying the TPP.

In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement has the benefit of protecting Canada's current preferential market status with the US, and of allowing Canada to further its access in the large Japanese market. Although the agreement does not include China, Canada's second largest trading partner, Canada can compensate for the prospective trade loss from the TPP by setting up a separate bilateral or multilateral free trade framework with China. The prospect of a bilateral free trade agreement is increasingly becoming more likely, judging from the series of events that led to the visit of

the Vice-Minister of Financial and Economic Affairs of China to Ottawa in January 2016. The establishment of the TPP presents new opportunities for better relations between Canada and China, due to mutual interests in furthering trade relations in the coming decade. China will most likely remain out of the TPP in the near future, as it sees the TPP as an instrument of the US, with the intent of constraining China's rising influence in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, China is also not expecting significant economic losses by remaining out of the TPP.

Since the TPP's expanded inception by the US, China has responded to the agreement with its own framework of regional economic integration. This was most prominently done through the establishment of another multilateral free trade framework, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, alongside numerous bilateral Free Trade Agreements that are either completed or in the process of negotiation. Despite how the TPP has been highly criticized in Canada for seemingly biased intellectual property guidelines and over its membership, the consequences of withdrawing from the TPP could be detrimental to the Canadian economy. This will be especially true, if Canada's decision makers fail to properly interpret situations, and take rash action before taking into consideration all foreseeable consequences. On the other hand, a separate free trade agreement in either a bilateral or multilateral context with China will decrease Canada's reliance on the US market, better specialize Canada's economy, allow Canada further access to the Chinese market, and help to improve the current trade balance with China. Ultimately, Canada's decisions regarding the TPP and a potential FTA with China will depend on priorities defined by Canada's top decision makers, and possible situational changes surrounding the TPP membership.ⁱ

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The Optics of China-Japan Relations from the Politics of ‘Historical Memories’

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Abstract

In recent years, China's relations with Japan have worsened, causing unresolved historical issues. China retains a deep sense of humiliation and anger, originating from the historic suffering caused by Japan. The memories have constructed a fear for the revival of Japanese militarism, as witnessed in the growing anti-Japanese sentiments and China's rapidly expanding economy and military strength over time. Going beyond rational logic, China's current behaviour towards Japan is deeply embedded in historical memories. China's burden of historical consciousness overshadows its present and future relations with Japan. In this view, the paper argues that China's relations with Japan are regulated by the logic of historical consciousness and national identity, driven by past experiences.

Keywords

China, Japan, historical memories, identity

Why China Reacts to Japan?

In September 2012, thousands of Chinese in Beijing marched to the Japanese Embassy to protest against the recent decision by the Japanese government to buy the islands, known as the Diaoyu in Chinese and the Senkaku in Japanese, from their private Japanese owners. The emotional crowd chanted anti-Japanese slogans, ransacked Japanese businesses, smashed Japanese cars, pelted stones at the buildings of the embassy compound and more. The protest soon spread across the nation, making it the first of such large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations after the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and the 2005 protests over the Japanese history textbook revision. With this, China-Japan relations hit its lowest point since 1972, when the two countries restored diplomatic ties.

Though these anti-Japanese sentiments do not come as a surprise, given the rise of public opinion and nationalist fervour in recent years, the irony lies in the fact that China’s anti-Japanese sentiments stand in sharp contrast to the strengthening economic relations between the two countries. The China-Japan bilateral trade relationship ranks the third-largest in the world. China is now Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of its trade, and Japan is China’s second-largest. In addition, Japan is the largest investor in China, with a stock of direct investment at more than US\$100 billion in 2014, or US\$30 billion more than the next largest source, the United States.¹ But, these burgeoning statistics have failed to tap the full potential of a mature, stable relationship decades after the turbulence of World War II. That is, the economic relationship has not succeeded in alleviating the tensions and rivalry between China and Japan.

What is noteworthy is that in the last two decades, China’s perception of Japan has significantly worsened. The ongoing territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea has critically plagued the bilateral relationship, furthering the nationalist quotient. There exists a perceptual gap of positive economic and political developments to that of negative sentiments of China vis-a-vis Japan. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the state of perplexity in China’s relations with Japan. It is uncertain if this animosity can be interpreted from the optic of national interest in terms of material forces. One can ask if China’s response to Japan runs deeper, in that the minds and hearts of the Chinese people play a vital role in defining the growing asymmetry in the relationship. In finding the rationale, this paper argues that it is the historical memories – wherein the Chinese mind conjures up images of Japanese atrocities during World War II – which has constructed China’s self identity against the Japanese ‘other’. China’s official position to any action by Japan calls for “taking history as the mirror and facing forward to the future”, reflecting the historical

consciousness of the tragic past. This paper thus addresses the seldom asked question of how identity affects China's relations with Japan, causing the 'animosity' in the relations.

Historical Memories of Japan in Chinese Psyche

The anti-Japanese demonstrations in China strongly highlight the historical consciousness of China towards Japan, bringing to the forefront the inherent tensions of historical issues. For China, the brutal memories of Japan as the puppet state of Manchukuo, the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women issues, war reparations, biological warfare units, and others create the prejudices that contribute to the present 'trust deficit'. The antagonistic sentiments against Japan are largely witnessed in terms of revision of history textbooks, Japanese high-level visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute reflecting the 'conditioned reflex' of Chinese towards Japanese actions. The Chinese reactions to these issues show that the emotional response originates from the connection between current events with historical grievances. Any act on the part of Japan reactivates the Chinese memory of wars and invasions that this country has suffered from many years ago. China reacted strongly – a “knee-jerk response”, as Allen S. Whiting once put it – to any perceived “revival” of Japanese imperialist ideology or symbols.²

For China, the brutal war and this part of history in relation to Japan, have left many sensitive historical symbols that are reactivated deliberately or unintentionally, creating a discord in China's attitude towards Japan. This fundamental reason helps to explain as to why the bilateral relations have always been fragile and dangerous even after decades of formal normalisation. It is because interpretations of the past pose a major barrier for China's reconciliation with Japan. In the current context of China's relations with Japan, historic memories plague bilateral interactions in three major ways.

First, the primordial view argues that “centuries of accumulated hatreds”³ are behind the present-day 'social' violence of China-Japan relationship. In this view, from the Chinese side, the problem does not just date from the Eight Year War but from the large indemnity and loss of Taiwan in 1895.⁴ Chinese concerns are rooted in their deep distrust of the Japanese, which is dominated by the historical legacy of Japanese occupation. China's anxiety over Japan's significant military capabilities and its alliance with the United States reflects the Chinese primordial beliefs of Japan intact, making the past relevant to what Japan represents today.⁵

Second, the instrumentalist view claims that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategically and rationally uses the history of Japanese imperialist aggression to gain

political and economic concessions. This point can be validated in two ways: First, history is used to take advantage of Japan’s war guilt and draw out political concessions from Tokyo. Secondly, it is utilized by the Chinese government to take a strong stance against Japan, thus, presenting itself as a patriotic force and enhancing its claim to legitimacy.⁶ For instance, China’s anti-Japanese protest in the post-1982 textbook controversy is interpreted by some as a convenient lever to bring the Japanese government to heel, in which it was largely successful.⁷ What makes history dominant in China’s policies towards Japan is that the Chinese government does not just use history as a card against Japan, but largely as part of patriotic education for domestic consumption. Memories of the negative history is linked to factional politics, as the elites utilize memories of Japan’s imperialist aggression to “coalesce support and weaken opponents”.⁸ For instance, historical sites of Japanese aggression were utilized by the Chinese Communist Party leaders in their ‘patriotic education campaign’, which aimed at strengthening the regime’s claims to power.⁹ Therefore, in China it is a common wisdom that patriotism - often in the form of anti-Japanese nationalism- is intrinsically linked to the government’s legitimacy in China.¹⁰

Third, the constructivist view argues that China and Japan perceive their relations in the background of their shared historical experience, wherein “the past is reconstructed with regard to the concerns and needs of the present”.¹¹ In this view, the discourse of the Chinese on Japan is clearly shaped by their “shared historical experience.”¹² This makes history an important factor in current security relations because it is especially “sensitive to perceptions of intentions and to manipulations of these perceptions.”¹³ The logic is grounded in China’s profound distrust in Japan for various reasons, but mainly due to the dissatisfaction over how Japan has handled certain historical issues. As a result, even though Japan is a weaker military power than the United States, Japan seems to be trusted less and more disliked than the United States in the eyes of China.¹⁴ That is, the memories of the tragic past has constructed China’s national consciousness, creating a nationalist rhetoric from past that vilifies Japan as a threat-creating neighbor in the present.

Perception and Identity: China’s ‘Self’ versus Japanese ‘Other’

Historical analogies play a vital role in political decision making. That is, people make sense of new situations by comparing them to older situations already stored in their memories. History profoundly influences the perception they have of the world around them, because memories act as important information processors. In this way, historical memory influences an actor’s interpretation and understanding of the external world and specific situations, and it often leads actors to endow a group with certain motives, and thus to interpret the world through frames defined in part by those motives.¹⁵ Similarly, in the case of China, the

memories of the past have constructed their collective national identity. It can be argued that what lies at the core of China's identity of the 'Self' is directly related to China's encounters with the western and later Japanese 'Others'. Therefore, for China, the historical memory of a 'victim' has constructed the identity of a 'victimized state' – which plays a crucial role in determining Chinese psyche in foreign policy. It is argued that Japan's emergence as an 'Other' in China's identity is a by-product of China's attempts to assert its 'victimhood' and regain its social and moral legitimacy within an international society.¹⁶

In this process of China's identity formation, what makes Japan more significant over other foreign invaders is that, China did not adjust its image of Japan by recategorizing Japan as a *waiguoren* (foreigner) state. Rather, it perceived itself as an "un-Japanese" state".¹⁷ That is, China's historical consciousness of Japan's aggression during 1931-1945 serve as the common link of collective post war identity that distinguishes them from the Japanese 'Other'. The 'othering' of Japan plays a strong role as it gives a positive thrust to China's identity against Japan. This clash of identities is the prime factor that constrains the present relations. This argument stands valid as China's economic relations with Japan has failed to heal the wounds of its past, rather with time China has become more assertive in claiming the wounds suffered in the past. Here, the clash lies in China's identity of self as the "victim" against the construction of Japan as the "victimizing Other".¹⁸

Given this identity clash, what dominates Chinese perception is the "potential resurgence of Japanese militarism", as witnessed in case of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, Taiwan and others. Such conflicts reflect that wartime history has become a leading factor in China's policy towards Japan.¹⁹ It can be argued that the present Chinese perception of Japan is strongly shaped by memories which stem from past Japanese aggression. The central causal factor is the deep distrust, misunderstanding and dislike which is triggered by the historical memory creating cognitive biases in China's behaviour towards Japan in the present. The image of Japan as a "modern, friendly neighbour" that was formed in the 1980s quickly gave way to that of a remorseless, vexatious, and stubborn "small man" that is still defined today by its wartime history of aggression.²⁰

The distrustful image of Japan results into a 'constructed fear' as many Chinese believe that an unrepentant Japan is bound to repeat its past aggression. This echoes the widespread historical deterministic idea that a country that does not acknowledge past misdeeds "correctly" is bound to repeat them.²¹ This makes the beliefs about a shared past matter for the perception of threat in the present and future foreign policy preferences, as the empirical findings suggest that "security and insecurity in Northeast Asia are not just a question of the balance of economic and military power in the region, but also hinges on the impact that

beliefs about the shared past has on the perception of threat”.²² In this regard, Chinese perceptions and beliefs about the Japan threat, based on the events of history, impacts China’s present behaviour towards Japan.

Conclusion

In an overall assessment, it stands validated that in China’s relations with Japan, historical memories act as the key driving force that shapes and constrains China’s behaviour and policies towards Japan. China’s memory-driven perception of a distrustful and aggressive Japan make the relations more fragile, impeding the process of reconciliation. This spiraling of an inherent suspicion over Japan’s intentions and motives significantly impacts China’s attitude, leaving no space for a positive perception of Japan. In this view, it can be rightly concluded that if China’s current identity is constructed from Japan’s past atrocities, then it becomes a truism, that its future interpretation of every act of Japan will be drawn from this historical prism. Therefore, in China’s relations with Japan, history is not just a matter of the past, but a key variable that defines the present and future of this relationship. That is, China’s Japan policy goes beyond the fixed contours of national interest. It is more connected to the conscience of national memory and identity.

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Event Report “One Belt One Road: A New Era of China’s Geopolitical Strategies”

***Timothy Law** is a 3rd Year student studying International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies at the University of Toronto, Victoria College. Currently, Timothy serves as an event correspondent and editor for Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.*

One Belt One Road: A New Era of China’s Geopolitical Strategies

February 24, 2016

Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Presented by

Professor H. Karrar (*Assistant Professor, History, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan*)

Professor Jenny Paltiel (*Professor, Political Science, Carleton University*)

Professor Victor C. Falkenheim (*Professor Emeritus, Political Science and East Asian Studies, University of Toronto*)

“One Belt One Road: A New Era of China’s Geopolitical Strategies” was an event hosted by *Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies* and co-sponsored by the Asian Institute in the University of Toronto on February 24th, 2016. The event featured a brief introductory remark from the Deputy Consul General of the People’s Republic of China, Mr. Xu Wei, as well as a panel of three speakers consisting of Professor Hasan H. Karrar, Assistant Professor of History from the Lahore University of Management Sciences, Professor Jeremy Paltiel, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, and Professor Victor C. Falkenheim, Professor Emeritus of East Asian Studies and Political Science at the University of Toronto. The event was moderated by Karl Yan, a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. The panel speakers presented their thoughts concerning the new Chinese policy of “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Established in 2013, the projected three-decade long initiative emphasizes the formation of new land-based trade routes through Central Asia, as well as new maritime-based trade routes from China to Europe. Discussing the geographic, economic, and political implications, the panelists presented varying perceptions regarding China’s attempt to construct and develop this new transnational initiative.

As a brief foreword, Mr. Xu Wei described China’s “One Belt One Road” policy as that of an economic opportunity in developing greater connection between China and the rest of the world. Mr. Xu explained the policy as not only for Chinese development, but also for the facilitation of growth in developing countries. Specifically, the policy focuses on both an efficient flow of resources through these nations and greater multilateral cooperation and collaboration for the nations involved with these new trade routes. Mr. Xu cautions against viewing this policy as a new Chinese “Marshall Plan” intended to unilaterally expand Chinese prominence and economic growth. Instead, Mr. Xu affirmed that the Chinese policy is aimed towards fostering peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation between China and the world.

The first speaker, Professor Hasan H. Karrar, discussed the changing geopolitical relationship between China and Central Asia from the 1980s to the present “One Belt One Road”. Karrar described Central Asia as the Chinese “gateway” to Eurasia, where the Chinese have been heavily engaged with the region since the 1980s. This occurred as a result of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and the resumption of trade between the two nations during that period. Karrar stated that by the 1990s, such economic engagement had accelerated during the 8th Five Year Plan from 1991-1995, which emphasized development in the interior of China. Coupled with the new independence of the Central Asian States during the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chinese economic

engagement was propelled to new heights. By 1994, China began to develop diplomatic relations with these Central Asian states, which later culminated in the 1996 development of a formal economic advisory body known as the Shanghai Five. This initiative was later institutionalized into the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) in 2001, forming a transnational body that formalized mechanisms for economic cooperation, an interbank consortium, and a transnational business council. Karrar described the SCO as being the predecessor of the One Belt One Road initiative, since the new initiative represented an expanded spatial and economic configuration of the broad economic aims of the SCO. The initiative is widely linked to other nations and generously funded to the tune of \$2 trillion appearing as a physical manifestation of China’s economic goals in Central Asia. Conclusively, Karrar, described the continual discourse in the development of “the new silk road”, perceives the “One Belt One Road” initiative as a continuation of increasing Chinese interaction and involvement in Central Asia, driven by Chinese economic interests in the region.

The second speaker, Professor Jeremy Paltiel, discussed his view of the “One Belt One Road” initiative as a means of revitalizing Chinese economic growth. Using economic figures, he established that the Chinese economy was seeing decreasing rates of growth compared to past figures since 2000. Citing a case example, Paltiel stated that in 2015, China was only using 66-70 percent of its full steel production capacity, having already saturated its own domestic ability to meet such supply as illustrated by the 60 million square meters of unsold housing in China. As trade and investment became increasingly unreliable sources of economic growth after the 2008 global financial crisis, Paltiel described how China increasingly realized that it needed to raise both domestic and global demand to meet their domestic overproduction. Consequently, Paltiel illustrated the “One Belt One Road” initiative as a major push towards alleviating such economic problems. Citing President Xi Jinping’s description of the world “as a community of common destiny” with China as a provider of public goods, Paltiel stated how China views the development of the world as integral in promoting their own domestic growth. By both initiating large infrastructure projects and situating developing nations on the “One Belt One Road”, it in turn creates a greater demand for Chinese products, thus spurring Chinese growth. Consequently, this initiative was illustrated as helping to replicate the Chinese development model, summarized in Paltiel’s quote, “if you build it, they will come.” Paltiel clearly illustrated China’s attempts to increase its transnational diplomatic and economic relationships in order to further the success of this initiative. Paltiel sees the initiative as the Chinese use of the visible and invisible hand in forming a synergy between market forces and government functions. This is all for the purpose of revitalizing global and China’s domestic economic growth.

The final speaker, Professor Victor C. Falkenheim, discussed the geopolitical responses to the Chinese venture, specifically the need for transnational collaboration within the ambitious One Belt One Road Project. As the One Belt One Road initiative involves up to 65 states, covering 50 percent of global Gross National Product and 4.4 billion people, Falkenheim described the initiative as containing both substantial risk and reward. Falkenheim further described Chinese domestic skepticism toward the projects, citing a People's University article documenting a series of four principal external challenges to the project, summarized as foreign geopolitical suspicion, territorial disputes, aspirations of rival regional powers, and political instability in Central and South East Asia. Analyzing Chinese foreign relations, Falkenheim stated that nations such as Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Pakistan were promised assurances of Chinese funding, were "bandwagoning" rather than balancing to the allure of development rather than cooperative engagement. In comparison, regional powers such as Russia, India and Singapore remained cautious of such an open reception to the initiative. In addition, Falkenheim described the development of Chinese political lobbying, citing the development of a pro-Chinese lobby in the European Union supported by the Eastern European nations benefiting from this economic engagement. In describing this cautiousness and mixed response to the One Belt One Road initiative, Falkenheim explained that the threat of soft power utilizing the invisible hand was most concerning to China's partners. Although the Chinese have attempted to overcome such criticism with their large financial backing as well as political engagement, Falkenheim established that China will likely continue to encounter lukewarm responses and criticisms as the project continues in the future.

From the illustration of economic interests of China in Central Asia described by Harrar, the use of the generate Chinese economic growth by Paltiel, and the illustration of the potential geopolitical challenges facing the project by Falkenheim, the diversity of interpretations mirrors the international debate regarding the Chinese "One Belt One Road" initiative. The panel as a whole can be seen as viewing the initiative as walking a fine line between economic growth, cooperative development, geopolitical concerns, and perceived Chinese ambitions. As concisely summarized by Professor Falkenheim, the three-decade time span of the project will definitely foster changing opinions, jokingly noting that another conference in 2017 would once again yield changing perceptions on the project.

Event Report “The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unifications to Transnational Korea Book Launch

Timothy Law is a 3rd Year student studying International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies at the University of Toronto, Victoria College. Currently, Timothy serves as an event correspondent and editor for *Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies*.

The Capiralist Unconciuous: From Korean Unification to Transational Korea Book Launch

Octorber 16, 2015

Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Presented by

Professor Hyun Ok Park (*Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, York University*)

“The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unification to Transnational Korea Book Launch” was an event hosted by the Centre for the Study of Korea at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, on October 16th, 2015. The main speaker was Professor Hyun Ok Park (Department of Sociology, York University), who discussed her investigation into the transnational qualities of the Korean community and its capitalistic influences in her newly published book, *The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unification to Transnational Korea*.

In providing a brief introductory academic discussion on Park’s book, two academic discussants – Ms. Jennifer Jinye Chun (Director, Centre for the Study of Korea, University of Toronto) and Professor Andre Schmid (Department of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto) – presented their thoughts on the book. Within their discussions, both focused on Park’s study of the Korean community through a narrative based on economics and transnationality rather than the traditional state-centric view. Stating that her use of the “capitalist unconscious” was an important tool in linking the study of politically separated states, both discussants described Professor Park’s book as both “ambitious” and “stunning”, complimenting the novelty of Park’s analysis and the significance of her new book as a fresh take on the transnational Korean community.

Continuing into Professor Park’s presentation, Park began by presenting the main theme of her novel: Korean unification through the lens of global capitalism in contrast to the traditional scope of territorial and ethnic sovereignty. She argued that in the post-Cold War period, the two Koreas were engaged in two separate but simultaneous transitions: being from socialism to capitalism, and from dictatorship to democracy. However, these two transitions are often conjoined together, with the Cold War rhetoric of the victory of democracy over communism being misapplied in the situation of the Korean peninsula.

In correcting the common misconception, Professor Park examined Korean unification with a focus on the proliferation of capitalist influence. She argued that socialist and capitalist principles in both Koreas stem from the same political fascination with industrial modernism: they embrace common aspirations for what Professor Park refers to as a “market utopia”. Professor Park coined this phrase as being defined by equality, justice, freedom, and other democratic principles. Accordingly, she perceived the post-Cold War period not as the fall of socialism, but rather the reconfiguration of capitalism in a radically new order, leading to both grave challenges and solutions within the transnational Korean community.

Professor Park further explained that even though Koreans are separated by geographic borders, the large Korean communities situated in China, North Korea, and South Korea are all connected by normative principles and exchanges of capital, thus forming a transnational unified Korea. In analysing this transnationalism, Park focused on the challenges and changes stemming from the introduction of capitalist ideals, stating examples such as increased privatization, deregulation, and labour migration. Utilizing the example of transnational migrants from North Korea, Park described how North Koreans work and trade in Northern China in increasing numbers and through this process are introduced as part of the capitalist network, filling the labour shortage in China. Additionally, Park stated that many Chinese Koreans migrate to South Korea or work in South Korean owned factories in China, thus further interacting with transnational capital.

Contrary to common perceptions of North Korean migrants as refugees, Professor Park explained that North Koreans are stateless in the sense that they harbour the longing for community, but not in terms of political protection. Although North Koreans often migrate to China or South Korea, they wish to continue migrating, displaying their transient state. This sense of identity is unaccounted for by either state sovereignty or citizenship. For these migrants, the influence of capitalist principles leads them to invest their transient identity in an unalienable sovereignty through their individual ability to conduct manual labour. Seeing this in a broader respect, Park stated that her observation is also applicable to other economic migrants and transnational labour, thus showing the globalized influence of capitalist principles in these matters.

In expanding on another example, Park applied an idea of historical repetition to Korean migration, specifically in the Chinese-Korean community referral. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, Chinese-Koreans were persecuted for capitalist practices, which were mainly implemented to achieve state-mandated collectivization quotas, thus exemplifying the influence of capitalism in socialist programs. The development of privatization in China during the 1990s, especially among Chinese-Koreans, was a commodification of socialist ideals (housing, healthcare) rather than reparation for past socialist challenges. Leading up to the present, Park stated that many Chinese-Koreans would describe the status quo as a “Cultural Revolution” because of their inability to maintain their cultural rights. Although the Chinese-Koreans interviewed by Park described their present crises as a product of past identity controversies rooted in the Cultural Revolution, Park’s inclusion of capitalism illustrates a different representation of the development in the Chinese Korean community.

Event Report “Towards a New Normal in Taiwan’s Democracy?”

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Towards a New Normal in Taiwan’s Democracy?

February 6, 2016

Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Presented by

Professor Alexander Chieh-Cheng Huang (*Professor, Institute of Strategic Studies, Tamkang University; Founder and Chairman of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies*)

Professor Shelley Rigger (*Brown Professor of East Asian Politics; Chair of Chinese Studies and Assistant Dean for Educational Policy, Davidson College*)

Professor Joseph Wong (*Ralph and Roz Halbert Professor of Innovation at the Munk School of Global Affairs; Professor and Canada Research Chair, Political Science, University of Toronto*)

“Towards a New Normal in Taiwan’s Democracy?” was an event hosted by the Asian Institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs in the University of Toronto on February 3rd, 2016. The event featured an introduction by the Director General of the Taiwan Economic Trade Office, Catherine Y.M. Hsu, and a panel of three speakers, consisting of Professor Shelley Rigger of the department of East Asian politics at Davidson College, Professor Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang from the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, and Professor Joseph Wong from the Munk School of Global Affairs. The panelists discussed their reflections and observations on both the current state of Taiwanese politics and the future of Taiwan’s political and economic development, especially in relation to the recent 2016 General elections.

As a brief introduction, Hsu described the elections a “peaceful transfer of power” and noted the fact that over 40 countries congratulated Taiwan for their successful election signifies the robustness and stability of the island nation’s democratic system. Following this introductory message, Professor Wong provided an overview of the election by mentioning the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) dramatic victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the recent 2016 election. Giving a personal anecdote on the situation, Wong described his feelings of calmness and serenity in regards to the Taiwanese election, which to him signified Taiwan’s status as a normal democracy, something that he stated was the “greatest compliment” that could be lauded to the nation.

The first speaker of the panel, Professor Huang, commented primarily on the causes for the DPP’s victory. Analyzing the political aspects, Professor Huang described the leadership of Taiwan as having a strong background in drawing politicians from the Mainland Affairs Council. The new President-elect, Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) and incumbent President Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) both have served on the council, which demonstrates the influence of the council, especially in relations to cross-strait affairs. Professor Huang stated that this election is the first time in history that the DPP dominated Taiwanese politics, emphasizing the development of grassroots support for the DPP which allowed them to gain a significant majority over the typically larger KMT.

Professor Huang, in explaining the thought process of the grassroots voter base, described it in terms of three crucial areas: “dignity, security, and prosperity.” In the election, Professor Huang saw all three play favour for the DPP. Professor Huang described the Taiwanese people’s discontent with social, political, and economic insecurity, especially concerning new demands for better economic conditions and food safety. Professor Huang described the people’s concern regarding the increasing mainland Chinese influence in Taiwan as the most

important, being deemed as a threat to the “dignity” of the Taiwanese voters. Professor Huang summarized the DPP’s and President Tsai’s view of Cross-Strait relations in Tsai’s statement, “you can never wake up a person who is pretending to be sleeping”, which referred to her KMT predecessors ambivalence in maintaining Taiwan’s status quo. Professor Huang stated that China is simply “sleeping” in the occurrence of such Taiwanese activities that promote a sense of autonomy and independence, the real possibility for an ‘awakening’ gave President Tsai an advantage among votes, but also placed her and Taiwan in a difficult position for her coming presidency.

The second speaker of the panel, Professor Rigger, reflected primarily on the reasoning of the KMT’s failure in the 2016 election. Professor Rigger described the KMT as suffering from a split between the old conservative elite and the newer grassroots members of the party. From 1945 to 2000, the KMT maintained uncontested control over Taiwan. Professor Rigger attributed the KMT’s longstanding success to its economic appeal to all socio-economic classes and its deep electoral roots, where past regional elections that occurred before the democratization of the 1970s entrenched the KMT’s influence deep into the grassroots political community.

However, Professor Rigger also stated that the KMT’s success relied on cooperation between its political elite and the grassroots community that emerged in the post-1980s. With the resignation of its two key leaders, Lee Teng-Hui (李登輝) and James Soong (宋楚瑜), who both forged good relations with the grassroots electoral parts of the KMT, the cooperation began to falter between the grassroots and the political elite. Although this divide was negated by the loss of Presidency in 2005, which acted to unify the KMT, the re-emergence of the KMT President Ma-Ying Jeou in the following 2008 election allowed for the divide to reemerge. Divided along the continuous mainland-focused policies of the central elite, the KMT was split due to the grassroots members and Ma’s Cabinet not being consulted on such policy changes. As such divides within the KMT weakened the solidarity of the party, it was further compromised by the new moderate path adopted by the DPP. Emphasizing greater focus on domestic issues, the DPP’s new moderate focus allowed them to move in and secure the median of the electoral vote. Professor Rigger attributed this as a highly influential aspect in the outcome of the 2016 election.

The last speaker, Professor Wong, primarily reflected on the future of the Taiwanese political environment. Regarding the KMT loss in the recent election, Professor Wong described KMT’s need to change and reflect on the changing environment of Taiwan’s political sphere, citing the need to accept a dramatic loss as a key medium for change. Professor Wong described the KMT’s success in the 2008 election as one of the last chances for the KMT to

“learn from losing”, whereby a loss could have shocked and changed its conservative policies and tactics. Professor Wong attributed the current election as a decisive turning point for the KMT, where the political practices of the party finally materialized into a visible mismatch between the KMT and the changing Taiwanese political and economic environment. Describing Taiwan’s economy as mature and well developed, Professor Wong stated that the growth of the economy has increasingly slowed, creating more consumption-driven inequalities – both being symptoms of post-industrial mature economies. As the KMT failed to adequately adjust their expectations to meet such economic realities, it could not match President Tsai Ing-Wen’s and the DPP’s changing position towards a more moderate stance which was better accustomed to the realities facing Taiwan.

President Tsai’s new stance as a moderate is much queried by Professor Wong, who broadens this question into whether the newer moderate stance and new political themes in Taiwan represent a “new normal”. With the dramatic failure of the KMT, Professor Wong stated that China lost a valuable ally in Taiwan due to their embracement of greater cross-strait relations. However, Professor Wong stated that China’s attribution of President Tsai as moderate and separate from the past pro-independent DPP President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) still allows for a continuation of the working relationship between the two sides. Consequently, President Tsai’s election brings about a bigger question over whether the dynamic of Taiwanese politics has achieved a “new normal” achieving a new sense of de-facto independence.

Concisely providing a definite conclusion to the panel, Professor Wong is neither for nor against such a new definition of independence. Instead Professor Wong sees the recent election as a clear demonstration of the voters’ questioning of past proceedings in cross-strait relations and the fact that Taiwan is no longer an abnormal democracy. Rather, Professor Wong saw Taiwan as a “regular” democracy that has the capacity, as seen in the election, to stoke democratic politics that constitute the new political “normal” in Taiwan.



SOUTHEAST ASIA

Event Report “Is the Middle Class a Harbinger of Democracy? Evidence from Southeast Asia”

Arthur Lui is a 2nd year student studying Peace, Conflict, and Justice Studies, and Contemporary Asian Studies.

Stanley Chia is a 2nd year student studying International Relations and History.

Arthur and Stanley currently serve as event reporters and copy editors for Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Studies.

Is the Middle Class a Harbinger of Democracy? Evidence from Southeast Asia

October 23, 2015

Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Presented by

Professor Erik M. Kuhonta (*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University*)

Since decolonization began in the post-WWII period, democratization has become an increasingly important topic in Southeast Asia. While there has been steady progress towards democracy in the region, democratic norms are often still challenged by Southeast Asian societies. Throughout the democratic process, the middle classes in these societies have and continue to play a significant part throughout the democratic process. On October 23, 2015, Professor Erik M. Kuhonta (Department of Political Science, McGill University) attested to in his talk, “Is the Middle Class a Harbinger of Democracy? Evidence from Southeast Asia,” an event hosted by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies at the Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs.

Over the past two decades, we have seen Indonesia shedding Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s symbol of democracy, followed by limited political reform by the military junta. On the other hand, we have also seen social movements against democratic regimes in the People Power Revolutions in the Philippines in 2001, and an ongoing political crisis in Thailand. With such inconsistency, Professor Kuhonta states that the middle class in Southeast Asia is a critical factor in shaping any decisive political developments in the region.

Professor Kuhonta also pointed out the problems involved with applying modernization theory to Southeast Asia. Modernization theory states that there is a positive correlation between economic development and democratization, positioning the middle class as the vanguard group in pushing for political change. However, modernization theory fails to analyze middle class preferences, and ignores the fact that developing democracies in the region tends to violate liberal values. Most importantly, modernization theory cannot explain why the middle class can be both anti- and pro-democratic. Professor Kuhonta therefore chose to work with a different analytical framework, looking at the relationship between rebellion and state institutionalization instead.

Professor Kuhonta began by stating that countries with a higher degree of institutionalization (that is, a state that provides public goods, stability, rule of law, and social development) generally have a lower possibility of rebellion against the state. In turn, rebellions are more likely to occur in states weakened by corruption and patrimonialism, with a low degree of institutionalization. Professor Kuhonta supported this point by addressing several case studies in different Southeast Asian countries.

His first example was the 1973 Thai popular uprising, which saw the middle class rebelling against the undemocratic, nepotistic regime of Thanom-Praphat-Narong. He then discussed

accusations of corruption made against democratically-elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006, upon his failure to pay taxes on the sale of Shin Corporation to Singapore's Temasek Company. In Malaysia, the 1998 *reformasi* movement saw the middle class challenging Prime Minister Mahathir. Mahathir had been incapable of dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis, and had also concealed his government's corruption by jailing opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. Lastly, Professor Kuhonta discussed Singapore, which has the largest middle class population among all the Southeast Asian countries. Challenges or rebellions against the authorities in Singapore have been infrequent; Professor Kuhonta attributes this to strong economic growth, the cooptation of civil society, and strong infrastructure and services.

Evidently, members of the middle class are a significant factor in the Southeast Asian democratization process. Drawing on the relationship between revolts and state institutionalism that Professor Kuhonta proposed, further research could also determine the extent to which the middle class is a mobilizing factor in encouraging their governments to democratize. Professor Kuhonta also pointed to the irony, which can be found in these case studies: the middle class sought stability and development, but also contributed to instability and weak institutional structures. It is also worth noting that even authoritarian ruling parties in Thailand and Malaysia admit to embracing democracy, when incentivized to do so by state and non-state actors.

Ultimately, Professor Kuhonta drew the conclusion that the middle class in Southeast Asia did not behave in a universal or liberal manner, and that state institutionalization was a critical factor in explaining whether or not the middle class chose to rebel.



SOUTH ASIA

India's Intervention in East Pakistan: A Humanitarian Intervention or an Act of National Interest?

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Abstract

The question of why India declined to rationalize its entrance to the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 as a humanitarian intervention is puzzling. This is because the intervention put an end to the 1971 Bangladesh genocide that killed an estimate of 300,000 to 3,000,000 Bengalis. This paper argues that India intervened in the war to cease the influx of Bengali refugees from entering its own borders. And, more importantly, to expand and pursue its geopolitical interests in South Asia, which included (a) weakening and dismembering its rival state Pakistan, and (b) rising as a regional hegemon in the northeastern South Asia region.

Key words

Bangladesh Liberation War, Bengali Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention

India's intervention in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War has been noted as a humanitarian intervention for ending the 1971 Bengali genocide, yet India has never justified its intervention as such. Therefore, an assessment as to whether India had altruistic humanitarian or national interest-driven intentions is vital to comprehend what motivates states to commit their resources in wars reported of mass atrocity crimes. For an intervention to be classified as "humanitarian", the intervening state's sole objective must be putting an end to the human rights violations. By definition, the intervention must not be conducted out of national security woes or interests.¹ To help readers better understand this topic, the background of both the Bangladesh Liberation War and the Bengali genocide is needed. When British rule over the Indian subcontinent dissolved in 1947, the British Raj was split into two sovereign states: the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The latter was further divided into two exclaves. West Pakistan bordered the northwestern front of India, while East Pakistan bordered India's northeastern front. Due to this border arrangement, the two Pakistans were geographically separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory.² To avoid confusion, this paper refers to the population of West Pakistan as Pakistanis and that of East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh) as Bengalis. This disunity between the two Pakistans was accentuated by their stark linguistic and ethno-cultural differences. The Punjabis were the ethnic majority in West Pakistan, while the Bengalis were that of the East.³ Their differences were further compounded by the politically dominant West's discriminatory policies against the Bengalis. The Bengalis were denied their democratic rights to govern and participate in the decision-making processes of Pakistan, and were economically exploited for their labor and natural resources.⁴ These discriminatory policies collectively sparked a violent upsurge that eventually led to the fall of the then-military dictator, General Ayub Khan in 1969. What followed was a democratic election in 1970, where the Bengali-led Awami League Party (ALP) won, while the Punjabi-led Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) was elected as the opposition party.⁵ This was primarily due to the Bengalis having a population larger than that of the Punjabis, as a majority of the Bengalis and the Punjabis cast their votes for their own ethnic-affiliated parties. Due to this, neither party embodied any national character to garner the support of both the Bengali and Punjabi electorates. The PPP, who had not yet forfeited its seats in the Pakistani Parliament (*Majlis-e-Shoora*), took advantage of the polarizing election results to legitimize its refusal to give up its power. Although the refusal left the Bengali population frustrated and helpless, it fueled the Bengali nationalist and self-determination movement to gain considerable momentum. Because such populist movements risked a Bengali secession, the then-President, General Yahya Khan, opted for a military solution: The West Pakistani military launched a systematic campaign of indiscriminate slaughter of the Bengalis on 25 March 1971.⁶ This was the start of the Bengali genocide, which also simultaneously triggered the Bengali secessionist

movement or the Bangladesh Liberation War. The genocide is estimated to have killed between 300,000 to 3,000,000 Bengalis.⁷ A year after General Khan's order, on 3 December 1971, India entered the war and pushed Pakistan to defeat on the 16th of that month.

This paper argues that while the Indian government did express its concerns about the Bengali genocide of 1971, its intervention in the Bangladesh Liberation War was not justified on humanitarian grounds, but rather by its national interests. Under this premise, the end of the genocide was an unintended by-product of India's intervention to the war – not a cause. The first argument of this paper looks at the Bengali refugee crisis and the economic burden it placed on India. The following two arguments look at India's geopolitical interests of entering the war. The former illustrates that India took advantage of the war as a means to weaken Pakistan. The argument also examines the relevance India's diplomatic alliance with the USSR had on Pakistan's defeat. Aside from India's aim to weaken Pakistan, the latter demonstrates that India also had both geopolitical and economic interests in aiding the Bengalis in establishing their own sovereign state. By replacing a foe with a friendly, but weaker state as its neighbour, India would rise as a regional hegemon in the South Asian region. To prove this point, this argument looks at India's post-war behavior towards Bangladesh and other neighbouring states like Nepal and Bhutan. Collectively, India intervened in the war to pursue its national interests.

The influx of Bengali war refugees from East Pakistan placed a burden on India's economy – which was, at the time, dysfunctional and weak. Because of this, the then-Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, was prompted to intervene in the war to return the refugees back to their motherland. A day after the outbreak of the war and reports of the genocidal killings, Gandhi addressed her concerns to the Indian public. She fully acknowledged the crisis, and urged the Indian Parliament (*Bharatiya Sansad*) to readily grant refugee status to the Bengalis entering Indian borders.⁸ This was and had been India's standard procedure to previous refugee influxes from past regional conflicts. Historically, India had granted refuge to Tibetans in 1959 due to the Tibetan uprising and to the Nepalese in 1960 after King Mahendra of Nepal dissolved the country's democratic rule.⁹ However, the rapid rise of Bengali refugees in India forced Gandhi to think otherwise. By the end of May 1971, only two months after the war's outbreak, nine million refugees had taken shelter in the state of Tripura – a state that held a population of only 1.5 million. Near the war's end on 15 December 1971, the refugee count climbed to over ten million across Tripura and six other states that took in refugees – both in and outside of the 825 camps that were set up.¹⁰

India was not equipped to accommodate ten million refugees. At the same time, both Gandhi and the Parliament had fears over the refugees' permanent settlement in India. Such

an outcome would cripple and exhaust India's economic aid capacities, and its public infrastructure would be overburdened and fail. There were also worries of India's own Bengali population uniting with the refugees to spark a secessionist movement within India.¹¹ These scenarios were only feasible in the case of a Bengali defeat – a highly likely outcome since the Bengalis were contrastingly undertrained and ill-equipped to fight the stronger Pakistanis. The prospect of these unwanted events prompted Gandhi to publicly threaten Pakistan. On 24 May 1971, Gandhi expressed her intentions to stop the refugee influx into India, and to guarantee their trip back returning to East Pakistan.¹² Shortly after Gandhi's announcement, the Indian government permitted the establishment of a Bangladeshi government in exile in Calcutta, and started the recruitment and training of Bengalis to fight the Pakistanis.¹³ Months after back-and-forth provocation between India and Pakistan, Pakistan attacked India on 3 December 1971. This resulted in India's intervention in East Pakistan. On the 16th of that month, the Pakistanis declared their surrender to the Indian government.

Although Pakistan pre-emptively attacked India first, both countries exchanged multiple provocations with one another prior to the attack. This demonstrates that India, in its commitment to stop the refugee influx, continued to provoke Pakistan even at the risk of another Indo-Pakistani war. For that reason, India was not forced to intervene as to respond to and counter the Pakistani attack. Rather, it intended Pakistan to strike first as to more easily justify its entrance to the war. More critically, it should be emphasized that neither Gandhi nor the Parliament made any significant strives to stop the Bengali genocide: Gandhi did express her concerns, but none of it translated into action. It was only after the refugee crisis exacerbated that Gandhi publicly condemned and threatened Pakistan. Therefore, India's entrance into the war in December had no intention of ending the Bengali genocide. India's efforts to return the Bengalis to their motherland simply coincided with the aspirations of the Bengalis – to end the genocide and establish their own sovereign nation-state. As demonstrated, India intervened in the war as to prevent the permanent settlement of the Bengali refugees and the consequences such event could entail.

Although the Indian government sought to enter the war to resolve its refugee crisis, it did so also to weaken Pakistan. This was only possible due to a security pact India had made with the USSR a few months prior to the war's outbreak in December 1971. It should first be established that India and Pakistan had been rival states since the inception of their statehood. Since the Partition of India in 1947 and until 1971, India had fought two wars with Pakistan: the First Kashmir War in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. These wars were fought over the contested territories of Kashmir and Jammu. To India, Pakistan was a constant threat, and thus, the Bengali secessionist movement served as a golden

opportunity to dismember and weaken its rival state. To elaborate, a defeat meant a loss of unprecedented scale for Pakistan. Pakistan would first most notably be forced to surrender East Pakistan, which meant losing more than half of its population. This would cease all of Pakistan's labor exploitations of the Bengali population and access to East Pakistan's natural resources. More importantly, Pakistan would lose multiple strategic fronts. It would no longer have access to the Bay of Bengal. Because of this, Pakistan would (a) lose its ability to threaten India's eastern coastlines, (b) only be able to access the Indian Ocean via the Arabian Sea, and (c) lose a maritime trade route to Southeast Asia. Therefore, a successful Bengali secession meant that India would have a significantly weaker rival state and two less fronts to be worried about. Aside from the defeat rendering Pakistan weaker, India would also enjoy a reduced Chinese presence in South Asia. China was an ally of Pakistan, and one of the three actors that fought over Kashmir and Jammu. Because of this, a Pakistani defeat meant that China's access to fronts that border India would cease as well – which only meant a more secure India.¹⁴ For these reasons, India had multiple geopolitical interests in helping the Bengalis defeat the Pakistanis. This was a notion shared by Gandhi and the Parliament. Furthermore, their diplomatic alliance with the USSR before their intervention is indicative of their geopolitical interest in defeating the Pakistanis in the war.

It should first be highlighted that Pakistan historically had been an ally of the US and regularly received the US' diplomatic support and military aid since 1954 and had multiple alliances in the Arab world – as it was an Islamic Republic. This was not the case for India; it remained a non-aligned state in the Cold War and had no alliances with powerful countries. Because of this, if India did intervene, it ran the risk of fighting the US and Pakistan's Arab allies. These prospects rendered an Indian victory highly difficult. This prompted Gandhi to ally with the Soviets on August 1971 – five months into the war and four months before India's intervention. The Soviets promised a full military support in the case of a US or a Chinese intervention.¹⁵

This treaty proved extremely helpful for India, as only a few days after India's entry to the war, Pakistan was on the brink of defeat. As a result, the Pakistanis sought help from the US to draft an appeal to the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 1971. The draft pleaded for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops from East Pakistan. Because the Soviets held a permanent seat in the Council, the Soviets vetoed the resolution and shut it down.¹⁶ Out of fear of a Pakistani defeat and a Soviet expansion in South and Southeast Asia, the then-US President, Richard Nixon, dispatched a fleet of battleships led by a nuclear weapon armed aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal. The arrival of the US fleet on 11 December 1971 prompted the Soviets to dispatch their own fleet armed with nuclear weapons two days after.¹⁷ The Soviet presence

in the Bay prevented the US from taking any combat roles. India, as a result, was able to successfully defeat Pakistan on 16 December 1971 without interference from Pakistan's allies.

As demonstrated, India developed an alliance with the USSR as a means to counter the US-backed Pakistan, ultimately, to pursue its geopolitical interests of dismembering and weakening Pakistan. Had India not formed an alliance with the Soviets, its military campaign against Pakistan would have been put to a halt by either the United Nations or the US's military presence in the Bay of Bengal. This would have left Pakistan undefeated. More critically, while India's pact with the USSR did help end the Bengali genocide, India's intervention in East Pakistan cannot be considered a humanitarian intervention. By definition, the intervening state must have no ulterior interests in its intervention. However, as demonstrated, the strategic advantages India would gain from a Pakistani defeat were multiple and too clear to ignore. For the reasons explained above, it is clear that India intervened in East Pakistan out of its own national interests.

The previous argument addressed that India had multiple geopolitical interests in a Pakistani defeat in the Bangladesh Liberation War. However, India also had an interest in helping the Bengalis establish their own nation-state. This was because, instead of having a rival state in its northeastern front, India would have an ally – a weak ally that it could easily exploit. And clearly, post-war India's diplomatic behavior towards Bangladesh was characterized by political dominance and economic exploitation. Furthermore, India capitalized on the absence of a Pakistani presence in northeast South Asia to dominate weaker states like Bhutan and Nepal and rise as a regional hegemon in that region.

Shortly after the establishment of an independent Bangladesh, India set up a subservient government to exert influence over Bangladeshi politics. And, To increase Bangladesh's security dependency on India, the Indian government also actively funded the Shanti Bahini rebels of the Chittagong Hill to destabilize the new state. Furthermore, India's influence over Bangladesh also extended to the control of its economy. The Bangladeshi *taka* (currency of Bangladesh) was only to be printed in India, and the *taka* was devalued whenever it was favorable to India's economic climate.¹⁸ India's autonomy-violating behavior towards Bangladesh was similar to how India treated its other Neighbor states. Specifically, Bhutan and Nepal, along with Bangladesh, were forced by India to sign and agree to the terms of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace (1972). Under the terms of this 25-year security treaty, neither Bangladesh, Bhutan, nor Nepal were allowed to actively support or participate in any armed conflict – without India's permission to do so. These states were

also obligated to militarily respond if any of its treaty members were attacked. They were also barred from signing other treaties incompatible with the Treaty of Friendship.¹⁹

Critically, post-war India's behavior towards Bangladesh and its neighbour states indicates that India desired to rise as a hegemon in northeast South Asia. To sum, India had two visible geopolitical goals in the war: (a) dismembering and weakening Pakistan, and (b) rising as a hegemon in the region. Considering these two interests, India's entrance to the war should only be interpreted as a pursuit of national interest – not as a humanitarian intervention. The end of the Bengali genocide was an inevitable by-product of India's intervention and victory in the war.

In retrospect, India's intervention in East Pakistan had no humanitarian goals. India instead entered the Bangladesh Liberation War to stop the influx of refugees, and took advantage of the war to expand its geopolitical influence over the northeastern South Asian region. India's pre-intervention and post-war behavior clearly demonstrates that the state had no altruistic humanitarian goals of ending the Bengali genocide. Cases of interventions that produces humanitarian successes should always be subject to question to determine whether the intervening state had any ulterior motives.

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Event Report “Road to Recovery: China, India, and Pakistan’s Role in Afghanistan’s Post-NATO Era”

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Road To Recovery: China, India, and Pakistan’s Role in Afghanistan’s Post-NATO Era

March 11, 2016

Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Presented by

Professor David Dewitt (*Professor, Department of Political Science, York University*)

Professor Edward Schatz (*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto*)

Professor Aisha Aimad (*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto*)

Professor Kanta Murali (*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto*)

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force officially announced an end to its 13-year long military operations in Afghanistan in 2014. It is no wonder that NATO's influences are diminishing with the eventual takeover of Afghanistan's local security forces. As NATO gradually withdraws from the war-stricken nation, its powerful regional neighbours like China, India, and Pakistan have demonstrated interest in renewing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. On 11 March 2016, *Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies* hosted the event "Road to Recovery: China, India and Pakistan's Role in Afghanistan's Post-NATO Era," at the Munk School of Global Affairs. The four invited panelists: namely, Professor David Dewitt from the Department of Political Science at York University, Professor Edward Schatz, Professor Aisha Aimad and Professor Kanta Murali from the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto examined how the withdrawal of NATO and Western presence in Afghanistan would affect the three countries relationship with the Afghan nation – in terms of their regional security and economic interests.

NATO and the West's Engagement in Afghanistan Is Not Over Yet

Professor Dewitt started his presentation by remarking that NATO and the West are concerned about Afghanistan's political and economic transition once they depart the war-stricken nation.

Due to these actors' interests involved and the current political dynamics in South Asia, he believed that the West is still going to treat Afghanistan in the same way as they do in the Middle East by assisting the national authorities in providing effective security across the country. As such, Iran, a long-standing rival of the West is ascending in the region lately. This is a compelling factor that makes a complete withdrawal an impractical option for the West. Furthermore, Afghanistan, with its geographically strategic location, is still a valuable partner that both Russia and the U.S. are always seeking deeper diplomatic ties with. While the national authorities are currently still dealing with the persisting Sunni-Shia tensions and high unemployment rate of the youths, Professor Dewitt stated that there is no reason for the West to withdraw from Afghanistan when all these issues are still a long way from being settled. Professor Schatz, who has a research focus on statehood and identity politics of ex-Soviet Central Asia, then provided his insights that the U.S. and its partners would still need to play a major part in the post-NATO era of Afghanistan. This is because, throughout Afghanistan's modern history, the country has demonstrated its weakness in conflict management and dependency of the West's assistance.

China's Approaches in Afghanistan

Professor Dewitt also indicated that China has always been longing for an opportunity to cooperate with Afghanistan as long as its government is able to stabilize its regime after the withdrawal of NATO. This is because China has demonstrated no sign of changing the status quo of Afghanistan when it comes to its economic interests. Lying in the Eurasian heartland between China and Europe, China has perceived Afghanistan as a key strategic partner in expanding its trade routes to Europe, and more importantly, the Middle East, which has an abundant oil reservoir. Afghanistan would also play a big part in the One Belt and One Road initiative: a significant development strategy recently announced by the Chinese government, in which more than 65 countries would be involved. In fact, in the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit 2015 and the 4th Ministerial Conference of Istanbul Process, China has stated its will in assisting Afghanistan in its post-war reconstruction. Moreover, since it shares a border with the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China – which has been suffering from frequent terrorist attacks since the late 1950s, Afghanistan could act as China's ally in its domestic anti-terror operations.

Pakistan's Approaches in Afghanistan

Although China's overarching influence in Afghanistan is inevitable, Professor Schatz stated that its neighbor, Pakistan is also a major stakeholder. Pakistan's role in Afghanistan should not be neglected. In his presentation, he first discussed about the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines, which transports natural gas from Turkmenistan to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Afghanistan could collect millions in transit fees from the project, the high energy demands of Pakistan could also be met. As of now, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are already participating in the Central Asia and South Asia (CASA) 1000 project, an electricity transmission system that is scheduled to launch in 2017. The project will provide stable electricity supply to the two South Asian states.


However, while Afghanistan would benefit from becoming a self-sufficient state after the completion of the above explained projects, Professor Aimad pointed out that the Afghan-Pakistani relations can hardly be normalized if the two states are unable to reach a consensus on the peace negotiations with Taliban. As such, she first stated that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the intelligence agency of Pakistan, has always been covertly supporting the Taliban within its border. Nevertheless, despite the Afghani public's disapproval of the Pakistani state's relationship with the Taliban, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is aware that excluding Pakistan from the peace negotiation will only further

exacerbate the covert relations between Pakistan and the Taliban. In other words, Professor Aimad indicated that mistrusts and sentiments of betrayal due to ISI's relation with the Taliban could be an obstacle for Pakistan to renew its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.

India's Approaches in Afghanistan

While Pakistan is currently co-operating with China on the construction of Gwader Port, a deep-sea port located on the shores of the Arabian Sea as one of the major agendas of the One Belt One Road initiative, Professor Schatz stated that India simultaneously intends to maintain its competitiveness in the region by assisting the Iranian government in building the Chabahar Port, and the trade routes connecting the two states through Afghanistan. Moreover, he stated that India is known as one of the major allies to Afghanistan during its military operations against the Taliban. In the post-9/11 era, India supported the Northern Alliance in Tajikistan, and as the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan, India used to provide military assistance to the Afghani government in fighting against the Taliban. Professor Murali, the chair of the event, has also briefly provided her insights on this topic. She agreed with Professor Schatz's remark that India is working on maintaining a "check-and-balance" relationship with China and Pakistan by developing an alliance with Afghanistan and Iran, and she specified that the construction of the Chabahar Port trade routes would enable India to build a stronghold in Central and South Asia region.

Rising prospects for peace and stability have now put Afghanistan in the world's spotlight. And, despite the intense competition between China, India and Pakistan over Afghanistan's diplomatic ties and future, Afghanistan will undoubtedly benefit from such competition.



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