Doklam: Prelude to the Clash in South-Asia

A Chinese emblem and an Indian flag at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing | Source: South China Morning Post
A Chinese emblem and an Indian flag at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing | Source: South China Morning Post

India and China are the rising economic and military powerhouses of the century. Not only do they have the largest populations in the world, they are also nuclear powers possessing great destructive military might. The Doklam land issue between India, Bhutan and China where the borders of the three countries meet (the tri-junction) was one of the tensest moments in Indo-Chinese relations this century, and signifies the inevitable clash between the two countries as China expands itself economically and politically. This paper will attempt to outline the causes behind the Doklam encounter, owing to the rising clashes: military, political, and economic, between China and India. This paper will analyse Chinese-Indian relations within the region in hopes of providing coherent reasons behind the drawn out Doklam Standoff. This article will first provide a background of Indo-Chinese relations and the Doklam issue, before moving to analyze the issue and its possible causes. The article will conclude by showing that the Doklam issue and other incidences are parts of the bigger duel between China and India as each nation attempts to increase and maintain their spheres of influence within South-Asia.

India and China have had a history of military confrontations, directly and indirectly. The last time the two met in a state of war was close to 50 years ago in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 which lasted for a month. Similar to the issues causing the 1962 conflict, the two countries once again butted heads in Doklam over territory.[1]  However, many factors have also changed since that time; both countries possess an estimated one million soldier armies, and have significantly stronger air and naval strengths.[2] Most importantly, they have developed nuclear warheads (China in 1964, India in 1974). Apart from the 1962 conflict, there have also been two border clashes in the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish, and the Nathu La and Cho La clashes. Including the Doklam incident, most of these events have transpired on the eastern side of the Indo-Chinese border rather than the Aksai Chin region on the Western side of the border.[3]

The confrontation arose when China extended a road into what was considered by Bhutan and India to be Bhutanese territory. It is important to note that land disputes in the region, despite numerous attempts at dialogue, have yet to be fully resolved. On Bhutan’s insistence, Indian troops were mobilized to prevent further encroachment by the Chinese. The result was a standoff lasting close to three months. Through commendable policies on both sides which prevented firearms to be carried by soldiers near the border, bloodshed and further escalation was prevented. Land ownership in the region, as in most land disputes, varies on which government is considered legitimate. Although numerous treaties have been signed, due to the claims that the signatory governments were illegitimate at the time, most of these treaties are considered to be invalid by successor states. However, this viewpoint is not shared by all, as other signatories may still feel them to be relevant, resulting in deadlock in most dialogues.[4] As such, there is no consensus between the countries in many land ownership disputes. The Doklam issue was resolved in late August, 2017, with neither Bhutan nor China giving up its claim to the land.

Having provided the reader with sufficient background knowledge to the crisis and its actors, this article will now analyse the possible causes into why the actions which resulted in the standoff were taken. The most commonly cited reason for Chinese road building near the tri-junctions, apart from China’s claimed infrastructure improvement, is for military advantage. The road construction near the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and China, which started the encounter, lies near the Siliguri corridor (called “Chicken’s Neck), a narrow piece of Indian Territory between Bangladesh and Nepal that connect the rest of the country to its North-East regions. Many military experts claim that this move, as well as ones in the past, have been Chinese efforts to get as close to the corridor as possible, thereby allowing them to cut off the majority of Indian soldiers in India’s Eastern Command in event of war.[5] In turn, the Indian government’s response to Chinese action has been fueled by both its commitment to Bhutan as well as denying the opposition any advantage. It is to be noted that India similarly has made organized efforts, through its Militaries Border Roads Organization, to construct roads for Military purposes as far back as 2005.[6]

The military advantage perspective answers the reasons for road construction but only partially explains the elongated standoff. I will argue that the standoff was sustained partly by two political aims. It is important to note that even if the Doklam issue occurred by coincidental road construction by Chinese authorities without ulterior motive, the resulting standoff would still be sustained by Chinese and Indian authorities for close to three months. During this time neither country chose to back off. The situation in the region sees two powerful nations facing off against each other, reminiscent of the early Cold War, where political capital was an essential tool to determine one’s influence, strength and image in the world stage. Hence, the standoff can be interpreted as a clash between two countries eager to appear stronger than the other. Second, throughout the entire debacle, the Chinese efforts to negotiate with Bhutan directly and its calls for India to stop interfering may be another tactic to disenfranchise the Bhutanese people from their Southern neighbour and towards the North. According to the New York Times, this effort may be showing promise as many Bhutanese Citizens are reportedly growing weary of Indian intervention in Bhutanese affairs.[7]

Focusing on the aforementioned possibility which sustained the crisis, it is necessary that we analyse China’s policy with regards to South-Asia to provide an explanation as to why China and India are fighting for influence in the region. The short answer is the fact that given their geographical proximity, their spheres of influence are likely to clash, especially as they grow and compete for allies in the region in which gains for one power come at the cost of the other. China has already made overtures in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in addition to East Africa and has a great deal of influence in the region.[8] It has constructed numerous commercial ports in the region and is actively seeking to create operational military bases in the Indian Ocean region.[9] Furthermore, its extremely close partnership with Pakistan, India’s arch nemesis to the West, and its construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has granted China military access to Pakistani soil and the Gwadar Port, much to Indian opposition.[10] [11] China maintains that these efforts have been commercial efforts to assist the colossal One Belt and One Road Initiative launched to increase Chinese importance and access to Global Markets, and to their credit a majority of development commercial. However, these developments together have nonetheless left many Indian politicians fearful of the Chinese “String of Pearls,” Chinese ports and bases which many in India feel would “undermine India’s position in the region.”[12] Furthermore, it is important to note that even commercial opportunities hoped to be availed by China represent a threat to Indian economic might, any economic gains in the region are to come at the cost of Indian manufacturers.[13]

Given the evidence and circumstances, Indian opposition is certainly understandable. As China increases its prominence as a Global trading capital and seeks to expand itself further, it is likely that they will meet opposition from their Southern Neighbour who no doubt has similar designs of their own.

The Doklam standoff was resolved on 28 August 2017. However, since then, both countries have built up their armed forces across from each other’s borders and have voiced their readiness to face each other in combat.[14] The aforementioned possibilities, in varying degrees, contributed to the long drawn out conflict. The Doklam issue was an important one, but in my opinion, it was made important not for the land upon which the standoff was carried out, but the bigger picture dance of influence that it is a sign of. Even as I edit this piece another standoff is arising in the Arunchal Pradesh in the same North-Eastern region of India where the Doklam standoff took place over the familiar issue of road construction[15]. Concluding, a combination of military and political reasons resulted in the standoff at Doklam, however, those reasons are born from the rivalry between two rising great powers of the 21st Century, who seek to oust one another for more influence in their neighbourhood of South-Asia.


Endnotes

[1] Das Gupta, Amit, and Lorenz M Luthi. The Sino-Indian War Of 1962: New Perspectives. 1st ed., Routledge, 2016.

[2] International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military balance: 2012. Oxford University Press, 2012.

“East-West military gap rapidly shrinking: report.” Edited by Ralph Boulton, Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 Mar. 2011, www.reuters.com/article/us-world-military/east-west-military-gap-rapidly-shrinking-report-idUSTRE7273UB20110308.

[3] Taylor, Fravel M. . Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Dispute. Princeton University Press., 2008. 190-210.

[4] “China Says India Violates 1890 Agreement In Border Stand-Off.” Reuters, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india/china-says-india-violates-1890-agreement-in-border-stand-off-idUSKBN19O109.

Barry, Ellen et al. “How India And China Have Come To The Brink Over A Remote Mountain Pass.” Nytimes.Com, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html.

[5] Panda, Ankit. “What’s Driving The India-China Standoff At Doklam?.” The Diplomat, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/whats-driving-the-india-china-standoff-at-doklam/.

[6] “73 Roads Of Operational Significance Being Built Along China Border: Kiren Rijiju.” The Economic Times, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/73-roads-of-operational-significance-being-built-along-china-border-kiren-rijiju/articleshow/59647920.cms.

[7] Myers, Steven. “Squeezed By An India-China Standoff, Bhutan Holds Its Breath.” New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/world/asia/squeezed-by-an-india-china-standoff-bhutan-holds-its-breath.html.

[8] Samaranayake, Nilanthi. “Are Sri Lanka’s Relations With China Deepening? An Analysis Of Economic, Military, And Diplomatic Data.” Asian Security, vol 7, no. 2, 2011, pp. 119-146. Informa UK Limited.

Perlez, Jane. “China To Aid South Sudan, But Pipeline Efforts Stall.” Nytimes.Com, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/china-to-aid-south-sudan-but-pipeline-efforts-stall.html.

[9] “China’S Foreign Ports The New Masters And Commanders.” Economist, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/international/21579039-chinas-growing-empire-ports-abroad-mainly-about-trade-not-aggression-new-masters.

[10]  “PM Modi Told China, Pakistan Economic Corridor Unacceptable: Sushma Swaraj.” Zee News, 2017, http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/pm-modi-told-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-unacceptable-sushma-swaraj_1605173.html.

[11] Raza, Syed. “China Given Contract To Operate Gwadar Port.” DAWN, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/786992/china-given-contract-to-operate-gwadar-port.

[12] J. Pehrson, Christopher. “String Of Pearls: Meeting The Challenge Of China’s Rising Power Across The Asian Littoral.” Carlisle Paper In Security Strategy, 2006, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB721.pdf.

[13] Brewster, David. “Beyond The ‘String Of Pearls’: Is There Really A Sino-Indian Security Dilemma In The Indian Ocean?.” Journal Of The Indian Ocean Region, Vol 10, No. 2, 2014, 133-149. Informa UK Limited.

[14] “Army Totally Ready To Face Any Situation In Doklam: GOC-In-C Lt Gen Abhay Krishna.” The Indian Express, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/doklam-standoff-china-india-army-vijay-diwas-4985842/.

Huang, Kristin. “China Starts To Build Up Troops Near Doklam Flashpoint.” South China Morning Post, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2124375/china-building-troop-numbers-near-doklam-after-summer.

[15] Prasanta Mazumdar and Sujan Dutta. “After Doklam, India-China faceoff in Arunachal Pradesh.” The New Indian Express, 3 Jan. 2018, www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/jan/03/after-doklam-india-china-faceoff-in-arunachal-pradesh-1742996.html.


Bibliography

“Army Totally Ready To Face Any Situation In Doklam: GOC-In-C Lt Gen Abhay Krishna.” The Indian Express, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/doklam-standoff-china-india-army-vijay-diwas-4985842/.

Barry, Ellen et al. “How India And China Have Come To The Brink Over A Remote Mountain Pass.” Nytimes.Com, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html.

Brewster, David. “Beyond The ‘String Of Pearls’: Is There Really A Sino-Indian Security Dilemma In The Indian Ocean?.” Journal Of The Indian Ocean Region, Vol 10, No. 2, 2014, 133-149. Informa UK Limited.

“China’s Foreign Ports The New Masters And Commanders.” Economist, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/international/21579039-chinas-growing-empire-ports-abroad-mainly-about-trade-not-aggression-new-masters.

“China Says India Violates 1890 Agreement In Border Stand-Off.” Reuters, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india/china-says-india-violates-1890-agreement-in-border-stand-off-idUSKBN19O109.

Das Gupta, Amit, and Lorenz M Luthi. The Sino-Indian War Of 1962: New Perspectives. 1st ed., Routledge, 2016.

Huang, Kristin. “China Starts To Build Up Troops Near Doklam Flashpoint.” South China Morning Post, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2124375/china-building-troop-numbers-near-doklam-after-summer.

  1. Pehrson, Christopher. “String Of Pearls: Meeting The Challenge Of China’s Rising Power Across The Asian Littoral.” Carlisle Paper In Security Strategy, 2006, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB721.pdf.

Myers, Steven. “Squeezed By An India-China Standoff, Bhutan Holds Its Breath.” New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/world/asia/squeezed-by-an-india-china-standoff-bhutan-holds-its-breath.html.

Panda, Ankit. “What’s Driving The India-China Standoff At Doklam?.” The Diplomat, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/whats-driving-the-india-china-standoff-at-doklam/.

Perlez, Jane. “China To Aid South Sudan, But Pipeline Efforts Stall.” Nytimes.Com, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/china-to-aid-south-sudan-but-pipeline-efforts-stall.html.

“PM Modi Told China, Pakistan Economic Corridor Unacceptable: Sushma Swaraj.” Zee News, 2017, http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/pm-modi-told-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-unacceptable-sushma-swaraj_1605173.html.

Raza, Syed. “China Given Contract To Operate Gwadar Port.” DAWN, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/786992/china-given-contract-to-operate-gwadar-port.

Samaranayake, Nilanthi. “Are Sri Lanka’s Relations With China Deepening? An Analysis Of Economic, Military, And Diplomatic Data.” Asian Security, vol 7, no. 2, 2011, pp. 119-146. Informa UK Limited.

“73 Roads Of Operational Significance Being Built Along China Border: Kiren Rijiju.” The Economic Times, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/73-roads-of-operational-significance-being-built-along-china-border-kiren-rijiju/articleshow/59647920.cms.

Many statements from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Chinese equivalent were used.


Tallal Usman is a third-year student majoring in Economic, Political Science and Public Policy. He is currently serving as a Contributor for Synergy.

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